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
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
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THE INFLUENCE OF ANTHROPOLOGY ON
THE COURSE OF POLITICAL
SCIENCE

BY

JOHN LINTON MYRES

*Wykeham Professor of Ancient History in the
University of Oxford*

BERKELEY,
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THE INFLUENCE OF ANTHROPOLOGY ON THE COURSE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE*

JOHN L. MYRES

Anthropology is the Science of Man. Its full task is nothing less than this, to observe and record, to classify and interpret, all the activities of all the varieties of this species of living being. In the general scheme of knowledge, therefore, anthropology holds a double place, according to our own point of view. From one standpoint it falls into the position of a department of zoology, or geography; of zoology, since man, considered as a natural species, forms only one small part of the animal population of this planet; of geography, because his reason, considered simply as one of the forces which change the face of nature, has, as we shall see directly, a range which is almost worldwide. From another point of view anthropology itself, in the strictest sense of the word, is seen to embrace and include whole sciences such as psychology, sociology, and the rational study of art and literature; since each of these vast departments of knowledge is concerned solely with a single group of the manifold activities of man. In practice, however,

*This essay was originally written as a Presidential Address to the Anthropological Section of the British Association for the Advancement of Science on the occasion of its meeting at Winnipeg in 1909. The address was printed in the Proceedings of the Association at that meeting (London, John Murray, 1910). The investigation is resumed here with more extensive references, ampler quotations from the older writers, and the addition of two sections, on Comparative Philology, and on Polygenism. This re-writing has been the result of my residence in Berkeley as Sather Professor of Classical Literature at the University of California during the months of January to April, 1914.

a pardonable pride, no less than the weighty fact that man, alone among the animals, truly possesses reason, has kept the study of man a little aloof from the rest of zoology. Dogmatic scruples have intervened to prevent man from ever ranking merely as one of the "forces of nature," and have set a hard problem of delimitation between historians and geographers. And the pardonable modesty of a very young science—for modern anthropology is barely as old as chemistry—has restrained it from insisting on encyclopedic claims in face of reverend institutions like the sciences of the mind, of statecraft, and of taste.

Yet when I say that anthropology is a young science I mean no more than this, that in the unfolding of that full bloom of rational culture, which sprang from the seeds of the Renaissance, and of which we are the heirs and trustees, anthropology found its place in the sunlight later than most; and almost alone among the sciences can reckon any of its founders among the living. This was of course partly an accident of birth and circumstance; for in the House of Wisdom there are many mansions; a Virchow, a Bastian, or a Tylor might easily have strayed through the gate of knowledge into other fields of work; just as Locke and Montesquieu only narrowly missed the trail into anthropology.

But this late adolescence was also mainly the result of causes which we can now see clearly. Man is, most nearly of all living species, the "ubiquitous animal." Anthropology, like meteorology, and like geography itself, gathers its data from all longitudes, and almost all latitudes, on this earth. It was necessary therefore that the study of man should lag behind the rest of the sciences, as long as any large masses of mankind remained withdrawn from its view; and we have only to remember that Australia and Africa were not even crossed at all—much less explored—by white men, till within living memory, to realize what this limitation means. In addition to this, modern Western civilisation, when it did at last come into contact with aboriginal peoples in new continents, too often came, like the religion which it professed, bringing "not peace but a sword." The customs

and institutions of alien people have been viewed too often, even by reasonable and good men, simply as "ye beastlie devices of ye heathen," and the pioneers of our culture, perversely mindful only of the narrower creed, that "he that is not with us is against us," have set out to civilise savages by wrecking the civilisation which they had.

I need not labour the point that it is precisely these two causes, ignorance of many remoter peoples, and reckless destruction or disfigurement of some that are near at hand, which are still the two great obstacles to the progress of our science. But it is no use crying over spilt milk, and I turn rather to the positive and cheering thought that the progress of anthropology has been rapid and sure, in close proportion to the spread of European intercourse with the natives of distant lands; and that its further advance is essentially linked with similar enterprises.

Anthropology and Politics in Ancient Greece

Instances of what I mean are scattered over the whole history of anthropology. Philosophy, as we all know, begins in wonder; it is the surest way to jostle people out of an intellectual groove into new lines of thought, if they can be confronted personally and directly with some object of that numerous class which seems uncouth only because it is unfamiliar. The sudden expansion of the geographical horizon of the early Greeks, in the seventh and sixth centuries, B. C., brought these earliest and keenest of anthropologists face to face with peoples who lived, for example, in a rainless country, or in trees, or who ate monkeys, or grandfathers, or called themselves by their mothers' names, or did other disconcerting things; and this set them thinking, and comparing, and collecting more and more data, from trader and traveller, for an answer to perennial problems, alike of their anthropology and of ours. Can climate alter character or change physique, and if so, how? Does the mode of life or the diet of a people affect that people's real self, or its value for us? Is the father, as the Greeks believed, or

the mother who bore them, the natural owner and guardian of children? Is the Heracles whom they worship in Thasos the same god as he whose temple is in Tyre? Because the Colchians wear linen, and practise circumcision, are they to be regarded as colonists of the Egyptians? or can similar customs spring up independently on the Nile and on the Phasis? Here, in fact, are all the great problems of modern anthropology, flung out for good and all, as soon as ever human reflective reason found itself face to face with the facts of other human societies, even within so limited a region as the old Mediterranean world.

And I would have you note that these old Greek problems, like all the supreme problems of science old and new, were not theoretical problems merely. Each of them stood in direct relation to life. To take only cases such as I quoted just now from the Father of History—is there, for example, among all the various regions and aspects of the world, any real earthly paradise, any delectable country, where without let or hindrance the good man may lead the good life? Is there an ideal diet, an ideal social structure, or in general, an ideal way of life for men; or are all the good things of this world wholly relative to the persons, the places, and the seasons where they occur? I do not mean that the ancient Greeks ever found out any of these things, for all their searching; or even that all ancient seekers after marvels and travellers' tales were engaged consciously in anthropological research at all. I mean only this: that the experiences, and the problems, and the practical *end* of it all, were as certainly present to the minds of men like Herodotus and Hippocrates, as they have been in all great scientific work that the world had seen.¹

In the same way it has for some while been clear to me that neither Plato nor Aristotle, the great outstanding figures of fourth-century Greece, was constructing theories of human nature entirely in the air. Their conceptions both of the ideal

¹ I have dealt more fully with this aspect of fifth-century Greece in a paper contributed to *Anthropology and the Classics*, Oxford, 1908.

state of society, and of the elements which were fundamental and essential in actual societies as they knew them, were determined to a very large extent by their observation of real men in Sparta, Persia, or Scythia. But it is also clear that much that had been familiar to the historians of the fifth century, and particularly to Herodotus, had fallen out of vogue with the philosophers of the fourth. Systematic clearness had been attained only by the sacrifice of historic accuracy. Thucydides, in fact, standing right in the parting of the ways between history and rhetoric, might fairly have extended his warnings to a dissociation of history from political philosophy, which was just as imminent.

The "Middle Ages" of Social Despair

From the modern evolutionary standpoint, as in the teleology of Aristotle, the notion that the *original* state of anything has any necessary connection with the perfect or *ideal* state of it, is barely intelligible. Each of these philosophies, like the earlier philosophy of Solon, "looks to the end," and interprets the past and the present in the light of the future and in strict relation to it. But this return to what in practical life would be optimism, is of quite recent growth, and closely related to the revival of Greek ways of thinking which characterizes our time. Almost until living memory, doctrines of a perfect past, and of human history as a series of lapses from past perfection remained dominant no less in what passed for anthropology than in history, theology, and thought at large. Sometimes it was the Golden Age of the Greeks of Hesiod's time, a time of blood and iron, of the wreckage of the older order, and chaotic gestation of a new; when belief (and practice too) was tinged, now with sunset memories of "Golden Mycenae," now with the twilight hope of a *magnus annus*—first fruit of astronomy newborn—which should at length turn full circle and repeat the perfection—and the decadence. Sometimes it was the deciduous "Paradise" of the Semites, once gone and gone forever, with no hope left at all in Babylonia, but that of

a final end to the existing cycle of things; or at best, where Egyptian ideas penetrated, of a day of final reckoning, when Osiris—or another—should come. But whether Greek of the Iron Age, or Semitic in origin, the belief was belief in a decadence. It involved a conception of history as a progress away from the ideal, in the direction of *παρεβάσεις*, perverted or distorted states, forming a series of progressive degeneration. Plato, whose experience inculcated pessimism, even while the eye of faith saw optimism, accepted from current literature, and from tales of Egypt, Hesiodic decadence and the notion of circularity; and even Aristotle, in politics, never freed himself from a popular impression at variance with his philosophic scheme.

From quite another side of Semitic thought, not unaffected by those Egyptian ideas of a restitution of all things “when Osiris shall come,” arises the Christian idea of what we may call the “post-social state,” when there shall be “neither marrying nor giving in marriage” but a dissolution of all bonds of civil society as we know it; a state of things which is to be, on the one hand, a complete realization of all that the natural order (conceived still as a decadence) prohibited the individual from attaining, and, on the other, almost the annihilation of individuality by incorporation in the Being of God. The latter solution, of course, is neither Greek, nor Semitic, nor Egyptian, but comes in from the tropical East, and mainly after Alexander’s time, though Plato had glimpses of it. And this idea of an evolution *into* a state of Nature which is future, whether conceived as proceeding *ad infinitum*, or as attaining a private consummation, has had profound influence from time to time, both on the growth of political theory, and in the practical administration of states. And besides this kinetic optimism, the static optimism of Greek politicians, and of Aristotle, when he is most nearly reflecting *τά λεγόμενα*—the Greek “man in the street”—faded almost out of existence, except among the barns of the Rich Fool, and in latterday Homes of Lost Causes.

Anthropology and the Renaissance

At the Revival of Learning it was the same as in the great days of Greece. New vistas of the world were being opened up by the voyagers; new types of men, of modes of life, of societies and states, were discovered and described; new comparisons were forced upon men by new knowledge crowding thick into their minds; and new questions, which were nevertheless old as the hills, made eddies and rapids in the swift current of thought, and cried out for an answer. Take the central political problems for example: What constitutes the right to govern, and what is the origin of law? In medieval Europe this was simple enough. The duke, or the king, or the bishop governed by authority of the emperor, or the pope; and pope and emperor ruled (like Edward VII) "by the Grace of God." Yet here, in Guinea, in Monomotapa, in Cathay, and in Peru, were great absolute monarchies which knew nothing of the pope or the emperor and were mighty hazy about God. Yet their subjects obeyed them, and gave good reasons for their obedience, and chiefest of their reasons (as in all times and places) was this: "We should be much worse off if we didn't."

Unsocial Man and the Pre-Social State

It would take me very far afield if I were to try to show how this universal answer came to change its ground from politics to anthropology, so that to the question—how men knew that they would be much worse off if they didn't—the answer came, that once upon a time they *had been* much worse off, *because* they didn't. } For my present purpose it is enough to note that, in all ages, philosophers who set out to define the *nature* of the State, have become involved in speculations about its *origin*; that historians in their researches into its origin, have been forced into conclusions as to its nature; and that in both cases every belief about the nature of the State has been found to involve a belief about a state of nature; an answer of some kind, that is, to the question whether man was originally and

naturally a social animal, or whether at some early period of his history he became social and domestic. In the latter event, how was domestication effected, and what sort of thing was undomesticated man? In the ancient world, after long controversy, Aristotle's definition of man as the "social animal" had carried the day, and ruled that question out of court. But at the Revival of Learning, the unnatural behaviour of certain actual societies towards their individual members had revived irresistibly the whole question whether society was part of the natural order at all, and not a device of the heathen, a mistake or a *pis aller*; and whether, if society was not thus "natural," men would not really be better off if they returned to their natural, pre-social, *unsocial* state, and began again at the beginning, to work out their own salvation. This belief in a pre-social state played a large part in the political philosophy of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; and conversely it was the very fact that the pre-social state as a philosophical conception fell out of vogue at the beginning of the nineteenth, which has distinguished modern political philosophy so markedly from its predecessors.

I have made it clear, I hope, that our problem of the history of the doctrine of a State of Nature and of its influence on political thought is independent altogether of the question how such a doctrine first came into existence. All that it can concern us to presuppose is that there descended from the ancient world to the modern a continuous popular tradition and fixed idea, *first*, that there had "once upon a time" been a stage of man's development in which all the conventions and restrictions of actual society, as well as all its benefits, were uninvented yet, and human animals—to put the whole matter in a nutshell—expatriated on this planet undomesticated; *secondly*, that in spite of social habits long acquired, it was still possible to isolate, by philosophical analysis of society itself and of the human mind, those traits, or some of them, which had characterized undomesticated man in those ancient days; *thirdly*, that it was conceivable—such are the audacities of faith—that some

of the *mirabilia* which ancient writers had preserved, from Herodotus onward, about the inhabitants of the Extremities, might turn out to have been survivals of pre-social man into an age when most men had become wholly social; and *fourthly*, that, if so, there was still an off-chance that further research might even now reveal examples of pre-social, or at least, actually non-social man, under circumstances which might permit him to be studied. But I have sufficiently indicated already, that the revival of political speculation which accompanied the Revival of Learning, however closely it may have been linked with the practical necessities of European politics, went also hand in hand with a revolt against an older psychology, and with a great new movement of world-study both for economic and for scientific ends.

It can easily happen that it matters less *what* men think, than *why* they think it. The precise form and content of their thoughts depend usually on temporary and local conditions, and may change promptly in response to changes in these; and it is the point of view from which they approach a new problem, the predispositions which they bring, the training which they have won from previous experience, which make the outcome of their thinking so incalculable beforehand; so simple, however, and so instructive, when we come to comment on it afterwards, in the light of history. This wider survey, to which the historian aspires, permits explanation of things thought. What neither historian nor psychologist can hope to do is to explain the thinker of them, the hero or the genius. That remains presupposed, a *primum mobile*, with effects, but no causes within human view: and the biographer's business is twofold, to follow forward these effects of the great man's interference in affairs, and to follow backward (what does lie within the field of history) the antecedents of those other factors of society and culture, among which at that precise moment in history the new force intervened; the instruments, human and other, with which he strives to realize what he has it in his mind to imagine. The completed work of art, however, is not often quite what

the artist set out to create. And this is just as true in the history of thought as in the history of action which it is so fatally easy to dissociate from it.

Now it is impossible to compare the successive presentations of the pre-social state, without being struck by the widely different content of them. But how was it that the conception of a pre-social state of man, whether conceived as a period of pre-historic development or as the result of a psychological analysis of mankind in society, assumed in different writers such widely different forms, and led—as was only natural—to such widely different proposals for the remedy of actual grievances? Why should Hobbes, for example, describe the life of the natural man as little better than a hell upon earth, “no arts, no letters, no society; and (which is worst of all) continuall feare, and danger of violent death; and the life of man solitary, poore, nasty, brutish and short”; “no property, no dominion, no Mine and Thine distinct, but only that to be every man’s, that he can get; and for so long as he can keep it.” How comes it that Locke, whatever else he may deny his natural man, at all events reserves to every man, even in his first *Treatise on Government*, property in his own person, and (as a corollary to this) property in the products of his labour, while in his second *Treatise* he contemplates also a natural property in agricultural land? How comes it, again, that Montesquieu bases the whole fabric of civilisation upon the timidity of pre-social man; while for Rousseau it is the utter fearlessness of the savage which most distinguishes him from the craven members of societies? Flat contradictions of this sort, between thinkers who were almost contemporaries, and who agree so closely in the form and system of their reasoning, clearly result not so much from any defect of method as from some discrepancy in the data which the method was employed to explain. The question, therefore, begins to assume another shape: Whence did those political philosophers, whose theories involved a state of nature, get their respective data as to the character of natural man?

It is common knowledge, of course, as I have hinted already, that each thinker's own view of the nature of society went far to determine his imagination of its origin; and that his view of its nature was itself suggested by the political stresses of his own time. Hobbes, for example, writing in the middle of the Great Rebellion, was searching for a sovereign whose mandate should be beyond dispute;² Locke, standing in even closer relation to the Revolution of 1688, was explicitly replying to the advocates of a divine right of kings, and insisting that the contract is revocable; Rousseau, confronted with iniquities which resulted from an antiquated distribution of privilege, is all for equality and fraternity as the necessary guarantees of liberty.

But it is possible also to put the sequence in the reverse order, and to make the inquiry, how far each thinker's conclusions as to practical politics resulted from his view of the nature of the State; how far his view of its nature is deducible from his beliefs as to its origin; and how far his beliefs as to the origin of society were themselves rendered almost inevitable for him, by the state of contemporary knowledge of the more primitive specimens of mankind and of the State itself.

The "Geographic Control" of the Renaissance

That such a line of reasoning was not foreign to the political thinkers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries is clear from a variety of considerations. In the first place, the whole movement in political philosophy, which is in question, stands, like the political events with which its turning points are so closely connected in point of time and personality, in the closest relation with a larger contemporary movement of scientific inquiry, of which the inquiry into the antecedents of society and of man is only one special, departmental, and relatively late

² Hobbes, *Leviathan* (ed. A. R. Waller. Cambridge, 1907), p. 528: "And thus I have brought to an end my discourse of Civill and Ecclesiasticall Government, occasioned by the disorders of the present time. . ."

application. And in the larger sphere, also, a general advance of physiographic theory had gone hand in hand with active physiographic discovery. Bacon's enlargement of current ideas of scientific method stands, as we all know, in the closest historical connection with the discovery of a new world by Columbus, and with the new prospects of exploration within the old world which were opened by Vasco da Gama. It would therefore be natural to expect that Hobbes, for example, should reflect in his *Leviathan* the current conceptions of what *pre-social* man would be like, as inferred from the behaviour and circumstances of *unsocial* man as reported by contemporary voyagers.

Two great events of this time, in particular, set the study of mankind, no less than all the physical sciences, on a new pinnacle of outlook, and challenged all the theories of the Greeks and Arabians which had done duty at second-hand to explain the universe, since the great days of Alexandria. First, the discovery of the Cape route to the East threw open to European observation vast tracts of country and an immense number of societies of men whose fame indeed had come down through Pliny and Ptolemy, but whom no one but a few traders and missionaries had visited in person, since the Arab and the Turk tore East and West asunder and began to keep them so. Then, within the same generation, the discovery of America opened up, literally, a New World, wherein (among many marvels) one of the things which impressed its explorers most vividly and constantly was the presence of varieties of men whose mere existence shook Adamite theories of mankind to their foundation; who utterly failed to conform to the traditional requirements of the Flood, and professed inveterate ignorance on that subject; and whose manners and customs—when indeed they seemed to have any—betrayed a culture, or a lack of culture, totally unlike anything which the Old World yielded, even taking into account the barbarous *Terra Nigritarum* which lay between the Canaries and India.

Thus almost at one gift three new sets of human documents were presented to the philosophers of Europe: (1) first-hand

knowledge of the famous empires and kingdoms of the civilised East, of India, China, and the parts of "India beyond the Ganges," as the saying was, beyond the desert belt of Asia; (2) fresh access to the black men, south of the desert belt of Africa; (3) the discovery, beyond the no less desert ocean, of new and Western "Indies," peopled by wholly un-Indian tribes, whose aspect was Tartar rather than Indian or Malay, and whose behaviour seemed all the more inexplicable because it differed totally from what was expected so surely by the geographers.

Bodin, 1577

It was long before this mass of new material could be compared and applied by the philosophers at home; but it was collected and recorded with avidity, and the insatiable demand for books of travel spread it broadcast, and made it sink deep into popular imagination. Still, with all his learning, even Bodin, writing in 1577, *Of the Lawes and Customes of a Common Wealth*,³ hardly shows by an allusion that he appreciates the new age that has dawned. There is a wonderful chapter, indeed, at the beginning of his fifth book, which is thus entitled: "What order and course is to be taken to apply the form of a Common Wealth to the diversitie of men's humors, and the meanes how to discover the nature and disposition of a people." Its contents show clearly what contribution he hoped to make to the art of statecraft, and also what was to be his method of research, to extract the truth from the mass of conflicting instances. It contains the whole pith and kernel of modern anthropo-geography, and completely anticipates the ethnological work of Montesquieu; but the data upon which it is based are with a single exception such as would have been available before the fall of Constantinople. His climatic contrasts are

³ I quote from the English edition of 1605, "out of the French and Latin copies done into English by Richard Knowlles, Author of the Turkish History."

based on the Ptolemaic geography; he betrays no knowledge of a habitable south temperate zone, and argues as if the world broke off short at the Sahara. It is only by a curious after-thought, which superposes on his classification of environments from arctic North to tropic South, a cross-division by grades of culture from civil East to barbaric West, that he betrays any hint that his cosmography has been disturbed by the new age of exploration. "The Spaniards have observed," he says, "that the people of Sina (China), the which are farthest Eastward, are the most ingenious and courteous people in the world; and those of Brezill, which are farre Westward, the most cruell and barbarous;"⁴ so that East goes with South, and West with North, and Bodin's cultural equator begins to lie askew between them; and we should note that the crucial instance here supplied by "those of Brezill" is his single glimpse of Columbian man.

He has indeed, full grip of the doctrine of a pre-social state, and of the application of inductive proof to support it; but his instances are exclusively derived from classical authors.

He that would see, he says,⁵ what force education, lawes, and customes have to change nature, let him look into the people of Germanie, who in the time of Tacitus the Proconsul had neither lawes, religion, knowledge, nor any forme of a Commonweale; whereas now they seeme to exceed other nations in goodlie cities and well peopled; in arms, varieties of arts, and civil discipline.

A curious exception goes far to establish this rule. The only instance which I can recall, in which Bodin refers to an event in Negro-land, is where he illustrates the revolt of the Mom-bottu Negroes against the Moors in 1526 (p. 555); but this was an event, the news of which certainly reached Europe by way of the Morocco ports, not by way of the southern route, or westward down the Gambia; it was also one which made a great sensation in Europe, and was still a commonplace of cosmo-

⁴ *Loc. cit.*, English ed., 1605, p. 562.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 565.

graphers and moralists a generation later. In illustration of this I quote as follows from Peter Heylin's *Microcosmus*:⁶

The last Moroccan governor, Soul Halin, was slaine by Ischia, Anno 1526, and the negroes againe recovered their long lost liberty: instituting divers kings, and among others, Ischia was worthily made king of Tombutum. After this advancement, he quickly united many of the weaker kingdoms to his owne, which at this day is the greatest of the foure in whose hands kingly authority remaineth.

This actual example of a "Leviathan" in process of construction was thus in text-book use in 1577, a generation before the time of Hobbes.

Shakespeare's Caliban

The trend of popular opinion at the end of the sixteenth century, as to the characteristics of the state of nature, could hardly be better illustrated than by the Shakespearean conception of Caliban, "solitary, nasty, and brutish;" barely human, in fact, but for his vices; living "like a bear" (as Montesquieu so often puts it), grubbing roots, and plundering bees' nests; a prey to panic, haunted by the spirit of the power of the air, and instinctively appeasing him, as savages do, by abstinence, abasement, and offerings. Mr. Hartland has only lately called attention again to the truth of detail with which Caliban is portrayed, and Mr. Sidney Lee has gone at some length into the question of his probable originals. No doubt there is in Caliban a touch of the gorilla, pure and simple; and a touch of the gorilla's own brother, the "Salvage Man" of heraldry and medieval legend; Linnaeus and Blumenbach, in fact, quote several examples of such "wild men of the woods" who had been captured in various parts of Europe, and described in books before Shakespeare's time. But apart from his make-up—which, in the Globe Theatre (as at Her Majesty's), was mainly to tickle the gallery—Caliban is certainly neither ape nor idiot. He has his own code of conduct (when he can bring himself

⁶ I quote the Oxford edition of 1636, p. 722.

to conform to it); he knows when he has done wrong; and in his treatment of his invaders, of his small belongings, and in particular of his island property, he corresponds too closely with the current sixteenth century descriptions of the feckless, passionate "child of nature" to be set down as anything else but an experiment in the portrayal of natural man. And if we once view Caliban from this standpoint, it becomes almost incredible that he should have preceded Hobbes' sketch of the state of nature by nearly half a century, unless Hobbes' portrait itself was based upon a type already widely current, and generally accepted in popular belief.

Edward Grimstone, 1615

I come now to a work of which I would gladly have further information. It is entitled *The Estates, Empires, and Principalities of the World*; it was published in London in 1615, and it is described as having been "translated out of the French by Edward Grimstone," doubtless the translator of Joseph Acosta (1604) and Jean Francois Le Petit (1608).⁷ I introduce this work here for three reasons. It contains a fuller application of what I shall best summarise as Baconian methods to political science, than is easily to be found elsewhere. It shows very clearly that by this time the new discoveries were already being applied systematically to philosophical ends. And it illustrates a remarkable series of coincidences of discovery which in less than a generation were to have a profound effect on European thought.

⁷ The *Dictionary of National Biography* knows nothing of this Edward Grimstone. I have also no clue as yet to the French original, and am inclined to suspect that "translated out of the French" is an euphemism for anonymity. So, like his translator, "I will leave him to your judicious censures, and to the mercie of the Booke-seller, who it may be, will commend him in the sale, if he be not interested in some other booke of the like nature." This is mock modesty; I know no "other booke of the like nature" between Bodin and Hobbes, and as Grimstone's volume is rare, I have not stinted my extracts.

The treatise consists of a collection of studies of human societies—*συνηγμένα πολιτεία*, as Aristotle used to call them—which professes to be complete. Its title-page, engraved by Ren. Elstracke, is of a cosmographic type which descends, for example, into the title-page of Heylin's *Microcosmus* a generation later; but which is seen here in its pristine glory. Four female figures, emblematic of Europe, Asia, Africa, and America, advance to do homage to James I, who sits enthroned, as he sits on Bodley's Tower in Oxford; and below are four posed warriors, in the weapons of their countries. America is represented by an obvious Aztec warrior in a peaked cap and coat of mail; but of the four women, America alone is nude: even Africa is partially draped in a mantle. The distinction is significant, for though Europe, Asia, and Africa all contribute to the contents of the book, America provides no example of a constitution at all: if it had any human inhabitants, they were, for Edward Grimstone, in a pre-social state.

A few examples will illustrate sufficiently Grimstone's style and method, his attitude towards the new and the older learning, and his obvious debt to Bodin and to contemporary geographers. His preface censures alike the mere complacent patriots

borne so farre in love with themselves as they esteeme nothing else and think that whatsoever fortune hath set without the compasse of their power and government, should also be banished from their knowledge; [and the mere politicians] a little more careful, who finding themselves ingaged by their birth, or abroad, to some one place, strive to understand how matters pass there, and remain so tied to the consideration of their owne Commonweale as they affect nothing else, carrying themselves as parties of that imperfect bodie, whereas in their curiositie they should behave themselves as members of the world. [In such he detects] a childish and simple curiositie; for what know they, if the commonweale, which containes them, be a cage of fooles, and whether they have need to borrow something of strangers, to better the Estate thereof, or else to settle themselves there? And how can they judge if affaires in their owne Estate be well ordered, if they doe not confront them with their neighbours or

with some more remote, to the end that they may repaire the defects, or better the beginnings.

“And there are others,” he goes on—and here his lash falls on the rigidly classical humanists of his own day—

which lie grovelling in the dust of their studies, searching out with the sciences the actions and manners of the Ancient, not respecting the Moderne, and they seeme so to admire the dead, as they have no care for the living. Of these three sorts of men, leaving the first to their pasture, with Lyons and Beares; and passing over the second, as incapable to see any farther, I wonder at the blindness of the last, who being endowed with excellent spirits, and exceeding curious, fill themselves with frivolous things, contemning the learning of that which imports them most, and as a man may say, know nothing in knowing all things.

What these classicists lack, in a word, is the “Science or knowledge of the World,” a good part of which knowledge “is comprehended in the discourse of this book.” And so

although my chief desseigne was to deal onely with politicke and civile matters, yet to the end they might find all together, and not be forced to seeke for the description of countries whose custome I represent, I have made the corographie,

which in the next generation Peter Heylin defines as the “exact description of some Kingdom, Countrie, or particular Province of the same.” But after describing thus “all that the countrie yeields and the beasts that naturally live there and have their breeding,” he adds

yet all this were little, to spend much time in the curious search of things the which are void of sence or reason, if I should not show you the man which dwells in evere countrie, and for whom all those things seem to have been made, first in his ancient posture, and with his old customes, either altogether or for the most part abolished, then in his modern habit, either with more civillite or with more rudenesse, according to the changes and revolutions of the world—for apparently men may become either better or worse to the end that every man may judge which is the better of the two Estates, and make use of part of the one and part of the other, having carefully ballanced the most considerable particularities of both.

He then explains that he must take account of their economics,⁸ their means of self-defense,⁹ and

the principale peece of commonweales the which is Religion, whereof I have discoursed, to show that it is the feare of some divinitie which maintaines people in their duties, makes them obedient to their princes, and divertes them much more from all bad desseignes than armes and souldiers which environ and threaten them. I do it also to show that whereas religion wants, of what sort soever it be, policie and order faile in like manner, and barbarisme, confusion, and rebellion, reign there in a manner continually, whereas they that seise on them should presently settle in their rude minds the apprehension of some power over all to dispose of things at pleasure.

Here there is certainly a remarkable anticipation of a well-known passage of the *Leviathan*; only the point of view is different, and the cynicism of Hobbes is well away.

Grimstone was well aware that he stood at the opening of a new period of discovery.

I protest with trueth that if I have given any ranke or commendation to this worke, I will give much more to those that shall labour to make it perfect, and that any man may adde something dayly unto it, for that from time to time they have more certaine advice from all parts, especially from those countries which have not been much frequented, either by reason of the distance, or for their barbarousnesse.

For his own part, however, he had clearly done his best with the materials which he had. The "Order of all the Estates

⁸ "It importing little to know the actions of nations, if they had not meanes to judge by the commodities which the place doth yield . . . and if withall they did not understand the meanes which these people have to live in the Estate wherein they are borne; I have unto their manners joined their wealth and riches, which show by their abundance, how men which enjoy them have abandoned themselves to delights or else given themselves unto Sciences, and by the want thereof, in what manner some have continued rude and barbarous, and others have applied themselves to arts and trades, to the end they might repaire the defect of nature by the perfection of their industrie and labore."

⁹ "Moreover, knowing well that althoughe a countrie be furnished with commodities which suffice or abound, yet the inhabitants are subject to be dislodged, if they be not able to repell them which shall undertake to wrest that violently from them which they hold, for this cause I have presently, after the discourse of their wealth, added that of their forces . . . to end they may judge if the Estate whereof I discourse may be easily overthrowne and changed."

contained within this booke" includes (besides all European states)

the kingdomes of Tartary, China, Japan, Pegu, the Great Mogul, Callcut, Narsinge, and Persia; the Turkes Estate in Europe, Africke and Asia (including the ancient kingdomes of Egypt, Judaea, Arabia, &c.), the empire of Presbiter John, the Estate of the King of Monomotapa, the realme of Congo, and the Empire of Morocco

and consequently was very fairly abreast of the travels and compilations of the day. His frank confession, therefore, that he knows only this, and wishes to know more, coupled with his total neglect of America, suggests that there may be real significance in the nude American on his title page; and that America was not regarded as offering any regular constitutions.

Now it is certainly remarkable that, with the exception of a few European republics, all the "Estates, Empires, and Principallities of the World," which the author thinks worth describing, and in particular all the non-European states, are personal monarchies of more or less absolute type: and this from a man who is expressly throwing classical and medieval experience to the winds, and setting out to describe men as he finds them.¹⁰

Peter Heylin and the Cosmographers

Nor is this peculiarity confined to Grimstone's treatise. The standard English cosmography of the early seventeenth century

¹⁰ A good example of his analysis is the opening paragraph of his chapter on the Government of the Turkes (p. 1064): "The government of the Ottomans is absolute, for that great Turke is maister in such sort, of all that is within his Estate, as the inhabitants tearme themselves his slaves; and their is not any one that can say he is maister of the house where he dwells, nor of the lands which he tills, no nor of himselfe, except some families which were priviledged by Mahomet the second at Constantinople; and there is not one in Turkie, how great soever, that can assure himselfe of the Estate wherein he lives, or of his owne life, unless it be by speciall grace from the Great Turke. He maintains this absolute power by two meanes: the one is, that he disarmes his subjects; the other is, that he puts all things into the hands of such as have abjured the Christian religion, and have been brought by way of tything from his Estates in their infancies. By these two meanes he enjoyes two benefits: the one is, that he deprives his provinces of the flower of their men, for that

is that of Peter Heylin, the learned, witty, and pugnacious chaplain of Archbishop Laud.¹¹ Its method of treatment is closely modelled upon that of Grimstone; the sequence of topics is the same, and there is a good deal of matter common to the two, though Heylin, of course, is far more encyclopedic in his treatment, and includes many regions and 'estates' which do not occur in Grimstone. Here, too, with hardly an exception, the constitutions which are described are despotic; and, as in Grimstone, particular attention is given to the brutal kingships of Western and Southern Africa. Almost the only exceptions are the cases where the royal power is not yet fully established, and others in which, to the best of Heylin's knowledge, there is no settled form of government.

In fact, if an unprejudiced inquirer were to attempt, with only the materials available in Heylin's time, to generalise as to the political evolution of the Old World outside Europe, I do not see how he could fail to arrive at the conclusion: *first*, that the natural and primitive state of man was, in the words of Hobbes, "poor, nasty, and brutish; in continual feare, and danger of violent death"; and *secondly*, that wherever man had emerged from this primitive condition it had been by sub-
mission, more or less voluntary, and more or less by way of a *pis aller*, to an absolute despotism, usually exercised by a single imperial master who, like Ischia of Tombutum, had superseded by common consent a number of smaller despots.

On the other hand, the notion still prevails that American man is nearly, if not quite, in an unsocial state; and it begins to have practical consequences, to justify annexation, no less than theoretical. For examples, see the passages quoted below from the *Microcosmus* to illustrate the anthropology of Locke.

he makes choice of the strongest children, and fittest for armes; the other is, that he armes and assures himself by this meanes."

Compare with this his "Discourse of the King of Monomotapa" (p. 1092) who is served by Amazon troops, and guarded by two hundred great dogs "the which he holds to be the safest guard."

¹¹ My quotations are from the Oxford edition of 1636, entitled *Microcosmus: a little description of the Great World*.

Thomas Hobbes

Hobbes himself does not often make mention of ethnographic matters. His outlook is, of course, primarily political, and his analysis, so far as it is not political, is psychological. Moreover, he is reticent throughout as to his sources. Now and then, however, he does lift the veil, and betrays an interest in the reports of travellers, and even a certain dependence on them. Even erroneous generalizations are sometimes in accord with the knowledge available in his time. Speaking of inherited distinctions, for example, and in particular about coats of arms, he says that

amongst the peoples of Asia, Africa, and America, there is not, nor was ever, any such thing. The Germans only had that custome, from whom it has been derived into England, France, Spain and Italy, when in great numbers they either aided the Romans, or made their own conquests in these Western parts of the world.

In our present state of knowledge this is of course flatly untrue; but after some search I am not able to lay my hand on an authority accessible to Hobbes who makes any mention of such customs among recently discovered tribes. Neither the Japanese heraldry nor the emblazoned tents of the Sioux and Southern Algonquins, still less the so-called totem-poles of the Vancouver coast, appear in literature till many years after the time of Hobbes.

On the vexed question of the "naturalness" of patriarchal rule, on which Hobbes differs as violently as usual from the current Aristotelianism, we should expect some illustration from recently discovered savages, if only for comparison with the classical examples in Herodotus and the ancient geographers. But the absence of such references does not prove Hobbes unacquainted with the literature of discovery, if only for the reason that he omits equally to give authorities for statements of which the accessible sources are known. His general attitude, though not positively that of an anthropologist, is at all events in agreement with the contemporary trend of observation. "When the

parents are in the State of Nature," he says, "the dominion there over the child should belong equally to both; and he be equally subject to both; which is impossible, for no man can obey two Masters." In civilised states, he goes on, the law decides whether the father's claim or the mother's shall prevail; "but the question lyeth now in the state of mere nature; where there are supposed no lawes of matrimony; no lawes for the education of children; but the Law of Nature, and the natural inclination of the Sexes one to another, and to their children." "If there be no contract," he adds, "the dominion is in the mother," and this for the same obvious reason as Heylin had given already for female sovereignty in Borneo.¹²

It may be admitted at once that Hobbes' normal attitude of opposition to the Aristotelian tradition is such that the mere fact that Aristotle had laid down that "the father is naturally in authority over the sons" may be held sufficient reason why Hobbes should decide for the matriarchate. But it is certainly an instructive coincidence—and for my own part I am inclined to regard it as more—that the first great groups of matriarchal folk to be studied in any detail were precisely in areas now being thrown open by the discoverers—Southern India, Negro Africa, and North America; so that, at this period, matriarchal institutions, which had so long been treated as evidence of human depravity, or, at best, as curiosities and antiquities, were being rehabilitated for the first time in European thought as a practical scheme of society. Heylin had even generalised already that female kingships were correlated with tropical climate.¹³ Once more the circumstances of the age and the general progress

¹² Hobbes, *Leviathan*, ch. 20 (Cambr. ed, p. 140.): compare Heylin, *Microcosmus*, Oxford, 1636, p. 830.

"The inhabitants of this Island are so curious to have a lawful Heir upon the Throne that the Husband not being certain the children which he has by his Wife are his own, but she is certain they are hers, therefore they rather chuse to be governed by a Woman, to whom they give the Title of Queen; her Husband being only her Subject, and having no power but what she gives him." (Quoted from Tavernier II, 140.)

¹³ *Ibid.*

of knowledge were forcing on the notice of the philosophers fresh phenomena of a kind which precisely fitted the demands of the philosophic situation.

Most important of all, however, is the direct appeal of Hobbes to the evidence of discovery, when he is dealing with the state of nature itself.

It may peradventure be thought [he says]¹⁴ theare was never such a time nor condition of warre as this, and I believe it was never generally so, over all the world; *but there are many places where they live so now.* For the savage people in many places of America, except the government of small families, the concord whereof dependeth on natural lust, have no government at all, and live at this day in that brutish manner, as I said before. However, it may be perceived what manner of life there would be, if there were no common Power to fear, by the manner of life which men that have formerly lived under a peaceful government use to degenerate in a civil War.

Here, clearly, we have Hobbes the psychologist and politician supplementing his psychological and political evidence from a totally different quarter, and in particular quoting America as the last citadel of pre-social man.

To refer all governments, as he explicitly does refer them, to the standard of Peru or Monomotapa; to imagine the State as a "Leviathan," a nightmare, a Frankenstein's monster, tolerable only because without it the life of man had been, and would be again, "solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short," was indeed but a partial inference from the life of "natural man," as it might have been constructed from evidence which was available even then. But it accords so closely with the accidents of contemporary discoveries, and with an actual tone of pitiful contempt which had come in fashion among the voyagers themselves, as to force the conclusion that Hobbes was really doing his best to state what nowadays we should call the "most recent conclusions of anthropologists" on a matter of practical concern, and that political science owes more than is commonly supposed to this attempt to define and interpret large

¹⁴ Hobbes, *Leviathan*, ch. 13 (Cambr. ed. p. 85.).

new facts of human nature as the Age of Discoveries revealed them.

John Locke

In the next generation the connection between "physics and politics" is even more strongly marked. Closely as Locke was allied, in his political aspect, to the leaders of the English Revolution, he is still more closely associated with the first administrators of the Royal Society, and that in more than one department. His *Elements of Natural Philosophy* remain to show how near he stands to Newton and the physicists; his medical studies kept him in close touch with the chemists and anatomists, and gave him a rational psychology; and we shall see how intimately his psychological analysis is concerned with his general anthropology. On the other hand, his interest in exploration and travel was keen and continuous. It peeps out in his *Two Treatises on Government*; it is evident in his *Essay on the Conduct of the Human Understanding*; it is confessed in a striking passage of his *Thoughts concerning Reading and Study for a Gentleman*; and it bears remarkable fruit in his Introduction to Churchill's *Collection of Voyages*, published in 1704, which shows him thoroughly acquainted with a wide range of the writers best qualified to inform him of the recent discoveries in regard to unsophisticated man.

Thus the case of John Locke is rather clearer than that of Hobbes. Here, too, though what impresses at the outset is the dependence of his political theory upon the political needs of his time, yet side by side with this we have the same intimate connection between his politics and his psychology as is obvious in the case of Hobbes, and it is naturally therefore to his psychology that I turn first for indications of his method of work. And we have not to go far into the *Essay concerning Human Understanding* before we have a good example of what I mean. In the third chapter he is following up his contention that there are no "innate principles" in the mind by an argument to the same effect as regards moral, or, as he calls them, "practical,"

principles. Virtue is generally approved, he says, not because it is innate, but because it is profitable; nor do men's actions betray any such "internal veneration of these rules." Even conscience, which is usually represented as checking us for our breaches of them, cannot be distinguished, in the mode of its origin, from any other kind of human knowledge, and that in many cases it is "from their education, company, and customs of their country" that men are persuaded that morals are binding on them; "which persuasion, however got, will serve to set conscience at work." Then comes the passage which concerns us now:

But I cannot see how any men should ever transgress these moral rules, with confidence and serenity, were they innate and stamped upon their minds. Have there not been whole nations, and those of the most civilised people, amongst whom the exposing of their children, and leaving them in the fields to perish by want or wild beasts, has been the practice, as little condemned or scrupled as the begetting them?

Then follows a list, a couple of pages long, of barbarities practised by the Mingrelians of the Caucasus; the natives of the interior of Africa; the Caribbees of the Orinoco; a people in Peru (who fattened and ate the children of their female captives); and many others. Among the Tououpinambos, another American tribe, "the virtues whereby they believed they merited Paradise were revenge and eating abundance of enemies; they have not so much as a name for God, and have no religion, no worship." Among the Turks "the saints who are canonised lead lives which one cannot with modesty relate."

He that will carefully peruse the history of mankind [he concludes] and look abroad into the several tribes of men, and with indifference survey their actions, will be able to satisfy himself that there is scarce that principle of morality to be named, or rule of virtue to be thought on (those only excepted that are absolutely necessary to hold society together, which commonly, too, are neglected betwixt distinct societies), which is not, somewhere or other, slighted and condemned by the general fashion of whole societies of men, governed by practical opinions and rules of living quite opposite to others.

Here, clearly, Locke claims to support, if not to found, his generalisation as to the nature of the human mind on a com-

parison of specific varieties of human behaviour. At the same time he makes definite exception of those principles which, as he says, "are absolutely necessary to hold society together," and these he is apparently inclined to regard either as actually innate or at all events as of a higher order of universality than the ordinary principles of morals. It is the beginning of a deep distinction in anthropological theory, which bears fruit, long after, in Bastian's distinction between Universal and Racial Ideas.¹⁵

There are other passages in the *Essay* in which the same argument is used, drawn from observation of actual savages. In Chapter IV, for example, he gives a long list of tribes whose members are devoid of the idea of God:

Besides the atheists taken notice of among the ancients, and left branded upon the records of history, hath not navigation discovered, in these later ages, whole nations at the Bay of Soldania (in South Africa), in Brazil, in Boranday, and in the Caribbee Islands, &c., amongst whom there was to be found no mention of a God, no religion?

He goes on to quote further evidence as to the Caiaquas of Paraguay, the "Siamites" (which "will I doubt not be a surprise to others, as it was to me"), and the Chinese. His authorities in this passage are ample: Sir Thomas Roe, the hard-headed English ambassador to the Great Mogul, and his French editor, Thévenot; de Choisy, for Siam; La Loubère, for Siam and China; Navarette and the Jesuit Relations, for China; Ovington, for Surat; Martinière, de Lèry, and Nicholas del Techo. For South Africa, of course, he quotes Terry, and through Terry, the educated Hottentot *Coore* or *Courwee*, who came to England for a time, and of whom Heylin, too, has a quaint story to tell. And these are no mere gleanings from other people's fields. Few of Locke's contemporaries had a better right to an opinion in the department of knowledge which now we should call anthropology, and which formed already a principal depart-

¹⁵ *Gemeingedanken* and *Völkergedanken*.

ment of geography. And he had the highest opinion of its importance, for in his *Thoughts concerning Reading and Study for a Gentleman* he recommends a list of original books of travel which occupies more than a page. His own reading was enormous, and set him wholly free of compendia like those of Heylin and Moll, which indeed he could compare and criticise as an expert. By a comparison of the libraries of Christ Church, of the Bodleian, and of the Royal Society, it is easy to verify the general conclusion that if the English gentleman, as Locke feared, did not think it worth while to bestow much pains on geography, it was not for want of available books or of examples of distinguished publicists who were also good geographers. And this is of some importance to my general thesis, for it shows that in Locke's time still, as in the days of Hobbes and before, inductive anthropology and inductive politics were greatly in the air and were being studied together; and consequently that a political philosopher, no less than a psychologist, was addressing a public which knew about savages and expected a thinker to take account of them.

It is time now to turn to the *Two Treatises on Government*. Their form was, of course, mainly dictated by that of Sir Robert Filmer's *Patriarcha, or the Natural Power of Kings*, in which the patriarchal theory of society, maintained with a thoroughness which would have delighted Aristotle, anticipates almost verbally the orthodox criticism which was levelled two centuries later at McLennan and Lewis Morgan. Filmer's attitude, in fact, is exactly that of the Aristotelian and classicist thinkers castigated by Edward Grimstone. He can quote Athens, Sparta, Rome, and the Jewish patriarchs; he is learned about Nimrod and Codrus; but from beginning to end he writes as if America and the Cape route to India were still unknown. Locke has arguments enough, of a more relevant kind, to bring against Filmer, and makes no direct comment upon the narrowness of his experience of mankind; but implicitly his reply is precisely in that form. It is an appeal to experience against authority; to

modern discovery in the new worlds beyond the oceans, against traditional accounts of ancient societies in the Mediterranean and the Semitic East. To refute Filmer's claim that patriarchal rule is natural, he recalls the systematic fattening and eating of children by the Peruvians,¹⁶ and quotes a long passage from de la Vega's *History of the Yncas*. On the question of the authority of the law over an alien, the "Indian" is his typical example:

The legislative authority by which they are in force over the subjects of the commonwealth hath no power over him. Those who have the supreme power of making laws in England, France, or Holland, are, to an Indian, but like the rest of the world—men without authority.¹⁷

Locke himself, indeed, was before long to be confronted with this question in a very practical shape; for it was he who was deputed to draw up a constitution for the new settlement of Carolina, the first British settlement which came into direct contact with communities of agricultural redskins of the Muscogean stock, and consequently one of the first to be confronted with any worse problems of expropriation than those which had been described by Heylin.¹⁸

¹⁶ Ch. I, 57.

¹⁷ Ch. II, 13.

¹⁸ Heylin, *Microcosmus*, Oxford, 1636, *An advertisement to the reader concerning America in general*. "He that travelleth in any Part of America not inhabited by the Europeans shall find a world very like to that we lived in, in or near the times of Abraham the Patriarch about three hundred years after the flood. The lands lie in common to the Natives and all Comers, though some few small parcels are sown, yet the Tiller claims no right in them when he has reaped his crop once. Their Petty Kings do indeed frequently sell their kingdoms, but that in effect is only the taking Money for withdrawing and going further up the Country, for he is sure never to want land for his subjects because the country is vastly bigger than the Inhabitants, who are very few in proportion to its greatness and fertility. . . . Sometimes whole Nations change their Seats, and go at once to very distant places, Hunting as they go for a Subsistence, and they that have come after the first discoverers have found those places desolate which the other found full of inhabitants. This will show that we have done them no Injury by settling amongst them; we rather than they being the prime Occupants, and they only Sojourners in the land: we have bought however of them the most part of the lands we have, and have purchased little with our Swords, but when they have made war upon us."

In the very next section¹⁹ he is confronted with another question of natural law on which the experience of the colonists was modifying opinion profoundly:

It is not every compact that puts an end to the state of Nature between men, but only this one of agreeing together mutually to enter into one community and make one body politic: other promises and compacts men may make with one another, and yet still be in the state of Nature. The promises and bargains for truck, &c., between the two men in Soldania, or between a Suris and an Indian in the woods of America are binding to them though they are perfectly in a state of Nature in reference to one another; for truth and keeping of faith belongs to men as men, and not as members of society.

Here we have a clear anticipation of Montesquieu's position:²⁰

The law of nature is naturally founded upon this principle, that the various nations ought to do one another as much good as possible in peace, and as little harm as possible in war, without damage to their true interests. . . . All nations have a law of nations. Even the Iroquois, who eat their prisoners, have one. They send and receive ambassies; they recognise laws of war and laws of peace. The only trouble is that this law of nations is not founded on the right principles.

Montesquieu, it will be observed, recurs here, like Locke, to the "Indian in the woods of America"; and we shall see presently that there is a historical reason for this prominence of the redskin in such a context.

One of Locke's main advances upon the position taken up by Hobbes is in his treatment of the right of property:²¹

Though the earth and all inferior creatures be common to all men, yet every man has a property in his own person. This nobody has any right to but himself. The labour of his body and the work of his hands we may say are properly his. . . . The fruit or venison which nourishes the wild Indian, who knows no enclosure, and is still a ten-

¹⁹ II, 14.

²⁰ *Esprit des Lois*, I, iii.

²¹ Ch. V, 27. Though the *Two Treatises on Government* were published simultaneously in 1690, it must be remembered that the first of them was written in reply to Filmer's tract of 1680, and bears evident marks of earlier composition. It was indeed already out of date in 1690; but for our present purpose it is this very circumstance which gives it value as evidence for the growth of Locke's knowledge and thought.

ant in common, must be his; and so his—i.e. a part of him—that another can no longer have any right to it before it can do him any good for the support of his life.

Here Locke's ethnological position becomes clearer still. He is familiar with the hunting and berry-eating redskin of the New England forests; but he is not yet brought into contact with the agricultural communities of the Southeast; and still less is he aware of the paradoxical behaviour of the later-discovered Indians of the Chaco, where precisely that observance holds of which he denies the existence—namely, that the actual hunter has no recognised right to his game, and sits out, hungry and patient, until the whole of the clan has had its fill. Locke proceeds accordingly:²² "Thus this law of reason makes the deer that Indian's who hath killed it. It is allowed to be his goods who hath bestowed his labour upon it, though before it was the common right of everyone."

His estimate of the agricultural skill of his "Indians" was a low one:²³

An acre of land that bears here twenty bushels of wheat, and another in America, which with the same husbandry would do the like, are without doubt of the same natural intrinsic value. But yet the benefit mankind receives from one in a year is worth 5*l*, and the other possibly not worth a penny: if all the profit an Indian received from it were to be valued and sold here, at least, I may say truly, not one thousandth.

Here again his experience does not extend yet to the agricultural communities of Carolina and Georgia; it is the rude husbandry of the Iroquois and Algonquins that is typical, for him, of the natural state of man. More generally still, when he speaks of the function and use of money,²⁴ he asserts: "Thus in the beginning, all the world was America, and more so than that is now; for no such thing as money was anywhere known."

His views on the natural estate of matrimony are coloured again from the same source. "All the ends of marriage being

²² § 30.

²³ § 43.

²⁴ § 49.

to be obtained under politic government, as well as in the state of Nature, the civil magistrate doth not abridge the right or power of either [parent] naturally necessary to those ends"; a reflection once more of the many curious compromises between patriarchal and matriarchal government in American societies, and particularly among the peoples who had partially adopted agriculture—namely, the Southern Iroquois and the Eastern Sioux of Virginia. America, as we see from the extract on money, though it is still near the state of nature, has in some parts advanced beyond it; but it is still to America that he turns for examples of more purely natural conditions:²⁵ "If Josephus Acosta's word may be taken, he tells us that in many parts of America there was no government at all."²⁶ "There are great and apparent conjectures," says he, "that these men [in Peru] for a long time had neither kings nor commonwealths, but lived in troops, as they do this day in Florida—the Cheriquanas, those of Brazil, and many other nations, which have no certain kings, but as occasion is offered in peace or war, they choose their captains as they please."²⁷

I will not deny [he goes on]²⁸ that if we look back, as far as history will direct us [he might well have added, as far as ethnology is any guide] towards the original of commonwealths, we shall generally find them under the government and administration of one man. . . . Conformable hereunto, we find the people of America, who (living out of the reach of the conquering swords and spreading domination of the two great empires of Peru and Mexico) enjoyed their own natural freedom [to elect a monarch], though *ceteris paribus* they commonly prefer the heir of their deceased king; yet, if they find him any way weak and incapable, they pass him by and set up the stoutest and bravest man for their ruler.

Once more America supplies the typical instance, and (once more) that part of America which best satisfies Locke's description is among the hunting tribes of the Southern Algonquins,

²⁵ § 102.

²⁶ § 102.

²⁷ Again he is quoting Acosta, *National and Moral History of the East and West Indies*, 1604, I, 25.

²⁸ § 105.

with their elective war-path chiefs, and regular deposition of the war-lord as soon as his physical force abates. And once more the comparative argument is pressed home, with a hypothesis of the graduation of culture from East to West, almost in the manner of Bodin or Thucydides:

Thus we see that the kings of the Indians, in America, *which is still a pattern of the first ages in Asia and Europe*, whilst the inhabitants were too few for the country, and want of people and money gave no temptation to enlarge their possession of land, or contest for wider extent of ground, are little more than generals of their armies; and though they command absolutely in war, yet at home, and in time of peace, they exercise very little dominion, and have but a very moderate sovereignty; the resolutions of peace and war being ordinarily either in the people or in a council, though the war itself, which admits not of pluralities of governors, naturally devolves the command into the king's sole authority.²⁰

Here, at all events, is a quite unmistakable sketch of the characteristic diarchies of the warlike tribes on the Appalachian chain and its Atlantic slope—Creeks, Cherokees, and the like: a type of constitution quite limited in geographical range, and exactly representing in its distribution the outskirts of European knowledge in Locke's day.

Robinson Crusoe

I made use of Caliban as a popular anticipation of Hobbes; as a sequel to Locke I cannot do better than refer to the savages in *Robinson Crusoe*, and particularly to Man Friday. This again is a composite portrait, the predominant features of which come from the piratical Caribs of the Brazilian coast, with their dug-out canoes, their simple weapons, their inveterate cannibalism. This Carib type represents a quite different line of observation from Locke's mainly redskin evidence, and the novelty is the more important, since at the next turn of the wheel Rousseau makes just as free with this very word "Carib,"

²⁰ § 108.

as Locke has done with his "Indian in the forest," or as Montesquieu was about to do with his "Iroquois."

So far as any other element besides Carib is recognisable in the savages of Defoe—and the portrait, as I have said, is clearly a composite one—it is another eighteenth-century type, the "South Sea Islanders," first popularised in England immediately before the appearance of *Robinson Crusoe* by the discoveries of William Dampier,³⁰ which were at the same time of great geographical importance, admirably described, and very widely read. They figure repeatedly, for example, in the foot-notes of Montesquieu.

But the point in which Defoe's savages date his book and affect our present subject most clearly is in the psychology of Man Friday. In particular, the dialogues between Crusoe and his man on such subjects as the existence of God, and other test questions of the day, are full of learning, and of ingenious, if partly humorous, parody of current psychology and of the state of nature. But to develop this subject in detail would require a whole essay to itself.

French Canada: Sagard and Lafitau

On French thought, meanwhile, as on English, the natives of North America had a very definite influence in the seventeenth century, though not quite in the same way as in England; for the natives whom the French encountered on the St. Lawrence were of a different stock, lived in a different latitude and climate, and enjoyed a very different culture. The French colonists also had come with different predispositions, and were struck by different characters in the order of things which they invaded. Here, as elsewhere, a foremost place must be given to the Jesuit reports—full and graphic records of native life and custom, which were widely read in France, as elsewhere,

³⁰ Capt. William Dampier, *A New Voyage round the World, describing particularly the Isthmus of America*, 1697. It will be remembered that *Robinson Crusoe* appeared in 1719.

and have hardly been superseded even now. Another book which became classical was that of Gabriel Sagard,³¹ which was well known to Locke, and is recommended by him, and was certainly a remarkable study of a barbarous people.

The full tide, however, of what I may call the Huron and Iroquois mythology does not come till the beginning of the next century. Another Jesuit missionary, Joseph Lafitau, produced, in 1724, a large work entitled *The Manners of the American Savages, compared with the manners of the First Ages*.³² Lafitau had only been five years in Canada himself; but he had the acquaintance of Julien Garnier, who had been in the mission field for sixty years, and spoke Algonquin, Huron, and all the five dialects of Iroquois. Lafitau's personal experience was mainly among the Iroquois; he did not, however, confine himself to the Redskins of French Canada; he ranged as far as the Eskimo and the Peruvians, and put together an immense amount of information. For all his protestations to the contrary, Lafitau starts with a theory:

I have not been satisfied to understand the character of the savages, and to make myself acquainted with their customs and practices. I have searched among these customs and these practices for traces of the most distant antiquity; I have read with care those of the most ancient writers who have treated of the manners, laws, and usages of the peoples with whom they had some acquaintance; I have compared these manners with one another, and I confess that while the ancient writers have given me lights on which to base some lucky guesses concerning the savages, the customs of the savages have given me light to understand more easily, and to explain many things which are in the ancient authors.

He regards the *Odyssey*, for example, as a collection of sketches of primitive peoples, strung together on the thread of an interrupted voyage from Troy, but having as their object to recommend the study of ethnology. Manners, moreover, are

³¹ Gabriel Sagard, *Grand Voyage au pays des Hurons*. Paris, 1632.

³² Joseph Lafitau, *Moeurs des Sauvages Ameriquains comparées aux Moeurs des premiers Temps*. 2 vols. Paris, 1724.

to be studied to form—perhaps even to reform—manners, and also to reform people's ideas. For example, he says:

I have seen with extreme pain, in the majority of the *Relations*, that those who have written of the manners of barbarous nations have depicted them as people who have no religious feelings, no knowledge of God, no object of worship; as people who have neither laws nor administration nor forms of government; in a word, as men who have little human about them except their faces. . . . I know [he goes on] that in these latter days people have wanted to shake the proof of the unanimous agreement of the nations to recognize a Deity, as if this unanimous agreement could possibly be a mistake. But the sophisms and subtleties of some individual who has no religion, or whose religion is highly suspect, cannot shatter a truth which has been recognised by the Pagans themselves, which has been received from all time without contradiction, and which we can assume as an axiom.

Having said that it is an axiom, Lafitau proceeds rather inconsistently to declare it his task to *prove* this unanimity of opinion among all nations, by showing that there is in fact no one so barbarous as not to have a religion and not to have morals. "And I flatter myself that I make the matter so obvious that no one can doubt it, unless he wishes to be blind in the midst of light."³³ He has a long chapter, also, on their form of government, again with one eye upon Locke:

Of all the forms of government, that which has seemed to me most curious is that of the Hurons and the Iroquois, because it is most like that of the ancient Cretans and Lacedemonians, who had themselves preserved the longest the laws and usages which they received from the first ages of the world. Though this oligarchic form of government is peculiar to them, the manner of dealing with business is pretty general in all the states of barbarous nations; the nature of the business almost the same, as well as their public assemblies, their feasts and their dances.

His conviction that human nature is the same all the world over comes out again later on.³⁴ "The time which I spent among the Iroquois has tempted me to describe their manners in greater

³³ Lafitau, I, p. 20.

³⁴ Lafitau, I, p. 25.

detail, because I know them better and am more confident of what I assert. Nevertheless one may say that the manners of the natives in general are pretty much alike."

We are here already in the middle of a reaction, on the one hand, against Locke's disproof of innate ideas, and, on the other, against the belief that the savages of the New World represent, in any essential, a lower stage of culture than is to be traced in survivals in classical antiquity. In fact, we are on the straight road to the noble savage as we get him in Pope's *Essay on Man* (1733), which uses Lafitau freely. But we are also very much further still on the road to a synthetic ethnology. Locke had pointed the way, in his Thucydidean comparison of the modern Indian kings to the "most ancient kings of Europe," by which, presumably, he meant the Homeric monarchy. When, therefore, the first curiosity and wonder began to subside, and the real similarity in the performances of human reason under similar circumstances began to be perceived, the foundations began to be laid for a fresh statement of the characteristics of non-social man. Whether the synthesis was to have a psychological or historical content was still a matter of uncertainty; but, in spite of all his eccentricities, I think we may count Lafitau as a pioneer of a new line of work. This at least he had of the pioneer: his book succeeded and was much talked of; he certainly influenced Pope and his English contemporaries, and in France he prepared the way for the decisive intervention of Montesquieu.

Montesquieu

It is easy to examine in similar detail the sources for the ethnology of Montesquieu, who had of course a very wide range of reading, and evidently made good use of his English acquaintances, and his connection with the Royal Society, to keep himself well posted in current English exploration. He quotes Dampier, the *Recueil des Voyages*, and the *Lettres Edifiantes* repeatedly; together with Hyde's *Persia*, Chardin's *Persia*, Pyrard's *Turkey*, Recaut's *Empire Ottomane*, Bernier's *Kash-*

mire, Perry's *Russia*, Smith's *Guinea*, Kaempfer's *Japan*, and a number of other explorers; and he has the immense merit that he rises altogether superior to the current cant about Caribs and Hurons. I doubt whether either name occurs more than once or twice throughout the *Esprit des Lois*. Montesquieu also goes far more nearly back to the geographical standpoint of Bodin than any of his predecessors or contemporaries.³⁵ If he does not, in fact, take rank as one of the founders of synthetic ethnology, it is because, like his great predecessor, he was inclined to overrate the influence of physical environment, and to neglect the human factor of racial momentum. But it is still for the future to show whether it is Montesquieu or the ethnologists who are in the right.

Man, as a physical being, is governed [for Montesquieu] like other material bodies, by invariable laws. As a rational being he is constantly breaking the laws which God has established, and changing those which he establishes himself. [He is made, that is, for a life in society.] But before all these laws are those of nature, so called because they are derived solely from the constitution of our being. To understand them rightly we must consider what man was before the establishment of societies. The laws of nature will be those which he would obey in such a condition. Such a man would at first only be sensible of his weakness. His timidity would be extreme, and if we need experience of that, there have actually been found 'wild men' in the forests: they are afraid of, and run away from, everything. In this condition, each one feels his own inferiority; at best, if at all, he feels himself an equal. He would never therefore attempt to attack, and peace would be the first law of nature.

At this point Montesquieu quotes "Wild Peter," to whom we must return before long, as a recent and notorious example of this kind of natural man. From this standpoint, he goes on to attack Hobbes' idea of a natural man, aggressive and domineering, and concludes that, just as fear drives men to fly, so signs of *mutual* fear would soon tempt them to draw nearer; not to mention the natural pleasure which any animal takes in

³⁵ See particularly Book XIV, *Of Laws in their relation with the nature of the Climate*, where his geographical learning is most displayed, and Book XI, of *Slavery*, and Book XVI, of *Domestic Slavery*.

the society of its kind. His four "laws of nature," therefore are (1) the sense of weakness; (2) the sense of hunger and desire to satisfy it; (3) the sense of mutual support; (4) the natural need of society in the sense of mere acquaintance. This last alone is purely human.

It will be seen at once that three of these are concerned merely with the maintenance of an animal life, and that so far, Montesquieu is arguing on the lines of a purely zoological psychology. It will also be clear that in the fourth "law of nature" he is either begging the question that man is a social animal, or else he is appealing to experience of actual human societies.

Montesquieu does not leave us long in doubt which is to be his line of argument. In the very next chapter he argues that "as soon as men are in association they lose the feeling of weakness; the equality which existed between them ceases, and the state of war begins. Each separate society comes to feel its strength, and this produces a state of war of nation against nation." For there must be different peoples. This last point, however, he does not attempt to prove.

Therefore there arise laws, in the relations in which these nations stand to one another; and these are the "Law of Nations"—the *Jus Gentium*.

All peoples have a law of nations. *Even the Iroquois*, who eat their prisoners, have one. They send and accept embassies, they recognise laws of war and laws of peace. The only trouble is that *this* law of nations is not founded on the right principles.

Here then, as was by this time inevitable for a Frenchman, Montesquieu is once more face to face with the Iroquois. Their "law of nations," it is true, "is not founded on the right principles"; but a law of nature they have got; and this is his proof that there is a law of nature. But clearly he only proves this if we are to assume that the Iroquois are in the state of nature; or at any rate so near to it as to be a fair sample of what human behaviour would be, untrammelled by any positive or non-natural law.

Montesquieu, therefore, like his predecessors, not only takes full account of recorded observations of barbarous peoples, but is directly and specifically guided in his argument by the last new thing in current anthropology, the Iroquois of French Canada, as revealed by Lafitau in 1724.

French Canada, however, is only a salient instance of the fascination which America in general was exercising.

The reason why there are so many savage people in America is that the soil there produces so many kinds of fruit on which one can subsist. If the women there dig up a bit of ground round their cabin, the maize comes up of its own accord. Hunting and fishing are enough to keep man in abundance. Besides, herbivorous animals, such as cattle, buffalos, and the like, succeed there better than carnivorous beasts. The latter have had dominion from all time in Africa.³⁶

Here the African lion and his human counterpart, Ischia of Tombutum, is detected fading away before the maize-cultivating, ruminant-hunting American, and the way is being cleared "by recent research" for the reckless, fearless "Carib" of Rousseau. He notes, also, in Book XI, the social effects of the lack of domesticable animals:

There is this difference between savage and barbarous peoples, that the former compose small scattered tribes, which for certain special reasons cannot unite; whereas barbarous peoples ordinarily compose small tribes which can unite. The former generally produce hunting peoples, the latter, pastorals;

and so on, through a great mass of material, and (still more) of broadly valid generalization, on which the work of a large and industrious school of French anthropological sociologists has done little more than comment and refine in detail. Earlier writers had been precluded from this continental contrast between hunters and pastorals by the belief, current in Heylin's time (*Microcosmus* 1636, p. 771, cf. 782) that there were pastoral peoples in Northwest America; an indication, as was believed, of their Tartar origin.

³⁶ Montesquieu, Book IX.

Rousseau

Rousseau, I need hardly say, remains something of a puzzle. Like his predecessors, he comes at the subject of the state of nature, in the first instance, as a reformer and a political philosopher; and I am bound to say that it is only in proportion as he feels the need of illustration, and realises that his whole case is hypothetical, that he is driven back upon ethnology as an ornament of style and as a makeshift for proof. Unlike his predecessors, however, he cannot be given credit for great learning on the point at issue, and he frankly admits as much: "As we know so little of Nature and agree so ill as to the meaning of the word Law, it would be difficult to settle on a good definition of the Law of Nature." There was, however, a good deal known about nature in 1753 which was not in Rousseau's philosophy. Yet he had clearly read travels, as everyone did in those days, and he reproduces a few details as to the qualities and customs of savages.

He quotes Peron's *Voyages aux Terres Australes* for the comparative strength of Europeans and Tasmanians, and illustrates sensory acuity from Hottentots and Redskins; but his favourite type is the Carib, whom we have already met in discussing Defoe. It is the Carib of Venezuela who shows such surprising skill in tackling wild animals; it is, too, "the inhabitant of the banks of the Orinoco," who learned the use of "those boards which he applies to the temples of his children, and which assure to them at least part of their natural idiocy and happiness." It is the Carib again who "sells his cotton mattress in the morning and comes with tears in the evening to buy it back, for lack of foresight that he was going to want it for the coming night," and whose happiness is, nevertheless, so quaintly compared with that of a European Minister of State. There is a curiously Amazonian flavour, meanwhile, about Rousseau's sketch of the primitive family.

The most ancient of all societies, and the most nearly natural, is that of the family. But even here the children do not stay bound

to the parent any longer than they need him for their own maintenance. As soon as this need ceases, the natural tie dissolves. The children, released from the obedience which they owed to the father, the father released from the care which he owed to the children, all return equally to independence. This common liberty is a consequence of human nature.

Such an analysis is, of course, only true in fact under the conditions of a tropical forest. Nowhere else does the family tie break down in the way Rousseau describes; and nowhere was this type of social anarchy more open to study than in the equatorial forests of South America.

Whence did Rousseau acquire his conception of the Carib? The most obvious source would be the 17th volume of the Abbé Prévost's *Histoire générale des voyages*, which contains a full summary of the "Origin, Character, and Customs" of the Caribs, and a narrative of European colonisation of the Antilles; but this volume does not seem to have been published till 1761. Raynal's *Histoire philosophique et politique des établissements et du commerce des Européens dans les deux Indes*, published in Geneva in 1781, is also too late; but Raynal in particular had a wide acquaintance, and his ideas were current in French society long before his book came out; so we are probably safe in crediting Rousseau with at all events a gossiping acquaintance with a type of savagery which was enjoying a considerable vogue in his time.

'Wild Peter'

Both Rousseau and Montesquieu were, of course, also in a position to enjoy the perplexities of the advocates and assailants of the doctrine of innate ideas when a real live specimen of *Homo sapiens ferus* turned up in the Hanoverian forests in the year 1724 and was canonized as a natural species by Linnaeus. The story of Wild Peter is probably familiar reading, but though the literature which this poor creature provoked is in parts diverting both to the anthropologist and to the philosopher, I should encumber my story unduly if I digressed. Montesquieu, having been in England and having his friends in Lon-

don, has not very much to say; but Rousseau gives Wild Peter a long note, and was evidently considerably impressed. Buffon's gyrations around this rather delicate topic are more entertaining than philosophical.

The South Sea Islanders

Rousseau wrote just too early to be able to make use of what must have appeared to his contemporaries a remarkable confirmation of his view of the state of nature—namely, the discovery by Cook, Bougainville, and La Pérouse of the Polynesian Islanders. But this discovery, coming as it did so closely after Rousseau's manifesto, and so markedly confirming certain phases of his sketch, seems to have attracted some attention and to have been given more than its due weight. For it came, at all events to the public mind, as the revelation of a new type of man and society, still more remote from contact with the modern world even than the Carib and the Iroquois, still more likely therefore to have withstood the attacks of reason, if not of time, and consequently to have preserved some traces of the original state. The South Seas had, of course, been traversed cursorily since the days of Magellan; Dampier had done much to make their natives known; and I have indicated the share which his work may have had in forming the portrait of Man Friday. But it was not till after the publication of Rousseau's *Discourse* that the significance of these data was appreciated; and ethnology owes much in this instance to philosophy for the impulse which was given in the generation which follows to the study of "Pacific Man", in more senses than one; though I think the debt is in part repaid when we see what Herder owes to ethnology.

The Pacific Islanders, of course, with their Garden of Eden existence, challenged all preconceived notions of the defective mentality of races remote from Europe, and effected an almost Copernican revolution in the self-centered ethnology of the discoverers. If a South Sea Islander like Omai could pick up

English, play chess, and behave like a gentleman after a few months' consort with Europeans, there could not be much amiss with his mind; and it was clearly time to amend current conceptions as to the identity of the primitive with the remote.

George Forster, for example, who wrote the first really philosophical account of the voyages of Captain Cook, with whom his father had sailed as one of the chief naturalists of the expedition, was completely convinced by his experiences that the Biblical record was true after all, and that the primitive state of man was a state of innocence and happiness. It was a reaction against the ideas of Hobbes, Locke, and Montesquieu, which went far beyond what was contemplated even by Rousseau, and it did more to retard the progress both of anthropology and a general biology than anything else in that century.

So long as the sentimental enthusiasm aroused by Rousseau persisted, there was little hope of advance in the direction of a solid ethnology. But in England the contagion was slighter, the contact with the facts of exploration closer, and the reaction earlier; and Germany too was already well awake, with Herder, almost before the Revolution was ablaze.

"I take this opportunity," writes Chamisso, who had himself been in the Pacific in 1815-18,³⁷

"to protest most vigorously against the term savage in its application to the South Sea Islanders. I prefer, so far as I can, to connect definite ideas to the words which I use. A savage for me is the man who in the absence of fixed abode, agriculture, and domestic animals, knows no form of property but his weapons, with which he maintains himself by the chase. Wherever the South Sea Islanders can be accused of corruption of morals, this seems to me to bear indication not of savagery but of over-civilisation. The various inventions, coinage, writing, and the like, which are appropriate to mark off the different degrees of civilisation which the peoples of our continent have attained, cease to afford under conditions so different any standard for this insular and isolated stock which lives under this happy sky, without yesterday or to-morrow, living for the moment, and for pleasure."

³⁷ Chamisso, *Works* I, 119.

Voltaire

I must leave out of consideration here the results of these successive pictures of the pre-social state on the course of political philosophy. All I am concerned to do here is to give reasons why these different conceptions took the particular shape that they did, under the several circumstances of the age which gave birth to them; and I hope that I have been able to show that one of the principal factors which determined their form was the actual state of anthropological knowledge in the years which immediately preceded the publication of each.

A good example—if this were the time to develop it fully—is the very entertaining controversy between Rousseau and Voltaire over the psychical unity and uniformity of man. What led Voltaire to a conception of the state of nature so totally opposite to that entertained by Rousseau? Partly, of course, his own political and philosophic standpoint, with which we are not concerned directly here; but partly also the circumstances that in the years which immediately preceded his attack upon Rousseau, the learned world of Europe—and learned France in particular—had come under the influence of a fashion—I might almost call it a craze—of enthusiastic admiration of China and things Chinese. The Jesuit Missions to China, in particular, had been sending home wonderful accounts of the civilisation of the Chinese, and fabulous versions of its antiquity; and it was, of course, common knowledge in Europe in the eighteenth century that any civilisation which went back into the second and third thousand years B. C. must be in respectably close contact with the origin of man, and therefore might be expected to reflect at close quarters the outlines of the original state. To find, therefore, that this immemorial civilisation of China had existed apparently unchanged since its first ages, was to discover fresh light on the nature of man and a new glimpse of primitive society. By this revelation of China, it is true, the Pharaoh's heart of the *ancien régime* was hardened in pursuit of what has come down into our vocabulary as *chinoiserie*; and, by a strange

irony, one of the acutest critics of that *régime* was furnished from the same source with a fresh instrument of proof of the essentially social nature of man in reply to the Nihilism of Rousseau:

Do you mean by primitive man (*sauvages*) a two-footed animal, walking on its hands too if occasion calls, isolated, wandering in the forests, pairing at hazard, forgetting the woman with which he has mated, knowing neither her offspring nor his parents, living like a beast, only without the instinct and the resources of the beasts? You will find it in books that this state is the true estate of man, and that we have merely degenerated pitiably since we left it. But I do not think that this solitary life ascribed to our forefathers is in human nature at all. If I am not mistaken, we are in the first rank of the gregarious animals, much as bees, wasps, and the like. If you come across a strayed bee, ought you to infer that this bee is in the state of mere nature, and that those which work in association in the hive have degenerated? All men do live in Society: can you infer from that, that there was a time when they did not?

Man in general has always been what he is. That does not mean that he has always had fine cities and so on: but he has always had the same instinct which leads him to feel affection for himself, for the companion of his toils, for his children, and so forth. That is what never changes, from one end of the world to the other. As the basis of society is always in existence, there always is some society. We were not made to live after the manner of bears. [A clear hit at the favourite simile of Montesquieu.] It is therefore demonstrated that Nature alone inspires us with the useful conceptions which precede all our thoughts. In morals it is the same. We all have two instincts which are the basis of society, pity and justice.³⁸

From this fundamental uniformity of the human mind, which Voltaire assumes and defends, it follows that certain fundamental ideas recur everywhere, under suitable circumstances, more especially such religious dogmas as the conception of the immortality of the soul. In this conception it will be seen that Voltaire at the same time reverts almost completely to the anthropological standpoint of Aristotle, and anticipates by a century the philosophic position of Bastian. But it is also clear that Voltaire's mode of arriving at the natural state of man does

³⁸ Voltaire *Œuvres*, XI, 19, 21; see also Rousseau's reply to this position, *Discours sur l'origine et les fondemens de l'inégalité parmi les hommes*, p. 170.

not differ in its method from that of his predecessors. Both alike discover it by the process of subtracting from human nature, as we know it, all that can be traced to the operation of any positive prescription or observance. What each side finds lying behind this customary stratum of human nature, whether sheer passivity, or positive qualities of a selfish tendency, or otherwise, depends as before, partly on the prejudices of the observer, but mainly on the current phase of emphasis on this or that section of what was known.

Christopher Meiners

The new attitude towards Rousseau is well illustrated by the criticism of Christopher Meiners, whose *Historical Comparison of the Customs and Constitutions, the Laws and Industries, the Trade and Religion, the Sciences and Educational Institutions of the Middle Ages* was published at Hanover in 1793. "Experience, history, and sound reason," he says, "are mishandled [by Rousseau] with unprecedented audacity. On all sides false or distorted facts are treated as fundamental, and the best known and best attested observations are misinterpreted or left on one side."³⁹ "Among the poets of enlightened peoples there is hardly to be found any fiction so utterly in conflict with experience and history as Rousseau's picture of the State of Nature, and of Natural Man."[†] But Meiners' criticism is directed wholly against Rousseau's ignorance of anthropological fact, and most particularly of facts about "modern savages"; not against the principles of his method. For, as Meiners himself contends,

The most important conditions in which considerable sections of the human race have been or are now to be found, are the conditions of savagery and barbarism, of incipient, or half-completed, or entire enlightenment. . . . Human history devotes its particular attention to the savages and barbarians of all parts of the world, who have never produced the smallest perceptible change in the fortunes of humanity as a whole; because often a single small horde of savages and barbarians can make greater contributions to the knowledge of human

³⁹ Vol. I, pp. 7, 16, 18.

nature than the most magnificent peoples who ever conquered and devastated a continent.

And Meiners goes on to hit also Montesquieu for his failure to appreciate the contribution of savages to political philosophy. Here we have clearly the beginnings of the modern comparative method, with its search of uncontaminated survivals of primitive, though not strictly pre-social states.

Herder

But it is mainly to Herder that the expression of the new movement is due; and it is his *Thoughts on the History of Mankind*⁴⁰ that makes the first sympathetic attempt to solve the problem of the development of man and his culture, and to create, in the modern sense, a science of man.

Already in comparatively early years, [he says] when the field of knowledge lay before me in all that morning glory from which life's midday sun detracts so much, the idea often besets me, since everything in the world has its philosophy and science, ought not human history, which after all lies nearest to ourselves, to have in a general sense its philosophy and science also?

He argues, thereupon, that we must discard speculation and follow experience simply.

When, therefore, we set about philosophising upon the history of our species, let us forswear, as far as possible, all narrow forms of thought which are derived from the culture of a single region, or even of a single school. It is not what man is among ourselves, nor what he ought to be in the conception of any dreamer whatever [this is clearly aimed at Rousseau] but what he is, on the earth in general, and at the same time in every single region in particular; or rather, what it is to which the rich multiplicity of accidents in the hands of Nature has had the power to train him. This is what we are to regard as the purpose of Nature for him.

⁴⁰ Herder, *Ideen zur Geschichte der Menschheit*, 1784. On Herder's interpretation of the American evidence, see Learned, *Herder and America*, in *American Annals*, N. S. II, 9. (Philadelphia, 1904): and on his sources in general, Grundmann, *Die Geographischen und Völkerkundlichen Quellen in Herder's Ideen*, Berlin, 1900.

Herder, that is, conceives it as possible, at the same time to determine inductively what man is in himself, and to determine by simple description what he actually is (or rather what *men* actually *are*) under the various different conditions in which we find him. But he insists on the distinction between these two modes of regarding man, or men; and rightly, for it is the confusion between the description of this or that kind of uncivilised man—Iroquois, Hottentot, or South Sea Islander—and the guess that uncivilised man everywhere *must* have such and such qualities or defects of qualities—which had in fact produced all the discrepancies between the previous theories of a pre-social state.

Writing when he did, Herder of course was but little more capable than his predecessors of delineating human nature in detail on inductive lines. His merit lies in the clearness with which he gripped and stated the conditions of the problem; in an advance of method, which came just in time to guide the theoretical treatment of a vast mass of new data. At the same time he did accomplish a good deal, even as regards the filling in of the picture. In particular, he marks the turn of the tide from the philosophy of the pre-social state towards the old Aristotelian conception of man as a social animal. Both Hobbes and Locke, though not I think anywhere named, come in for effective criticism:

There have been philosophers [he says] who on account of this instinct of self-preservation have classified our species among the carnivora, and made out its natural state to be a state of war. Of course when man plucks the fruit of a tree he is a robber; when he kills an animal he is a murderer; and when—with a footstep, with a breath, perhaps—he takes the life of myriads of invisible creatures, he is the most brutal oppressor on earth . . . But put Man among his brethren, and ask the question, Is he naturally a beast of prey of his own kind, is he an unsocial being? In his physical shape he is clearly not the former, by his birth still less the latter.

Herder is thus returning afresh to the Aristotelian conception of the parental bond as the complement and remedy

of the long helpless infancy.⁴¹ Herder's ideal man has, in fact, a humanity which is in itself an end, an ideal, not a pre-social attribute, and just for this reason humanity exists potentially in all members of the species, however small their progress towards realising it, or however eccentric the results of their social activity.

Look at the godlike laws and regulations of humanity, which emerge, if only in the merest traces, among the most savage peoples. Can they really have been invented by the exercise of reason only after the lapse of thousands of years? Can they really owe their origin to this changeful sketch, this man-made abstraction? I cannot believe it, even from the standpoint of history. If men had been distributed like animals on the earth's surface, to invent for themselves the inner form of humanity, we should still find mere human stocks, without language, without reason, without religion or morals; for as man was created such is he still upon the earth. On the contrary, neither history nor experience shows us human orang-outangs living actually anywhere: the fables which the late writer Diodorus and the still later Pliny tell us, of 'insensitive' (*ἀναισθητοί*) and other inhuman men, either betray themselves by their own fabulous quality, or at least deserve no credence on the testimony of these authorities. No European people, still more no Greek people, has ever been more savage than the New Zealander or the Fuegian, at all events when we take into account the factor of climate; and yet those inhuman tribes have reason and speech, and (in a word) humanity.

Then he turns upon Locke:

All those traits of savagery (even granting that the Hottentot buries his children alive, and the Eskimo shortens the life of his aged father), result from a melancholy necessity, which nevertheless never conquers the original instinct of humanity.

⁴¹ "He is received in the arms, and suckled at the breast, of love; he is brought up by human beings, and receives from them a thousand good things which he has never earned. To this extent is he shaped in and for Society: without it he could neither come into existence nor grow into a Man at all. At the point, too, at which he begins to be unsocial, and does violence to his own nature by coming into conflict with other living beings, he is once more no exception, but is acting in conformity with the great law of self-preservation which is found in all created things."

The Passing of the Pre-Social State

All these theories of a social contract as the starting-point of human societies presupposed, as we have seen, that mankind had actually passed through a pre-social state; and the proof which had been offered of this supposition, though partly theoretical and *a priori*, had partly also been inductive and based on experience. Further, the experience of "primitive man" which was actually open to the philosophers of the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, had been, in fact, such as to force the conclusion not merely that a pre-social state had once existed, but that some barbarous peoples had not yet emerged from it. It was a sad error of observation, as we now know, which led to that conclusion; but, given the travellers' tales, in the form in which we can read them in the cosmographies and voyages of the time, I do not see how that conclusion could have been avoided without culpable neglect of such evidence as there was. If blame is to be assigned in this phase of inquiry at all, it is to be assigned to the travellers and traders, for making such poor use of their eyes and ears. All, however, that I am concerned to establish at present is this, that one of the most important and far-reaching speculations of modern political philosophy, the speculation as to a pre-social condition of mankind, and a social contract which ended it and brought in society and the state, arose directly and inevitably from the new information as to what primitive man *was* and *did*, when he was studied in the seventeenth century at Tombutum, or Saldanha Bay, or the "backwoods of America," or the "bank of the Orinoco river."

But the social contract theory has long since passed out of vogue. In natural, as in political science, it has served its purpose. Beginning, in the days of the discoveries, as a plausible hypothesis which held together a number of casual observations, and accommodated itself, perhaps all too well, to the new contributions as they came, it excused three revolutions, justified the annexation of a hemisphere, and guided

the infancy of a new science, anthropology; provoking many researches and much thought, of more permanent value than itself. Only the gradual growth of fresh standards of evidence, and fresh refinements of method detected its absurdities and confusions; till, with history and law pulling one way, and psychology the other, the doctrine of a pre-social state dissolved into its elements, and left us a mere phrase. Nowadays, when we describe a person as being in a state of nature, we mean only this, that like America on Grimstone's titlepage, he has left his clothes behind. Political consequences, indeed, of this group of theories are with us today, like the political consequences of the belief in the divine right of kings; but the theories themselves are dead, and likely to remain so. Plato and Aristotle, with their belief in man as a naturally social animal, have come by their own again, for most of us, if not for all; and the search for an ideal state, which shall realise and fulfil man's social instincts, is again in full cry.

Four new sets of problems can be distinguished all clamorous for a solution, and all failing to find this solution in the theories of a pre-social state. Herder had been driven to a new formula for the common humanity, by the diversity of the evidence about so many "primitive" peoples, and had been led to restate much of Montesquieu's geography in distinguishing between essence and accidents. The new science of geology, and in particular the researches of Boucher de Perthes (1848-1858) on the quaternary gravels of the Somme Valley, were seen to demand such a vast lapse of time since man's first appearance, that the probability vanished that any set of men now extant should have retained a "pre-social" culture. A new humanitarianism, stimulated by practical applications of Rousseau's doctrines, based part of its case on the brotherhood of man, and was met by the objection that men were not brothers, at all events when one is white and one is black. And the accidents of their birth gave Europe a new philosophy of language and of law which seemed to vindicate Aristotle on a

point where he had been most ruthlessly attacked by Hobbes, namely as to the naturalness of paternal, as opposed to maternal authority. Comparative ethnology, prehistoric archaeology, polygenism, and the patriarchal theory (the political counterpart of Aryanism) advanced on parallel lines over the ruins of the social contract. Not all these new enquiries, and appeals to fresh evidence, affected political science appreciably. Archaeology had least of all to say, for it was concerned with the productive, not with the social arts; with technology, not with institutions. Only as the humanist handmaid of geology did it lend a hand in the fight for a sane interpretation of Genesis. Herder's contribution has been estimated already; it had much to do with the first formulation of that doctrine of nationality which checked the career of Napoleon, and still is the largest force in international thought.

What part, if any, has the direct study of barbarous people played at this fresh turn of the wheel? Let us look once again at the state of geographical knowledge, and more particularly, as before, at the regions in which by transitory chance of circumstances, there was most to be learned at the moment.

The Patriarchal Theory

In the first place, economic and political causes were leading throughout the eighteenth century towards the formal declaration of European rule over large parts of India; and it was inevitable that one of the first consequences of this should be the discovery by the new rulers of India that the dominant civilization of the country was at the same time rigidly patriarchal in structure, highly intolerant of change, and apparently also of very ancient date. That the practical problems of administration were most urgent in northern India was yet another of those accidental circumstances which make and mar philosophies; for it veiled from view the peaceful southern matriarchates, and focused the attention of statesmen and theorists alike on the pugnacious patriarchs of the

north. The necessary result was the growth, in England, of a new school of comparative jurisprudence, for which Montesquieu and Blackstone had already made clear the way; which reaches its finest flower and certainly its widest vogue in the writings of Sir Henry Maine. For it was not only for the government of India that the new learning brought new light: the discovery of ancient Indian law threw the study of Roman law into an entirely new perspective, and furnished that great monument of tradition and of observation with a deep and strongly-featured background. From this new point of view, the Aristotelian doctrine as to the naturalness of patriarchal society seemed to gain new validity, as the basis of induction widened; and since early Semitic society, and the primeval society of Semitic tradition and legend, were rigidly patriarchal also, an even wider comparison, embracing India, Arabia, and ancient Europe in the same survey, seemed to justify the belief, which had always remained popular in Europe, that the primitive state of man had been neither pre-social nor nasty and brutish at all; but in the best sense "very good".

The patriarchal theory dominated political science for nearly fifty years. "The effect of the evidence derived from comparative jurisprudence," Sir Henry Maine could write in 1861,⁴²

is to establish that view of the primeval conditions of the human race which is known as the patriarchal theory. There is no doubt, of course, that this theory was originally based on the Scriptural theory of the Hebrew patriarchs in Lower Asia.⁴³ It is to be noted,

⁴² Maine, *Ancient Law*, pp. 122-3.

⁴³ Maine digresses here to deal with historical reasons for its neglect: "But, as has been explained already, its connexion with Scripture rather militated than otherwise against its reception as a complete theory, since the majority of the enquirers who till recently addressed themselves with most earnestness to the colligation of social phenomena, were either influenced by the strongest prejudice against Hebrew antiquities, or by the strongest desire to construct their system without the assistance of religious records. Even now [1861] there is perhaps a disposition to undervalue these accounts, or rather to decline generalizing from them, as forming part of the traditions of a Semitic people." *Tantum religio potuit suadere malorum.*

however, that the legal evidence comes nearly exclusively from the institutions of societies belonging to the Indo-European stock, the Romans, Hindoos, and Slavonians supplying the greater part of it; and indeed the difficulty, at the present stage of the inquiry, is to know where to stop; to say of what races of men it is *not* allowable to lay down that the society in which they are united was originally organised on the patriarchal model.

And he refers explicitly to the former controversy between Filmer and Locke, to point out how the tables had now been turned upon the latter.

Thus in the half-century which intervenes between Herder and Maine, the political philosophy of Europe seemed to have turned almost wholly from exploration to introspection; from the Pacific to early Rome and the German forests; and from the study of survivals in the modern practice of savages, to that of primeval custom betrayed by the speech and customs of the civilised world. It was Aristotle over again, with his appeal to custom, ancestral belief, and canonical literature, following hard upon the heels of the visionary revolutionary Plato. Maine's own words, indeed, about Rousseau^{43a} would be applicable almost without change to the course of Greek thought in the fourth century B. C.:

We have never seen in our own generation, [he says] indeed the world has not seen more than once or twice in all the course of history, a literature which has exercised such prodigious influence over the minds of men, over every cast and shade of intellect, as that which emanated from Rousseau between 1749 and 1762. It was the first attempt to re-erect the edifice of human belief after the purely iconoclastic efforts commenced by Bayle, and in part by our own Locke, and consummated by Voltaire; and besides the superiority which every constructive effort will always enjoy over one that is merely destructive, it possessed the immense advantage of appearing amid an all but universal scepticism as to the soundness of all foregone knowledge in matters speculative. . . . The great difference between the views is that one bitterly and broadly condemns the present for its unlikeness to the ideal past, while the other, assuming the present to be as necessary as the past, does not affect to disregard or censure it.

I have devoted some space to these first steps of lin-

^{43a} *Ibid.*, pp. 86-9.

guistic paleontology and comparative jurisprudence because the method of inquiry which they announced promised at first sight to make good a very serious defect in the instruments of anthropological research. Human history, outside of Europe and of one or two great oriental states like China, hardly went back beyond living memory; even Mexico had no chronicles beyond the first few hundred years, and the records of old-world states like China, which at first sight offered something, turned out on examination to have least to give. They had lived long, it is true, but their lives had been "childlike and bland," devoid of change, and almost empty of experience. Consequently there was no proof that the "wild men" of the world's margins and byways were really primitive at all. The churches held them children of wrath, degenerate offspring of Cain; the learned fell back upon pre-Adamite fictions, to palliate, rather than to explain their invincible ignorance of Europe and its ways. Here, however, in the new light thrown by the history of speech, there seemed to be a prospect of deep insight into the history of human societies. Disillusionment came in due course, when doctors disagreed; but illusion need never have taken the form it did, had either the philologists or the philosophers realised that all the really valuable work was being done within the limits of a single highly special group of tongues; that the very circumstance that this group of tongues had spread so widely, pointed to some strong impulse driving the men who spoke them into far-reaching migrations; that one of the few points upon which linguistic paleontologists were really unanimous was that both the Indo-European and the Semitic peoples, in their primitive condition, were purely pastoral; and that this pastoral habit was itself an almost coercive cause for their uniformly patriarchal organisation. The last point, however, belongs so completely to another phase of our story that it is almost an anachronism to introduce it here. It serves, however, to indicate, once again, if that be necessary, how completely the philosopher,

and even the man of science, is at the mercy of events in the ordering of his search after knowledge. It is, indeed, almost true to say that if the primitive Aryan had not had the good fortune not merely to live on a grass-land, but also to find domesticable quadrupeds there, there could no more have been a science of comparative philology in modern Europe, than there could be among the natives of your own Great Plains or of the Pacific Coast: for in no other event would there have been any such family of languages to compare.

In the absence of warning thoughts like these, however, the comparative philology and the comparative law of the patriarchal peoples of the Northwest Quadrant and of India went gaily on. What Maine had done for India, Maine himself, with Sohm and von Maurier, in Germany, Le Play, de Laveleye, and d'Arbois de Jubainville in France and Belgium, W. F. Skene in far-off Scotland, Whitley Stokes and others in Ireland, Rhys in Wales, and Mackenzie Wallace and Kovalevsky in Russia, had done for the early institutions of their respective countries; all emphasising alike the wide prevalence of the same common type of social structure, based upon the same central institution, the patriarchal family, with the *Patria Potestas* of its eldest male member as its overpowering bond of union; and Maine's own words do not the least exaggerate the beliefs and expectations which were evoked by this new aspect of the study of man.

Maine himself, indeed, seems to have realized (*l. c.*, p. 130) that "the earliest and most extensively employed of legal fictions is that which permitted family relations to be created artificially, and there is none to which I conceive mankind to be more deeply indebted;" and a similar fiction was extensively employed by comparative ethnologists as well, to explain away cases which did not seem to come under the rule. Yet only on one point does Maine seem to hesitate at all:

The conclusion then which is supported by the evidence is, not that all early societies were formed by descent from the same ancestor,

but that all of them which had any permanence or solidity were so descended, or assumed that they were. An indefinite number of causes may have shattered the primitive groups, but wherever their ingredients recombined, it was on the model or principle of an association of kindred. Whatever were the facts, all thought, language, and law adjusted themselves to the assumption. (*l. c.*, pp. 131-2.)

No feature of the rudimentary associations of mankind is deposed to by a greater amount of evidence than this; and yet none seems to have disappeared so generally and so rapidly from the usages of advancing communities. (*l. c.*, p. 135.)

Yet even this sweeping generalization is supported only by examples from Indo-European peoples. It is Aristotle's assumption, over again, of the universality of the Greek city-state, an organism as rigidly delimited by geographical and economic circumstances as the patriarchal family itself.

Comparative Philology delimits the "Aryan Home"

The "Indo-European" challenge to the comparative study of the patriarchal societies was accompanied, step by step, by another Indo-European parallel of hardly less importance. It was forced, indeed, into greater absurdities by its more enthusiastic advocates, but embracing as it did the whole range of the nameable works of man, it led inevitably, at the last, back to the consideration of geographic environment and to a realization of the local limitations of the Indo-European régime, extensive though its frontiers were. There had been intermittent speculation, from the sixteenth century onward, as to the significance, and the probable cause, of the resemblances which every scholar felt to exist between languages so remote geographically as German and Persian; but it was not until the discovery of Sanskrit—itself an immediate fruit of the British occupation of India—that the proof became convincing that the resemblances between the languages of the Greeks, Romans, and Teutons, on the one hand, and of the Sanskrit-speaking lords of northern India on the other, were such as to show that these languages were derived from a common source: that it was the differences between them, not their resemblances, which stood in need of

explanation by the secondary and subsequent action of time, climate, and customs. This conclusion was reached independently and almost simultaneously by Sir William Jones in 1786,⁴⁴ by Frater Paulinus a Sancto Bartholomaeo in 1798,⁴⁵ and by Johann Christoph Adelung in 1806.⁴⁶ The last-named, by the way, had already in 1781⁴⁷ carried war into the other camp by his attack on the prevalent tradition that the earliest and only original language of mankind was Hebrew; and he remained in the belief that there was no case yet for enthroning any other language in its place; "Noah's Ark, for me, is a closed fortress," he said; "and the ruins of Babylon need fear no molestation from me."⁴⁸ But his successors were less cautious, and Noah's Ark seemed likely to float far away from Ararat, upon a new flood of philological literature. Rhode⁴⁹ seems to have been the first, in 1820, to draw from linguistic similarities geographical conclusions as to an "Aryan Home," which he placed in Central Asia. Lassen⁵⁰ in 1847, proposed southwestern Persia as an analogous "Home of the Semites", and lent his great authority to the hypothesis of a common place of origin for the primitive Semites and Aryans. Crawford⁵¹ meanwhile in 1820 had applied the same new science of comparative philology to the principal linguistic groups of the Pacific, Polynesian and Malay; and was one of the very first to take the further step, and argue that if two peoples retained the same names for things, they must be held to have had those things in use and in mind, before they became separated in language

⁴⁴ Sir Wm. Jones, in *Asiatick Researches*, I, p. 422.

⁴⁵ Fa. Paulinus, *Dissertatio de antiquitate et affinitate linguae zendicae, sanscritanicae, et germanicae*, Padua, 1798.

⁴⁶ J. C. Adelung, *Mithradates oder allegemeine Sprachenkunde* I, Berlin, 1806.

⁴⁷ J. C. Adelung, *Ueber die Geschichte der deutschen Sprache*, Leipzig, 1781.

⁴⁸ J. C. Adelung, *Mithradates* I, p. 11.

⁴⁹ J. G. Rhode, *Die heilige Sage des Zendvolkes*, Frankfurt, 1820.

⁵⁰ Ch. Lassen, *Indische Alterthumskunde*, 1847.

⁵¹ J. Crawford, *History of the Indian Archipelago*, London, 1820.

or abode. Crawford's sketch of aboriginal Polynesian society and culture deals mainly, it is true, with material arts and means of subsistence; and Von Klaproth's⁵² application of the same method in 1830 to Indo-European languages turned on the names of plants. Eichhoff was the first to show, by systematic parallel lists of words for the family and society, how "this rich and tenacious civilization propagated itself in a thousand different degrees, but always in similar stocks and in regular ramifications, . . . over the enormous area that civilization now covers, and whose borders are daily extending"; but it was Kuhn⁵³ in 1845 who finally wedded comparative philology with comparative law, by his proposal "to advance from the conclusion that all these great peoples are related to one another, to a further conclusion, the establishment of the main features of the state of the original people in the days before they separated." Kuhn's work, however, brilliant as it was, was superseded within three years by a philologist of the first rank, Jacob Grimm,⁵⁴ and it was Kuhn's second edition, which appeared in 1850, almost wholly re-written, which is the real cornerstone of linguistic paleontology; his *Journal for the Comparative Philology of German, Greek and Latin*⁵⁵ was founded in the following year, 1851, and it is this mass of materials which underlay the first popular application of the new method to classical studies, in Mommsen's great *History of Rome*,⁵⁶ which began to appear in 1854.

Kuhn's argument was restated and carried somewhat further by Benfey, in his preface to Fick's *Vergleichendes Wörterbuch der Indogermanischen Sprachen*, which appeared in 1868. By

⁵² J. von Klaproth, *Nouveau Journal Asiatique*, p. 112, 1830. *Asia Polyglotta* 1831.

⁵³ A. Kuhn, *Zur ältesten Geschichte der Indo-Germanischen Völker*, Berlin, 1845 (second edition, 1850), p. 2.

⁵⁴ Grimm, *Geschichte der deutschen Sprache*, 1848.

⁵⁵ Kuhn, *Zeitschrift für vergleichende Sprachforschung auf dem Gebiete des deutschen, griechischen und lateinischen*.

⁵⁶ Mommsen, *Römische Geschichte*, Berlin, 1854.

this time the archeological evidence for the antiquity of some kind of man in Europe had been summarized and made accessible in Lubbock's *Pre-historic Times* (1862): and this of course made impossible for ever such a position in regard to the population of Europe as had been taken by Mommsen in regard to Italy only three years before.

• Geiger's analysis of the Indo-European tree names, a further revision of Kuhn's work, appeared in 1871,⁵⁷ and makes a positive claim for an Aryan home "somewhere in Europe", namely in central and western Germany; one of the first fruits in the long recrimination between anthropologists east and west of the Rhine, which followed the Franco-Prussian War.

A further important step belongs also to the year 1871.⁵⁸ Kuno was, I think, the first to lay stress on the consideration that a *family* of languages presupposed not merely a single original language, but geographical circumstances favorable to its gradual differentiation, and at the same time to its essential coherence. Such geographical conditions, he pointed out, were realized only by a wide featureless area, uniform in character and temperate in climate. Such areas exist only in the great grass lands of the Old World, and the distribution of these accord with the linguistic evidence as to the geographical range and pastoral habit of the primitive Aryan, and may very likely be found to account for these. Consequently he was inclined to indicate as the "Aryan Home" the great plains of southeastern Europe.

Kuno's introduction of a geographical factor into the controversy is itself characteristic of a great contemporary movement in German geography, the first extension of which to criticism of the philologists is the essay of J. Schmidt published in 1872,⁵⁹ and the latest a paper of F. Ratzel in 1904. But this anticipates

⁵⁷ Geiger, *Zur Entwicklungsgeschichte der Menschheit*, Stuttgart, 1871.

⁵⁸ Kuno, *Forschungen in Gebiete der alten Völkerkunde*, Berlin, 1871.

⁵⁹ J. Schmidt, *Die Verwandschaftsverhältnisse der Indogermanischen Sprachen*, Weimar, 1872.

the order of events. It was less the geographers than the ethnologists who wrecked the patriarchal theory.

The Matriarchate in Southern India, Africa, and North America

The patriarchal theory lasted barely fifty years. It had owed its revival, as we have seen, to two fresh branches of research, comparative jurisprudence and comparative philology, both stimulated directly by the results of European administration in northern India. It owed its decline to the results of similar inquiries in other parts of the world, stimulated no less directly by other phases of the great colonising movement, which marks, above all other things, the century from 1760 to 1860. Here again a small number of examples stand out as the crucial instances. British administration in India had, of course, been extended over the non-Aryan south, as well as over the north; and in Travancore, and other parts of the Madras Presidency, British commissioners found themselves confronted with types of society which showed the profoundest disregard of the patriarchal theory. Like the Lycians of Herodotus, these perverse people "called themselves after their mothers' names": they honoured their mother and neglected their father, in society, and government, as well as in their homes; their administration, their law, and their whole mode of life rested on the assumption that it was the women, not the men, in whom reposed the continuity of the family and the authority to govern the state. Here was a *parecbasis*, a perverted type of society, worthy of Aristotle himself. It is a type which, as a matter of fact, is widely distributed in southern and southeastern Asia, and had been repeatedly described by travellers from the days of Tavernier (in Borneo) and Laval (before 1679 in the Maldivé Islands), if not earlier still. It existed also in the New World and Lafitau had already compared the Iroquois with the ancient Lycians. But it was Buchanan's account of the Nairs of the Malabar Coast, published in 1807,⁶⁰ which came at the psychological moment, and

⁶⁰ Buchanan, F., *A Journey from Madras through the Countries of Mysore, Canara, and Malabar*, 3 vols, 1807.

first attracted serious attention. At the other extremity of India, also, analogous customs were being recorded, about the same time, by Samuel Turner in Tibet, which might have given pause at the outset to the speculators who hoped to base general conclusions on anything so special and peculiar as the customs of Aryan India.

Similar evidence came pouring in during the generation which followed; partly, it is true, as the result of systematic search among older travelers, but mainly through the intense exploitation of large parts of the world by European traders and colonists. Conspicuous instances are the Negro societies of western and equatorial Africa, first popularised by the republication of William Bosman's *Guinea* (1700), in Pinkerton's *General Collection of Voyages and Travels* (London, 1808, &c.), and by Proyard's *Histoire de Loango* (1776), which also reached the English public in the same invaluable collection. But it was from the south that the new African material came most copiously, in proportion as the activity of explorers, missionaries, and colonists was greater. Thunberg's account of the Bechuanas⁶¹ takes the lead here; but for English thought the principal authorities are, of course, John Mackenzie⁶² and David Livingstone.⁶³

It was not to be expected that America, which had made such remarkable contributions to the study of man in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,⁶⁴ should fall behind in the nineteenth, when its vast resources of mankind, as of nature's gifts, were being realised at last. From Hunter,⁶⁵ Gallatin,⁶⁶ and School-

⁶¹ Pinkerton, vol. xvi.

⁶² John Mackenzie, *Ten Years North of the Orange River* (1859-69), Edinburgh, 1871.

⁶³ David Livingstone, *Narrative of an Expedition to the Zambesi and its Tributaries* (1858-64), London, 1865.

⁶⁴ The harvest of the earlier period is gathered up in F. X. Charlevoix, *Histoire et description de la Nouvelle France*, 6 vols, Paris, 1744; *Histoire de Paraguay*, 6 vols, Paris, 1756.

⁶⁵ Hunter, *Manners and Customs of several Indian Tribes located West of the Mississippi*, Philadelphia, 1823.

⁶⁶ Gallatin, *Archæologia Americana*, Philadelphia (from 1820 onwards).

craft,⁶⁷ in the twenties, to Lewis Morgan⁶⁸ in 1865, there was hardly a traveller "out West" who did not bring back some fresh example of society destructive of the patriarchal theory.

As often happens in such cases, more than one survey of the evidence was in progress simultaneously. Bachofen was the first to publish,⁶⁹ and it is curious that his great book on "Mother-right" appeared in the very same year as Maine's *Ancient Law*. Lubbock's *Pre-historic Times*, in the next year, represents the same movement of thought in England in a popular shape, but almost independently. In America, Lewis Morgan, whom I have noted already as an able interpreter of Iroquois custom, followed up his detailed studies of Redskin law by a Smithsonian monograph in 1871 on *Systems of Consanguinity and Affinity of the Human Family*, and, in 1877, by his book on *Ancient Society*. Meanwhile Post had published his great work on the *Evolution of Marriage*⁷⁰ in 1875, and J. F. McLennan his first *Studies in Ancient History* in 1876. It was the generation of Darwin and of the great philologists, as we have seen, and survivals were in the air: Dargan⁷¹ pointed out traces of the matriarchate in the law and custom of Germany, and Wilken⁷² in those of early Arabia. The period of exploration, if I may so term it, closed on this aspect of the subject with Westermarck's *History of Human Marriage*, which was published in London in 1891.

Australian Evidence: Totemism and Classificatory Kinship

I have now mentioned India, South Africa, and North America, three principal fields of English-speaking enterprise during the nineteenth century, and have indicated the con-

⁶⁷ Schoolcraft, *Travels in the Central Portions of the Mississippi Valley* (New York, 1825); *Notes on the Iroquois* (1846).

⁶⁸ Lewis H. Morgan, *Proc. Am. Acad. Arts and Sciences*, vii, 1865-8.

⁶⁹ Bachofen, *Das Mutter-recht*, Stuttgart, 1861.

⁷⁰ Hermann Post, *Die Geschlechts-genossenschaft der Urzeit und die Entstehung der Ehe*, Oldenburg, 1875.

⁷¹ Dargan, *Mutter-recht und Raubehe und ihre Reste im Germanischen Recht und Leben*, Breslau, 1883.

⁷² Wilken, *Das Matriarchat bei den alten Arabern*, Leipzig, 1884.

tribution of each to modern anthropology in its bearing on political science. Only Australia remains; and, though Australia's task has been shared more particularly with North America, I shall be doing no injustice to Lewis Morgan or to McLennan if I couple with their names those of Fison and Howitt,⁷³ as the discoverers of classical instances of societies which observe neither paternal nor maternal obligations of kinship as we understand them, but have adopted those purely artificial systems of relationships which in moments of elation we explain as totemic, or, in despair, describe as classificatory.

Hermann Post: Comparative Jurisprudence

Our retrospect, therefore, of the last fifty years shows clearly once again how intimately European colonisation and anthropological discoveries have gone hand in hand: first to establish a matriarchal theory of society as a rival of the patriarchal; and then to confront both views alike with the practices and with the theory of totemism.

From the point of view of political science, all this mass of inquiries finds applications already in more departments than one; though it is probably still too early to appraise its influence adequately. The new Montesquieu has not yet arisen to interpret to us the *Spirit of the Laws*. Most directly, perhaps, we can trace such influence in the *Comparative Jurisprudence* of Hermann Post, whose first work on the *Evolution of Marriage* appeared, as we have seen, in 1875. Post's general attitude is best seen in his *Introduction to the Study of Ethnological Jurisprudence*, which was published in 1886, and in his *African Jurisprudence* of 1887.⁷⁴ As the result of a survey of social organ-

⁷³ Fison and Howitt, *Kamilaroi and Kurnai*, Melbourne and Sydney, 1880.

⁷⁴ Hermann Post, *Einleitung in das Studium der ethnologischen Jurisprudenz* (Oldenburg 1886); *Afrikanische Jurisprudenz* (1887). His position is however already clear in his first synthetic work, *Der Ursprung des Rechts*, 1876, as well as in his earlier book on marriage. For a good summary of Post's views see Th. Achelis, *Die Entwicklung der modernen Ethnologie* (Berlin, 1889), p. 113-128, and the same writer's *Moderne Ethnologie* (1896).

isations, considered as machinery in motion, Post points out very justly that it is useless to attempt to explain social phenomena on the basis of psychological activities of individuals, as is too commonly assumed, because all individuals whose conduct we can possibly observe have themselves been educated in some society or other, and presume in all their social acts the assumptions on which that society itself proceeds.

"I take the legal customs of all peoples of the earth," so he wrote in 1884,⁷⁵ "the residual outcome of living legal consciousness of humanity, for the starting-point of my inquiry into the science of law; and then, on that basis, I propound the question, What is law? If by this road I arrive eventually at an abstract conception of law, or at an idea of law, then the whole fabric so created consists, from base to summit, of flesh and blood."

It is the same method, of course, which had already yielded such remarkable results to Montesquieu and even to Locke. The point of view is no longer that of a Maine or a McLennan, students of patriarchal or of matriarchal institutions by themselves. It is that of a spectator of human society as a whole; and such a point of view became possible at all only when it was already certain that no great section of humanity remained altogether unexplored, however fragmentary our knowledge might still be, of much that we ought to have recorded. And its immediate outcome has been to throw into the strongest possible relief the dependence of the form and still more of the actual content of all human societies on something which is not in the human mind at all, but is the infinite variety of that external nature which society exists to fend off from man, and also to let man dominate if he can.

This was, of course, already the standpoint of Comte, with his emphasis on the *monde ambiant*. But Comte, the citizen of a state which except in Canada had failed to colonise, and therefore had little direct contact with non-European types of society, confined himself far too exclusively to European data. His

⁷⁵ Post, *Die Grundlagen des Rechts* (1884).

strength is precisely where the science of France was so magnificently strong in his day, in the domain of pure physics; it is his analogies between politics and physics which are so illuminating in his work, as in that of his English compeer, Herbert Spencer;⁷⁶ and it is the weakness of both in the direction of anthropology which mainly accounts for the shortness of their respective vogues.

Friedrich Ratzel: Anthro-po-geography

At the point which we have now reached in this rapid survey of our science, it was obviously to geography—the systematic study of those external forces of nature as an ordered whole—that anthropology stretched out its hands; and it did not ask in vain. But while English geography had remained exploratory, descriptive, and (like English geology) *historical* in its outlook, the new German science of *Erdkunde*—“earth-knowledge” in the widest sense of the word—had already come into being on the basis of the labours of Ritter and the two Humboldts, and under the guidance of such men as Wagner, Richthofen, and Bastian; the last-named also an anthropologist of the first rank. It was, thus, to a distinguished pupil of Wagner, Friedrich Ratzel, that anthropology owed, more than to any other man, the next forward step on these lines. In Ratzel’s mind, history and geography went hand in hand as the precursors of a scientific anthropology.⁷⁷ History to define *when*, and in what order, man makes his conquests over nature; geography to show *where*, and within what limits, nature presents a conquerable field for man. Much of this, of course, was already implicit in the teaching of Adolf Bastian, whose monumental volumes on *Man in History* had appeared at Leipzig as early as 1860; his *Contributions to Comparative Psychology* in 1868; and his *Legal Relations*

⁷⁶ Compare Quetelet’s *Essai de physique sociale* (1841), as a symptom of the trend of French thought at this stage.

⁷⁷ Ratzel, *Anthro-po-geographie*, Leipzig, vol. i, 1882; ii, 1891.

among the *Different Peoples of the Earth* in 1872⁷⁸—three years before Post's first essay. But Bastian, inaccessible for years together in Tibet or Polynesia, was rather an inspiration to a few intimate colleagues than a great propagandist; and besides, it was not till the appearance of his *Doctrine of the Geographical Provinces* in 1886⁷⁹ that he touched on this precise ground, and by that time Ratzel's *History of Man* had already been out for a year.⁸⁰

Polygenism and Slavery

Hitherto we have been concerned with that social or cultural aspect of anthropology which deals with what men *do* and how they order their lives; and so lies obviously on the frontiers of political science. Yet one of the most striking instances of interaction concerns the other half of the science of man, the study, namely, of what men *are* in their physical breed, as members of the animal kingdom. At first sight this enquiry lies remote enough from politics. Yet throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, and about the very cradle of physical anthropology, was played a controversial comedy in which it is difficult to say whether anthropology or politics did more, at the moment, to misguide and deform the other. The question which the anthropologist was asked to decide was this: "Is there but one kind of man, or are there two or more?" The use which the politician meant to make of the answer was to determine the rightness or wrongness of Negro slavery.

Until the latter part of the eighteenth century, no one had doubted, so far as I can discover, that Man, so far as he could be regarded as animal at all, formed a single indivisible species.

⁷⁸ Bastian, *Der Mensch in der Geschichte* (Leipzig, 1860); *Beiträge zur vergleichenden Psychologie* (Berlin, 1868); *Rechtsverhältnisse bei verschiedenen Völkern der Erde* (Berlin, 1872).

⁷⁹ Bastian, *Zur Lehre von den geographischen Provinzen*, Berlin, 1886.

⁸⁰ Ratzel, *Völkerkunde* (Leipzig, 1885). His *method* is best studied in the first volume of his *Anthropo-geographie* (Leipzig, 1882).

The anthropologies of Greece and Egypt had rested on the rough generalization (which was in fact true for the original field of observation round the Mediterranean Sea), that well-marked types of complexion, red, yellow, white, and black, were characteristic of accepted geographical regions, Egypt, Asia, Europe, and Africa. Such, too, was the first modern grouping suggested by F. Bernier in 1672; and such in essentials were those of Buffon in 1749, and Linnaeus in 1755. Linnaeus indeed had been much impressed by "Wild Peter", as we have seen, and had included *Homo ferus* in his *System of Nature*, out of sheer excess of precaution. Buffon never seems quite to have made up his mind whether there were wild men or no. But this was beside the point. The slave-owning eighteenth century knew quite well that Negroes and Chinamen were no more *Homo ferus* than they were chimpanzees, and justified enslavement as Aristotle had justified it of old, on the ground that, if anything, it was to the advantage of the slave. Even Blumenbach's discoveries in the comparative anatomy of the skull did not seriously disturb the old regional interpretation of human varieties; and as long as these types were regarded as regional phenomena, they were not unnaturally regarded as due to regional influences. Blumenbach himself, for example, regarded man as naturally white-skinned, and followed Greek precedent in attributing the blackness and yellowness of Africans and Asiatics to the effects of solar heat. He was forced, however, by his comparative method to regard the Negro skull as morphologically nearer than the Caucasian to the skulls of the great apes. On the other hand, the excessive variability of his American skulls, and (later) the marked similarity between his Malay and his Mongoloid material, led him to qualify the regional scheme with which he started; and prepared the way for the zoological, and more especially anatomical, work of the next generation.

But it was no accident that the generation which first doubted, on the political side, the legitimacy of white man's ownership of black man, and translated those doubts into prac-

tice and acts of Parliament, was precisely the generation which first doubted on the theoretic side, whether white man and black man were of the same blood. The explanation is simple and the sequel instructive. As long as slavery was regarded as justifiable morally, no one troubled himself to justify it anthropologically. But no sooner was the naturalness of slavery called in question by the Abolitionists—under the influence of Rousseau's following, and the "Declaration of the Rights of Man"—than the slave-owners raised the previous question: "Granted that I am my brother's keeper, and granted that this means that I may not be his master, yet is *this* man, this black brother, in any true sense my *brother* at all? Is he not, on the face of him, only an exceptionally domesticable animal, and of different lineage from mine?"

The first important treatise was Sommering's *Mémoire sur les Nègres*, in 1785, a perfectly honest piece of scientific work. It was reinforced in 1791 by Camper's study of the anatomy of face and jaw, and by White's work, in 1795, on the forearm. The latter was just too late to influence Buffon in the revised classification which he thought it time to publish in that year; but it influenced profoundly both Prichard and Lawrence in England, and Cuvier and Geoffroy de St. Hilaire abroad. Clearly if man began his career as a single type, he had been *diablement changé en route*. But had there been time for such changes to occur? Purely extraneous considerations, some derived from ancient literature, some from chronological researches in the seventeenth century, and all alike unchecked as yet by the infant science of geology, prevailed to throw anthropologists, and indeed all zoologists alike, into opposing camps. For there is nothing like an error of fact to promote divergence of theory.

Lamarck, followed by Geoffroy de St. Hilaire, and in England by Prichard and Latham, was prepared to contend (1) that a natural species not only could spread into different regions within the accepted limits of time, but also could give rise to strongly marked varieties suited to each of these regions,

through inheritance of acquired variations; (2) that if eventually the process of differentiation should be found to be slower than anthropologists at present supposed, they must nevertheless hold tight to the idea of development, and go back to the Archbishop for more time. Cuvier, at the other extreme, impressed by the persistence of specific differences, and by the weight of the authority which imposed the brief time-limit, assumed, rather than argued, an original multiplicity of types. In the special instance of man, the question was complicated further, and not least for the followers of Cuvier, by the circumstance that the same authorities which placed Creation so late, appeared to assign a single origin to all forms of man. Attempts had indeed been made intermittently from the seventeenth century onward, to dissociate from the family of Adam the remoter and ruder races which travellers were discovering; but in 1800 most people still accepted the tradition of a single origin, and explained the blackness of the Negro by the "curse of Cain." Cuvier himself, somewhat inconsistently, followed the orthodox view on this point also. All mankind, for him, was of one species, and the differences between Caucasian and Negro were racial only. Prichard and most of the Englishmen took the same view, and devoted themselves to the enquiry, *how, when, and why* this single human species had become differentiated regionally.

Many Lamareckian anthropologists on the other hand, holding at the same time that species were mutable, that different types of men showed specific differences, and that the geographical barriers to wholesale migration were insuperable, found it easier to derive the white man and the negro, within their respective regional limits, Europe and Africa, from different species of apes, than to derive white and black man from a common human ancestor. In France the leader of this "polygenist" school was Virey, whose *Histoire naturelle du genre humaine* appeared in 1801. Its influence in England is apparent from Lawrence's *Lectures on the Natural History of Man*, which came out in 1817.

On the continent of Europe, as will be apparent from the dates given above, this zoological controversy coincided almost exactly in time with the new philological movement of which I have already tried to show the significance. The contribution of philology to the discussion was unfortunate. It is concisely expressed in Schlegel's *quot linguae, tot gentes*; and this gross fallacy of the equivalence of speech and breed, dominated continental thought on this subject for half a century, reinforcing the sentiment of nationality in public affairs, and (in this special question) working wholly in favour of the polygenists.

In England, quite different considerations were at work. French political axioms, as to the rights of man, of which I have already traced briefly the anthropological ancestry, operated in England to produce not liberty nor equality, but fraternity; not a revolution among the whites, but emancipation for their black brethren. And inasmuch as the case for abolition rested on the sole consideration that all races of men were in some unqualified sense of one blood, it was clear that the proof or disproof of single origin for black and for white had the most direct bearing upon morals and practical politics. Two consequences can be traced. In England, the cradle of emancipation, polygenist views could hardly get a hearing. As late as 1848 Dr. Prichard, the leading representative of the unitary view, admitted frankly that "if these [polygenist] opinions are not every day expressed in this country, it is because the avowal of them is restrained by a degree of odium that would be excited by it."⁸¹ In America, where slavery was still practised, and supported by vast material interests, all anthropology which assumed or defended the brotherhood of man was discounted as a concession to sentiment or dogma. Those who would appreciate the new bent given to anthropological study in America are referred to the introduction to Nott and Gliddon's *Types*

⁸¹ J. C. Prichard, *Natural History of Man*, London, 1848, p. 6. Prichard himself had had to give up the Ussherian chronology to save the unity of species: to such trials of fortitude were the learned exposed in the middle of the nineteenth century.

of *Mankind*.⁸² Here it is set forth as the province of ethnology to investigate no less "what position in the social scale Providence has assigned to each type of man," than "the primitive organic structure" or "how far a race may have been, or may become, modified by the combined action of time and moral and physical causes." The meaning of this last phrase becomes clearer on the next page, where it is stated that

the grand problem, more particularly interesting to all readers, is that which involves the *common* origin of races; for upon the latter deduction hang not only certain religious dogmas, but the more practical question of the equality and perfectibility of races; we say 'more practical question,' because while Almighty Power, on the one hand, is not responsible to Man for the distinct origin of human races, these, on the other, are accountable to Him for the manner in which their delegated power is used toward each other.

The writers go on to narrate a very curious episode, when Mr. Secretary Calhoun, in the course of diplomatic correspondence with France and England about the proposed annexation of Texas to the United States, called Mr. Gliddon, and through him Dr. S. G. Morton of Philadelphia⁸³ into consultation, and having "soon perceived that the conclusions which he had drawn long before from history, and from his personal observations in America . . . were entirely corroborated by the plain teachings of modern science," he concluded that it behoved the statesman to lay aside all current speculations about the origin and perfectibility of races, and to deal, in political argument, with the simple facts as they stand. The upshot was a strongly-worded despatch from Washington to the American Ambassador to France; and although the English press, "which was then unanimously unitary", complained anxiously that Mr. Calhoun had introduced *ethnology* into diplomatic correspondence, a com-

⁸² Published in Philadelphia in 1854, and already in its seventh edition in 1857. The title itself is instructive.

⁸³ Dr. Morton was the distinguished author of the *Crania Aegyptiaca* published in 1844; where the conclusion is maintained that "the organic characters which distinguish the several races of men are as old as the oldest record of our species." It was indeed to determine this point that he turned his attention to *Egyptian* material at all.

munication from the Foreign Office promptly assured our government that Great Britain had no intention of intermeddling with the domestic institutions of other nations.

Less than half a generation later the tables were completely turned. The Ethnological Society of London, which had been founded during the period of nationalist aspiration—*quot linguae tot gentes*—which culminated in 1848, found itself in such complete and cordial agreement with the polygenist propaganda, that when the American crisis became acute the Unitary party seceded, and formed an Anthropological Society, which pursued a not wholly friendly rivalry with the Ethnological.

It took more than two generations, as will be seen from the dates, to settle this momentous question: and then, as so frequently happens in the human sciences, the question was not really settled but superseded. The recognition of Boucher de Perthes' discovery, by the English mission of 1858, the appearance of Darwin's *Origin of Species* in 1859, on the scientific side, and the issue of the American Civil War on the political, shelved the whole problem: and in 1870, three years before the publication of the *Descent of Man*, the Ethnological and the Anthropological Societies buried the hatchet, and became merged in the Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland.

Epilogue

These examples, I think, are sufficient to show how intimately the growth of political philosophy has interlocked at every stage with that of anthropological science. Each fresh start on the never-ending quest of *Man as he ought to be* has been the response of theory to fresh facts about *Man as he is*. And, meanwhile, the dreams and speculations of one thinker after another—even dreams and speculations which have moved nations and precipitated revolutions—have ceased to command men's reason, when they ceased to accord with their knowledge.

And we have seen more than this. We have seen the very questions which philosophers have asked, the very questions

which perplexed them, no less than the solutions which they proposed, melt away and vanish, *as problems*, when the perspective of anthropology shifted and the standpoint of observation advanced. This is no new experience; nor is it peculiar either to anthropology among the natural sciences, or to political science among the aspects of the study of man. It is the common law of the mind's growth, which all science manifests, and all philosophy.

And now I would make one more attempt to put on parallel lines the course of political thinking. It is not so very long ago that a great British administrator, returning from one of the gravest trials of statesmanship which our generation has seen, to meet old colleagues and classmates at a college festival, gave it to us as the need he had most felt, in the pauses of his administration, that there did not exist at present any adequate formulation of the great outstanding features of our knowledge (as distinct from our creeds) about human societies and their mode of growth, and he commended it to the new generation of scholarship, as its highest and most necessary task, to face once more the question: What are the forces, as far as we can know them now, which, as Aristotle would have put it, maintain or destroy states?

But if a young student of political science were to set himself to this life-work, where could he turn for his facts? What proportion of the knowable things about the human societies with which travellers' tales and the atlases acquaint him could he possibly bring into his survey, without a lifetime of personal research in every quarter of our planet? I have in mind one such student setting out to investigate, on the lines of modern anthropology, the nature of *authority* and the circumstances of its rise among primitive men; and the difficulty at the outset is precisely as I have described. In the case of the "black fellows" of Australia such a student depends upon the works of some four or five men, representing (at a favourable estimate) one-twentieth even of the known tribes of the accessible parts of that continent. For British South Africa he would be hardly

better served; for British North America, outside the ground covered in British Columbia by Boas and Hill-Tout, he would have almost the field to himself; and the prospect would seem to him the drearier and the more hopeless when he compared it with things on the other side of the forty-ninth parallel.

[The reader is reminded at this point that this essay was originally designed to be read at a meeting in Winnipeg; and that these concluding paragraphs were of immediate application then. In part the circumstances which suggested them have been most happily changed by the establishment of a Department of Ethnology at Ottawa, and the early publications of that department, under the general editorship of the geological survey of Canada, promise well for the fulfillment of its design.

But the other practical suggestion, of a systematic record of the ancestry and physique of newcomers into the states of the New World, still remains unrealized; and meanwhile the generation is dying out, which alone has the most vital data in its memory. As long as this great scientific view is not met, I cannot as historian or as anthropologist regard what I then wrote as obsolete. It was addressed then to fellow-citizens in Canada; but science knows no frontiers, and I leave the words as they stand, for friends and colleagues in California. They too know the need, and as occasion serves, they will play their part to meet it.]

Now, our neighbors south of that line have the reputation of being practical men; in other departments of knowledge they are believed to know well what pays. And I am forced to believe that it is because they know that it *pays*, to know all that can still be known about the forms of human society which are protected and supervised from Washington, that they have gone so far as they have towards rescuing that knowledge

from extinction while still there is time. The Bureau of Ethnology of the United States of America is the most systematic, the most copious, and, I think, taking it all in all, the most scientific of the public agencies for the study of any group of men, *as men*. The only other which can be compared with it is the ethnographical section of the Census of India, and that was an effort to meet, against time, an emergency long predicted, but only suddenly foreseen by the men who were responsible for giving the order. Thus, humanly speaking, it is now not improbable that in one great newly-settled area of the world every tribe of natives, which now continues to inhabit it, may at least be explored, and in some cases really surveyed, before it has time to disappear. But observe, this applies only to the tribes which now continue to exist; and what a miserable fraction they are of what has already perished irrevocably! It is no use crying over spilt milk, as I said to begin with; the only sane course is to be doubly careful of whatever remains in the jug.

An Ethnological Survey for Canada

And now I conclude with a piece of recent history, which will point its own moral. When the British Association met first outside the British Isles, it celebrated its meeting at Montreal by instituting, for the first time, a section for anthropology; and it placed in the chair of that section one of the principal founders of modern scientific anthropology, Dr. Edward Burnett Tylor, then recently installed at Oxford, and still the revered professor of our science there. Through his influence mainly, but with the active goodwill of the leading names in other sciences in Canada, a research committee was formed to investigate the northwest tribes of the Dominion; and for eleven consecutive years expeditions wholly or partly maintained by this Association were sent to several districts of British Columbia. These expeditions cost the Association about £1,200 in all. I am glad to think that the chief

representative of this committee's work, Dr. Franz Boas, has long since realised, in his great contributions to knowledge, the high hopes which his early reports inspired.

When the Association met the second time on Canadian soil, at Toronto, the occasion seemed opportune for a fresh step. Dr. Boas had already undertaken work on a larger scale and under other auspices. But it was thought likely that if a fresh committee of the Association were appointed, with wider terms of reference and further grants, it would be possible to select and to train a small staff of Canadian observers, and by their means to produce such a series of preliminary reports on typical problems of Canadian anthropology as would satisfy the Dominion Government that the need for a thorough systematic survey was a real one, and that such a survey would be practicable with the means and the men which Canada itself could supply. Among the leading members of this Ethnographic Survey Committee I need only mention three—the late Dr. George Dawson, Mr. David Boyle, and Mr. Benjamin Sulte, each eminent already in his own line of study, and all convinced of the great scientific value of what was proposed. The first year's enterprise opened well; workers were found in several districts of Canada; the Association sent out scientific instruments, and formed in London a strong consultative committee to keep the Canadian field-workers in touch with European students of the subject. But the premature death of George Dawson in 1901 broke the mainspring of the machine; the field-workers fell out of touch with one another and with the subject; the instruments were scattered, and in 1904 the Ethnographic Survey Committee was not recommended for renewal.

I need not say how great a disappointment this failure was to those of us who believe that in this department of knowledge Canada has great contributions to make, and who know that if this contribution to knowledge is not made within the next ten years, it can never be made at all. I am not speaking merely of the urgency of exact study of the Indian peoples.

This indeed is obvious and urgent enough; and the magnificent results of organized effort in the United States are there to show how much can still be rescued. But at the moment I appeal rather for the systematic study of your own European immigrants, that stream of almost all known varieties of white men with which you are drenching yearly fresh regions of the earth's surface, which if they have had experience of human settlements at all, have known man only as a predatory migratory animal, more restless than the bison, more feckless and destructive than the wolf. Of your immigrants' dealings with wild nature, you are indeed keeping rough undesigned record in the documents of your Land Surveys, and in the statistics of the spread of agriculture over what once was forest or prairie; and in time to come, *something*—though not, I fear, much—will exist to show what good (and as likely as not, also, what irremediable harm) this age of colonisation has done to the region as a whole. But what you do not keep record of is Nature's dealings with your immigrants; you do not *know*—and as long as you omit to *observe*, you are condemned not to know—the answer to the simple all-important question, *What kinds of men do best in Canada? What kind of men is Canada making out of the raw material which Europe is feeding into God's mills on this side?*


Over in England, we are only too well aware how poor a lead we have given you. We, too, for a century now, have been feeding into other great winnowing chambers the raw crop of our villagers. We have created (to change the metaphor), in our vast towns, great vats of fermenting humanity, under conditions of life which at the best are unprecedented, and at their worst almost unimaginable. That is *our* great experiment in modern English anthropology. We are beginning to know, in the first place, what types of human animal can tolerate and survive the stern conditions of modern urban life. We are learning, still more slowly, what modes of life, what modified structure of the family, of the daily round of society at large, can offer the adjustment to new needs of


life, which human nature demands under this new, almost unbearable strain. We are seeing, more clear in the mass, even if hopelessly involved in detail, the same process of selection going on in the mental furniture of the individuals themselves; new views of life, new beliefs, new motives and modes of action; new, if only in the sense that they presuppose the destruction of the old.


That is our problem in human society at home. And yours, though it has a brighter side, is in its essentials the same. Geographers can tell you something already of the physical "control" which is the setting to all possible societies on Canadian soil. Scientific study of the vanishing remnants of the Redskin tribes may show you a little of the effects of this control, long continued, upon nations whom old Heylin held to be "doubtless the offspring of the Tartars." Sympathetic observation and friendly intercourse may still fill some blanks in our knowledge of their social state; how hunting or fishing—or, in rare cases, agriculture—forms and reforms men's manners and their institutions when it is the dominant interest in their lives. But what climate and economic habit have done in the past with the Redskins, the same climate and other economic habits are as surely doing with ourselves. In the struggle with Nature, as in the struggle with other men, it is the weakest who go to the wall; it is the fittest who survive. And it is our business to *know*, and to record for those who come after us, what manner of men we were, when we came; whence we were drawn, and how we are distributed in this new land. An Imperial Bureau of Ethnology, which shall take for its study all citizens of our State, as such, is a dream which has filled great minds in the past and may some day find realisation. A Canadian Bureau is at the same time a nearer object, and a scheme of more practicable size. In the course of this meeting, information and proposals for such a Bureau of Ethnology are to be laid before this section by more competent authorities than I. My task has only been to show, in a preliminary way, what our science has done in the past,

to stimulate political philosophy, and to determine its course and the order of its discoveries.

"Some men are borne," said Edward Grimstone just three centuries ago, "so farre in love with themselves, as they esteeme nothing else, and think that whatsoever fortune hath set without the compasse of their power and government should also be banished from their knowledge. Some others, a little more carefull; who finding themselves engaged by their birth, or abroad, to some one place, strive to understand how matters pass there, and remaine so tied to the consideration of their owne Commonweale, as they affect nothing else, carrying themselves as parties of that imperfect bodie, whereas in their curiositie they should behave themselves as members of this world." It is as "members of this world," I hope, that we meet together to-day.







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THE REORGANIZATION OF SPAIN
BY AUGUSTUS

By

JOHN JAMES VAN NOSTRAND, JR.

Instructor in History in the University of Pennsylvania

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS
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ERRATA

Page 107, note 9. *For See Map II read See Map I.*
Page 116, line 19. *For Criterior read Citerior.*
Map II. *Bactus F. should be Baetis F.*

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
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PREFATORY NOTE

A knowledge of the chief geographic features of Spain and its position with reference to other parts of the Mediterranean World is essential to an understanding of its history, particularly the history of the Roman conquest. Separated from Italy by a broad expanse of sea and by untamed Gallic tribes, the Iberian peninsula was difficult of access to the Romans. It was much more closely joined by nature to Africa than to Europe, and the larger rivers, with the single exception of the Ebro, appeared to welcome invasion from the south and west rather than from the northern or eastern sides. After overcoming these obstacles the Romans had to adapt their tactics to meet guerilla opposition and their strategy to the conquest of small and loosely joined political units, both the results of the geographical configuration of the peninsula. Final Roman victory was then as much a conquest of nature as of man.

The history of Spain reaches far into the past. Phoenicians, Greeks and Carthaginians added their quota to a civilization in which Iberian and Celtic elements were combined. It remained for the Romans to unite and organize these different constituents and to make the Iberian peninsula an integral part of their great imperial domain. This was not the work of one man, nor of one brief period of time, but the activities of Augustus and the reorganization of 27-2 B.C. marked the beginnings of a systematic administration which endured. The aim of this study is to estimate the value of that organization by a survey of the political and administrative history of Spain from 218 to 19 B.C., by an examination of the reorganization of Spain under Augustus, and by an attempt to gauge its continuity during the first century of this era.

I. THE ROMAN CONQUEST OF SPAIN, 218-19 B.C.

The growth of Carthaginian power in Spain, after the first Punic War, had not failed to attract the attention of Rome, but no thought of Spain as a possible base of military operations against Italy appears to have entered the minds of Roman generals or statesmen. It is true that in 226 B.C. a treaty signed by Hasdrubal defined the northern limit of Carthaginian sway.¹ This treaty made the river Ebro the boundary of Carthaginian expansion in Spain. Rome might and did make alliances south of the line, but Carthage could not advance north of it. It rested, then, with Rome to enforce the treaty, that is, to protect the territory north of the Ebro and to support her allies.² But the failure to realize the Barcid menace and the engagement of her forces in Illyricum and Cisalpine Gaul caused Rome to leave the guardianship of this frontier to the free Greek city-states of northeastern Spain. The result of this shirking of responsibility was the capture of Saguntum by Hannibal in 219 B.C.³ and the unopposed march of the Carthaginian forces into Italy.

Shortly after the outbreak of the second war between Rome and Carthage, P. Cornelius Scipio, consul, was ordered to Spain.⁴ The news of Hannibal's rapid advance, however, led him to turn back at Massilia, after entrusting to his brother Gnaeus command of the fleet and army designed for the Spanish campaign.⁵ Beginning at Emporiae the Roman forces gradually fought their way southwards along the coast, until the year 212 B.C., when the destruction of the Roman army and the loss of both leaders

¹ This unusual policy of diplomatic interference in extra-Italian affairs was probably the result of appeals by Massilia, a friend of Rome and commercial rival of Carthage. Frank, *Roman Imperialism*, 121 ff. On the treaty see Poly. 2, 13, 7; 3, 27, 9. App. *Iber.* 7. Livy 21, 2.

² Precedents were not lacking. Rome had agreed to maritime restrictions imposed by Carthage and by Tarentum. The treaty with Hasdrubal was simply an application of the same principle to military operations, with the difference that Rome dictated the terms in this case.

³ Livy 21, 6-9; 11-15. Poly. 3, 17. App. *Iber.* 10.

⁴ 218 B.C. Livy 21, 26. Poly. 3, 45.

⁵ Livy 21, 61. Poly. 3, 76.

again gave to the Carthaginians control of all the territory south of the Ebro.⁶ The brilliant campaigns of the Younger Scipio restored Roman supremacy, and resulted in the expulsion of the Carthaginians from Spain.⁷

At this point Rome assumed the responsibility of imperial control of her newly acquired possessions. Military operations were commenced against those tribes which had not acknowledged the suzerainty of Rome, the city of Italica was founded, and new provincial officials were appointed.⁸ The emphasis still remained upon the military side of occupation, for the tribes accepted Roman authority with as little grace as they had that of the Carthaginians. From 207 B.C., revolt, submission, oppression and revolt followed in dreary repetitions steeped in blood and filled with horrors; at times the unemotional virtues of a Cato,⁹ or the humanity of a Gracchus¹⁰ offered hopes of speedy and permanent submission, but their examples were not followed and the grinding process of a merciless conquest went on until the natives were exhausted. The methods of warfare employed in subjugating and controlling the Spanish tribes need not be described.¹¹ A brief review, however, of the direction and extent of Roman sway is necessary as a basis for a more detailed study of the romanization of Spain under Augustus.

The territory held by the Romans in 206 B.C.¹² comprised the eastern coastline from Emporiae in the north to Carthago Nova. The capture of Gades in 206 B.C. had given the Romans a foothold on the Atlantic coast as well. In other words, practically all the Greek and Carthaginian settlements had fallen into their hands. Of the native tribes, many had been subdued and others

⁶ Livy, 25, 32-36. App. *Iber.* 16.

⁷ Livy 26, 41-51; 27, 17-20; 28, 1-4; 12-16; 19-38.

⁸ Livy 28, 38; 29, 1-3, 5, 13; 30, 2, 27. App. *Iber.* 38. Poly. 11, 25-33. Flor. 2, 17, 7.

⁹ Livy 34, 8-21, 26; 35, 10. App. *Iber.* 40-41.

¹⁰ Livy 40, 35; 44, 47-50. App. *Iber.* 43. Diodor. 29, 26. Plut. *Tib. Gracch.* 1, 5. Poly. 26, 4. Flor. 2, 17, 9. Oros. 4, 20. Cic. *Brut.* 27, 104.

¹¹ For an ingenious but improbable defense of Rome see Frank, *op. cit.*, 129, 230.

¹² See Map. III.

made allies of the Roman people. These were the groups nearest the military posts of the Romans.

This territory Scipio handed over to his successors, the first two provincial governors sent out by Rome.¹³ These two men, not of consular rank though granted proconsular power, were given as separate military districts the territories known as Hither and Farther Spain. It was thought that the provinces would remain pacified, and so the number of troops was reduced.¹⁴ But the military strength of the interior tribes was underestimated. The obstinate defense of the natives together with the lack of continuity arising from frequent changes in commanders of the invading forces reduced Roman advance to a minimum. In the year 197 B.C. the increasing importance of the new province was recognized, and resulted in the election of two additional praetors to replace the two temporary proconsular officials.¹⁵

News of more serious outbreaks led, in 196 B.C., to the assignment of one Roman legion to each province,¹⁶ and in 195 B.C. one of the consuls, M. Porcius Cato, was sent to Spain.¹⁷ The successes of Cato offered a marked contrast to the doubtful or fruitless victories of his predecessors. Under his leadership the Romans subdued the eastern half of the peninsula.¹⁸ But either through ignorance on the part of the Senate, or for local political reasons,¹⁹ the provinces were declared pacified, and the control passed back in 194 B.C. to the regularly appointed praetors. From that date up to 171 B.C. the Roman advance was uneven. A defeat of Aemilius Paulus in 190 B.C. was offset by a victory

¹³ Livy 28, 38. *App. Iber.* 38. This division was probably made in order that one governor might watch the Celtiberi from the east while the other watched the Lusitani from the south.

¹⁴ Livy 30, 41.

¹⁵ Livy 32, 27-28; 33, 25. *App. Iber.* 39.

¹⁶ Livy 33, 26. *App. Iber.* 39.

¹⁷ See note 9.

¹⁸ A striking proof of the weakness of the Romans is to be found in the fact that Cato's first step was to drive a native force from Rhodae at the extreme northwest of the peninsula.

¹⁹ A desire to thwart the ambitions of the younger Scipio. See Heitland, *Roman Republic*, II, 43.

later in the same year.²⁰ Discontent began to appear not only among the legionaries, but even among the commanders;²¹ due in the former case to the length of service, the distance from home, and the hardships of the Spanish campaigns; the official unrest being a proof that Spain was not the most convenient place for refilling one's purse, or for the social and intellectual diversions which made Greece such an attractive field of operations.²² The pecuniary disadvantages of a Spanish command did not come from the poverty of the peninsula, for Cato had brought to Rome booty which rivalled in amount the spoils returned from the Eastern provinces. They were due to the long campaigns which left little time for systematized looting, to the wholesale destruction of their own property by the Spanish tribes, and finally to the work of Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus, praetor in Hither Spain 180-179 B.C., who adopted a policy of justice and kindness towards both subject and allied states, based on treaties which remained in force for twenty-three years. As a result of the subsequent interest in Spanish affairs displayed by Cato and Gracchus, and partly as a result of the readiness of the provincials to demand justice,²³ Spain enjoyed two decades of peace. But the mismanagement of the Roman governors caused two outbreaks which threatened to overthrow the power of the conquerors.

In 156 B.C. the Lusitani commenced a war which lasted, with brief intermissions, for twenty-three years. In the year 153 B.C. the Celtiberi revolted.²⁴ M. Fulvius Nobilior, who was sent out to reconquer them, was but the first of fifteen consuls who commanded armies in Spain between the years 153 and 133 B.C.²⁵

²⁰ Livy 37, 46. Oros. 4, 20.

²¹ App. *Iber.* 49. For mutiny in 206 B.C. see Livy 28, 19-38.

²² N. Feliciani, "L'Espagne à la fin du IIIe siècle avant J. C.," *Boletín de la Real Academia de la Historia*, XLVI, 363-398, presents strong arguments against the traditional view that the wealth of Spain was inexhaustible. But Cato had encouraged local industries and the treaties of Gracchus protected them. The true condition lay midway between extreme wealth and extreme poverty.

²³ App. *Iber.* 49. Livy 43, 2.

²⁴ App. *Iber.* 44.

²⁵ Schulten, *Numantia*, 266-268.

This was the last concerted struggle for freedom on the part of the Spanish tribes. Its measure of success was due not only to the incompetence of the Roman generals, but also to the unity of the tribesmen and their knowledge of Roman tactics. It failed because Rome at last found capable commanders, and because the natives, unable to throw off for long their tribal and personal jealousies, lost sight of the value of co-operation and destroyed their leader. The highest expression of Spanish national feeling was displayed by their commander, Viriathus.²⁶ But his personality alone could not hold together the forces he had gathered and his death at the hands of assassins marked the end of all general opposition to Roman arms. The fires of revolt still burned in scattered sections of the country, but the next few years were marked by a steady increase of Roman victories. Resistance came to an end with the capture and utter destruction of Numantia, a city of the Celtiberi, which had held the armies of Rome at bay for ten years.²⁷

After 133 B.C. Spain, for the most part, submitted to Roman rule. The emphasis, save on the borders of the provinces, shifted from military to civil, that is, administrative affairs. In 132 B.C. a commission of ten senators was sent to establish a form of civil government for the provinces.²⁸ Romanization went on rapidly during the years of peace. Roads were built, Roman traders penetrated the interior, Spanish troops served in the Roman armies, and returned with Roman ideas, language, customs, and dress. Tribute was levied in the most acceptable manner, in the form of a *stipendium*, a fixed amount payable directly to the Roman government.²⁹ Thus the Two Spains escaped the trials of those provinces whose taxes were collected by the *publicani*. The reports offered by the historians of this period bear witness to the peaceful spirit which characterized the years after the fall

²⁶ App. *Iber.* 50-75. Diodor. 32-33. Livy *ep.* 52-54. Oros. 5, 4. Flor. 2, 17.

²⁷ App. *Iber.* 76-97. Livy *ep.* 54-59. Flor. 2, 18. Vell. 2, 1. Oros. 5, 4-5. Plut. *Tib. Gracch.* 5-7. All modern accounts have been superseded by the *Numantia* of Schulten.

²⁸ App. *Iber.* 99.

²⁹ Livy 43, 2. Cf. Frank, *op. cit.*, 129.

of Numantia. An expedition against the Baleares in 124-123 B.C.,³⁰ and an uprising in 112 B.C. in Farther Spain³¹ were the only hints of warfare from 133 to 105 B.C. At the latter date, incited by the weakness of Rome as exhibited in her defeats at the hands of the Teutons and of Jugurtha, the Lusitani revolted. By 101 B.C. this revolt was apparently crushed by D. Junius Silanus. During the following year, however, L. Cornelius Dolabella continued the Lusitanian campaign.³² A rebellion of the Vaccaei in 98 B.C. was put down with cruelty and treachery by the consul, Lucius Didius, in whose army there served as military tribune, Quintus Sertorius. So serious was this outbreak that, even though assisted by P. Licinius Crassus, proconsul in Hither Spain, Didius was forced to remain in his province for five years before his work was completed.³³

In the year 83 B.C. began the Sertorian War.³⁴ It marked the beginning of a new epoch in the history of Rome, being the first contest in which a Roman leader conducted a civil war, using a Roman province as a base. Throughout the war there was no desire expressed for independence from Rome. Sertorius proclaimed himself the legal ruler of Hither Spain, fighting against usurpers. Like Caesar, he was the champion of the Constitution; like Vespasian, his designs were on Rome. For eleven years Sertorius, aided by Marian troops and native levies, held his own against consular armies and famous generals. His downfall, like that of Viriathus, was due to the lack of unity among his followers and the treachery of his officers. After his assassination the war came quickly to an end.

The importance of Spain in Roman politics did not cease with the overthrow of the Sertorian party. Seven years later, in 65 B.C., Gn. Calpurnius Piso was sent to Spain as *quaestor prae-*

³⁰ Livy *ep.* 60.

³¹ App. *Iber.* 99.

³² Sext. Rufus, 4. CIL, I, p. 460.

³³ App. *Iber.* 99. Plut. *Sertor.* 3. Livy *ep.* 70. Strabo 3, 5, 11. Cf. Wilsdorf, *Leipziger Studien*, I, 64 ff.

³⁴ App. *Iber.* 101. App. *B. C. I.*, 108-115. Oros. 5, 23. Livy *ep.* 91-93. Plut. *Sertor.*

tore, with the evident purpose of establishing there a military base for the Catilinarian conspirators.³⁵ The murder of Piso put an end to this plan, and it was not until 61 B.C. that Spain again appeared to play its part in extra-local affairs. On this occasion it merely offered to Julius Caesar a field for the restoration of his finances and for military exploits.³⁶ The results of Caesar's years were satisfactory to both parties concerned; for he returned to Rome free from debt, and with successful campaigns in the north and northwest to his credit, while the Spanish people congratulated themselves over reduced taxes, just government and excellent administration.

Spain, as a strategic point in the struggles of the next few years, became the battleground of factional fighting. Pompey gained the Two Spains as his province in the year 55 B.C.,³⁷ was allowed to retain them for a five-year period, and might have been the first of the Caesars had he made use of his legions there. But the men of that generation, with the exception of Caesar, believed that Rome was still the center of imperial strength. Following this idea, Pompey remained in the capital, conducting the government of Spain through *legati*. In the contest between Pompey and Caesar, Spain was the first Pompeian province to be attacked. A brief and merciful campaign resulted in the submission of Pompey's legions and the Spanish tribes to Caesar.³⁸

The harsh government of Caesar's lieutenant, Q. Cassius Longinus, led to a revolt which was apparently crushed by the battle of Munda.³⁹ But the memory of Cassius' oppressions led the provincials to place their men and resources at the disposal of the Republicans fighting against the heirs of Caesar. For some

³⁵ Sallust *Cat.* 19. Sueton. *Caesar* 9. Dio 36, 44. Cic. *Sull.* 24, 67 ff. Cic. *Mur.* 38, 82.

³⁶ Sueton. *Caesar* 18. Plut. *Caesar* 5, 11-12. Livy *ep.* 103. App. *B. C.* 2, 8. App. *Iber.* 102. Cic. *Balb.* 19, 43. Dio 37, 52-53.

³⁷ Livy *ep.* 105. Flor. 4, 2, 12. Eutrop. 6, 18. Vell. 2, 48, 1. App. *B. C.* 2, 18. Dio 39, 33. Caesar *B. C.* 6, 1. Plut. *Crassus* 15-16. Plut. *Caesar* 28, 36.

³⁸ Dio 41, 22. Cic. *ep. ad Att.* 10, 8-18. Caesar *B. C.* 1, 37-55, 59-87; 2, 17-21. Sueton. *Caesar* 34.

³⁹ Dio 42, 15-16; 43, 28-42. App. *B. C.* 2, 103-106. Plut. *Caesar* 56. Vell. 2, 55. Livy *ep.* 116. Ovid *Fasti* 3, 715.

time Sextus Pompey, a son of the great Gnaeus, held Spain.⁴⁰ His departure for Sicily left the province in the hands of Lepidus, the *triumvir*. A period of peace followed, enduring to 27 B.C. In that year Augustus commenced a campaign against the Cantabri and the Astures which rounded out the Roman conquest, making the peninsula a political unit.

II. THE CIVIL ADMINISTRATION OF SPAIN, 218-27 B.C.,

That Rome entered upon her series of conquests without preparation, if not without real desire for expansion,¹ is demonstrated in the early history of the Spanish provinces. The first commander there, a consul, delegated his power to a *legatus*, nor did he reach Spain until the year following his appointment.² This indication of unpreparedness was supplemented by the irregularities attendant upon the election of the younger Scipio to command the armies in Spain.³ *Proconsules ex plebiscito* continued to be chosen up to the year 197 B.C. Then, by the addition of two praetors, a number of officials was created sufficient to govern the various parts of Rome's growing empire.⁴ These praetors governed either with praetorian or with proconsular power, and in times of crisis were replaced by men of proconsular rank. There is one instance of a quaestor being chosen to govern Hither Spain,⁵ and other exceptional appointments were made during the last years of the Republic, but in general it may be said that the chief executives of the Roman Republican government in Spain were consuls or proconsuls, praetors or propraetors. The usual number of subordinate officials accompanied their chiefs; one quaestor for each province, one *legatus* for each praetor, three *legati* for each consul.

The term of office was regularly one year, but exceptions to

⁴⁰ App. B. C. 3, 4; 4, 84, 94. Dio 45, 10; 48, 17. Cic. *ep. ad Att.* 16, 14.

¹ The theory of Mommsen, and especially of Frank.

² Livy 22, 22. Poly. 3, 97, 2-4. App. *Iber.* 15.

³ Livy 26, 18-20. Poly. 10, 2. App. *Iber.* 18. Flor. 2, 6, 37. Eutrop. 3, 15. Zonar. 9, 7.

⁴ Livy 32, 27. Marquardt, *Staatsverwaltung*, I, 517.

⁵ Gn. Calpurnius Piso, in 65 B.C.

this rule were common both at the beginning and at the close of the Republican period.⁶ Officers and troops at first traveled to Spain by sea by way of Genua and Massilia,⁷ but with the improvement of roads and the pacification of the tribes of southern Gaul, the land route came to be more commonly used. It was not until the end of the Republican period, however, that an army traveled the entire distance by land.⁸

The civil administration of Spain before the time of Augustus has not been the subject of any connected account. Some details of Republican rule have been given a place in the pages of the historians of antiquity; others may be assumed from the fact that they were common to all the provinces. But it should be remembered that Spain was the governmental experiment station of the Romans.⁹ Therefore it is not unreasonable to suppose that many early schemes were given a trial in Spain, failed, and were soon forgotten. Of the plans which succeeded, there remains enough to construct the following account.

Many details of administration were conducted by the military officials. In fact, the division between civil and military functions was not completely carried out until the time of Diocletian. But the manifold character of the duties of a provincial governor was much more apparent at the beginning of a conquest than after pacification had been secured. The administrative duties of a conquering official may be divided roughly into the collection of tribute, taxes, and all other forms of compensation which the fortunes of war brought to the victors; the regulation of industries, commerce and trade; the definition of boundaries; the introduction and supervision of Roman law courts; the determination of the political status of the subject communities; and the recommendation of individuals or groups for admission

⁶ P. Cornelius Scipio, 218-212. P. Cornelius P. f. Scipio, 210-206. L. Cornelius Lentulus, L. Manlius Acidanus, 205-201. T. Didius, 98-94. P. Licinius Crassus, 97-94. Q. Caecilius Metellus Pius, 79-72. Gn. Pompeius Magnus, 77-72, 54-49.

⁷ App. *Iber.* 26, 27, 37, 42.

⁸ Cic. *Vat.* 5, 12. Sueton. *Caesar* 56. App. *B. C.* 2, 103. Dio 43, 32. Oros. 6, 16.

⁹ Sicily offered few problems. It was smaller, well organized, a text book of hellenistic administration.

to the citizen body of Rome. All of these duties were performed under the direction of the Senate, or subject to its approval. In many cases the first step in organization was taken by the official to whom a province had been assigned, assisted by a commission of ten senators. The work of these men was incorporated in a *lex provinciae*. Of the commission chosen for Spain and its work, we know only the date of its appointment, 133 B.C.¹⁰ That it was not appointed until after a century of conflict indicates the difficulty which the Romans experienced in subjugating the Spanish tribes. However, the provincial governors did not wait for the guidance of a *lex provinciae*. The collection of revenue was too important a task to admit of delay.

There are records of large amounts of booty obtained in Spain, beginning with the year 214 B.C.¹¹ Although the totals by no means equalled those returned from the East, the Romans might reasonably hope that the province, when subdued, would prove a profitable investment. Money and corn were usually sent out to the Roman armies but this was due to the fact that the local mints were not used by the Romans, also to the lack of surplus grain in a land whose wealth lay in cattle, orchards and minerals.¹² The booty consisted of bullion or works of art,¹³ as did the compulsory contributions which were often levied.¹⁴ Some regular tribute was evidently collected early in the time of Roman occupation, for Livy records that in 205 B.C. the communities of Spain were ordered to pay double taxes and furnish clothing for the army.¹⁵ The amount of the regular tax was light, for the Romans, in order to retain the friendship of the tribes, levied only the twentieth required by their Barcid predecessors.¹⁶

¹⁰ App. *Iber.* 99.

¹¹ Livy 25, 39; cf. 26, 47; 28, 38; 31, 20; 32, 7; 33, 27; 34, 46; 39, 42; 40, 43; 41, 7; 41, 28; 45, 4.

¹² 182 B.C., the first exception noted (Livy 40, 35).

¹³ Cf. references cited in note 11.

¹⁴ Livy 21, 61; 22, 20; 40, 47. Voluntary contribution, Livy 40, 44.

¹⁵ Livy 29, 3; cf. 30, 3.

¹⁶ One may agree with the statement of Frank (*op. cit.*, 129), that "this new province cost the state more than it yielded," if the reckon-

Commercial life had been interrupted by the Roman conquest. The series of wars during the latter half of the third century had not only robbed Spain of her portable wealth, and put an end to steady industrial production of any sort, but it had also brought with it a new master and new commercial relationships. Of the first steps in the necessary readjustment we know little. In 197 B.C. Cato reopened the silver and iron mines.¹⁷ The other industries apparently struggled along without much assistance. As a rule the extant accounts of contemporaries are filled with military deeds and little space is given to consideration of the commercial and industrial development of Spain. Individual merchants followed the Roman standards,¹⁸ but how they were protected, what restrictions were placed upon the native dealers, or what encouragement was given them we do not know. An excellent statement of the administrative problems as they appeared to the Romans is given by Bouchier:¹⁹

The task which lay before the Republic was to complete the conquest of the peninsula: in the south to add the idea of a state to that of a number of isolated towns by providing common magistrates, an official religion, priesthood, language, and code of laws; in the center to develop the natural resources of a not very productive district; in the north to bring down the fierce highland clans to the plains, to overawe them with military colonies, and encourage them to pursue the peaceful occupations of mining and agriculture, or else to take service as legionaries or auxiliaries.

In the year 206-205, by appointing two officers of proconsular rank²⁰ to succeed the Younger Scipio, Rome took the first step in the process of division which ultimately made of the Iberian peninsula six provinces. It was not until 197 B.C., however, that the Two Spains were definitely established as separate military districts, with a regularly elected praetor in charge of

ing be in money. But the Romans used Spain as a recruiting ground for auxiliary and legionary troops (Livy 27, 38. 209 B.C.). For the imperial period see Arnold, *Studies of Roman Imperialism*, 143.

¹⁷ Livy 24, 31.

¹⁸ Livy 28, 22.

¹⁹ E. S. Bouchier, *Spain under the Roman Empire*, 16.

²⁰ Livy 28, 38. App. *Iber.* 38. Cf. Mommsen, *Staatsrecht*, II, 1, p. 633, note 3.

each.²¹ Almost half a century elapsed before the boundaries were accurately determined.²² Hither and Farther Spain remained the two divisions until 49 B.C. At that time Pompey, to whom the Two Spains had been entrusted, governed them through three *legati*, each with a district of his own. This was the first attempt at a tripartite division of the peninsula.²³

During the wars which followed, civil administration was demoralized, if not altogether destroyed. At any rate, no hint of a reorganization of the provinces has come to us from the records of 49–27 B.C. But the mass of evidence indicating a tripartite division between 27 B.C. and 14 A.D. is conclusive. Mommsen's earlier view²⁴ that the division did not take place before the principate of Tiberius, was withdrawn,²⁵ and many efforts have been made to establish a more definite dating. The work of Detlefsen has been mentioned.²⁶ Of the Spanish writers, Lafuente and Altamira offer little assistance.²⁷ Partsch, Ursin, Mispoulet and Gardthausen have offered solutions of the problem.²⁸ The final word has not been written, nor is it my intention to discuss at length the arguments brought forward in support of different dates. But reference should be made to two recent discussions, one by Braun,²⁹ the other by Wallrafen.³⁰ The former concludes

²¹ Livy 32, 27–28. Note the exceptional union of the two provinces under one praetor during the second Macedonian war, 167 B.C. (Livy 44, 17).

²² App. *Iber.* 49; cf. 39. Livy 33, 25.

²³ Caesar *B. C. I.*, 38, 1. Marquardt, *Staatsverwaltung*, I, 102. A military division and not permanent. For another view see Detlefsen, in *Comm. phil. in honorem Mommseni*, p. 28.

²⁴ *Res Gestae Divi Augusti*, ed. Mommsen, 5, 35 (ch. 28).

²⁵ *Res Gestae* . . . , iterum ed., p. 222.

²⁶ See note 23.

²⁷ Lafuente (I, 48, col. 2) follows Dio 53, 12, and App. *Iber.* 102: "Dio al senado la Betica, y se asigno a se el resto de la Peninsula, del cual hizo despues una doble provincia con los nombres de Lusitania y Tarraconense . . ." Altamira (I, 114): "Augusto (o quiza su sucesor Tiberio) formo con parte de la Ulterior otra provincia llamada Lusitania . . ."

²⁸ Partsch, *Die Darstellung Europas in den geographischen Werken des Agrippa* (Breslau, 1875); Ursin, *De Lusitania provincia* (Helsingfors, 1884). Both quoted by Wallrafen, see note 30.

²⁹ Braun, *Die Entwicklung der spanischen Provinzialgrenzen*.

³⁰ Wallrafen, *Die Einrichtung und kommunale Entwicklung der römischen Provinz Lusitanien*.

there was a division into three provinces made by Agrippa in 27 B.C., at which time Baetica was made a senatorial province; that between 7 and 2 B.C. Augustus revised the boundaries of the first division, giving to Baetica, Lusitania and Hispania Citerior the territories which they held up to the time of Diocletian. On the other hand, Wallrafen believes that the division of Agrippa was not an administrative one, but simply the withdrawal of Lusitania from Hispania Ulterior and of Asturia and Callaecia from Hispania Citerior to form a military district. He believes that the temporary division was made permanent, that is, transferred from a military to a civil basis, by the definite organization of the three provinces about 15 B.C., and that at that date Baetica became a senatorial province.

The shortest and clearest presentation of the arguments in favor of a dating after 15 B.C. is given by Kornemann,³¹ who bases his selection of 15 B.C. as a *terminus post quem* on (1) the foundation of the colony Augusta Emerita in 25 B.C., (2) the praetorian rank of P. Carisius, governor of Citerior 25-22 B.C., (3) the probable date, 19 B.C., of Agrippa's measurements of *Lusitania cum Asturia et Callaecia*, (4) the foundation of other Augustan colonies "*utraq̃ue Hispania*" in 15 B.C. On the other hand, 6 B.C. is taken as the *terminus ante quem* on the grounds (1) that Pliny made use of statistics compiled by Augustus, i.e., before 14 A.D.; (2) that these statistics were compiled before the establishment of the Lancienses Oppidani as a stipendiary community, i.e., before 6 A.D.; (3) that the tripartite division included a change in the eastern boundary of Baetica, a change made before 2 B.C.; (4) that Callaecia, made an administrative unit for the first time in the tripartite division, addressed C. Caesar in an inscription which dates from before 6 B.C.

Between 15 B.C. and 6 B.C., Kornemann points out three possible dates for the division, 14, 10, and 8 B.C. The choice of one of these dates must be an arbitrary one without positive proof. In rejecting Kornemann's choice of 8 B.C., and accepting Wallrafen's date, 15-14 B.C., I am governed by a fairly strong argu-

³¹ Kornemann, *Die Entstehung der Provinz Lusitanien*.

ment from probability. There was no reason why the division should be postponed after the final subjugation of the Astures and Cantabri. Then, if ever, was the time to transfer Baetica from imperial to senatorial control. The military importance of Lusitania as a base of attack upon the northern tribes ceased with their conquest, and the troops could be transferred without much fear to the Hither Province. The evidence which appears to favor a later date can be explained independently of such a supposition. An inscription of Baetica³² came at a time of general rejoicing and need not have represented any local change at that time. In like manner the honors paid to C. and Lucius Caesar³³ by the provincials may be dated at 8 B.C. without affecting the date of the tripartite division. The strongest argument in favor of the later date is that the changes were not incorporated in the *Agrippa-Karte*, and that Augustus would not make such changes before the death of Agrippa through fear of injuring the pride of his lieutenant. One may question the assumption that exact provincial divisions were given in the *Karte*, and it is highly improbable that Augustus would postpone an administrative step for eight years with the sole motive of preserving intact the pride of Agrippa.³⁴

III. MUNICIPAL DEVELOPMENT OF SPAIN, 218-27 B.C.

Although Augustus was professedly and at heart an Occidentalist he utilized all traces of Hellenistic organization in the administration of the great western territories of Rome. Greek civilization had been spread over the Mediterranean lands in and by city-states, and even the vast ideas of world-empire and uni-

³² Imp. Caesari Augusto p(atri) p(atriae), Hispania Ulterior Baetica, quod beneficio eius et perpetua cura provincia pacata est . . . (Dessau, I, 103 = CIL, VI, 31267). Mispoulet would date the division of Hispania Ulterior from this inscription, on or after 2 B.C. (*Revue de Philologie*, XXX, 302).

³³ Kornemann, *op. cit.*, 228, notes 1, 2.

³⁴ Agrippa's pride did not always hinder Augustus. See Bury, *Students' Roman Empire*, 50. For another refutation of this argument see Wallrafen, 56.

versal citizenship had not driven out of use the time-tried and successful method of incorporating new communities into a common *Kulturgebiet* by the establishment of urban centers as ever-present reminders of the power and glory of the conquerer. In the three Gauls little pioneering work had been done,¹ but in Spain and particularly in Baetica the earlier foundations of Phoenician and Carthaginian settlements afforded the Romans a basis for the approved method of administration. The persistence and power of this foreign influence had had its effect on native organization. The old tribal units were breaking down, and many of the village communities exercised the sovereign rights of a Greek *polis*.

Of the 175 towns in Baetica at the time of Augustus, Abdera, Asido, Baelo, Ebusus, Gades, Lascuta, Malaca, Oba, Sexi, Turiregina, Vesci, and Iptuci were foreign settlements. Some of them dated back to the days of Phoenician colonization. They were originally trading stations, and as such had exerted a marked influence over the native tribes of the adjacent interior. It was not until the advent of the Barcids, however, in 226 B.C. that any attempt at thorough exploitation was made. During their rule the people of the southern part of the peninsula learned the cost of civilization. The Turduli, Turdetani and Baeturi were tamed, were trained to pay tribute in men and money, and were taught to live in cities, to prefer the restraints of peace to the freedom of tribal war.

After this preliminary education, the people of Baetica proved to be docile pupils of the Romans. By 133 B.C. this section of the Farther Province was essentially romanized.² The coins of many of the towns indicate a continuous municipal life from the time of the Carthaginian conquest.³ The political readjustment was not difficult.⁴ The commercial readjustment, however, was more arduous. It was most keenly felt, no doubt, by the traders of

¹ O. Hirschfeld, *Klio*, VIII (1908), 464-476. Reprinted in *Kleine Schriften*, No. VI.

² Strabo 3, 2, 15.

³ Zobel de Zangroniz, II, 3-12, 200-205.

⁴ Livy 32, 2. Cic. *pro Balb.* 15, 34. Mommsen, *History of Rome*, III, 9.

Gades and the other Carthaginian settlements, men whose knowledge and acquaintanceship were confined to a business world of which Rome had not been a part. But the subjugation of the neighboring restless tribes brought peace to the country and an opportunity for economic recovery.⁵

Throughout the period 218–133 B.C. Roman town foundations in the Two Spains were military in their character. The territory later known as Baetica received three foundations of this kind. In 206 B.C. Italica was chosen by the younger Scipio as a home for some of his veterans. It was given the title of *municipium*, retaining that status in the time of Hadrian.⁶ The only colony of this period in Baetica was Carteia, founded about 170 B.C. The Senate granted its citizens the Latin right and settled here the sons of Roman soldiers by Spanish mothers.⁷ Corduba, although it received some Roman settlers about 150 B.C., was not officially incorporated until a much later date.⁸

With the fall of Numantia in 133 B.C., the military motives for municipal establishments lost much of their force. Rome's energies, moreover, were absorbed by local reforms and civil wars. It was not until the revolt of Sertorius that the Iberian peninsula once more attracted attention. By that time administrative needs or political expediency dictated the numbers and location of new provincial municipalities. In Baetica, Caesarian foundations are the first evidences of this new policy. The colonies Hasta Regia, Hispalis, Itucei, Ucubi and Urso were established by Caesar, or by the triumvirs in accordance with the memoranda left by him. Twelve *municipia*, bearing the cognomen Iulia, were also established by Caesar.⁹

The centralizing forces of Phoenician, Greek and Cartha-

⁵ Parvan, *Die Nationalität der Kaufleute*. Fertig, Land und Leute.

⁶ Sueton. *Augustus* 94. Gellius 16, 13, 4. CIL, II, 1135. Heiss, *Description générale des monnaies* . . . , p. 380.

⁷ Livy 28, 30; 43, 3.

⁸ CIL, II, p. 306. Perhaps Pompeian.

⁹ Artigi quod Iulienses, Asido quae Caesarina, Concordia Iulia, Constantia Iulia, Contributa Iulia, Fama Iulia, Gades (see below, p. 116), Iiturgi quod Forum Iulium, Osset quod Iulia Constantia, Restituta Iulia, Sexi Firmum cognomine Iulium, Urgia cognomina Castrum Iulium.

ginian civilization did not affect to an appreciable extent the political organization of west central Spain. There are legends of Greek settlements on the Atlantic coast which may reflect an actual colonization by the pathfinders of the Massiliot or Phocæan merchants.¹⁰ The Barcids, too, had made some impression upon the farther bank of the *Anas* river.¹¹ But the people of Lusitania lived in small groups, a sort of "twilight zone" between pure tribal units and true city-states. Their cities were citadels and little else,¹² with the possible exception of coast towns like Olisipo and Salacia, or of the punicized settlements such as Balsa and Myrtilis. Far in the north the tribal grouping was larger and firmer. Hermandica, or Elmantike, later Salamanca, was the center of the Vaccaei, a large and important tribe.

The absence of any real unity made conquest by the Romans as difficult as it was certain. Each small group had to be conquered in turn, and then watched carefully lest it should suddenly vanish, only to reappear in the ranks of the enemy.¹³ A policy of extermination was the natural result. Strongholds were destroyed and the inhabitants killed or sold into slavery. This destructive work went on from the first meeting of Lusitanians and Romans in 193 B.C.¹⁴ to the outbreak of the Sertorian War. Fighting did not cease until 60 B.C.,¹⁵ but about the year 80, Q. Caecilius Metellus founded in the south a military station which took its name from the founder. Metellinum¹⁶ was a colony in the time of Augustus. Whether it received the *ius coloniae* at the time of its foundation cannot be determined, but it represented the first attempt to introduce Roman municipal life into this part of the peninsula. The second town to be raised above the stipendiary rank was Salacia.¹⁷ Its cognomen

¹⁰ Bouchier, *Spain under the Roman Empire*, p. 12.

¹¹ Wallrafen, *Einrichtung*, p. 35.

¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 35-36.

¹³ Livy 38, 35. App. *Iber.* 44-45.

¹⁴ Livy, 35, 7.

¹⁵ Livy *ep.* 103.

¹⁶ Pliny 4, 117.

¹⁷ Wallrafen, *Einrichtung*, p. 38, note 4. CIL, II, p. 802.

Imperatoria is neither Augustan nor Caesarian; hence it is conjectured that Sextus Pompey conferred upon the town its second name, and that at the same time he granted to its citizens the Latin right. It was to Caesar, the successor of Alexander in city founding,¹⁸ that Lusitania was indebted for the greatest number of municipal additions at the hands of a single individual. Three colonies, Pax Iulia, Norba, and Scallabis, were established by him, and his liberal hand gave to the province its single municipality with full Roman rights, Olisipo. He also advanced Myrtilis and Ebora to the status held by Salacia.

In the municipalization of the Hither Province, the Romans had a foundation of Greek and Carthaginian coast towns upon which to build. The Greeks had entered this district as market seekers, and made no attempt to secure more than "quarters" for trading purposes. The relationship between the newcomers and the natives was apparently one of latent hostility, if the accounts¹⁹ of Emporiae, the first Greek trading post, be true. The mutual suspicion which prevailed there was perhaps exceptional, for in the other Greek towns the immigrant element was so small that it was soon merged into the larger native population.²⁰ On the whole, it is difficult to attribute to the Greeks a large amount of direct influence upon the political development of the Iberian tribes. The centralization of the coast cantons into urban communities was due rather to the needs of trade, and to the wealth which came from an increasing commerce. Rhodae, Emporiae, Chersonesus and Alonae had Greek settlers, but the assimilation was so thorough that only the first two have preserved a survival of Hellenic influence in the use of Greek on their coins. By the time of the Barcid conquest the city-dwelling habit had spread along the coast and up the larger river valleys. The most important of the river towns was Saguntum, an ally of the Romans about 225 B.C.

¹⁸ Pompey also has a claim to this title, but his foundations failed to become the nuclei of a new civilization as did Caesar's.

¹⁹ Strabo 3, 4, 8. Poly. 2, 6, 19. Pauly-Wissowa, V, 2527.

²⁰ Bouchier, pp. 10-11.

Carthaginian activity in eastern Spain was neither intensive nor permanent. The only foundations²¹ were some naval stations in the Balearic islands and Carthago Nova, for a brief period the military center of a new empire. From it the commands of the Barcids carried weight beyond the Ebro and the Pyrenees to Massilia,²² but in 206 B.C. the city was in the hands of the Romans, and its former owners were driven from the peninsula.

Roman leaders, then, had to weld into a political unity a few Greek coast settlements, one Carthaginian town, a narrow hinterland of hellenized natives, and a vast stretch of unknown territory beyond. Conquest was the first step, and the wars of the period from 218-133 B.C. were so severe and so continuous that Roman foundations during that time were primarily military. Tarraco, the first Roman foundation in all Spain, was the work of the Scipios.²³ It was used from the first as the chief military base of the province. Graccuris, a reorganization of the original Ilurcis in 179 B.C., and Valentia, a settlement of veterans in 138 B.C., are the only direct evidences of municipal creation on the part of the Romans during the conquest period. Many native towns are mentioned by Livy, and numismatic finds attest their wealth and number, but the general policy here, as in Lusitania, was to scatter the forces of the enemy, not to encourage the centralization which would come from the building of towns.²⁴

After the destruction of Numantia, municipal life was looked upon with more favor by the Romans. Few of the later foundations were more than organized native towns, a proof of the advanced character of these Iberian municipalities. Unfortunately the details of this period are lacking. The work of Sertorius cannot be ascertained but we know that some of his troops were settled in Spain by Pompey.²⁵ The assignment of town founda-

²¹ Schulten, in Pauly-Wissowa, VIII, 2, 2033-2034.

²² Bouchier, pp. 11-12.

²³ *Scipionum opus* (Pliny 3, 21).

²⁴ Cato sought to destroy the towns (Livy 34, 8-21). Cf. the work of Gracchus (App. *Iber.* 44).

²⁵ A conclusion based upon the number of Sertorii in Spain. Cf. CIL II, Index Nominum.

tions to the period 133-49 B.C. can be made only by a doubtful process of elimination. Given the lists of colonies and Roman municipalities of Pliny, we may segregate the foundations of Augustus, which are identified by their cognomen Augusta. The foundations of Caesar may be identified by the cognomen Iulia. There remain eight *municipia civium Romanorum* which may have attained their status before Caesar's time. Baetulo, Blandae and Iluro were situated on the coast north of Tarraco; Ilerda, not far from Tarraco, and Osca had played an important part in the civil wars; Biscargis and Turiasso were on the Ebro; while Bilbilis was but an outpost of this romanized Ebro district.

After his victories over the Pompeian commanders in Spain, Caesar granted the *ius coloniae* to Acci, Carthago Nova and Celsa. He raised to the status of *municipia civium Romanorum* Calagurris and Dertosa. Castulo, Iulia Libica and the Tearulienses were granted the Latin right by him; and the *stipendiaria* Iuliobriga and Segisama Iulia were evidently organized as towns by his orders.

From the foregoing account one can see that the Roman towns founded in Spain between 218 B.C. and 133 B.C. were conquest communities, groups of veterans settled in the hellenized or punicized districts for the purpose of maintaining peace. Metellinum, the only foundation of the next half century, was a belated representative of this type. During this period the privileges of Roman citizenship were too jealously guarded to permit their extension to native communities in the provinces.

A decided departure from this policy of exclusion is shown in the work of Sertorius, Pompey and Caesar. They may have been moved to a liberal extension of the rights of Roman citizenship by a selfish desire to obtain men, money and good-will in return for favors granted, or by a genuine interest in the welfare of at least this portion of the empire. These motives were not contradictory, and both were probably instrumental in bringing about the official romanization of Spain.

There were four factors which made this new policy practicable and desirable. In the first place the districts were pre-

pared for local autonomy. Then, too, it was to the best interest of the party leaders to obtain the fidelity of the provincials by liberal grants of citizenship. Again, the independent powers (assumed or conferred) of these leaders freed them from the restraints of the conservative authorities in Rome. Finally, the *Leges Iulia* and *Plautia Papiria* had established a precedent which Sertorius and his successors were quick to follow.²⁶

IV. THE PROVINCIAL REORGANIZATION OF SPAIN UNDER AUGUSTUS

The history of Roman Spain under the beneficent rule of Augustus and his successors in the principate is more intelligible than that of any period previous thereto. This is true in the first place because romanization was carried on by intelligent men following a definite plan, and in the second place because it was not confined to a portion of the peninsula but included the whole of it. Unity and continuity were, therefore, the two characteristics of Roman rule under the early Empire. Spain had had a century of vain resistance to Roman arms, a second century of administrative experiments and civil wars; under the Empire it was to have a season of peace and prosperity. During this time the Spanish people demonstrated their ability along many different lines. They furnished Rome material wealth from fields and mines,¹ gave soldiers, scholars, poets, priests and two of her most famous emperors.² The foundation upon which this

²⁶ Roman municipalities (*coloniae* and *municipia*) in Spain before Augustus:

	Lusitania	Baetica	Hispania Citerior
Founded by Caesar	6	17	8
Other foundations	2	2	11*

* Cf. p. 102 f.

This tabulation, based on incomplete evidence, cannot claim mathematical accuracy. It is correct, at least, in showing that Caesar's foundations outnumbered those of all his predecessors, and in demonstrating that the greater portion of Caesarian towns were in the southwestern quarter of the peninsula.

¹Mispoulet, *Le régime des mines*; Feliciani, *L'Espagne*; Fertig, *Land und Leute*.

²Trajan and Hadrian. For lists of famous men see Diercks, *Geschichte Spaniens*; Jung, *Romanische Landschaften*; Bouchier, *Spain under the Roman Empire*; Arnold, *Studies*.

greatness rested was the reorganization by Augustus and the efficient administration which he introduced into the peninsula.

Before Spain could be treated as a unit for administrative purposes, there remained one final step of pacification in the subjugation of the hardy mountaineers of the northwest.³ The campaign, although pressed with the utmost vigor by the most skillful of Rome's generals, covered a period of twelve years (28-16 B.C.). Even then success came as a result of extermination rather than through pacification. The establishment of three legions in the lowlands nearby served, however, to keep the survivors quiet, and allowed the more submissive tribes to cultivate their fields in peace. Meanwhile the work of reorganization had begun.

Although there is no definite statement by the authorities as to a general census of the Spanish people, it may safely be assumed that an enumeration of the inhabitants as a basis for taxation and military levies was made by Augustus soon after a similar task had been undertaken in the Gallic provinces.⁴ At the same time, under the direction of Agrippa, there was compiled a mass of geographical statistics which furnished the later writers on Spain practically all their information concerning roads, towns and natural features of the country.⁵ It was in this work of Agrippa that there appeared for the first time details of the tripartite division of the Spanish provinces. The inadvisability of continuing the old units of Hither and Farther Spain, even as military districts, had been recognized by Pompey; and the strategy of the Cantabrian war rendered desirable a division which would unite the northwest quarter of Spain under the control of a single authority. In this survey of Agrippa, Baetica included the territory bounded on the south by the Atlantic and the Mediterranean from the mouth of the river Anas to the southernmost point of the lands of the Contestani, a little below Carthago Nova. From that point the line ran to

³ Gardhausen, *Augustus und seine Zeit*, I, 691 ff.

⁴ Hirschfeld, *Klio*, VIII (1908), 464-476. See Ch. III, note 1. Arnold, *op. cit.*, 141.

⁵ Detlefsen, *Die Anordnung der Bücher des Plinius*, 12, note 1; cf. Braun, *Die Entwicklung der spanischen Provinzialgrenzen*, 8-81, 100 ff.

the northwest through the country of the Oretani until it reached the Anas at a point not far above Metellinum; thence generally along the Anas to the ocean. Lusitania included all the western part of the peninsula, its eastern boundary being the Anas up to the point where the Baetica line turned eastward. Thence the line ran to the north until it reached the Pyrenees.⁶ The combined area of these two divisions was not equal to that of the third. Equality in area, however, was not the aim of the administration. That other motives governed can be seen in the changes made by Augustus.⁷ For the boundaries of Lusitania were moved southward to the river Durius, thereby uniting in the larger Hispania Citerior the two most unsettled districts of the Cantabri and the Astures. Baetica was reduced by a shift in its northern boundary, which then reached the Mediterranean at a point between Murgi and Urçi about seventy-five miles south of Carthago Nova.⁸

Almost three centuries passed before the tripartite division was changed. During that time Spain exerted its greatest influence on the Roman world. Differing widely as they did in natural resources, racial elements and degree of civilization, the three provinces received varying forms of administrative attention, and their contributions to Rome were correspondingly unlike. Still, it was the aim of the Roman government to obtain administrative uniformity throughout the peninsula. Accordingly, from the very beginning of this era, certain levelling tendencies were set in motion, and the forces and devices which made for unity were encouraged, improved and perfected.

The importance of Roman roads as the arteries along which were poured the forces of Roman civilization was in no place better exhibited than in Spain. Soldier, trader, priest and scholar used them in quick succession. At their intersections and terminals sprang up flourishing cities. They made for unity and uniformity as did perhaps no other single work of the

⁶ Braun, *op. cit.*, 80-81.

⁷ These changes are referred by Braun to 7 B.C. I prefer Wallrafen's date, 15 B.C. See above, p. 96.

⁸ See Map, I. A detailed account is given in note A, p. 117 ff.

Romans. In fact, the spread and permanence of Roman civilization may be followed by a study of the road-building activities and the subsequent establishment of Roman cities in the various parts of Spain. It was one of the most significant features of the administration of Augustus that his improvements and additions to the existing system of roads were so great.⁹

In the southern part of the peninsula Augustus did little save to connect the old military road along the coast from the Pyrenees to Carthago Nova with the Caesarian road from Gades to Corduba. By this extension, Baetica and Citerior were brought into closer touch, and a double exit was made for the mineral wealth of south central Spain. From Gades via Hispalis and from Corduba, roads ran northwards to Emerita, the great center of southwestern Spain. Still northwards from Emerita stretched two long highways, one to the northeast through Caesarobriga, Toletum, Segontia, Bilbilis to Caesaraugusta, the other due north through Salmantica to Asturica. Two additional lines of communication were thus established between north and south. There remained for Augustus but one more pioneer task, the connection of Tarraco and the east with the remote northwest. This was accomplished by a road from Tarraco to Asturica, Lucus Augusti and Bracaraugusta. It is probable that Spain and Gaul were more firmly joined at this time by two roads over the Pyrenees, one from Pompaelo, the other from Caesaraugusta, to Burdigala.

PROVINCIAL SUBDIVISIONS

Two new subdivisions appeared for the first time in Spain as parts of the administrative system of Augustus. Of these the more perplexing, both with reference to its boundaries and to

⁹ Material for a study of Roman roads in Spain was collected by Hübner, in *CIL*, II, pp. 619 ff.; to this there have been numerous additions in *Ephemeris Epigraphica*, vols. VIII and IX, and in many articles in the *Boletín de la real academia de la historia*. The itineraries of the later Empire should be consulted. The best secondary sources are the maps of ancient Spain, e.g. Kiepert's; Berger, *Ueber die Heerstrassen des römischen Reichs*; Jung, *Romanische Landschaften*, p. 44 f.; Arnold, *Studies of Roman Imperialism*, p. 143; Friedländer, *Sittengeschichte*, II, 17 f. See Map II.

the competence of its officials, was the diocese.¹⁰ Hispania Citerior was divided into three dioceses. One of these included the territory which formed the *conventus* Bracarum and Lucensis; the second contained the *conventus* Asturum and Cluniensis; and the third the *conventus* Caesaraugustanus, Tarraconensis and Carthaginiensis. The first was called Callaecia, the third Tarraconensis, the name of the second is unknown.

The term diocese had been applied to a Hellenistic division, and from the eastern predecessor it is probable that the subdivision in Hispania Citerior was derived. The chief official of each diocese was a *legatus Augusti*, an appointee of the *princeps*, although in his work subordinate to the provincial governor. The duties of the *legatus* were both military and administrative, at least in the two dioceses to the north. Strabo reported that the *legatus* of Callaecia held command of the two legions stationed in his diocese, and the *legatus* of the second diocese had one legion under him. In the inscriptions some of the *legati* are entitled *iuridici*, proving that juridical power was also theirs.

The three dioceses organized by Augustus were reduced to two in the principate of Claudius, the *conventus* Cluniensis being attached to the diocese Tarraconensis, and the *conventus* Asturum attached to the diocese Callaecia. Under the titles Asturia et Callaecia and Tarraconensis these two divisions remained unchanged to 214 A.D. At that date some reorganization was made, probably the transference of the western military post, Legio, to the jurisdiction of the eastern *legatus*. Finally, under Constantine or Diocletian, the diocese Asturia et Callaecia became a separate province.

Each province was subdivided into judicial districts called *conventus iuridici*. There were fourteen of these districts in the Three Spains, four in Baetica, three in Lusitania, and seven in Hispania Citerior. Roman law had been administered in the Republican period by the provincial governors and their assist-

¹⁰ For a discussion of the diocese see Kornemann, in Pauly-Wissowa, V, 716-721; and also "Die Dioezesen der Provinz Hispania Citerior," *Klio*, III, 323-325. Mispoulet, *Revue de Philologie*, XXXIV (1910), 309-328.

ants, generally during the months of winter when the troops were at rest. Under Augustus the time of the sessions was changed to the summer, the judicial centers were increased in number and made permanent, and the boundaries of their spheres of jurisdiction accurately defined. Although Hübner¹¹ divided the *conventus* Cordubensis into two parts, basing his division upon Pliny's account, it appears more reasonable to accept Detlefsen's¹² correction in punctuation, and to consider each district a compact geographical unit.

The generalization, commonly accepted, that the *conventus* were arranged in such a manner as to break up existing local groupings is only partly true.¹³ If it had been the intention to dissolve tribal organization by this system, the districts to which the divisive policy would have been applied were those of the northwest where tribal loyalty was most in evidence. But the *civitates* of the Varduli, Cantabri and others were united in the same judicial area. In one instance even provincial boundaries were set aside in order to allow the citizens of Baria¹⁴ to receive their justice from a conventual center in Baetica. Conventual organization in Spain appears to have acted as a unifying factor rather than as a divisive force.

On the other hand, it is true that a new form of loyalty was introduced through the conventual organization. The imperial cult appeared in conventual form in the northwest with the deities, Rome and Augustus, and the priests, entitled *sacerdotes*.¹⁵ This conventual cult did not become popular in the settled sections where there were numerous municipal cults, but the idea of

¹¹ CIL, II, p. 833 and map. Kiepert follows Detlefsen in his *Formae Orbis Antiqui*.

¹² *Philologus*, XXX, 276 f. He substitutes a full-stop for the comma in: *vergentis ad mare. Conventus vero Cordubensis . . .* (Pliny 3, 10).

¹³ It is true of Gaul where the tribal units were larger. In Spain each *conventus* contained at least one entire *natio*.

¹⁴ *Adscriptum Baeticae* (Pliny 3, 19). Cf. African towns Icosium and Zilis, similarly attached to Spanish conventual districts.

¹⁵ The *conventus* Asturum, Bracaraugustanus and Lucensis had *sacerdotes*. *Conventus* Carthaginiensis had a *flamen*. For a discussion of the conventual cult see Ciccotti, *I sacerdoti . . . della Spagna*, p. 44; Toutain, *Les cultes païens*, I, 99.

a territorial division midway between the urban and provincial units was used by the organizers of the early Christian Church.¹⁶

A third use of the *conventus* is indicated by the title *censitor conventus*.¹⁷ To judicial and religious officials was added an imperial tax-gatherer. Thus it was that the *conventus* gradually assumed an important position in the administrative organization of Spain and, as a result, men came to describe themselves as *ex conventu*.¹⁸

PROVINCIAL OFFICIALS

When Baetica became a senatorial province, it was, in theory, freed from imperial control, and its officials were responsible to the Senate. Long years of Roman occupation had made its inhabitants, even in the days of Cicero, more Roman than the Romans. No foreign enemies, at least for the next century, or rebellious subjects threatened to disturb its peace, no imperial troops were needed for its protection. The division of senatorial and imperial provinces, from which one might expect marked differences in administrative treatment, was to a great extent formal and theoretical, for, in addition to their great influence over the Senate, Augustus and the succeeding emperors were the real masters of the provincial governors sent out by that body. Thus, though the titles of the officials differ, the system of government was the same; the actual differences arising out of local conditions rather than from any division of governmental authority at Rome.

The chief officials of Baetica were a *proconsul* of praetorian rank, a *legatus proconsulis* and one *quaestor*. Its capital city, the residence of the governor, was Corduba. The province was

¹⁶ Hübner suggested in CIL, II, pp. 363, 419, that a final solution of the conventual boundaries question would be based on a study of the territorial units of the early Church. Jung repeated the suggestion (*Romanische Landschaften*, 10, note 2). Braun reserved the field for himself six years ago (*Die Entwicklung der spanischen Provinzialgrenzen*, 128). We await the result of this investigation.

¹⁷ CIL, VIII, 7070; cf. procurator c. Tarrac. CIL, II, 3840.

¹⁸ Jung, *op. cit.*, p. 8, note 2; Hübner, *Hermes*, I, 113 f. (reprinted in *Römische Heerschaft*); for a discussion of the *conventus* with references see Pauly-Wissowa, IV, 1173-78.

subdivided into four *conventus*, Hispalensis, Cordubensis, Astigitanus, and Gaditanus.

From an administrative point of view, Lusitania was the least important of the three Spanish provinces. It lacked the material wealth which made Baetica so valuable to Rome, and on the other hand there were within its borders no untamed tribes demanding a regular military establishment to keep them in order. The Augustan colony, Emerita, became the capital of the province and the residence of its governor, a *legatus Augusti*. This official held the proconsular *imperium* from the emperor and was assisted in matters of finance by procurators, generally men of equestrian rank. The three *conventus* of the province were Pacensis, Emeritensis, and Scallabitanus.

The province Hispania Citerior had an administrative organization suitable to the complexity offered by its size and local differences. At the head was placed a *legatus Augusti*, of consular rank, whose residence was Tarraco. This city had the double advantage over the old capital, Carthago Nova, of being nearer to Rome, and at the same time closer to the unsettled districts of the northwest. While the governor's authority extended over the whole province, his attention was, for the most part, given to the Mediterranean shore. Under him were the three subordinate *legati*, one of whom governed the district behind the eastern mountains from the Durius to the Baetis. A second, with one legion, ruled the northern districts from the Mediterranean to the territory of the Astures; while the third, with two legions, administered the extreme northwest. There were seven *conventus* in the Hither Province, Carthaginensis, Tarraconensis, Caesaraugustanus, Cluniensis, Asturum, Lucensis, and Bracarum.

MUNICIPAL ORGANIZATION

The most important single document for the study of the municipal organization of the western provinces by Augustus is the *Historia Naturalis* of Pliny. In his account of Spain, Pliny combined personal experience, the work of earlier geogra-

phers and the official documents of Agrippa, Augustus and Vespasian. The record is by no means a complete one, nor is it free from error, but, corrected and supplemented by the epigraphical evidence contained in the *Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum* and the various additions thereto, it offers material sufficient for a reconstruction of the administrative organization of Spain under Augustus.

The three provinces contained a total of 399 local administrative units: 26 of these were *coloniae*, 24 were *municipia civium Romanorum*, 48 were *oppida Latii veteris*, 6 were *oppida libera*, 4 were *oppida foederata*, and 291 were *stipendiaria*.¹⁹ The classification of these units with reference to their respective provinces is as follows:

	Lusitania	Baetica	Citerior
Coloniae	5	9	12
Mun. civ. Rom.....	1	10	13
Opp. iur. Lat.	3	27	18
Opp. libera	6
Opp foederata	3	1
Stipendiaria	36	120	135

*Lusitania*²⁰

Universa provincia dividitur in conventus tres, Emeritensem, Pacensem, Scalabitanum, tota populorum XLV, in quibus coloniae sunt quinque, municipium civium Romanorum, Latii antiqui III, stipendiaria XXXVI.—(Pliny 4, 117).

Pliny's description of Lusitania has been subjected to critical examination by Detlefsen and Wallrafen. The number and names of *coloniae* and *municipia*, as given by Pliny, have been confirmed by epigraphical evidence. Of the stipendiary towns, thirty-three were named by Pliny; the three additional towns necessary to complete the total, as suggested by Wallrafen, are Aritium, Caetobriga and Ammaia.

Aside from the striking difference in treatment between the northern and southern halves of the province, there is little

¹⁹ Reference should be made to the single example of *cives Romani qui negotiantur* at Bracara Augusta (CIL, II, 2433).

²⁰ See Map I.

worthy of comment in the administrative organization. This difference of treatment is but a reflection of the previous history of Lusitania, bounded on the south by a country of peaceful inhabitants, drilled in civilization; exposed on the north to the raids of wild tribesmen who neither taught civilization to their neighbors nor allowed them to practise any of its arts in peace. The different levels of Lusitanian life can best be exemplified by the Augustan foundations in the province. The one Lusitanian colony of Augustus, Emerita Augusta, was located in the south on the banks of the river Anas. To the natural advantages of location on a navigable stream, surrounded by fertile fields, Augustus added artificial aids to its growth by making it the terminus of a road from the south, and of two highways from the north. It was the capital of the province, and money was lavishly expended on its public buildings by Agrippa. It became, in fact, the imposing center of a highly civilized area. Far more humble was the lot of a town in central Lusitania which bore the name of the first *princeps*. Augustobriga was a tributary town on the Tagus river. It was apparently a new organization, a group of natives introduced for the first time to municipal institutions. There were no industries to foster its growth, no imperial patrons to encourage its development; it began and remained simply a way station on an imperial road. In the north a few tributary towns, chief among them Ocelum on the Durus, were recognized. But the old tribal units were used in this backward district.

*Baetica*²¹

Iuridici conventus ei IIII, Gaditanus, Cordubensis, Astigitanus, Hispalensis. Oppida omnia numero CLXXV, in iis coloniae VIII, municipia c. R. X, Latio antiquitus donata XXVII, libertate VI, foedere III, stipendiaria CXX.—(Pliny 3, 7).

Pliny's totals for the province of Baetica have been accepted by scholars without change,²² but his detailed account presents

²¹ See Map I.

²² Halgan, *Essai sur l'administration des provinces senatoriales sous l'empire romain*, pp. 51, 65, 80, 98, 121.

difficulties, some of which cannot be solved. Ten cities were given the rank of colony. Munda has been excluded because of the probability that it had lost its title in 45 B.C., and because Pliny himself practically admits that its colonial status was a thing of the past by his use of the perfect tense "fuit."²³ This excision would leave the nine colonies of the total given by Pliny.

The problem of identifying the *municipia* is more complex. There are but two of the *municipia civium Romanorum* expressly indicated by Pliny, Regina and Gades. Thirty other towns are named to which the status of *municipium* may be attributed. The use of a double name, one Latin and the other a local appellation, differentiates these towns from those of lower status. But it is almost impossible to tell which of them possessed full rights of citizenship and which held only the Latin right. A study of the arrangement in Pliny's account led Detlefsen to add three names to the list of Roman *municipia*,²⁴ which would give a total of five *municipia civium Romanorum* and 28 *municipia iuris Latini*, as opposed to the 10 *m.c.R.* and 27 *m.i.L.* of Pliny. Without any definite statement of status, or any corroborative evidence, this addition of Detlefsen cannot be taken as more than a possible conjecture. There are three communities, however, which may be included in the number of *municipia* on evidence which, in my opinion, outweighs the report of Pliny. Italica was a *municipium* in the Republican period and was made a colony by Hadrian. It also struck coins which are dated from 27 B.C. to 23 A.D. Carmo was a large and important town throughout the Republican period, its citizens were assigned to the tribe Galeria, its Latin coins indicate municipal status before, if not during the time of Augustus, its *pontifex sacrorum publicorum municipalium* was a municipal officer. Abdera struck two coins which date from the principates of Augustus and Tiberius. The first, with the inscription *Ti. Caesar Augusti F.*, is Augustan, and bears also the letters *D.D.*, which prove the existence of a municipal decurionate. The Tiberius coin does not bear the

²³ Pliny 3, 12: inter quae [colonias] fuit Munda.

²⁴ Segida, Ulia, Urgao (Philologus, XXX, 276).

D.D., but the very fact that a coin could be struck bearing the name of the town shows that it still retained its municipal status. The *flamen divi Augusti* and the *duovir* of the inscriptions also bear witness to the status of the town.²⁵

Of the six *oppida libera* given in Pliny's totals, but two are mentioned in the detailed account, Astigi Vetus and Ostippo. Singilia Barba may be added to the number because it appears to have retained a hint of its former status in the name adopted when Vespasian granted to it the Latin right, *Municipium Flavium Liberum*.²⁶ Cartima has been classed as a free town on account of an inscription which was set up in honor of a *decemvir*.²⁷ This title is also found in an inscription from Ostippo,²⁸ and is, in all probability, the regular magistracy of an *oppidum liberum*.

Only two *oppida foederata* are named, one being left unrecorded by Pliny. Detlefsen²⁹ has suggested Ripa, and Hübner³⁰ proposed Suel, but neither of these conjectures can be verified.

The colonies of Baetica were increased in number by three Augustan foundations.³¹ In seeking motives for their establishment in this pacified and thickly populated area, one must pass by the usual hypothesis of military or administrative necessity. The desire to foster economic growth may have guided the founder in the selection of sites, but the most pressing problem of Augustus was the discharge and settlement of his land-hungry veterans. Some of the older colonies of Baetica received groups of legionaries, and it was, no doubt, as veteran settlements that the new foundations were established. The *cognomina* Augusta Gemella, and Augusta Firma have a military flavor.

Of the *municipia*, Gades alone honored Augustus in its name.

²⁵ With one exception the municipal *flamines* of Spain were citizens of *municipia* or *coloniae*. But see Geiger, *De sacerdotibus Augustorum municipalibus*, 3-6.

²⁶ CIL, II, 2021, 2025.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 1953.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 5048.

²⁹ *Philologus*, XXX, 271.

³⁰ CIL, II, p. 246.

³¹ Astigi, Tucci, and possibly Asido.

It is reported³² that Gades received municipal rights from Caesar in 45 B.C., but the cognomen Augustani is taken as a bit of contradictory evidence. May it not have come through the confirmation of Caesar's grant, or because of additional privileges (or settlers) under Augustus? The title *Parens* which is given to Agrippa, and the inscription *Providentiae Augustae* on coins show at least that the attentions of the *princeps* and his lieutenant were gratefully received.

In general, however, the southern section of Hispania Ulterior received from Augustus comparatively scant attention. The work of Caesar had been sufficiently thorough in the extension of political privileges to the urban communities; there were no townless areas necessitating special organization, or additional settlers; there were none to punish, none to reward. Baetica worked out its own salvation for almost a century unaided. The attention of Augustus, and of his successors, Julian and Flavian, was fixed upon that difficult problem, the incorporation and romanization of the new land in the northwest.

*Hispania Criterior*³³

... civitates provincia ipsa praeter contributas aliis CCXCIII continet, oppida CLXXVIII, in iis colonias XII, oppida civium Romanorum XIII, Latinorum veterum XVIII, foederatorum unum, stipendiaria CXXXV.—(Pliny, 3, 18.)

The detailed account of this province by Pliny gives eleven of the twelve colonies listed in the totals. Three towns have been proposed for the honor of twelfth place, of which Dertosa appears to have the best claims.³⁴

With reference to the *municipia*, both Roman and Latin, Pliny's sins are those of omission. Eleven names of *municipia civium Romanorum* are given out of a total of thirteen; sixteen *oppida Latinorum veterum*, of a total of eighteen. Detlefsen³⁵ would have us look to the northwest for the missing towns because the three *conventus* of that section have no towns of higher

³² Cic. *pro Balb.* 15, 34. Livy, 32, 2.

³³ See Map I.

³⁴ Pauly-Wissowa, V, 1, 247.

³⁵ *Philologus*, XXXII, 619-621.

status definitely assigned to them in Pliny's account. The chief argument against this view is that a special form of administration was given to this section of the province. Whether or not this argument may be forced to the extent of denying the existence of any municipal units, the fact remains that the establishment of Roman or Latin towns in this district is highly improbable. Bracara Augusta had a group of Roman citizens who possessed an independent organization; a proof that this was not a Roman *municipium*. Again, an official was said to have performed all the honors in his "*res publica*," a term which was not applied to towns which had been granted the Latin right. The only indication of higher status in any of these communities is the appellation *urbs* attributed to Asturica Augusta by Pliny. The evidence will support the conclusion that there were fifteen stipendiary units established by Augustus in this newly conquered territory, but it does not bear out Detlefsen's conjecture that towns of higher status were founded there by Augustus.³⁶

The effect of the reorganization upon the Hither Province was to emphasize the importance and to accelerate the development of the north. Augustus' choice of Tarraco as the provincial capital and the favors shown to the northern port meant the gradual decline of Carthago Nova. The foundations of Barcino, Caesaraugusta and Dertosa gave an impetus to the economic development of the Ebro valley, and the establishment of military camps in the northwest offered protection to those desiring to exploit the mineral wealth of that district. The three Augustan colonies in the south, Ilici, Libisosa and Salaria, were veteran settlements, as were the four colonies of the north. Virítane and group allotments were also made to veterans, and around the military camps there grew up settlements in which veterans undoubtedly resided.

NOTE A

The details of the final Augustan division are as follows. The boundaries of the province of Baetica, beginning at the south-

³⁶ See Chap. V.

west corner, included the town of Murgi.³⁷ Epigraphical evidence has helped to fix the location of this town close by the sea in the modern Campo de Dalías.³⁸ The exact line between Baetica and the nearer province lay between Murgi of the former and Urci of the latter.³⁹ Following possibly the course of some intervening stream, the boundary reached the watershed of Mons Solonius,⁴⁰ keeping to that natural line up to the point where it sinks into the valley south and east of Granada. There the line turned northward, passing to the east of Illiberi.⁴¹ The next point which may with certainty be attributed to the territory of Baetica is Tucci.⁴² With equal certainty, Mentesa⁴³ lies within Hispania Citerior. The natural boundary between these two would be the Guadalbullon,⁴⁴ a tributary of the Baetis. Following along this stream the provincial line would reach and include Ossigi,⁴⁵ at which point the river Baetis first enters the province to which it has given its name. Such a line would place the *municipium* Aurgi⁴⁶ within Baetica.

After crossing the Baetis the boundary can be described only in the most general terms. It is known that Sisapo⁴⁷ was in Baetica, that Oretum⁴⁸ was in Citerior. Somewhere between these towns, through the Saltus Castulonensis⁴⁹ and along the ridges of the Sierra Morena, the Roman surveyors marked the line, bearing away to the northwest until they reached the cleft through which the Anas pours its waters to the south. This was the meeting-point of the three provinces. From the southeast came the line between Baetica and Citerior. Northward along

³⁷ Pliny 3, 8; cf. 3, 17.

³⁸ CIL, II, 5489.

³⁹ Pliny 3, 6.

⁴⁰ Pliny, 3, 6.

⁴¹ Pliny 3, 10. Ptol. 2, 4, 9.

⁴² Pliny 3, 12. CIL, II, p. 221.

⁴³ CIL, II, p. 234.

⁴⁴ Braun, *Die Entwicklung der spanischen Provinzialgrenzen*, 113.

⁴⁵ CIL, II, p. 293.

⁴⁶ Pliny 3, 9. CIL, II, p. 293.

⁴⁷ Pliny 3, 14.

⁴⁸ Pliny 3, 25.

⁴⁹ Braun, *op. cit.*, 93, 107, 113 f.

the Anas ran the boundary between Citerior and Lusitania. To the west and south, following the valley of the Anas, stretched the line between Baetica and Lusitania.

The Anas is given both by Pliny⁵⁰ and by Ptolemaeus⁵¹ as the northern and western boundary of Baetica. But the statement is true only in a loose and general sense. In no part of its course did the line cross the river to its right, or western bank, for the towns along that bank, Lacimurga,⁵² Metellinum,⁵³ Emerita Augusta,⁵⁴ Myrtilis,⁵⁵ and Aesuris,⁵⁶ are all assigned to Lusitania. That the boundary did leave the river line on the left side is evident from the fact that some of the territory of Emerita Augusta was to be found across the river.⁵⁷ Serpa,⁵⁸ a town of Lusitania, is also on the left bank, and Fines,⁵⁹ which was evidently a border station between the two provinces, lay thirteen miles east of Serpa.

The dividing line between Lusitania and Citerior passed through a mountainous and sparsely settled country. After leaving the Anas where that river turned sharply to the south-east, the boundary continued northward, passing between Caesarobriga⁶⁰ and Toletum.⁶¹ Libora is mentioned by Ptolemaeus⁶² as a town on the Tagus below, that is, west of Toletum, still in Citerior. The exact site of Libora is still in dispute, although its direction from Toletum is accepted by authorities. The result is that the boundary must have crossed the Tagus nearer Caesarobriga than Toletum. Thence the line ran be-

⁵⁰ Pliny 3, 7; cf. 3, 17.

⁵¹ Ptol. 2, 5, 1.

⁵² Pliny 3, 13. Ptol. 2, 5, 7.

⁵³ Pliny 4, 117. Ptol. 2, 5, 6.

⁵⁴ Pliny 4, 117. Ptol. 2, 5, 6.

⁵⁵ Pliny 4, 117. Ptol. 2, 5, 6.

⁵⁶ CIL, II, p. 786.

⁵⁷ Frontinus, *de controuv. agror.* 1, 51 (ed. Lachmann).

⁵⁸ Braun, *op. cit.*, 119 ff.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

⁶⁰ Pliny 4, 118.

⁶¹ Ptol. 2, 6, 56.

⁶² Ptol. 2, 6, 56. Braun, *op. cit.*, 116-117.

tween the Vaccaei⁶³ of Citerior and the Vettones of Lusitania. Avela,⁶⁴ about fifty miles north of Caesarobriga, according to Pliny's account, lay in Citerior, although it was placed in Lusitania by Ptolemaeus.⁶⁵ Thus far the direction was almost due north, but by a shift to the north-northwest the boundary reached the Durius at a point just below Arbocala. Kiepert,⁶⁶ following Ptolemaeus, does not join the line to the Durius until Ocelodunum is passed, but I prefer the interpretation of Braun,⁶⁷ who defends Pliny and places Ocelum in Lusitania. From some point slightly below Arbocala the boundary followed the Durius to the sea.

V. NON-URBAN UNITS

One of the most interesting and at the same time one of the most intricate problems solved by the Roman government in Spain was the administration of the half-civilized districts of the interior. When the Romans first entered the Iberian peninsula, they had to deal not only with city-states, but also with tribal groups and with smaller units which had asserted their independence of a central tribal authority without assuming the organization of a city-state. The larger groups were ethnic kingdoms possessing a dangerous unity in time of war, and for that reason were invariably broken up by the Romans as soon as they were conquered. It was the custom of historians and other writers of antiquity to describe these ethnic groups, such as the Lusitani and Celtiberi, by the word *gentes*. But each group was actually a number of *gentes*. Thus, for example, the Lusitani consisted of Elbocori, Turduli Veteres, Paesures, and others. If external influences had not altered the political development of Spain, it may be assumed that the larger units would have gradually overshadowed the original constituent

⁶³ Braun, *op. cit.*, 67, 94 ff.

⁶⁴ Pliny 3, 19.

⁶⁵ Ptol. 2, 5, 7.

⁶⁶ *Formae Orbis Antiqui*, XXVII.

⁶⁷ Braun, *op. cit.*, 117 f.

elements and in the end would have become united under a few leaders, perhaps a single one. Such was the growth of Spain after the expulsion of the Moors, and such was the development of England from 449 to 828. But the processes were reversed in the Iberian peninsula by the introduction of the city-state principle. The tribal units of Baetica had been disintegrated by the driving attacks of the Barcids and by the no less potent influence of the Phoenician and Greek independent settlements. The separate *gentes* asserted themselves as the true political units; some centering about a citadel and taking up the forms of city-state organization, while others retained their pastoral or agricultural status. This independent spirit in the smaller units was found not only in Baetica and southern Lusitania but also along the Mediterranean littoral. Rome found in Saguntum an independent city-state with which she could make a treaty by 225 B.C. and the *gentes* of the northeast were small units. Only in the interior did the tribal kings maintain their authority.

The conquering Romans for the most part recognized these kings and their political authority only as long as they were successful belligerents. For purposes of administrative organization they dealt directly with the constituent *gentes*. Whenever the circumstances permitted, municipal units were formed, but many of the *stipendiaria* still retained their gentile character. Schulten¹ makes the distinction between urban and non-urban units that the former were given names ending in *-enses*, the latter names ending in *-tani*. In Lusitania only three units thus denote their non-urban organization, the Aranditani, Cibilitani and Igaeditani. But Hispania Citerior contains fifteen names of this sort, all of them with the rank of *stipendiaria*.

Another group of non-urban units in Lusitania and Hispania Citerior are designated by a nominative plural ending in *-i*. There are six of these names in Pliny's account of Lusitania, classed as *stipendiaria*.²

It is evident that neither the ending *-tani* nor *-i* indicates ad-

¹ *Rhein. Mus.*, L, 508.

² Colarni, Elbocori, Paesuri, Tapor, Turduli veteres, Barduli.

ministrative units which were even lower in status than the *stipendiaria*. But in Pliny's description of Hispania Citerior, there were 114 *civitates* of precisely this character.³ All indications point to their location in the *conventus* of northwestern Spain. There the opportunities for the assertion of local independence were meager, tribal organization was strongest, and the need of a different form of organization by the Romans imperative. The organization of this district has been discussed by Detlefsen in an article on the Hither Province⁴ and by Hübner in the *Corpus*.⁵ Their results have been criticized by Schulten in a special study of the peregrine communities of the Roman Empire.⁶ The conclusions of Schulten have been followed with but few changes.

The main problems are those of terminology, for not only does Pliny, the chief source, contradict himself, but he also differs from the usage of the inscriptions. Pliny describes one of these *conventus* as follows:

In Cluniensem conventum Varduli ducunt populos XIII, ex quibus Alabanenses tantum nominare libeat, Turmogidi III, in quibus Segisamonenses et Segisamaiulienses. In eundem conventum Carietes et Venenses V civitatibus vadunt, quarum sunt Velienses. Eodem Pelendones Celtiberum IIII populis, quorum Numantini fuere clari, sicut in Vaccaeorum XVII civitatibus Intercatienses, Palantini, Lacobrigenses, Caucenses. Nam in Cantabris VII populis Iuliobriga sola memoratur, in Autrigonum X civitatibus Tritium et Virovesca. Arevacis nomen dedit flumen Arevā. Horum VI oppida, Secontia et Uxama, quae nomina crebro aliis in locis usurpantur, praeterea Segovia et Nova Augusta, Termes ipsaque Clunia Celtiberiae finis. Ad oceanum reliqua vergunt Vardulique ex praedictis et Cantabri. (Pliny 3, 26.)

If the contents of this quotation be analyzed and the territorial units classified in the order of their size (or, better, of their inclusiveness), it will be found that, after the *conventus* itself, the largest units are represented by the names Varduli,

³ 293 *civitates* less 179 urban units leaves 114 non-urban units.

⁴ *Philologus*, XXXII, 603-614, 659-668.

⁵ CIL, II. See the introductory remarks to each *conventus*.

⁶ *Rhein. Mus.*, L, 495 ff.

Turmogidi, Carietes et Vennenses, Pelendones Celtiberum, Vaccaei, Cantabri, Autrigones, Arevaci. These larger units contain smaller divisions which are called *populi* (Alabanenses, etc.), *civitates* (Velienses, etc.) and *oppida* (Secontia, etc.). Judged by the standards of usage in his preceding descriptions, Pliny employed the terms Varduli, Turmogidi, etc., here simply as "historical reminiscences." That is to say, we would conclude that these larger units had no political status, and that the terms were merely descriptive with a purely geographical significance. It would then follow that the *populi* and *civitates* were municipalized *gentes*. But we learn from inscriptions that Varduli retained a political and administrative meaning, for an official was appointed for taking the census of the *civitates* of the Vascones and Varduli.⁷ Military diplomas also record *alae* and *cohortes* of the Varduli, Cantabri and Carietes.⁸ The best proof of the continued status of these larger units lies in the use of their names to designate the *origo* of individuals.⁹ A natural conclusion, based on this evidence, is that the larger units are *gentes* and the smaller *populi* are divisions of *gentes*. Satisfactory as this conclusion may appear, it does not agree with all the facts as we know them. The fundamental objection voiced by Schulten is that divisions of *gentes*, for example *pagi*, are not and cannot be independent of the *gens* of which they are a part. But there are proofs of the independence of some of these *populi*.¹⁰ Therefore Schulten asserts that the larger units of the four *conventus* were *nationes*, or groups of *gentes*; that the *populi* and *civitates* were *gentes*; and that the *oppida* of these *conventus* were not true *oppida* but *castella*, which possessed no legal status. Before discussing his reasons for presenting this hypothesis I shall add the other sections of Pliny relating to the northwestern district.

⁷ CIL, VI, 1463.

⁸ A partial list of *alae* and *cohortes* is given by Detlefsen, *Philologus*, XXXII, 660 ff. Cf. Wilmanns, 1520; Orelli-Henzen, III, 3900, 5433, 5442. Indices, pp. 137-138.

⁹ CIL, II, 4233, 4240, 4192, 4191, 3061, 6093.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 760, 2633.

Iunguntur iis Asturum XXII populi divisi in Augustanos et Transmontanos, Asturica urbe magnifica. In his sunt Gigurri, Pesici, Lancienses, Zoelae. Numerus omnis multitudinis ad CCXL liberorum capitum. Lucensis conventus populorum est sedecim, praeter Celticos et Lemavos ignobilium ac barbarae appellationis, sed liberorum capitum ferme CLXVI. Simili modo Bracarum XXIII civitates CCLXXXV capitum, ex quibus praeter ipsos Bracaros, Biballi, Coelerni, Callaeci, Equaesii, Limici, Querquerni citra fastidium nominentur. (Pliny 3, 28.)

A Pyrenaeo per oceanum Vasconum saltus, Olarso, Vardulorum oppida, Morogi, Monosca, Vesperies, Amanum portus, ubi nunc Flaviobrica colonia; Civitatum novem regio Cantabrorum, flumen Sauga, portus Victoriae Iuliobricensium, ab eo loco fontes Hiberi XL p. portus Blendium. Orgenomesci e Cantabris. Portus eorum Vereasueca. Regio Asturum, Noega oppidum, in paeninsula Pesici, et deinde conventus Lucensis, a flumine Navialbione Cibarci, Egi, Varri cognomine Namarini, Iadovi, Arroni, Arrotrebae. Promuntorium Celticum, amnes Florius, Nelo. Celtici cognomine Neri et Supertamarci, quorum in paeninsula tres arae Sestianae Augusto dicatae, Copori, oppidum Noeta, Celtici cognomine Praestamarci, Cileni. . . . A Cilenis conventus Bracarum, Helleni, Grovi, castellum Tyde, Graecorum subolis omnia. Insulae Sicae, oppidum Abobrica. Minius amnis IIII ore spatiosus, Leuni, Seurbi, Bracarum oppidum Augusta, quos super Gallaecia. Flumen Limia. Durius amnis ex maximis Hispaniae, ortus in Pelendonibus et iuxta Numantiam lapsus, dein per Arevacos Vaccaeosque determinatis ab Asturia Vettonibus, a Lusitania Gallaecis, ibi quoque Turdulos a Bracaribus arcens. (Pliny 4, 110.)

In the three *conventus* thus described there were four larger units containing *populi*, *civitates* and *oppida*, the Astures Augustani, Astures Transmontani, Bracares and Lucenses. The proof that these four groups and the nine similar groups of the *conventus* Cluniensis were used as political units by Augustus and were not merely geographical terms is found, as I have said, in the inscriptions, particularly in the epigraphic use of these names to designate the *origo* of individuals. It is true that the form used is generally *ex gente* (*Cantabro*). But the term *gens* is also applied in an official document¹¹ to the Zoelae, one of the *populi* of the Astures. Either this use of the term *gens* is incorrect, or the use of the term by the Cantabrian *cives*, for the two units were evidently not considered equal in the Roman scheme of administration. Fortunately there is a test which may be applied to determine the validity of the terminology. A *gens*

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 2633.

cannot be divided into non-urban units which are independent politically of the *gens*.¹² The only method of achieving local independence under the Roman system was by incorporation on a municipal basis. But there are proofs of independent action on the part of the units described by Pliny as *populi* which had no such municipal basis. This action can be explained only on the hypothesis that the larger units were *nationes* and the smaller ones *gentes*.

Populi and *civitates* are interchangeable terms. Most of these *populi* bear names which indicate complete absence of any municipal characteristics, for example, Orgenomesci, Gigurri, Pesici, and Zoelae. Still other have names such as are commonly applied to communities known in the province of Africa as *res publicae*.¹³ A *res publica* had many of the forms of an *oppidum stipendiarium* without its status, possessed an *ordo*, *territorium*, *magistri*, and its inhabitants were wont to style themselves *cives*, although they were de jure only *incolae*. Up to this point the contention of Schulten that these *populi-civitates* were *gentes* holds without question, but there are listed among these *populi* certain names, e.g. Iuliobriga, Secontia, Uxama, which look like town-names, and which are called *oppida*. If *populus* and *oppidum* are synonymous, then *populus* cannot equal *gens*. By way of reply to this objection, Schulten demonstrates, using epigraphic evidence, that the *oppida* were de jure *castella*.¹⁴ As a partial excuse for the technical error of Pliny, he suggests that these communities were larger than the average *castellum*, approaching the dignity of a true *oppidum* in size at least. He also ventures the conjecture that these *castella* were centers of former *gentes*. This conjecture, if accepted, would fill out the series of steps through which each unit of these north-western *conventus* would have to go in order to reach, let us say, the dignity of a *municipium*. The progress of any of these groups may be traced as follows. At the entry of the Augustan

¹² Schulten, *Rhein. Mus.*, L, 496.

¹³ *Ibid.*, under "Africa."

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 499.

troops the Lancienses were a gentile group of the *natio* Asturum. After the conquest they were still considered as a part of the Astures for purposes of military levies, census, etc. They had reached such a state of political development before the conquest,¹⁵ however, that instead of remaining a simple *gens*, they were advanced one step and were allowed to call themselves a *res publica*.¹⁶ The *res publica* became more and more urban in character until it reached the rank of *stipendiarium*. The status of *municipium*, one step beyond, was reached before the time of Trajan.¹⁷

Although agreeing in general with the solution of the Plinian puzzle by Schulten, I differ with him in one point. Induced, perhaps by a desire for uniformity, Schulten denies political status to any urban district in the four *conventus* of northwestern Spain, with the exception of Asturica. There are arguments both general and specific which may be cited in contradiction of so sweeping a generalization.

It is a common and unchallenged tribute to Augustus to say that he sought to Romanize the provincials by municipalization. It is true that in Gaul and in Africa the existing political organization was left practically untouched. But even in these cases some exceptions were made, and Roman municipal organizations were established in the midst of tribal groups. The advisability of inaugurating, at least, a municipal system in northwestern Spain was most obvious, for until the district was truly pacified one-eighth of the Roman army had to be stationed there. Still Schulten asserts that the country was left without a single municipal organization after which the tribal communities might pattern.

It will be noted, too, that in order to retain his uniformity theory Schulten has to reject Pliny's use of the word *oppidum* in its usual sense of an independent municipal unit, and forces the *oppida* into the class of *castella* or *vici*. There is, in my

¹⁵ Heiss, *Description générale des monnaies*, 252.

¹⁶ CIL, II, 4223.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 760.

opinion, a real and intended antithesis in the phrases of Pliny, "*castellum Tyde . . . oppidum Abobrica*." The antithesis was not based on size, or on relative importance. It simply records the status of the two communities.

If it is accepted as probable that Augustus made some beginnings in the municipalization of this district, and that Pliny used the term *oppidum* to denote these municipal beginnings, an examination of the units thus described by Pliny tends to strengthen the argument from probability. In addition to the six *oppida* of the *Arevaci*, eight other *oppida* are mentioned, to which may be added "*Asturica urbs magnifica*." The territory of the *Arevaci*, situated at the southeastern corner of this backward district, was the most obvious place for municipal beginnings. If the work was to be done gradually this was the proper place for a beginning. The other *oppida* were situated on or near the seacoast, and formed an encircling band of civilization around the backward district.

The acceptance of these fifteen units as urban communities of at least stipendiary rank removes a difficulty connected with the totals of Pliny. Schulten points out that there were 129 *civitates* ascribed by Pliny to the four *conventus*. Out of these must come the 114 non-urban units. If we accept the dictum that the 129 were all non-urban, it is impossible to explain the discrepancy. But if the 15 *oppida* (14 *oppida* and 1 *urbs*) be considered as municipalized units, Pliny's total of 129 *civitates* minus 15 urban units will give the required 114 non-urban units.

VI. THE MUNICIPAL IMPERIAL CULT

The inception and growth of the imperial cult in the Roman Empire have been treated by scholars with varying degrees of interest. But even those who have given the subject their most careful attention have reached conclusions which are, to say the least, uncomplimentary to the founders of the cult. We are asked to believe that the institution was accidental and incidental, the voluntary expression of a contented people, without the control

or assistance of those it most benefitted; or we are told that a loathsome custom of the effete Orient was transplanted by a calculating *princeps* to the vigorous Occident, and there forced down the throats of an unwilling people. The evidence which comes from the Iberian peninsula does not support either of these conclusions. It appears rather to sustain the belief that the natural and wholesome feeling of relief of the Roman world when the *Pax Romana* was assured was skillfully crystallized by Augustus into an abiding institution.

The reason for reviewing the subject of the imperial cult in the Spanish municipalities is not for the introduction of new evidence, but to obtain a better understanding of the relationship of the cult to general administrative policy. It has been the custom to regard it as an institution apart from the real life of the people, and the governmental policies of the rulers. Fiske¹ has found some antecedents in Roman customs as well as the Graeco-Oriental ingredients; Kornemann² has considered the cult as an agent for the advancement of Roman *Kultur*; Hirschfeld³ has noted the deep-seatedness of the cult in that its forms were transferred almost intact to the Christian Church. None of these facts can be explained as the result of the adoption of an Oriental fad, or as the product of a cult introduced by a hypocritical despot.

While Augustus was slowly recovering from an illness brought on by the hardships of the Cantabrian campaign, he received in Tarraco an embassy from the people of Mytilene announcing the formal deification of Augustus by that city in the customary Hellenistic fashion.⁴ The pleasant reception offered that embassy did not escape the notice of the local dignitaries, and they hastened to emulate their eastern fellow-subjects by the erection of an altar to Augustus in their own city. The example set by Tarraco was followed by many other municipalities of

¹ G. C. Fiske, *Notes on the worship of the Roman Emperors in Spain*, p. 101 ff.

² Kornemann, *Zur Geschichte der antiken Herrscherkulte*, p. 51 ff.

³ Hirschfeld, *Zur Geschichte des römischen Kaisercultus*, p. 833 ff.

⁴ Heinen, *Klio*, XI, 151, note 4.

Spain and the imperial cult had been thoroughly and firmly established before the death of Augustus in 14 A.D. This date is important in the history of the municipal cult in that the name Augustus then designated the second *princeps*. For, through deification by the Senate of Rome, the first *princeps* became *divus*, while the title of Augustus was conferred upon his successor. Thus two courses were open to the devotees of the imperial cult. Sacrifices could be continued to the first *princeps* under the name *divus Augustus*, or the living *princeps* could be revered as Ti. Caesar Augustus, or simply Augustus. (The two might be combined in a cult *divo et Augusto*, but we have no evidence of such a combination). A third and final step was taken when two *principes*⁵ had been officially deified in 54 A.D. Cults of the *divi* were organized, and in some instances the living Augustus was included as a member of the divine group. The increasing number of forms which the imperial cult might assume is indicated in the following table:

27 B.C.-14 A.D.	14-54 A.D.	54- A.D.
Augusto	divo Augusto	divo Augusto
	Augusto (= Tiberio)	divo Claudio
	[Divo et Aug.]*	[divis Augustis]*
		[Augusto (Neroni)]*
		[divis et Aug.]*

* No evidence of these cults is found in Spain.

A closer study of the municipal cults adds many details to the generalizations of this table. These details will be presented in chronological order, a method of presentation which will exclude many undated and undateable pieces of evidence, but which increases the probabilities of the conclusions based on the material presented. A superficial glance at the data of the municipal imperial cults leads one directly to the conclusion that there was neither rhyme nor reason to the institution. Indeed one doubts whether such a bundle of confusion may justly be called an institution. Even a careful collection, assortment and scrutiny of details has brought Toutain to a position, a state-

⁵ Augustus and Claudius.

ment of which requires a number of negatives.⁶ The writer must confess to a theory. He is not convinced by the brilliant negatives of Toutain; he believes that the cult was not a haphazard growth without guidance, but that it possessed both rhyme and reason.

The imperial municipal cult in Spain under Augustus had the following features: first, an altar dedicated to Rome and Augustus, and second, a priest, whose title was *flamen Romae et Augusti*. The assumption that this form of the cult was the only one to be found during the lifetime of Augustus is based on the evidence collected by Kornemann.⁷ The cult with its priestly titular continued without change in many cases through the centuries, but the date of foundation was before 14 A.D. in every case. There are other proofs of the reverence paid to Augustus during his lifetime,⁸ but the only evidence admitted here will be inscriptions containing the names of municipal priests and coins which indicate by representations of altar or temple the existence of a cult in the towns whose names they bear.

In addition to the first cult-foundation of Tarraco, Barcino, Castulo, Complutum, Pollentia, Saetabis, and Valeria had *flamines Romae et Augusti*.⁹ To the principate of Tiberius must be assigned the foundation of a new form of the cult, that of Rome and the deified Augustus, at Clunia.¹⁰ A ritual was also established at Olisipo in honor of Iulia Augusta, the mother of Tiberius, and another in honor of Germanicus Caesar.¹¹ Tiberius himself received cult honors from the citizens of Pax Iulia.¹² The presiding priest was in each case a *flamen*. But a new title,

⁶ Toutain, *Les cultes païens*, pp. 96, 101, 113, 152, 167. May not variety and freedom in nomenclature be admitted without receding from the position that the *principes* were vitally interested in the imperial cult? Rome's particularistic treatment of the Italian towns is never cited as proof of her indifference. Quite the contrary.

⁷ *Op. cit.*, p. 118.

⁸ CIL, II, 2106, 2703, 3524, 5182; *Ephem. Epigr.*, VIII, 280.

⁹ Tarraco, CIL, II, 4224, 6097; Barcino, 4516, 6147, 4520; Castulo, 3276; Complutum, 3033; Pollentia, 3696; Saetabis, 3623; Valeria, 3179.

¹⁰ CIL, II, 2782.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 194.

¹² *Ibid.*, 49.

pontufex (*sic*), is given to a contemporary cult of the Caesars at Anticaria.¹³ The Caesars of this cult were undoubtedly Germanicus and Drusus. The four years of Caligula are represented by establishments at Ulia and Carma in honor of the deified Augustus, and to a foundation at Mentesa in honor of Caligula's mother.¹⁴ *Flamen* is still the title given to the priest. No inscriptions of new cult officials can be definitely assigned to the principate of Claudius, but a *flamen divi Claudii* of Tarraco, and the *sodales Claudiani* of Cabeza del Griego¹⁵ should be placed in time near the date of his death, 54 A.D. Fiske says of the first inscription, "It is, of course, later than 54 A.D."¹⁶ But from what we know of Claudius' policy in Britain,¹⁷ it is possible to believe that this cult may have antedated the death of the *princeps*. In favor of this view it may be noted that Tarraco was the religious center not only of Hispania Citerior, but of the whole peninsula, hence the most fitting place for official innovations. The failure of scholars to find any trace of change or addition to the municipal cults of Spain during the principate of Nero gives in addition an argument from silence. For it is not to be supposed that Nero should add to the glory of a predecessor without seeking a share himself.¹⁸

Before undertaking a summary of Flavian activity in cult foundations, some notes on the Julian period should be added. In the first place, it should be remembered that in 15 A.D. the provincial cult was established in Hispania Citerior, with its chief official a *flamen Augustalis* (= *flamen divi Augusti*) *provinciae*, and its center adorned with a temple.¹⁹ Similar cults were established in Lusitania and Baetica, in all probability,

¹³ *Ibid.*, 2038.

¹⁴ Ulia, CIL, II, 1534; Carma, 5120; Mentesa, 3379.

¹⁵ Tarraco, CIL, II, 3114; Cabeza del G., 5879.

¹⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 108.

¹⁷ Kornemann, *Zur Geschichte der antiken Herrscherkulte*, pp. 103-104.

¹⁸ Monuments to Nero may have been destroyed as a result of his failure to obtain official apotheosis, or by the soldiers of Galba before official action had been taken.

¹⁹ Kornemann, *op. cit.*, p. 65, note 2. Heiss, *Description générale des monnaies*, p. 124; Heinen, *Klio*, XI, 139 ff.

during the principate of Tiberius.²⁰ Another phase of imperial cult development to be noted is the foundation of the conventual cults.²¹ These were certainly not a product of local initiative. Three of them were placed in districts where few municipalities existed. Their function was educational in that they presented a concrete illustration of the principles underlying the new monarchy. A third subject of importance is the office of *flaminica*. Toutain has proved that the title was not conferred *ex officio* upon the wives of the *flamines*.²² If, then, they were chosen as priestesses of cults, why were they chosen instead of men? The answer is²³ that they were elected to preside over the temples or altars of the deified women of the Caesars. The date of the first *flaminica* is then to be placed after the formal apotheosis of Livia, the first *diva*, in 42 A.D.²⁴ In conclusion it should be noted that the only titles for this period of the official municipal cults were *flamines* and *flaminicae*. The use of *sacerdos* and *pontifex* in official cults of the municipalities is of later origin.²⁵

The new foundations which can be assigned to the Flavian period are few and, in general, merely witnesses of the growth of the official pantheon. *Flamines divi Vespasiani, divi Titi* and *divi Traiani* in Tarraco have left records to prove that in the capital of the Hither Province each new *divus* was honored by an individual cult. An inscription of Ipsca records the dedication of a building, perhaps a temple, to Vespasian, the donor and dedicator being entitled *pontifex designatus*. The paucity of new cults does not necessarily indicate any diminution in strength or popularity of the imperial cult as an institution. A reduplication of priesthoods would have been a useless expense to the municipalities, for the cults of Rome and Augustus transferred

²⁰ Kornemann, *op. cit.*, 122 f.

²¹ Ciccotti, *I sacerdozi*, 44 f.; Kornemann, *op. cit.*, 119 f.

²² *Ibid.*, 167.

²³ *Ibid.*, 112.

²⁴ An unofficial cult of Livia as Iulia Augusta was established in Olisipo before her apotheosis (CIL, II, 194).

²⁵ *Sacerdos* was the title of the priests of the conventual cult in the northwest. There was also a *pontifex* [sic] *Caesarum*, but the *Caesares* were not fully accredited *divi*. Hence this cult was not official.

their allegiance from one living ruler to the next. The *divi* were not completely forgotten, however. Their names remained in the oath of allegiance,²⁶ and the records of their work in roads and buildings served as reminders of their former greatness. In order to make the remembrance of the *divi* more lasting, to incorporate it in the cult ritual, Hadrian introduced the last important innovation in the nomenclature and organization of the imperial cult. During this emperor's visit to Tarraco in the winter of 122-123 A.D. he rebuilt the temple of Rome and Augustus, and re-established the old cult on a new basis.²⁷ The priests were from that time on to pay honor to Rome and the *divi*. A pantheon was thereby formed which would continue to increase with the deification of each Augustus. This change in the provincial cult was copied by many municipalities, and a number of inscriptions indicate the spread of the new idea and its slightly varying forms.²⁸

The evidence of the preceeding pages comprises the data upon which the traditional interpretations of the municipal cult are based. That which follows contains the arguments in favor of a new interpretation. Stated in thesis form, that interpretation is: first, that the imperial cult was the expression of an emotion sincere in all its aspects; second, that the organization and the institutionalizing of that emotion were undertaken with equal sincerity by Augustus and his successors in the principate; third, that this institution was an important feature of the general administrative policy of the Early Empire as was, for example, the introduction of Roman Law.

There are certain primary objections to this theory, objections which spring from a prejudice insidious and most difficult to eradicate, namely, the unconscious interpretation of ancient terms by modern ideas. If the meanings current at the beginning of the Christian era, be given to the terms *deus*, *divus*, *apotheosis*, *Augustus*, etc., the charge of hypocrisy so often

²⁶ CIL, II, 172. Cf. the oath of the *Lex Malacitana*.

²⁷ W. Weber, *Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des Kaiser Hadrianus*, p. 115 ff. Kornemann, *op. cit.*, pp. 111-112.

²⁸ Kornemann, *op. cit.*, p. 110.

levelled at the participants in the so-called "worship" of human beings is left without support. After 1600 years of monotheism the word *deus* connotes omnipotence, omniscience. It had no such significance to the people of the Roman world in 27 B.C. It is true that hints of an all-powerful being or force, superior to all the gods, were in the air.²⁹ The Stoic philosophers were seeking to raise Jupiter-Zeus to that high position, but to the vast majority, Zeus, Hera and the other immortals were merely supermen and superwomen. There was no impassable gulf between *deus* and *homo*. If a *deus* (*θεός*) could enter an Oriental court in the form of a king, and dwell on earth as long as life remained in that king's body, the Occidental could also bridge the gap by the apotheosis of any man who proved himself far superior to the average human being. To the Greek the individual thus elevated became *Σωτήρ* but the Roman distinguished between the gods of his ancestors and those *homines* who obtained divine honors because of their *res gestae*. The latter he termed *divi*, and indicated the potential divinity in candidates for that honor by the title *Augustus*. If, "drunk with sight of power," these men abused their privileged positions, future generations refused to recognize them as divine. But if they had been faithful in the performance of their tasks, they might repeat with all sincerity the words of Vespasian "Puto deus fio."³⁰

The evidence in favor of the view that the imperial cult was foisted upon the Roman West and did not spring from the hearts of the people there, is of three kinds. The first is that of our own senses. We cannot imagine a civilized man worshipping another man as a god. The answer is that the Roman idea of god and ours are radically different. In the second place, the Ides of March are cited as proof of the Occidental abhorrence of a god-king. It has been stated that the tragedy of the Ides of March was a protest against the Oriental program of Julius Caesar. That program was a varied one, containing a campaign against the Parthians, world-empire, the establishment of a

²⁹ Warde-Fowler, *Roman Ideas of Deity*.

³⁰ Sueton. *Vespas.* 24.

dynastic monarchy, universal citizenship, and the deification of the living ruler. It is enlightening to learn just who were the Protestants and to what extent their protest was successful. There were many senators in the conspiracy, representing ostensibly a large proportion of the Roman public. Did this public include the Roman populace? No. Did it include the people of Italy? Not to the extent of active participation in the war which followed. Did it include any or all of the western provinces? If it did, they gave no sign. The leaders of this anti-Oriental group, strangely enough, were supported by the legions of the east and by money wrung from Greeks and Asiatics, the last people in the world to protest against an Oriental program. As a matter of fact, the conspirators were encouraged by the dwindling middle class in Italy and by a small group in Rome, men of theory like Cicero, and others who envied the power of Caesar. In spite of the weak showing of the Republican party in the west, there was an element of protest in the Ides of March which was not neglected by Augustus. If we compare the plans of Caesar and the *acta* of Augustus, we find that the "son" achieved a diplomatic victory over the Parthians, that he continued the advance towards world-empire, that at the end of forty-two years (44-2 B.C.) he had established a dynastic monarchy in all but name, that he had restricted citizenship to the sons of Italy, and that he had based his life work on the sacrosanctity, the divine character, of Rome's First Citizen. The protest, as heeded by Augustus, was founded on the hatred of the name king, and on an intense sectional patriotism, not on religious objections to the divine aspirations of rulers. If deification, apotheosis or incarnation had been ideas both new and objectionable to the Roman people, Augustus would not have sought, nor could he have obtained, their support by insisting upon the deification of his "father," by assuming the title of *divi filius*, and by inaugurating a literary revival which was filled with references to him as *Σωτήρ οἰκουμένης*, *divinus puer*, *iste deus*, etc.⁸¹

⁸¹ Heinen, *Klio*, XI, 139 ff.

The third source of evidence against the unwillingness of the west to enter into the spirit of the imperial cult is the work of Tacitus. No historian of antiquity is more notorious for his partisanship, no writer has a greater reputation for skillfully concealing the truth when it does not conform to his thesis, nor has his equal been found in ability to condemn with a phrase and cast suspicion over a whole life with an adjective. If the Roman people had been the unwilling victims of an imperial policy for a century, the work of Tacitus would never have seen the light of day. Certainly in his time the institution was so firmly established in the hearts of the people that the publication of so scathing a denunciation could be permitted by Trajan without fear of revolution. One may with justice refuse to accept the unsupported testimony of a man who spent the best years of his life in silent protest against a system which the rest of the world welcomed. The proof of that welcome is to be found in the growth of the voluntary reverence paid to the rulers of Rome.

That the people of the three provinces of the Iberian peninsula considered Augustus worthy of divine honors, and sought to offer him those honors voluntarily is the conclusion reached after a study of the municipal cult in those provinces. The first cult was founded in a municipality which had every reason to be thankful both to Rome and to Augustus for its prosperity and prominence, and at a time when its favors had reached the limit of hope and desire. Thanks to Rome, Tarraco had risen from a small Iberian village to become the most important city in the peninsula,³² the capital of its largest province. The divine Julius had granted it the *ius coloniae*, and the emperor himself had received two consulships from the Roman people while resting within its walls. It is true that the request of the citizens of Tarraco may have been forced from them by a despotic master, or that they made the request as a matter of form, hoping to flatter their visitor with a display of reverence which they did not feel. But as the evidence cumulates it militates more and

³² The best account of Tarraco is that of Hübner, *Römische Heerschaft in Westeuropa* (reprinted from *Hermes*, I, 92 ff.).

more strongly against this hypothesis. We cannot discover the sincerity of these men by an examination of the evidence which they have left; but by determining the method of growth and by ascertaining on which side the initiative lay, we can at least approximate the attitude of the devotees of the imperial cult.

The first fact which attracts the attention is that in all the provinces of Spain, the municipal cults antedated the foundations of the provincial cults. Again, it is known that Augustus insisted that the statue of the goddess Roma be associated with his,³³ but "after the ascension of the divine Augustus," to quote Tacitus,³⁴ the request to establish a cult to the *divus* alone was made by the Spaniards. The divinity of the first *princeps* was recognized by the provincials, and in their enthusiasm some coins were struck at Tarraco with the inscription "Deo Augusto."³⁵ In the third place a cult of Tiberius Caesar Augustus was surely established by local initiative, not at the request of the *princeps*. Finally, though the official inclusion of other *principes* in the imperial cult had its beginnings in 54 A.D. when Livia was deified, still on Spanish coins struck before the death of Caligula there are references to Livia as Juno.³⁶ None of these acts would come from people to whom the ideas of incarnation were repugnant.

In the establishment of a state religion, Augustus followed precedents. There was nothing new in any of its details. The adoration of the goddess Roma, which is often described as an innovation, had its beginnings in the days of the Republic. Roma was the Greek personification of the Eternal City's power. The important position given to this goddess by Augustus was a pledge of his loyalty to Rome and to Italian nationalism, not a proof of his reluctance to receive divine honors.

The arguments in favor of the sincerity of Augustus and the people of the Roman West in their acceptance of divine kingship could be strengthened by a study of the spread of the mes-

³³ Heinen, *op. cit.*, p. 147, note 5.

³⁴ "Ab excessu divi Augusti."

³⁵ Eckhel, *Doctrina nummorum*, I, 1, p. 57.

³⁶ Heiss, *Description generale*, 272.

sianic idea throughout the Hellenistic world, by an analysis of political theories from the days of Isocrates to those of Panaetius and Cicero, and by recognition of the general demand for a universal peacemaker. To charge Augustus with hypocrisy is to endow him with an intelligence superior to those of the greatest political thinkers and theologians of his day. To what extent were his successors of the same mind? The usual summary of the principate of Tiberius may be expressed as a series of ditto marks. He is credited with a continuation of the policies and institutions of Augustus. We learn from Tacitus, however, that Tiberius would not receive divine honors, that he insisted upon his mortality. This was indeed a break with the program of Augustus, but it is to be explained by reasons other than the ones generally advanced. Tiberius was chosen by Augustus not so much as his successor as the guardian of the true successor, Germanicus.³⁷ His refusal to accept divine honors was in harmony with the wishes of Augustus, at least until the death of Germanicus. But from that point his refusal rested no longer on the ground that he was merely a vice-regent. It has been explained as the act of a tyrant who refused to carry out the folly of religious pretence to cloak his absolutism. Tiberius was not wholly without religious ideas, however, no matter what his attitude towards the imperial cult may have been, for we know that he was deeply interested in solar monotheism.³⁸ He did not attempt to make his personal belief the state religion of the empire, but his withdrawal from the dynastic cult system as inaugurated by Augustus weakened the whole Augustan program. The *acta* of Tiberius were not made permanent by the deification of their author, succession was left to chance and intrigue, and the continuity of policy disturbed. The imperial cult had at least this measure of support from Tiberius: during his principate provincial cults were established in the three Spanish provinces and elsewhere, and the municipal cults to Augustus continued to increase in number.

³⁷ Augustus forced the adoption of Germanicus upon Tiberius.

³⁸ Cf. the relations of Tiberius with Manilius.

It is difficult to discover in the distorted accounts of a "mad-man's" career any proof of his sincerity in any policy. Nevertheless, on the subject of his own divinity Caligula gave vent to an insistence which had none of the earmarks of hypocrisy. If the charge of insanity be treated as false, the actions of Caligula can be explained as a tactless but forceful continuation of the plans of Caesar.³⁹ Claudius, in his turn, believed that the responsibilities of his position entitled him to divine honors. His policy was Caesarian in that he expected those honors before his *excessus*, but to this he added the plan of Augustus in which members of the imperial family were to be deified, as well as the *principes*.

There are two more "proofs" of disbelief in the imperial cult and its tenets by the emperors. The first is at the expense of the young Nero. It is said that no one who would be pleased with, or allow the publication of, Seneca's *Apokolokyntosis* could be sincere in his maintenance of a cult so ridiculed. Let it be remembered that Nero was but a youth when this skit was read to him by his guardian. Even had he arrived at years of discretion, proof would still be lacking that the institution and not the individual Claudius was the target of the satirist. Medieval literature abounds with attacks upon individual popes by men whose belief in the Church as an institution was unquestioned. The case against Nero and his tutor is about as strong as one which might be made against Dante and his readers. The Victorian attitude of modern critics, together with the feeling that individual attack is always at the expense of the institution, has led them to accept the report of Tacitus with all its insinuations. In like manner have they made use of the dying words of Vespasian to demonstrate the disbelief of that *princeps* in the imperial cult. But these words may be taken with equal readiness as proof of the sincere belief of an honest man in his immortality, and in the eternity of his power.

The sincerity of the Spanish people in their initiation of the various cult forms, and the sincerity of the *principes* in organiz-

³⁹ Cf. Willrichs, *Caligula*.

ing and continuing the cult have their best proofs in the importance of the institution, its penetration into all social classes, and its length of life. The details of organization have been most carefully arranged and interpreted by Toutain.⁴⁰ A repetition of his conclusions is made here, simply to justify the statement that the cult was thoroughly organized. One may object to a static treatment of an institution which had an organic development, but there were certain elements which were undoubtedly permanent. The center of the cult, for example, was an altar, or a temple. Representations of these altars are to be found on the coins of Tarraco, Emerita Augusta, Ilici and Italica;⁴¹ of the temples, on the coins of Tarraco, Emerita Augusta, Ilici, Caesaraugusta, Carthago Nova, and possibly of Abdera.⁴² In the case of Tarraco, the altar was erected and dedicated first during the lifetime of Augustus, while the temple was not built until after the death of the first *princeps*. It does not follow that this sequence was observed in the cults inaugurated after 14 A.D.

With reference to the officials, practically all discussions agree in the following general characterization. The names of the officials were *flamen*, *flaminica*, *sacerdos* (man or woman), *pontifex* and *magister Larum*. The flamine was an elective office, probably annual. Eligibility to office was based on local citizenship only, although the expenses connected with the acceptance and performance of the flamine restricted the applicants to those financially capable, and the honor in which the office was held restricted the number still more closely to the most popular of the wealthy. The office could be held more than once, and in more than one community at different times. As an added token of respect, the electors often granted an honorary life flamine to their favorites.

⁴⁰ *Les cultes païens*, 152-69.

⁴¹ Tarraco, Heiss, *op. cit.*, 124; Emerita, 401; Ilici, 277; Italica, 380.

⁴² For Tarraco, Emerita, and Ilici, see preceding note. Caesaraugusta, Heiss, *op. cit.*, 202; Carthago Nova, 270. The Abdera temple (Heiss, *op. cit.*, 310) may have been an old Punic one, but was apparently rededicated to the service of the imperial cult.

Although the evidence is not so complete as regards the *sacerdos* and *pontifex*, scholars have agreed that these officials, too, held an elective office for one year, and were governed by the same rules of eligibility, honorary membership, etc. It is only when attempts have been made to differentiate the officials that a great variety of opinions have appeared. The most sweeping negative statement is that of Toutain, who denies not only the possibility of obtaining any distinction, but even the existence of any. He supports the first position by citing exceptions to almost every conceivable rule, but the affirmation that *flamen* and *sacerdos* are synonymous terms rests upon a single inscription.⁴³

The one obvious flaw in this piece of evidence is that it refers to a *flaminica*, not to a *flamen*. Even if this objection be overruled as a quibble, the fact remains that the two terms *flaminica* and *sacerdos* need not be considered synonymous, because they are connected by the word *sive*. One may ask why both titles of this priestess should so carefully be engraved if there was no distinction between them.

One distinction can be made between *flamen* and *sacerdos* in the provinces. In the days of the Republic there were municipal *sacerdotes* whose duty it was to conduct the worship of the gods of the Roman pantheon. Fiske⁴⁴ has suggested that when the municipal imperial cult was introduced into Spain it was sometimes given in charge of the existing local *sacerdotes*, at other times placed in the hands of a newly elected *flamen*. Why the new priesthood adopted a different title he does not seek to explain. To accept the implied answer of Toutain that there was no rule, no uniformity, that the nomenclature was a matter of chance, or at best depended on the whim of the community, would mean the abrupt cessation of all discussion or inquiry. But if we insist upon the existence of a rational mind directing the institution, we may at least continue setting up hypotheses until

⁴³ CIL, II, 3278. . . . *flaminicae sive sacerdoti municipi Castulonensis*. Other examples, outside of Spain, are noted by Geiger, *De sacerdotibus Augustorum municipalibus*, 3-6.

⁴⁴ Notes on the worship, 120 f.

the true one is found, or all possible conjectures are refuted. The writer has no hypothesis to propound, but he wishes to protest against the position that there is no solution simply because no solution has been found.

VII. MUNICIPAL DEVELOPMENT DURING THE FIRST CENTURY A.D.

The work of Augustus was fundamental for the growth of the western provinces, but the superstructure of his successors was equally essential. Although complete records, official or unofficial, are lacking, such material has been preserved as to justify the assertion that Augustus and his successors used both diligence and intelligence in completing the romanization of the west through municipalization. The Iberian peninsula continued to enjoy its favored position. No radical or spectacular steps were taken in municipal development, but the increasing number of towns, the advance in status of those already organized, and the gradual substitution of municipal for tribal names in the geographers' lists and in inscriptions indicate a course of development as thorough as it was gradual.

The policy of Tiberius was extremely conservative. During his principate the municipalities of Spain enjoyed protection from corrupt officials, speedy justice, and a continuance of the advantages granted them by Augustus. The provincials were thus enabled to grow accustomed to their new mode of life, and to prepare themselves for additional privileges in the future. The one reactionary policy of Tiberius, his refusal to continue the cult of the living Augustus, brought more harm to its author and to the empire as a whole than to the people of Spain. On the other hand, the establishment of provincial imperial cults gave a religious unity to the peninsula and, as such, may be regarded as an important contribution to its national development.¹

¹ Epigraphical evidence for the principate of Tiberius is listed in CIL, II, Suppl., pp. 1096-1097. Literary sources are cited in Bouchier, *Spain under the Roman Empire*, p. 56. For the cult innovations see Kornemann, *Zur Geschichte der antiken Heerscherkulte*, p. 115.

The Spanish provinces were affected to some extent by the administrative changes of Caligula, under whom the local mints were closed. The prestige which had come from judicial control over the African towns Zilis and Icosium was removed when the province Mauretania Tingitana was formed. A number of milestones bearing the name of Caligula prove that the provincial officials were not remiss in their care for the roads during these four years.²

The activities of Claudius touched Spain even more lightly than those of his predecessor. One inscription of an individual made a citizen "*a divo Claudio*," the cognomen Claudia given, perhaps, by this *princeps* to Baelo, and a few milestones, are the only records of imperial interest in Spain from 41 to 54 A.D. Nero's principate passed without any known changes, and even the revolution of 68-69 A.D., although it centered at first around Spanish officials, was apparently confined to the military camps. The brief rule of Otho resulted in additions to Baetica of some portions of Mauretania, and the colonies of Emerita and Hispalis were given additional citizens.³

The Augustan scheme of administration had remained practically unchanged for over eighty years. It had succeeded because it gave to the provincials peace and justice. It failed because it afforded the provincials no opportunities for obtaining political equality, a failure which was remedied by Vespasian. There were many reasons why Vespasian should feel kindly disposed towards the Spanish people. He was a soldier who had campaigned in Spain, and knew the natives; he was a plebeian who had risen from the ranks to the highest position in the empire, and was perhaps, on that account, more in sympathy with others who had ambitions; his long years in the provinces had made him less selfishly national, and more cosmopolitan; his accession had been made easier by the loyalty of the legions in

² For fiscal and judicial changes see Willrichs, *Caligula*, p. 422 and note 5; p. 316 and note 2. The inscriptions are listed in CIL, II, Suppl., p. 1097.

³ CIL, II, Suppl., p. 1097-1098; cf. introductory remarks under Baelo, Emerita and Hispalis.

Spain to his cause; and he posed as the avenger of the unfortunate Galba. For some or all of these reasons, Vespasian conferred many favors upon individuals and communities in Spain. Some veterans of the auxiliary troops enrolled in Spain were granted Roman citizenship with honorable discharges from military service. One citizen was "*adlectus ad tribunicios*;" another "*adlectus in equite*." But the most important grant was that of the *Ius Latii* to all the stipendiary communities which were organized as towns. The effects of this grant were twofold: it gave to all the citizens of the towns affected an advanced legal status, and it gave to the families of the municipal executives the full rights of Roman citizenship. The actual extent of this grant cannot be determined with accuracy. It did not make all the Iberians Romans, as Josephus reported, nor did it apply to all the stipendiary towns of Pliny's lists. Within the years which followed the reorganization of Augustus many changes must have taken place of which no record has been found. New towns, no doubt, had come into existence, and others had been reduced to the dependent status of *pagus* or *civitas contributa*. Still, the economic development of Spain under the Julians, and the great number of new towns with the cognomen Flavia favor the assumption that Vespasian's grant affected a number of towns equal to that given by Pliny.⁴

Tests of municipal advance in status under the Flavians may be made by listing the towns whose citizens were enrolled in the tribe Quirina; those which bore the cognomen Flavia; and those which possessed the Flavian name in some other form.

	Baetica	Lusitania	Citerior
Quirina	15	6	11
Mun. Flav.	13	1	12
Other towns	6

This table indicates that Baetica received the greatest share of benefit from this grant, inasmuch as the number of communi-

⁴ Newton, *Epigraphical evidence for the reigns of Titus and Vespasian*, also gives the literary references. Proof of the pacification of the northwest may be found in the withdrawal of two legions from that district. See Pfitzner, *Geschichte der römischen Kaiserlegionen*, 99.

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PROLEGOMENA TO HISTORY
THE RELATION OF HISTORY TO LITERATURE,
PHILOSOPHY, AND SCIENCE

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I

INTRODUCTION

In an address on "The Study of History," delivered at the University of Glasgow in 1884, Principal Caird set in a clear light the problem that lies before History as a university study. "The expediency," he said, "of introducing the study of history into a university curriculum turns upon the question whether history is capable of scientific treatment. Knowledge which has not yet been elevated out of the domain of facts and details, which has not submitted itself to the grasp of principles, or become in some measure illuminated and harmonized by the presence of law, cannot, I suppose, be regarded as a fit instrument of the higher education."¹

To this challenge there has been no adequate response on the part of those who are professionally engaged in the study and teaching of history. In England and America it is only on rare

¹ John Caird, *University Addresses* (Glasgow, 1899), pp. 225-26.

occasions that the professor of history seems disposed to lay aside the presentation of assured fact in order to consider the nature of the foundation upon which his constructions rest. Hence it is that most of our contributions to historical theory are to be found in the inaugural lectures of university professorships and the presidential addresses of historical societies and associations. Possibly the subjects of these communications, which have much in common, are considered too general and debatable to be offered in regular courses of instruction; possibly it is only upon such important occasions that the scholar may look for an audience sufficiently expert to justify him in taking up problems of admitted complexity, and it may be that the speaker welcomes the opportunity to express his matured convictions. It is evident, indeed, that these are not perfunctory speeches; they are, without exception, informed by a spirit of earnestness, which, however, not infrequently cloaks hesitating thought. In a measure all these pronouncements, it must be admitted, are excursions into unfamiliar territory, and betray an air of having been written under pressure, rather than of being the spontaneous expression of familiar ideas. However this may be, the fact remains that the English-speaking representatives of historical scholarship, when called upon to stand out for a moment from among their fellows, find that the particulars which they themselves have been investigating can not be relied upon to make a general appeal, and so it comes that cherished researches are temporarily neglected for the brief advocacy of some view of the nature and utility of history. Restricted to such situations, it is not remarkable that the consideration of the fundamental problems of historical study has shown but little vitality during the last fifty years. Assertion evokes rejoinder—Freeman will have none of Stubbs, and Firth improves upon Bury—and each latest speaker is sensitive to the lapses of his immediate predecessors. Thus the problems, lightly touched, remain, like politics and religion, subjects on which every man is presumed to have an opinion, but which the taste of the moment places outside the pale of direct and sustained discussion.

Among historical scholars there still is disagreement as to whether history is or may become a science, though there seems to be unanimity of opinion that some part, at least, of historical work is "scientific." "Whether," said Stubbs, "we look at the dignity of the subject-matter, or at the nature of the mental exercise which it requires, or at the inexhaustible field over which the pursuit ranges, History, the knowledge of the adventures, the development, the changeful career, the varied growths, the ambitions, aspirations, and, if you like, the approximating destinies of mankind, claims a place second to none in the roll of sciences."² Bury would have us remember always that though history "may supply material for literary art or philosophical speculation, she is herself simply a science, no less and no more."³ Villari, after passing in review the opinions held on the question, reaches the conclusion that "History can never be converted into a philosophical system nor into a natural or mathematical science. Nor would it even be possible to attain that purpose by forcing it to use methods appertaining to other studies."⁴

Among philosophers and men of science opinion on the subject is equally varied. "A science of history in the true sense of the term," Jevons said, "is an absurd notion. . . . In human affairs, the smallest causes may produce the greatest effects, and the real application of scientific method is out of the question."⁵ Sidgwick did not "consider History a Science, so far as it is merely concerned with presenting particular events in chronological order."⁶

The uncertainty of the situation is shown further by the criticisms which, while condemning the present methods of historical scholars, express confidence in the possibility of a

² William Stubbs, *Seventeen Lectures on the Study of Medieval and Modern History* (Oxford, 1887), p. 85.

³ J. B. Bury, *An Inaugural Lecture* (Cambridge, 1903), p. 42.

⁴ Pasquale Villari, *Studies, Historical and Critical* (New York, 1907), p. 108.

⁵ W. S. Jevons, *The Principles of Science* (London, 1883), p. 761.

⁶ Henry Sidgwick, *Philosophy, its Scope and Relations* (London, 1902), p. 4, note.

science of history. Karl Pearson remarks that "historians have assumed . . . that history is all facts and no factors." He himself thinks that "natural history, the evolution of organic nature, is at the basis of human history," and that "only when history is interpreted in this sense of natural history does it pass from the sphere of narrative and become science."⁷ Hobhouse, looking beyond existing limitations, believes that "we can conceive as not indefinitely remote a stage of knowledge in which the human species should come to understand its own development, its history, conditions, and possibilities, and on the basis of such an understanding should direct its own future."⁸

It will be evident from the conflict of opinion thus exhibited that we are here confronted with a problem at once of difficulty and importance. Mere expression of opinion cannot, however, advance the discussion further—the only way open is to institute an inquiry into the nature and characteristics, on the one hand, of Science, and, on the other, of History.

⁷ Karl Pearson, *The Grammar of Science* (2d ed., London, 1900), pp. 358–59.

⁸ L. T. Hobhouse, *Mind in Evolution* (London, 1901), p. 336.

II

THE METHOD OF SCIENCE

What distinguishes the work of contemporary physicists or biologists from that of historical scholars is the critical self-consciousness of the former in regard to the mental processes involved in research and discovery. Scientific methodology deals primarily with the psychological analysis of the investigator's mode of thought. The purpose of this analysis, as Stallo remarked, is to eliminate from science its latent metaphysical elements, to foster the spirit of experimental investigation, and to accredit the great endeavor of scientific research to gain a sure foothold on solid empirical ground.¹ Science recognizes that all investigation proceeds in the human mind; it takes account of the fact that the order in which ideas associate themselves differs radically from the order manifested by phenomena in external nature; and it acts upon the principle that only by maintaining a constant surveillance over what goes on in our minds is it possible to determine what goes on outside.

"Natural laws are formulae which express the constant relations existing between phenomena, as distinguished from association of ideas in the subjective consciousness."²

"Now the principle of arrangement in the actual world, i.e., in nature, is not logical, but it is a kind of divine confusion, and whenever we destroy this we step out of the region of the natural into that of the artificial."³

Historical investigators, on the other hand, have made a policy of ignoring these preliminaries in favor of getting at once to the

¹ J. B. Stallo, *The Concepts and Theories of Modern Physics* (New York, 1882), p. 8.

² Friedrich Paulsen, *Introduction to Philosophy*, tr. by Frank Thilly (2d ed., New York, 1906), p. 376.

³ J. T. Merz, "On a General Tendency of Thought during the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century," *University of Durham Philosophical Society, Proceedings*, 3 (1910), 316.

"facts" themselves. There are, however, no shortcuts to knowledge, and historical inquiry, which may prove more arduous in the long run than its obvious interest would suggest, has suffered from the neglect of inquiries that have been found necessary in other fields. How far History is from making use of the recognized methods of scientific investigation may be inferred from its current dictum that historical scholarship must confine itself at present to the collection of facts, so that from these, in an undefined future, the "laws" of history may be formulated. It may be true that every science starts from a basis of ascertained fact and looks to the discovery of "laws" as the goal of its endeavors, but it is a commonplace of modern science that the collection of facts does not of itself lead to the discovery of "laws." •

"Malgré tous les progrès accomplis, nous sommes donc encore dans une période de préparation, d'élaboration des matériaux qui serviront plus tarde à construire des édifices historiques plus vastes."⁴

"Still in our little day we can do something. We can at least make ready the way for those who are to supplant us, and we may even do somewhat towards the more pious work of prolonging for some small space the posthumous lives of those who went before us."⁵

"What we ask of the historian, it is said, is, by careful investigation and impartial weighing of contemporary and other evidence, to put us in possession of the facts as they actually occurred at any given time and place. The future may be the field for conjecture and speculation as to the course of events, . . . but history, as has been recently said, 'can have no presuppositions, her province is to recall and not to construct . . . and she demands from the historian to make his mind simply the mirror of reality, the surrender of his judgment to the decree of the ages, not the projection of his fancies into a region that has forever passed from the limit of creation.'"⁶

"This work, the hewing of wood and the drawing of water, has to be done in faith—in the faith that a complete assemblage of the smallest facts of human history will tell in the end. The labour is performed for posterity—for remote posterity."⁷

"At the very beginning of all conquest of the unknown lies the fact, established and classified to the fullest extent possible at the moment.

⁴ Gabriel Monod, "Introduction," *Revue historique*, 1 (1876), 34.

⁵ E. A. Freeman, *The Methods of Historical Study* (London, 1886), p. 267.

⁶ John Caird, as cited, pp. 240–41.

⁷ J. B. Bury, as cited, p. 31.

To lay such foundations, to furnish such materials for later builders, may be a modest ambition . . . etc.”⁸

“Imperfect as our vision into the future is and must be, by using it as well as we can we shall be enabled better to serve the needs of the historians who shall come after us and enter into our labors. Comforted by this reflection we may retire once more into our subterranean caverns.”⁹

This point of view is a well-understood symptom. “And whenever,” Paulsen says, “like Faust, [Science] begins to feel that there is something wrong with its critical endeavors or its *encheiresis naturae*, it straightway consoles itself with general phrases: Nothing is too insignificant for the true scientist; or, We are not yet ready for generalisations; the detail work must first be brought to a close.”¹⁰

The procedure now advocated by historians—namely, that we should investigate the past with our minds a perfect blank as to what we wish to know or what we may expect to find—was formulated by Francis Bacon. “Men,” he said, “should bid themselves for a while renounce conceptions, and begin to make acquaintance with things themselves.”¹¹ Bacon himself, however, failed absolutely in attempting to apply his own method,¹² the value of which may be estimated historically by the fact that it has not been followed by any one of the great masters of science.¹³

✓ The actual method of science is based on recognition of the fact that “it is only when we approach Nature with a question that we can expect to get an answer. Only those who seek find. And seeking, as opposed to rummaging, consists of a series of guesses.”¹⁴ “Nature gives no reply to a general inquiry—she must be interrogated by questions which already contain the answer she is to give; in other words, the observer can only observe that which he is led by hypothesis to look for: the experimenter can only obtain the result which his experiment is

⁸ G. B. Adams, “History and the Philosophy of History,” *American Historical Review*, 14 (1909), 236.

⁹ J. F. Jameson, “The Future Uses of History,” *History Teacher's Magazine*, 4 (1913), 40.

¹⁰ Friedrich Paulsen, as cited, p. 43.

¹¹ *Novum organum*, i, 36.

¹² James Welton, *Manual of Logic* (London, 1907), II, 38.

¹³ W. S. Jevons, as cited, p. 507.

¹⁴ J. H. Muirhead, *Philosophy and Life* (London, 1902), p. 237.

designed to obtain."¹⁵ Of special interest in the present connection is a statement made by Charles Darwin in 1861. "About thirty years ago," he wrote, "there was much talk that geologists ought only to observe and not theorize; and I well remember some one saying that at this rate a man might as well go into a gravel-pit and count the pebbles and describe the colors. How odd it is that anyone should not see that all observation must be for or against some view if it is to be of any service!"¹⁶

"I think," Romanes says, "it ought now to be manifest to everyone who studies it, that up to the commencement of the present century the progress of science in general, and of natural history in particular, was seriously retarded by what may be termed the Bugbear of Speculation. Fully awakened to the dangers of webspinning from the ever-fertile resources of their own inner consciousness, naturalists became more and more abandoned to the idea that their science ought to consist in a mere observation of facts, or tabulation of phenomena, without attempt at theorizing upon their philosophical import. . . . Looking to the enormous results which followed from a deliberate disregard of such traditional canons by Darwin, it has long since become impossible for naturalists, even of the strictest sect, not to perceive that their previous bondage to the law of a mere ritual has been forever superseded by what verily deserves to be regarded as a new dispensation."¹⁷

The insistence of historical scholars on restricting their efforts to the collection of facts appears to be an expression of the desire for certainty in the results obtained.¹⁸ Bacon also entertained this notion. "Our method of discovering the sciences," he said, "is one which leaves not much to acumen and strength of

¹⁵ Sir E. R. Lankester, *The Advancement of Science* (London, 1890), p. 9.

¹⁶ Charles Darwin, *More Letters*, ed. by Francis Darwin (New York, 1903), I, 195. Darwin's attitude is well expressed in his Autobiography, where, discussing his own mental qualities, he says: "I have steadily endeavored to keep my mind free so as to give up any hypothesis, however much beloved (and I cannot resist forming one on every subject), as soon as facts are shown to be opposed to it." *Life and Letters* (New York, 1889), I, 83.

¹⁷ G. J. Romanes, *Darwin, and after Darwin: I. The Darwinian Theory* (Chicago, 1892), pp. 2-4.

¹⁸ "La critique historique et les sciences auxiliaires qui s'y rattachent offrent ceci de satisfaisant à ceux qui s'y livrent qu'elles peuvent . . . arriver à des résultats positifs et certains." Gabriel Monod, in *De la méthode dans les sciences* (2^e éd., Paris, 1910), p. 388.

wit, but nearly levels all wits and intellects.”¹⁹ Science, on the other hand, is adventurous and accepts risk. The scientist recognizes an element of uncertainty in his undertakings, and is well aware that he will be fortunate indeed if his results serve as stepping-stones for the advancement of knowledge. “Certainty is mediate, and the specific characteristic of scientific hypothesis is just that it emphasises this mediacy by bringing it clearly into consciousness.”²⁰ The hypothesis accepted by the scientific investigator is that which seems most in keeping with the facts in his possession at the moment, and the test of its validity is the extent to which it reduces phenomena to order and system. A new hypothesis is admitted when it is found to accord more closely with observed facts or when it brings a greater body of facts into relation with each other than had been done by a previous hypothesis.²¹ “As the sciences have developed,” William James says, “the notion has gained ground that most, perhaps all, of our laws are only approximations.” “Investigators have become accustomed to the notion that no theory is absolutely a transcript of reality, but that any one of them may from some point of view be useful. Their great use is to summarize old facts and to lead to new ones.”²² Obviously, then, it is not the function of science to gratify the desire of men for certainty. No scientific “law” is to be regarded otherwise than as a “working hypothesis” which has proved of value in organizing some phase of experience. “The conception,” Bertrand Russell says, “of the ‘working hypothesis,’ provisional, approximate, and merely useful, has more and more pushed aside the comfortable eighteenth century conception of ‘laws of nature.’”²³

¹⁹ *Novum organum*, i, 61.

²⁰ Muirhead, as cited, p. 235.

²¹ Cf. George Shann, *The Criterion of Scientific Truth* (London, 1902), *passim*.

²² William James, *Pragmatism* (New York, 1907), pp. 56-57. Pragmatism, it may be pointed out in passing, is the extension of the scientific conception of validity to “what truth everywhere signifies. Everywhere . . . ‘truth’ in our ideas and beliefs means the same thing that it means in science” (p. 58).

²³ Bertrand Russell, “Preface,” in Henri Poincaré, *Science and Method*, tr. by Francis Maitland (London, [1914]), pp. 6-7.

"For logical purposes a Law of Nature is a compendious formula which is intended to describe the actual behaviour of some selected series of events, and is not known to be merely a convenient fiction."²⁴

"'Law' is a term which is applied to a sequence or a grouping of phenomena only in a metaphorical sense. It is a convenient term which men of science use in classifying their observations, often as a synonym for hypothesis."²⁵

"How idle is it to speak of the law of gravitation, or indeed of any scientific law, as ruling nature. Such laws simply describe, they never explain the routine of our perceptions, the sense-impressions we project into an 'outside world.'"²⁶

The method of science is, then, something other than the cataloguing of facts. "Cognitions of particular facts, however accurately observed, do not constitute a science so long as they remain loose and unconnected."²⁷ "A mere after-one-another in time is of no philosophical or scientific interest; thus, e.g., the scientific historian will not write mere annals. Annals are the materials for history, and are not yet history."²⁸ "The task of historical science is just as little exhausted . . . with the fixing of former events as, for instance, the task of physics with the establishment of a single fact, as the temperature of a given place at a given time."²⁹ The facts of history, like those of our personal experience, are particulars, they constitute a sequence of different happenings. Now, "while the apprehension of phenomenal difference . . . is the basis or prerequisite of thought, thought proper, i.e., discursive thought, begins with the apprehension of identity amid phenomenal difference. Objects are perceived as different; they are conceived as identical by an attention of the mind to their point or points of agreement. They are thus classified, the points of agreement, i.e., those properties

²⁴ F. C. S. Schiller, *Formal Logic* (London, 1912), p. 314.

²⁵ Alexander Hill, *Introduction to Science* (London, 1900), p. 19.

²⁶ Karl Pearson, *The Grammar of Science* (3d ed., London, 1911), p. 99.

²⁷ Henry Sidgwick, *Philosophy, its Scope and Relations* (London, 1902), p. 7.

²⁸ D. G. Ritchie, *Darwin and Hegel* (London, 1893), p. 51.

²⁹ Wilhelm Ostwald, "On the Theory of Science," *Congress of Arts and Science, St. Louis, 1904* (Boston, 1905), I, 351.

of the objects of cognition which belong to them in common, serving as the basis of classification."⁸⁰

For purposes of thought and communication the particularity of experience is reduced by giving names to classes of objects. Science is the systematic extension of this process beyond the limits of what is immediately obvious. Its fundamental postulate is a formulation of the assumption on which men have always acted in "naming" things—which is, that the phenomena of nature, notwithstanding their infinite variety, may be grouped in classes. While "naming" classifies like objects together, it does not necessarily indicate relations between the classes. Thus, in ordinary language, we speak of "cat," "tiger," "leopard," without verbal suggestion of connection. Science, on the other hand, creates a name-system in which relationship is shown, as, for example, *felis domestica*, *felis tigris*, *felis pardus*. Furthermore, in addition to nouns there are verbs; actions and processes are named as well as objects. Here again Science assumes a regularity in nature that makes "naming" possible, and one of its great objects is to disengage processes from the complex of phenomena and describe them in convenient formulae. Science may thus be said to reverse the operation involved in the compilation of a dictionary, for while the latter undertaking begins with "names," Science arrives at names—like "natural selection," and "conservation of energy"—when its formulae come to be generally accepted.

Any individual fact is the focal point of an indeterminate number of natural processes. The perplexing thing in nature, and, one might say, the very reason for the existence of Science, is that processes do not exhibit themselves in isolation—such as is artificially set up in laboratory experiments—but are hidden in intricate combinations. Appearances vary owing to the interference of processes with each other; if there were no "complications" in medical cases it would be possible to state precisely the course of any malady; antiseptics are used to prevent the

⁸⁰ Stallo, as cited, p. 130.

intrusion of undesirable "natural" processes. In face of this situation scientific investigators have found that knowledge is to be obtained, not by massing facts indiscriminately together, but by following up one specific inquiry at a time. Science proceeds by breaking up the totality of the universe into parts, and by experiment and observation isolates phenomena from their surroundings. Science "is before all a classification, a manner of bringing together facts which appearances separate."³¹ "In mentally separating a body from the changeable environment in which it moves, what we really do is to extricate a group of sensations on which our thoughts are fastened and which is of relatively greater stability than the others, from the stream of all our sensations."³² In thus isolating or dissecting strands it must be understood that science does not exhaust experience, nor does any given investigation assume to exhaust the content of the phenomena with which it deals. "Physical science," Mach says, "does not pretend to be a complete view of the world; it simply claims that it is working toward such a complete view in the future. The highest philosophy of the scientific investigator is precisely this toleration of an incomplete conception of the world and the preference for it rather than an apparently perfect, but inadequate conception."³³ It follows that there will always be elements in the phenomena which, from the point of view of the particular investigation, are irrelevant—in other words, "accidental." While, however, science recognizes this characteristic in phenomena, it assumes that the "accidental" aspect springs from the limited scope of the inquiry which is being pursued. "Accident" is thus seen to be natural process out of focus for an individual investigator at a given time.

Science, then, sorts phenomena in order to identify processes. In doing this there is but one possible method it can employ, and

³¹ Henri Poincaré, *The Foundations of Science*, tr. by G. B. Halsted (New York, 1913), p. 349.

³² Ernst Mach, *Popular Scientific Lectures*, tr. by T. J. McCormack (3d ed., Chicago, 1898), p. 200.

³³ Ernst Mach, *The Science of Mechanics*, tr. by T. J. McCormack (2d ed., Chicago, 1902), p. 464.

"hypotheses must guide all attempts to attain knowledge." The result being given, and the problem being to discover how this result has been arrived at, science is forced to adopt the method of trial-solution. "In selecting a working hypothesis," Lodge says, "we must proceed by trial and error." "To try several clues, and at last to perceive the probabilities in favor of one of them, to pursue that one into all its consequences and ramifications till it is either verified or discredited—that is scientific procedure."³⁴ The method pursued is to suppose such a process as would seem to account for the results given in experience, and to test this supposition or hypothesis by reference to the facts.

"Modern discoveries have not been made by large collections of facts, with subsequent discussion, separation, and resulting deduction of a truth thus rendered perceptible. A few facts have suggested an hypothesis, which means a supposition, proper to explain them. The necessary results of this supposition are worked out, and then, and not till then, other facts are examined to see if these ulterior results are found in nature."³⁵

"Everyone," Venn remarks, "who has ever had to work out the solution of any little matter in daily life which has puzzled him, knows how many and how wild were the guesses that fitted through his mind before he paused at one which seemed more hopeful. The larger the stock from which he has to draw, the better, other things being equal, is his chance of finding a good one amongst them. And the same holds good of the more serious speculations of the scientific man."³⁶

"All intellectual processes are based on abstraction—that is, on concentrated attention directed to a selected portion, with limitation of scope, and elimination of whatever may be regarded as unessential or irrelevant. . . . Anatomists dissect out the nervous system, the blood-vessels, and the muscles, and depict them separately—there must be discrimination for intellectual grasp—but in life they are all merged and co-operating together; they do not really work separately, though they may be studied separately. . . . The laws of nature are a diagrammatic framework, analysed or abstracted out of the full comprehensiveness of reality."³⁷

Scientific investigators are fully aware that this method involves grave dangers. "With the valuable parts of physical

³⁴ Sir Oliver Lodge, *Reason and Belief* (New York, 1910), pp. 140-141.

³⁵ Augustus De Morgan, *A Budget of Paradoxes* (London, 1872), p. 55.

³⁶ John Venn, *The Principles of Empirical or Inductive Logic* (London, 1889), p. 399.

³⁷ Sir Oliver Lodge, *Continuity* (New York, 1914), p. 71.

theories," Mach says, "we necessarily absorb a good dose of false metaphysics, which it is very difficult to sift out from what deserves to be preserved, especially when those theories have become very familiar to us."³⁸ Hence it is that Science requires, for its protection no less than for its guaranty, the labor of verification. "The progress of physical science since the revival of learning," Huxley stated, "is largely due to the fact that men have gradually learned to lay aside the consideration of unverifiable hypotheses; to guide observation and experiment by verifiable hypotheses; and to consider the latter, not as ideal truths, the real entities of an intelligible world behind phenomena, but as a symbolical language, by the aid of which Nature can be interpreted in terms apprehensible by our intellects."³⁹ Verification, Lewes pointed out, "was so little understood by the ancients, that it found neither employment in their practice, nor recognition in their philosophy." "To this source every one of their errors may be traced. Every error may be shown to have arisen from reliance upon unproved facts, precipitate inductions, or mere phrases reasoned from as if they were demonstrated truths. And to this source, likewise, may all the errors of moderns be traced."⁴⁰

Science, then, is aggressive, and aims at overcoming the particularity that distinguishes the universe. To this end it attacks the world piecemeal, and dissects and isolates strand after strand from the totality of things, on the assumption that the whole is like a cable—but what the cable is for, how it comes to be made up of fibres and strands, and between what points it stretches, are questions that Science regards as outside its province and beyond its ken.

³⁸ Ernst Mach, *Contributions to the Analysis of the Sensations*, tr. by C. M. Williams (Chicago, 1897), p. 23, note.

³⁹ T. H. Huxley, *Method and Results* (New York, 1896), p. 65.

⁴⁰ G. H. Lewes, *Aristotle* (London, 1864), pp. 59, 61.

III

HISTORICAL INVESTIGATION AND HISTORIOGRAPHY

1

The word *history* is commonly used in a variety of senses; thus in speaking of the "history" of a state we may mean either a narrative or the course of events in the past, just as in speaking of a man's "life" we may refer either to his biography or to the sequence of his personal experiences. In the former of these senses, which the usage of scholars sets in the foreground, the word retains the double meaning attached to it by the Greeks, and implies both investigation and composition.

"We are apt," Gilbert Murray says, "to apply to the sixth century the terminology of the fourth, and to distinguish philosophy from history. But when Solon the philosopher 'went over much land in search of knowledge,' he was doing exactly the same thing as the historians Herodotus and Hecataeus. . . . 'Historiê' is inquiry, and 'Philosophia' is love of knowledge. The two cover to a great extent the same field . . . [but] the 'Historikos' is mostly a traveller and reciter of stories."¹

The critical spirit of the Ionian awakened to the realization that, as Hecataeus said, the stories of the Greeks were diverse and incredible, and proceeded forthwith to revise the narratives that formerly had been unquestioningly accepted. Though new, historical investigation did not supplant composition, for it was regarded as ancillary to historiography. Throughout the classical period the older element retained its primacy, and, owing to the cultivation of rhetoric, which was taught, even tended to exercise an undue influence on research, which was not taught. In the

¹ *History of Ancient Greek Literature* (New York, 1897), p. 123. Cf. Alfred & Maurice Croiset, *Histoire de la littérature grecque* (Paris, 1890), II, 535; J. B. Bury, *The Ancient Greek Historians* (New York, 1909), p. 16. The double significance may perhaps be felt in Burke's phrase "to rake into the histories of former ages . . .," since the word "rake" is here the modern representative of the Old English *racu* or *raca*, history. The German word *Geschichte* involves a reference to that which has come to pass, *das Geschehene*, and has therefore primarily the objective signification. Cf. P. E. Geiger, *Das Wort "Geschichte" und seine Zusammensetzungen* (Freiburg, i.B., 1908.)

nineteenth century the situation is different, for scholarship, reverting, one might say, to the primary meaning of the word *history*, makes a sharp distinction between historical investigation, which, it asserts, is a science, and historical composition, which it regards as an art. Today, among scholars, "history" is identified in a special manner with the new element of inquiry that distinguished the work of Hecataeus from the compositions of the epic poets; and it is stated with authority that "to clothe the story of a human society in a literary dress is no more the part of a historian as a historian [meaning investigator], than it is the part of an astronomer to present in artistic shape the story of the stars."² Indeed, the separation has become so pronounced that it has been found necessary to reclaim for the word *history* its classical dualism of meaning. "Is history a science or an art?" "Men," Firth says, "give opposite answers according to their conception of the methods and objects of the historian." "To me," he continues, "truth seems to lie between these two extremes. History is neither, but partakes of the nature of both. A two-fold task lies before the historian. One half of his business is the discovery of the truth, and the other half its representation."³ So, by way of a twentieth-century compromise, the position of Hecataeus is regained.

The view expressed by Firth is widely held; thus Albert Sorel says: "L'histoire tend à devenir une science, la science des sociétés; elle a toujours été, elle sera toujours un art, l'art de démêler les passions des hommes et de les peindre."⁴

"L'histoire est un art," Camille Jullian thinks, "à la condition d'être d'abord une science."⁵

Gabriel Monod is of opinion "que l'investigation et la construction historiques constituent une science qui fournit ses matériaux à l'art de l'histoire. En un mot, c'est dans la méthode et la critique historiques et dans les résultats de leurs opérations que consiste la science de l'histoire. Tout ce qui est mise en œuvre, exposition, est l'art de l'histoire."⁶

² J. B. Bury, *An Inaugural Lecture* (Cambridge, 1903), p. 17.

³ C. H. Firth, *A Plea for the Historical Teaching of History* (2d ed., Oxford, 1905), p. 8.

⁴ *Nouveaux essais d'histoire et de critique* (Paris, 1898), p. 11.

⁵ *Extraits des historiens français du xix^e siècle* (6^e éd., Paris, 1910), p. cxxviii.

⁶ In *De la méthode dans les sciences* (2^e éd., Paris, 1910), pp. 371-372.

"On a longtemps discuté," it has been said, "la question de savoir si l'histoire est une science ou un art. La question est vraiment oiseuse, l'histoire est à la fois une science et un art." "L'histoire n'est donc pas une curiosité, un dilettantisme sans portée, c'est une science rigoureuse, c'est un art exquis, c'est l'inépuisable répertoire de l'expérience acquise par l'humanité, depuis qu'elle a commencé de se connaître."⁷

"In this vexed question whether history is an art or a science, let us call it both or call it neither. For it has an element of both. It is not in guessing at historical 'cause and effect' that science comes in; but in collecting and weighing evidence as to facts, something of the scientific spirit is required for an historian, just as it is for a detective or a politician."⁸

"I am therefore unable to agree with those who think that history must be either exclusively a science or an art. It is a science to the extent to which what are commonly known as scientific methods are requisite for accuracy and proper proportion in the details used in the presentation. But the presentation must always be largely that of an artist in whose mind it is endowed with form and life."⁹

To the earlier Greeks, the writer of prose narrative was a logographer, and the historian an investigator. Unfortunately, the disuse of the former term has led to much confusion of thought. This may be observed in the character of the suggestions that have been put forward for a beginning-point of "history." Thus, while admitting that "long before history, in the proper sense of the word, came to be written, the early Greeks possessed a literature which was equivalent to history for them and was accepted with unreserved credence—their epic poems," Bury is of opinion that the Greeks originated history because they were the first to apply criticism to historical materials.¹⁰ If, however, the specialist of a later period be consulted, he will be found to say, with Lord Acton, that "in the Renaissance, the art of exposing falsehood dawned upon keen Italian minds, [and] it was then that history as we understand it began to be understood, and the illustrious dynasty of scholars arose to whom we still look both for method and material."¹¹

⁷ G. Desdèvises du Dezert & L. Bréhier, *Le travail historique* (Paris, 1913), pp. 5, 17.

⁸ G. M. Trevelyan, *Clio, a Muse; and other Essays* (London, 1913), p. 30.

⁹ Viscount Haldane, *The Meaning of Truth in History* (London, 1914), p. 34.

¹⁰ J. B. Bury, *The Ancient Greek Historians* (New York, 1909), pp. 1-2.

¹¹ Lord Acton, *A Lecture on the Study of History* (London, 1896), p. 11.

So, likewise, the student of modern history would have "history" begin in his period. "The Middle Ages," Gooch says, "produced historical writers of high literary merit—Matthew Paris and Lambert of Herzfeld, Joinville and Froissart—whose testimony to events of their own time was fairly trustworthy; but the essential conditions of study did not exist." "For the liberty of thought and expression, the insight into different ages and the judicial temper on which historical science depends, the world had to wait till the nineteenth century, the age of the Second Renaissance."¹²

"L'histoire, qu'on la considère comme une branche de la littérature ou comme une science, date pour nous de la Renaissance. Sans doute le moyen-âge avait eu parmi ses chroniqueurs des écrivains remarquables tels que Joinville, Villani ou Froissart, mais ils ne sont pas à proprement parler des historiens; ils ont en vue plutôt le présent que le passé; ils veulent conserver pour la postérité le souvenir des événements qu'ils ont vus et auxquels ils ont pris part, plutôt que retracer à leurs contemporains une image fidèle des temps antérieurs."¹³

The series of illustrations might, of course, be carried much further; thus Round says of Freeman: "But then I should hasten to add that he belonged to a by-gone school, that he had not the modern scientific spirit or the modern ardour for discovery—that, in a word, . . . he was 'a superseded fossil.'"¹⁴

Arbois de Jubainville has devoted a book to an exposure of the faults of Fustel de Coulanges. The fundamental idea of Fustel, he says, is false; it was not religion that was "l'unique base de la société primitive"—but war! "Les œuvres historiques écrites *a priori* sous l'empire de ce préjugé antimilitaire ont été le fléau de notre pays."¹⁵

"The tone of contemptuous superiority is never absent"—this remark, singularly enough, was not made with any reference to modern historians; Bernadotte Perrin thus describes the characteristic attitude of classical historians towards their predecessors.¹⁶

¹² G. P. Gooch, *History and Historians in the Nineteenth Century* (London, 1913), pp. 1, 13.

"The writing of history in the sense in which we now use the word, began in England with the eighteenth century." A. J. Grant, *English Historians* (London, 1906), p. xxiv.

¹³ Gabriel Monod, "Introduction," *Revue Historique*, 1 (1876), 5.

¹⁴ J. H. Round, "Historical Research," *Nineteenth Century*, 44 (1898), 1007.

¹⁵ *Deux manières d'écrire l'histoire* (Paris, 1896), p. 259.

¹⁶ Cf. his address "The Ethics and Amenities of Greek Historiography," *American Journal of Philology*, 18 (1897), 255-274.

Thus "history" is made to begin anew with every reawakening of the critical spirit. Obviously, these discoveries of "beginnings" are made by scholars who identify history with critical inquiry. On the other hand, those who identify it primarily with composition press the beginning ever further back, not only to epic poems and ballads, but to the simplest recital of some unwonted occurrence or adventure.

It is true that the historical scholars of the nineteenth century undertook the reform of historical method with high ideals of objectivity and truthfulness. Having made the discovery that there existed materials—like the Venetian *Relazioni*—for testing the accuracy of the older narratives in the discarded relics and forgotten mementoes preserved in the lumber-rooms and waste-heaps of civilization, scholars devoted themselves to the work of criticism and revision. And, indeed, just as old personal letters re-read will revivify circumstances which have faded with time, and correct the impressions retained of even memorable happenings, so the community memory has been reawakened and restored by the exploitation of archives, the excavation of ruins, and the elucidation of customs and observances by comparative study. The result of the discovery of verificatory materials was that scholars proceeded—like Hecataeus—to call in question the reliability of the great series of writings which embody the memory of European peoples in regard to their past. At the same time, however, the new results continue to be stated in the old form.

History, as Gaston Boissier remarks, "has perfected its methods, it has not changed its nature."¹⁷ The Greeks consciously regarded composition as the aim of the historian, and required that the statements incorporated should be subjected to criticism.¹⁸

¹⁷ Gaston Boissier, *Tacitus, and other Roman Studies*, tr. by W. G. Hutchison (London, 1906), p. 82. J. F. Rhodes says: "The scientific historians have not revolutionized historical methods, but they have added much." *Historical Essays* (New York, 1909), p. 45.

"To tell the story with Herodotus is what we have come to, after all experimenting." Justin Winsor, "The Perils of Historical Narrative," *Atlantic Monthly*, 66 (1890), 293.

¹⁸ That the standards of criticism have varied with the ages goes without saying. On the other hand, to judge ancient criticism by modern

In the last analysis, the academic practice of the present has not modified this formula, even though it ignores composition and throws the weight of its approval on the side of investigation. In fact, it has not been questioned that historiography—the presentation of events in narrative form—is the end towards which all inquiry is contributory.¹⁹ This is implied, for example, in the common acceptance of Ranke as a pattern of the modern historian. His formula—“wie es eigentlich gewesen”—which, in the discussions of the last half-century, has come to have a significance out of all proportion to its intrinsic importance, has in its own context no greater significance than any one of the many similar statements that had been made and remade since the Renaissance.²⁰ Ranke was a man of letters, and he restated the contents of Venetian dispatches with all the assurance of a Livy or a Dio Cassius. He himself avoided any probing of the fundamental problems of historical study²¹; for him, as for his

standards is the abnegation of historical thinking. Compare, for example, such statements as that of Wilamowitz-Moellendorf: “The many words which Polybius devotes to his own method and to the criticism of Ephorus and Timaeus are at bottom as banal as Lucian’s essay on the writing of history.” *Greek Historical Writing*, tr. by Gilbert Murray (Oxford, 1908), p. 15. Mommsen had earlier said of Polybius: “His treatment of all questions, in which right, honour, religion are involved, is not merely shallow, but radically false.” *History of Rome*, tr. by W. P. Dickson, IV, 246.

¹⁹ “Le tableau narratif des faits passés est la forme la plus complète de l’œuvre historique.” C. & V. Mortet, *La science de l’histoire* (Paris, 1894), p. 60. “Il en résulte que l’exposition tient la place principale dans le travail historique: la recherche des sources n’est qu’une opération accessoire.” G. Desdevises du Dezert & L. Bréhier, *Le travail historique* (Paris, 1913), p. 8.

²⁰ Compare, for example, the following extract from Edmund Bolton’s *Hypercritica* (1618?): “For all late Authors that ever yet I could read among us convey with them, to Narrations of things done fifteen or sixteen hundred years past, the Jealousies, Passions, and Affections of their own Time. Our Historians must therefore avoid this dangerous Syren, alluring us to follow our own Prejudices, unless he mean only to serve a Side and not to serve Truth and Honesty, and so to remain but in price while his Party is able to bear him out with all his Faults, for quarrels sake. He is simply therefore to set forth, without Prejudices, Depravations, or sinister items, things as they are.” In J. E. Spingarn, *Critical Essays of the Seventeenth Century* (Oxford, 1908), I, 93.

²¹ “Weil er sich nicht in die Irrgänge metaphysischer Geschichtstheorien verlieren wollte, unterzog er viele Grundfragen der Geschichte überhaupt nie einer exakten Prüfung.” Eduard Fueter, *Geschichte der Neueren Historiographie* (München, 1911), p. 485.

predecessors, "history" meant a narrative based upon what seemed the best testimony available—and even Professor Bury presents his scientific results in narrative form. "I know of no one," Mr. Round says, "who wishes to confuse the writing of synthetic history with the work of original research; still less does any one demand that the former shall be given up and the latter alone permitted." We, he continues, who are engaged in the work of research "are but paving the way for the 'synthetic' historian" of popular desire.²²

It is one of the great obstacles to the promotion of a mutual understanding between historical scholars that in any discussion of the problems of historical study the minds of the participants play fast and loose with the different meanings of the word *history* itself. In the first instance, as has been seen, the word meant "inquiry;" but, whether in the classical period, the Renaissance, or today, in the common usage of men it has meant and still means the finished literary product to which the results of all our investigative technique are merely tributary. It is another matter that many scholars at the present time carry on their researches without heed of any relation between inquiry and historiography, and are far from being satisfied with a conception that limits historical work to this position of subordination. These scholars aim, as they say, to pursue "history," meaning investigation, "for its own sake," and find satisfaction in the thought that their work is scientific. It is, in fact, to these scholars, who may or may not be conscious of "*le malaise dont souffre l'histoire*," of which Louis Halphen speaks, that the present considerations touching the underlying problems of historical method are primarily addressed; but to these men, in particular, it is necessary to say that "history" is the name of a literary form or genre having pronounced individual characteristics, and that these characteristics must be observed and

²² J. H. Round, "Historical Research," *Nineteenth Century*, 44 (1898), 1005. The attitude of certain modern investigators seems to be quite perfectly expressed by Mr. Round in the same context. "But all we ask," he says, "is that Mr. Harrison should allow us to pursue our toilsome path, and refrain from ridiculing our method and caricaturing our results."

described before it is possible to discuss intelligently the possibilities that await historical investigation conducted upon an independent footing.

2

At any moment, it might be considered, there are as many things happening as there are human beings. In the broadest sense these happenings are the facts of history. On the other hand, everyone will agree that a few only of all these incidents are of "historical" importance. Even the most detailed of diaries or of letters to absent friends omits the common affairs of daily life. So, in regard to public affairs, there is a continual process of selection going on, by which "important" events are singled out and retained in memory. There is, too, an ascending scale of importance in events—the destruction of a city is felt to be less memorable than the downfall of an empire. In a sense, moreover, happenings are not memorable intrinsically, but in proportion to the scope of their consequences; whether the assassination of a dignitary or official will be passed over with a momentary expression of condemnation or will shake civilization to its foundations depends upon what may be described as the strategic position which he occupies at the juncture. History narrates the specific acts of individuals, but always in relation to wider issues; the individual with whose acts it is concerned stands, if but for a moment, in a definite relation to the life and honor of the group of which he is a part. } Briefly, the facts with which history is concerned are happenings that are unusual; they are events which for one reason or another compel the attention of men. Consequently, it is inevitable that histories should chronicle wars, and ignore the routine life of peoples.

Furthermore, it is evident that the events chronicled are those that appear unusual to men at the time. Take the following extracts from the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle*:

A.D. 793. This year came dreadful fore-warnings over the land of the Northumbrians, terrifying the people most woefully: these were immense sheets of light rushing through the air, and whirlwinds, and fiery dragons

flying across the firmament. These tremendous tokens were soon followed by a great famine; . . .

A.D. 890. . . . This year also was Plegmund chosen by God and all his saints to the archbishopric in Canterbury.

A.D. 891. This year . . . after Easter, about the gang-days, or before, appeared the star that men in book-Latin call *cometa*: some say that in English it may be termed "hairy star"; for that there standeth off from it a long gleam of light, whilom on one side, whilom on each.

Similarly, every age has its own criteria for distinguishing between the usual and unusual, between events "historically" negligible and events "historically" important. A problem thus presents itself to the investigator, for, while his purpose is to determine what it was that happened, he is limited in making his statements of fact to what has already been recorded, and this, in turn, is a selection made by men whose ideas and judgments are different from his own. Now, one may say that "no guide is so sure for an historian as an overmastering sense of the importance of events as they appeared to those who took part in them," and that "there can be no other basis on which to found any truly sympathetic treatment,"²³ but this does not meet the point that the bases of judgment in regard to what is unusual, exceptional, or important vary with time. In other words, neither the contemporary chronicler nor the later historian determines what is noteworthy in events by a fixed standard; the one like the other follows unconsciously the association of his own ideas. Far indeed from accepting just what he finds substantiated in his authorities, the modern historian takes it as a postulate that "no man, not even the greatest and wisest, can fully understand the significance of what he is doing," and believes that it is because we are not contemporaries of the events that we can describe intelligently what it was that actually took place. Briefly, this means that the shifting interests of the ever-changing present constitute the criteria of importance for the irrevocable happenings of the past. That this subjective view is regarded with approval is evident from the frequent reiteration

²³ Mandell Creighton, "Introductory Note," *Cambridge Modern History* (New York, 1902), I, 5.

of Goethe's saying that "History must from time to time be rewritten, not because many new facts have been discovered, but because new aspects come into view, because the participant in the progress of an age is led to standpoints from which the past can be regarded and judged in a novel manner." "It is not," Mark Pattison stated, "because new facts are continually accumulating, because criticism is growing more rigid, or even because style varies; but because ideas change, the whole mode and manner of looking at things alters with every age; and so every generation requires facts to be recast in its own mould, demands that the history of its forefathers be rewritten from its own point of view."²⁴

The historian's aim is the statement of what has taken place in the past. In a stricter view this is a restatement, made after examination of the available evidence, of what men have said took place. The modern historian, however, does not accept the judgment of the contemporary reporter as to what is historically important; on the contrary, he sets aside Plegmund and the comet to piece together inadvertent hints with the object of reconstructing aspects of life which, as usual and familiar to contemporaries, escaped direct mention in their writings. The original statement is a selection from the infinite number of contemporary happenings made in accordance with ideas current at the time; the modern restatement is a selection, dominated by ideas current now, from the restricted content of the original statements. It follows, therefore, that the basis of selection for the facts of history is subjective; and that the judgments of any present time in regard to the past remain, for still later inquiries, documents

²⁴ "Gregory of Tours" [1845], in his *Essays* (Oxford, 1889), I, 2. Cf. F. H. Bradley, *The Presuppositions of Critical History* (Oxford, 1874), p. 15. "The history then, which is for us, is matter of inference, and in the last resort has existence, as history, as a record of events, by means of an inference of our own. And this inference furthermore can never start from a background of nothing; it is never a fragmentary isolated act of our mind, but is essentially connected with, and in entire dependence on the character of our general consciousness. And so the past varies with the present, and can never do otherwise, since it is always the present upon which it rests. This present is presupposed by it, and is its necessary preconception."

in the history of ideas rather than contributions to knowledge of the past.

"Most of the great historians whom our age has produced will, centuries hence, probably be more interesting as exhibiting special methods of research, special views on political, social, and literary progress, than as faithful and reliable chroniclers of events; and the objectivity on which some of them pride themselves will be looked upon not as freedom from but as unconsciousness on their part of the preconceived notions which have governed them."²⁵

"L'historien est dominé à son insu par les idées religieuses, philosophiques, politiques qui circulent autour de lui, et il serait facile de montrer par exemple que l'Histoire universelle de Bossuet, le Siècle de Louis XIV de Voltaire, les œuvres de Guizot, d'Augustin Thierry, de Macaulay, de Droysen ou de Ranke, ne sont que des produits spécifiques de certains états de civilisation ou de culture nationale. Bref, on peut dater une conception historique comme on date, en histoire de l'art, les écoles et les styles."²⁶

Again, an imaginative element is introduced into historical narrative by the mode in which the historian deals with the materials he accepts. If the conventions of historical investigation, instead of permitting the selection of such facts from the sources as are interesting to us, were to require that everything contained in the documents should be considered, the investigator would be forced to question how the facts we ignore came to be regarded as important by contemporaries. At any time, the conception of what is remarkable or worthy of record is a function of the whole body of current ideas, and what the writer sets down represents not merely his private judgment, but that of the community of which he forms a part. Hence we are led to see the force of Maitland's dictum that history is not only "what men have said and done," but "above all what they have thought." From such a beginning important lines of investigation would open out: thus we would have to inquire how ideas arise, and what is the relation between ideas and conduct; and this would form an introduction to the strictly historical task of tracing the actual emergence of ideas in the past, and the consequent modifications of conduct that ensued. As it is the

²⁵ J. T. Merz, *A History of European Thought in the Nineteenth Century* (Edinburgh, 1896), I, 7.

²⁶ Henri Pirenne, *Revue historique*, 64 (1897), 52.

business of psychology to determine, by present observation and experiment, "the processes whereby an individual becomes aware of a world of objects and adjusts his actions accordingly,"²⁷ so history would inquire into the results of the same processes throughout the course of time. It may be remarked that for such an inquiry every statement preserved from an earlier period would have an objective value.

The modern historian has, however, adopted another approach to psychology, concentrating his attention upon the problem of the relation in which the writer stood to the events he described, with the object of detecting the bias in his statement of what took place.²⁸ The result of this has been the incorporation into history of naïve speculations as to personal motives. This procedure is natural, for it is followed by everyone in daily life. Habitually we interpret the behavior of others by analogy, attributing to them motives such as we recognize in ourselves; and not only do historians introduce similar psychological speculations to account for the views of earlier writers and the actions of historical characters, but they regard this exercise of the imagination as the final proof of competent scholarship.

Of Ranke, Fueter says: ". . . an sich hat er sicherlich sein Bedeutendstes als historischer Psychologue geleistet. . . . suchte Ranke bis zum Innern der Persönlichkeit vorzudringen. . . . So liebevolle Sorgfalt hatte bisher noch nie jemand der historischen Psychologie zugewandt. Am wenigsten die Historiker selbst. . . . Er ruhte nicht, bis er das Seelenleben historischer Persönlichkeiten bis in seine feinsten Verzweigungen blossgelegt hatte. Er besass in wunderbarem Masse die Fähigkeit, in die Empfindungen fremder Menschen einzudringen und ihre Gedanken nachzufühlen, zu *penetrieren*, wie er es nannte."²⁹

²⁷ G. F. Stout, *Manual of Psychology* (2d ed., London, 1904), p. 4.

²⁸ Ranke "versuchte vor allem den Geschichtschreiber selbst und dessen Intentionen im Augenblick der Niederschrift genau psychologisch zu rekonstruieren." Eduard Fueter, *Geschichte der Neueren Historiographie* (München, 1911), p. 479.

"In order to determine which statements are to be suspected, we are to ask what *can* have been the general aim of the author in writing the document as a whole; and again, what can have been his particular purpose in making each of the separate statements which compose the document." C. V. Langlois & C. Seignobos, *Introduction to the Study of History*, tr. by G. G. Berry (New York, 1903), p. 166.

²⁹ Fueter, as cited, pp. 477-78.

Of Stubbs, it was said by an intimate: "His historic instinct was such as to enable him not only to judge of men and of the course of events, but made him capable of predicting with remarkable precision how a man would act in certain circumstances."³⁰

Stubbs himself wrote: "It is almost a matter of necessity for the student of history to work out for himself some definite idea of the characters of the great men of the period he is employed upon. History cannot be well read as a chess problem, and the man who tries to read it so is not worthy to read it at all. Its scenes cannot be realized, its lessons cannot be learned, if the actors are looked on merely as puppets."³¹

"The historian," Henry Nettleship said, "is not only a lover of truth, not only a chronicler of events. These, indeed, he must be at his peril, but how much more! Insight into human nature—and this implies the rarest knowledge and finest sympathy of which man is capable; the power of tracing the delicate relation between deed and motive, and the pressure of action upon circumstance and circumstance upon action; knowledge of the world, in short, in the highest sense of that expression."³²

Lord Acton thought that "the science of character comes in with modern history."³³

Elsewhere he says: "The responsible writer's character, his position, antecedents, and probable motives have to be examined into; and this is what, in a different and adapted sense of the word, may be called the higher criticism, in comparison with the servile and often mechanical work of pursuing statements to their root."³⁴

Professor Firth is of opinion that a contemporary "who undertook to write a history of the seventeenth century could put together a pretty full account of what happened, but it must be necessarily rather superficial and general. He could not go below the surface and explain either the causes of events or the motives of the actors."³⁵

"Captain Vidal," an Oxford professor says, "has not only worked out the complex mind of Soult . . . nor the moods of his generals alone, but that of the army, the magistrates, and the civil population of southern France."³⁶

After all this it is refreshing to come upon D. G. Hogarth's *apologia*: "The charm of guessing ancient motives from the records of ancient

³⁰ W. H. Hutton, *William Stubbs, Bishop of Oxford* (London, 1906), p. 169, quoting Dr. J. L. Darby, Dean of Chester.

³¹ *Historical Introductions to the Rolls Series*, ed. by Arthur Hassall (London, 1902), p. 89.

³² *Lectures and Essays*, 2d series, ed. by F. Haverfield (Oxford, 1895), p. 245.

³³ *History of Freedom, and other Essays* (London, 1909), p. 409.

³⁴ *A Lecture on the Study of History* (London, 1896), pp. 41-42.

³⁵ "The Development of the Study of Seventeenth-Century History," *Royal Historical Society, Transactions*, 3d ser., 7 (1913), 28-29.

³⁶ C. Oman, *English Historical Review*, 29 (1914), 590.

deeds fascinated me—there is much in the pursuit to appeal to a gambler—and I resolved to attempt a speculative biography of some great man.”³⁷

Well, we are moderns, but Dionysius of Halicarnassus wrote of Theopompus: “There remains his crowning and most characteristic quality, . . . the gift of seeing and stating in each case not only what is obvious to the multitude, but of examining even the hidden motives of actions and actors and the feelings of the soul (things not easily discerned by the crowd), and of laying bare all the mysteries of seeming virtue and undiscovered vice. Indeed, I can well believe that the fabled examination, before the judges in the other world, of souls in Hades when separated from the body is of the same searching kind as that which is conducted by means of the writings of Theopompus.”³⁸

Notwithstanding the fact that we conduct our lives in relation to those around us on inferences as to their feelings and desires, it is evident that no one can observe directly what is going on in the mind of another. The inferential process has a certain practical justification in its application to those among whom we have been brought up, and with whom we are in familiar association. On the other hand, “the besetting snare of the psychologist is the tendency to assume that an act or attitude which in himself would be the natural manifestation of a certain mental process must, therefore, have the same meaning in the case of another.”³⁹ Even with our own contemporaries we are continually making mistakes, and “interpretation becomes more difficult in proportion to the difference between the mind of the psychologist and the mind which he is investigating.”⁴⁰ Hence, in considering the mental condition of persons “widely removed in their general circumstances and conditions from our own, we must assume an attitude of critical suspense until we have taken into account everything which can have a bearing on the problem.”⁴¹ Nevertheless, the historian boldly projects himself into the past, and endeavors to make the actions of Alexanders and Attilas psychologically intelligible to modern readers by imagining himself in their place. In so doing he subordinates the facts

³⁷ *Accidents of an Antiquary's Life* (London, 1910), p. 2.

³⁸ Tr. by W. R. Roberts in *The Three Literary Letters of Dionysius* (Cambridge, 1901), p. 125.

³⁹ G. F. Stout, as cited, p. 22.

⁴⁰ Stout, as cited, p. 21.

⁴¹ Stout, as cited, p. 23.

to his own personality, and heightens the interest of the narrative by giving it the color of comprehensibility.

The ascription of motives is a dubious venture for one who professes to limit his statements to known and documented facts,⁴² but not only is the practice questionable in itself, it leads on to an attitude still less in keeping with the claims of historical research. In fact, inferences in regard to the motives of others are almost necessarily followed by judgments upon their conduct. So Lord Acton can say: "I exhort you never to debase the moral currency or to lower the standard of rectitude, but to try others by the final maxim that governs your own lives, and to suffer no man and no cause to escape the undying penalty which history has the power to inflict on wrong."⁴³ It may be well to point out that the masters of ethical theory are the first to utter warnings against the formulation of judgments such as these. "Histories," T. H. Green says, "no doubt, would be much shortened, and would be found much duller, if speculations about the motives (as distinct from the intentions) of the chief historical agents were omitted; nor shall we soon cease to criticise the actions of contemporaries on the strength of inferences from act to motive. But in all this we are on very uncertain ground. . . . It is wiser not to make guesses where we can do no more than guess, and to confine ourselves . . . to measuring the value of actions by their effects without reference to the character of the agents."⁴⁴

⁴² "The practice of introducing imaginary speeches into histories being now generally abandoned, the modern historian cannot be accused of this aberration from truth. But, in general, he indemnifies himself amply for this forbearance. If he does not put imaginary words into the mouths of his speakers, he suggests imaginary motives for their acts." Sir G. C. Lewis, *A Treatise on the Methods of Observation and Reasoning in Politics* (London, 1852), I, 243.

⁴³ *A Lecture on the Study of History* (London, 1896), p. 63. Cf. R. G. Latham's description of the historian's work, *Man and His Migrations* (New York, 1852), pp. 9-10: "An empire is consolidated, a contest concluded, a principle asserted, and the civil historian records them. He does more. If he be true to his calling, he investigates the springs of action in individual actors, measures the calibre of their moral and intellectual power, and pronounces a verdict of praise or blame upon the motives which determine their manifestation."

⁴⁴ *Prolegomena to Ethics*, ed. by A. C. Bradley (Oxford, 1883), pp. 318-19.

The historian, then, "selects" the facts to be included in his work in accordance with some personal localized view; and "explains" events by the imaginative reconstruction of the character and motives of the participants. The "selection" of facts and the "realisation of character" are thus seen to be fundamental elements of historiography; but to appreciate fully the significance of this fact a wider outlook must be taken.⁴⁵

3

Every art involves the two elements of expression and form. The object of the artist is not to communicate information, but to stimulate in others a mood or feeling similar to his own. The work of art is not a direct or immediate reaction to experience (such as is the cry of physical pain) or a mere statement of fact; the impulse in which it originates is the emotion evoked by the memory of an experience. This act of creation which is characteristic of art has its beginning when the experience is lived over in the mind of the artist and is remade by contemplation. "On the actual day of battle naked truths may be picked up for the asking; by the following morning they have already begun to get into their uniforms." The work of art is not a transcript of experience, but the experience seen through the impression it has produced; it is not the utterance of personal hope or fear, but the expression of such an emotion detached from its immediate relation to the artist. The aim of the artist is not the imitation of a fife and drum, but the reproduction of what is felt to have been the mood or emotion evoked by hearing the fife and drum in certain circumstances. The effect produced may be illustrated by a description from Priscus:

"When evening came on torches were lighted and two barbarians stepped forth in front of Attila and recited poems which they had composed, recounting his victories and his valiant deeds in war. The banqueters fixed their eyes upon them, some being charmed with the poems, while others were roused in spirit, as the recollection of their wars came

⁴⁵ On the subject-matter of this section, consult further: Carl Becker, "Detachment and the Writing of History," *Atlantic Monthly*, 106 (1910), 524-536.

back to them. Others again burst into tears, because their bodies were enfeebled by age and their martial ardour had perforce to remain unsatisfied." ⁴⁶

Form is limitation imposed by the necessity of concentration and relevance if the impression is to be adequately conveyed. Since emotion is dissipated by diffuseness, and attention distracted by the suggestion of alternative avenues of thought, "unity" is the first requisite of a work of art. Artistic creation is the vivid realization or apprehension of an "action." The question of the artist's "selection" of facts for presentation, as of his choice of subject and the proportion and symmetry in his treatment, arise only when the work of art comes to be the subject of academic discussion. The problem of "beauty" is likewise secondary, being concerned with the effect produced by the work of art upon its auditors or beholders. "Beauty" is not the aim of the artist; it is a term used to express the sense of satisfaction in the auditor or beholder at the adequate rendering of the subject. It will thus be seen that all art is, in a sense, "opportunistic," that is, dependent upon fortuitous stimulation for inspiration.

Now, historiography, as we have seen, is the relation of unusual happenings; it is the narration of matters that are felt to be momentous in a higher sense, and that arouse passion to a more emphatic type of expression than the vicissitudes of men's private fortunes. On the other hand, the intensity of its expression is matched by a strict limitation in the width of its appeal, for whereas men of all times and countries find in themselves an aesthetic response to the dramas of Sophocles and Shakespeare, histories are written for men of one time and one people. So it is that "historic art," as Hirn says, "has everywhere reached its highest state of development amongst nations who have had to hold their own *vi et armis* against neighboring tribes, or in the midst of which antagonistic families have fought for supremacy."⁴⁷ "Most of the old German heroic poetry," Ker

⁴⁶ Tr. from *Fragmenta Historicorum Graecorum*, IV, 92, in H. M. Chadwick, *The Heroic Age* (Cambridge, 1912), p. 84. The account refers to the year A. D. 448.

⁴⁷ Yrjö Hirn, *The Origins of Art* (London, 1900), p. 179.

remarks, "is clearly to be traced, as far as its subjects are concerned, to the most exciting periods in early German history, between the fourth and sixth centuries."⁴⁸ "Speaking broadly," Bernadotte Perrin observes, "it always required some great spectacular struggle—the Trojan War, the Persian Wars, the Peloponnesian War, the duel between Sparta and Thebes, the Hellenic conquest of Asia—to elicit, as it were, a great historian."⁴⁹

One is reminded of Lucian's caustic introduction to his essay on *The Way to Write History*: "Well, to compare like with like, the majority of our educated class is now suffering from an Abderite epidemic. . . . From the beginning of the present excitements—the barbarian war, the Armenian disaster, the succession of victories—you cannot find a man but is writing history; nay, everyone you meet is a Thucydides, a Herodotus, a Xenophon. The old saying must be true, and war be the father of all things, seeing what a litter of historians it has now teemed forth at a birth."⁵⁰

Similarly, in the fifteenth century, "it was the early success of the French war which gave the stimulus that was needed to produce the firstfruit of a national historical literature" in England;⁵¹ while, not to multiply instances unnecessarily, it is a commonplace of knowledge that European historiography in the nineteenth century was born of war.

Pursuing this phase of the subject, it will be seen further that historiography is the account of struggles seen in the light of their outcome. A concurrent, moment-for-moment record of occurrences, if any such existed, would provide most desirable materials for history, but would not be regarded as historiography. The relation of statement to event is uniquely brought out by Sir Ian Hamilton:

⁴⁸ W. P. Ker, *Epic and Romance* (London, 1897), p. 24.

⁴⁹ "History," in *Greek Literature, a Series of Lectures delivered at Columbia University* (New York, 1912), p. 152.

⁵⁰ *Works*, tr. by H. W. Fowler and F. G. Fowler (Oxford, 1905), II, 110.

⁵¹ C. L. Kingsford, *English Historical Literature in the Fifteenth Century* (Oxford, 1913), p. 8.

"If," he says, "facts are hurriedly issued, fresh from the mint of battle, they cannot be expected to supply an account which is either well-balanced or exhaustive. On the other hand, it is equally certain that, when once the fight has been fairly lost or won, it is the tendency of all ranks to combine and recast the story of their achievement into a shape which shall satisfy the susceptibilities of national and regimental vainglory. It is then already too late for the painstaking historian to set to work. He may record the orders given and the movements which ensued, and he may build up thereon any ingenious theories which occur to him; but to the hopes and fears which dictated those orders, and to the spirit and method in which those movements were executed, he has forever lost the clue. On the actual day of battle naked truths may be picked up for the asking; by the following morning they have already begun to get into their uniforms."⁵²

It is evident, then, that historiography, however near the event, is not a colorless record, but is a rendering of what has happened in terms of the emotions awakened by the result. Here the case of Thucydides suggests itself. On the basis of his statement that "he began to write when they first took up arms," modern opinion appears to assume, despite the evidence, that the history as we have it was composed concurrently with the events. So it is asserted, for example, that "he did not take up his pen to celebrate, his aim was to understand."⁵³ What the hopes and intentions of Thucydides at the beginning of the war may have been we do not know; it was the result—or shall we say the *peripeteia*, the tragic "revolution," the climax of pity and terror, the decisive reversal?—which determined that the Athenian version of the history of the Peloponnesian War should be an Athenian tragedy.⁵⁴ "The catastrophe of 404 B.C. set in a new light the significance of all that had happened since the original outbreak of hostilities in 431 B.C., and imparted to the whole series of events a unity of meaning."⁵⁵ The writings of contemporary historians convey something that can never be incor-

⁵² *A Staff Officer's Scrap-Book during the Russo-Japanese War* (5th impr., London, 1907), I, v.

⁵³ J. B. Bury, *The Ancient Greek Historians* (New York, 1909), p. 78.

⁵⁴ Sir R. C. Jebb, "The Speeches of Thucydides," in *Hellenica: a Collection of Essays*, ed. by Evelyn Abbott (London, 1880), p. 319. Cf. F. M. Cornford, *Thucydides Mythistoricus* (London, 1907).

⁵⁵ Bury, as cited, p. 80.

porated in the results of scholarship, and this is the spirit manifested in the community of which the writer is a part. The description of the conflict may be imperfect or inaccurate, but it reflects the emotion of those whose fortunes turned upon the issue. Men of genius, it has been said, are in general distinguished by their extreme susceptibility to external experience; the great historians are men of genius who have felt and rendered adequately the emotions of their fellows in the crises of national existence. So it is true that "contemporary history never dies," that "Thucydides and Clarendon are immortal," and that "on the other hand, no reputation is so fleeting as that of the 'standard' historian of his day."⁵⁶

The spirit in which history is written can best be appreciated from a study of origins. Heroic poetry begins in descriptions of contemporary happenings. A perfect example of this type of narrative is the Old English poem on the battle of Maldon. The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle records the incident to which the poem relates (991 A.D.): "This year was Ipswich plundered; and very soon afterwards was Alderman Britnoth slain at Maldon." The poem is epic in quality and its tone may be caught from Professor Ker's translation of a notable passage:

"Byrhtwold spoke and grasped his shield—he was an old companion—he shook his ashen spear, and taught courage to them that fought:—

"Thought shall be the harder, heart the keener, mood shall be the more, as our might lessens. Here our prince lies low, they have hewn him to death! Grief and sorrow forever on the man that leaves this war-play! I am old of years, but hence I will not go; I think to lay me down by the side of my lord, by the side of the man I cherished." "⁵⁷

The speech is the poet's but it embodies the spirit of the time and glories in the heroic deed even though it ended in disaster, and prizes the virtues of loyalty to the chieftain and unflinching courage in the face of defeat.⁵⁸ "Heroic poetry—

⁵⁶ Mark Pattison, *Essays* (Oxford, 1889), I, 1.

⁵⁷ Ker, as cited, p. 63.

⁵⁸ Chadwick, as cited, p. 97, says of the poem: "There can be no reasonable doubt that it was composed within a few years, possibly even

indeed in a sense we may say the Heroic Age itself—owes its origin” to contemporary compositions which glorify the hero’s exploit immediately after the event. “The chief object which the characters of the Heroic Age set before themselves,” Chadwick continues, “was to ‘win glory’—to have their fame celebrated for all time,”⁵⁹ and such glory was to be won by brave deeds. “Let him, who can,” is the sentiment of *Beowulf*, “win for himself glory before he dies; that is the best thing which can come to a warrior in after times, when he is no more.” In the heroic age, the deeds celebrated and the glory attained were alike personal, and the hero neither hesitated to boast of his own prowess nor to reward others for singing his praises. “The great works of commemoration,” Hirn says, “are all monuments of boasting. By the grandiloquent hieroglyphics on palaces and pyramids and by the extolling hymns that he orders to be sung in his praise, the exultant hero endeavors to win from future admirers a meed of praise which shall quench his thirst for glorification. Even in this case, therefore, history, in its psychological sense—that is, the concentration of attention upon times other than the present—has been born of pride. By relying on this emotional-istic interpretation,” he proceeds, “we can explain the otherwise extraordinary development of commemorative art amongst tribes on relatively low stages of intellectual development. The same explanation also accounts for the artistic value of the primitive records. The intensely emotional element of exultation, pride, and boasting that pervades so many of the commemorative poems and dramas makes this kind of history an art in the proper sense of the word.”⁶⁰

With the passing of time, the once-contemporary heroic narrative came to relate to long-past deeds. How the content of the story suffered in transmission and retelling need not here be

months, of the battle.” F. J. Snell says: “It is a contemporary history permeated by the spirit and illumined with the art of heroic poetry. . . . It is not a mere tale to amuse, but a trumpet-call to the courage and patriotism of the nation, which, in some quarters, were evidently beginning to flag.” *The Age of Alfred* (London, 1912), p. 114.

⁵⁹ Chadwick, as cited, pp. 87, 88, 97, 325 ff., 339.

⁶⁰ Hirn, as cited, p. 181.

considered at length; suffice it to say that "the epic poem is cut loose and set free from history, and goes on a way of its own."⁶¹ The facts disappear, and all that remains is the emotional impression that the earlier poetry conveyed. Thus "all that is constant, or common, in the different poetical reports of Attila, is that he was great. What touches the mind of the poet out of the depths of the past is nothing but the tradition, undefined, of something lordly."⁶² The sort of history embedded in the epic, therefore, may be compared with that retained in the popular mind in regard to such national heroes as Washington and Lincoln. The epic poet, Professor Ker continues, "is bound to the past, in one way; it is laid upon him to tell the stories of the great men of his own race," and "it does not matter in what particular form the history may be represented, so long as in some form or other the power of the national glory is allowed to pass into his work."⁶³

4

At this point, Aristotle's discussion of poetry and history inevitably forces itself upon attention.⁶⁴ The dictum which everyone remembers is that "the distinction between historian and poet is not in the one writing prose and the other verse—you might put the work of Herodotus into verse, and it would still be a species of history." The distinction between them "consists really in this, that the one describes the thing that has been, and the other a kind of thing that might be."⁶⁵ Stated again, the

⁶¹ Ker, as cited, p. 27.

⁶² Ker, as cited, p. 28.

⁶³ Ker, as cited, p. 28. Cf. S. H. Butcher, as cited below, p. 402: "Much of the poetry of the Greeks might be called authentic history—true not in precision of detail or in the record of personal adventures, but in its indication of the larger outlines of events and in its embodiment in ideal form of the past deeds of the race."

⁶⁴ See S. H. Butcher, *Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art* (3rd ed., London, 1902), and Ingram Bywater, *Aristotle on the Art of Poetry* (Oxford, 1909); we are fortunate in having in these editions equally fine examples of two different types of critical scholarship.

⁶⁵ *Poetics*, IX, 2, tr. Bywater, p. 27; cf. Butcher, p. 35.

distinction is that "poetry tends to express the universal, history the particular." By 'the particular' Aristotle means what, for example, Alcibiades did or suffered; by 'the universal' he means "how a person of a certain type will on occasion speak or act, according to the law of probability or necessity." That is, "given a personage of a certain character and in a certain position as the beginning of the story, all the rest must be the natural or necessary consequence of this initial situation."⁶⁶

"The element of 'universality' in Greek Tragedy, as Aristotle understands it, means no more than is indicated in his present distinction between a poem and a history; and it is in no wise peculiar to Tragedy. Aristotle tells us it was to be seen in the Comedy of his time; and it is found in just the same way in the modern novel—even in the historical and in the so-called realistic novel. In all these forms of imaginative literature the personages are, as we say, 'characters,' in other words, ideal personalities, made to act and speak in accordance with the law of character which the author has assumed for each."⁶⁷

As thus stated by Aristotle, the contrast between history and poetry appears self-evident; in reality, however, it is an invention of the critic: the element of 'universality' is found in historiography as well as in tragic or epic poetry. The fact is, Aristotle, on the one hand, considers only the finished product of the dramatist—not the artist's way of working—and, on the other, he ignores entirely the treatment of character in historiography. The Greek tragic poet did not begin with the conception of "a person of a certain character," but with legends (or histories⁶⁸) whose outcome was predetermined and known. "By consecrated usage the tragedian was confined to a circle of legends whose main outlines were already fixed." "The great facts of the legends could not be set aside." "The details of the story might vary within wide limits, but the end was a thing given; and in the drama the end cannot but dominate the structure of the whole—incidents and character alike."⁶⁹ In Greek

⁶⁶ Bywater, as cited, pp. 187-88.

⁶⁷ Bywater, as cited, p. 189.

⁶⁸ "Aristotle himself speaks of the myths as history," Butcher, p. 402.

⁶⁹ Butcher, as cited, pp. 356-57.

tragedy, then, the end of the story was the dramatist's starting-point, and from this he worked back to a beginning. The invention of the author was concerned, not with displaying the consequences that would follow upon a given character being placed in a certain initial situation, but with presenting such a character as would make the known outcome appear rational and inevitable—not indeed in terms of the commonplaces of ordinary life, but setting forth the highest possibilities of human nature in the stress of unwonted circumstances. Now, from the time of Herodotus to the present day, historians have devoted themselves to an exactly similar undertaking; they have described great and serious events in the light of their outcome, and have sought to make the deeds of heroes intelligible by the imaginative reconstruction of character. "It is in the realizing of grand character," Stubbs says, "that the strength of historical genius chiefly displays itself,"⁷⁰ and a more recent observer has remarked that "the only peculiar province of written history is in dealing with individual character and influence."⁷¹ In this important particular, therefore, historiography is indistinguishable from imaginative literature.⁷²

"The history of a political community is analogous to an epic or dramatic composition, or to a novel; inasmuch as they both narrate a succession of human acts and sufferings."⁷³

⁷⁰ William Stubbs, *Seventeen Lectures* (Oxford, 1887), p. 112. Cf. Theodore Watts-Dunton, "Poetry," in *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 9th ed., XIX, 280: "The artist's power of thought is properly shown not in the direct enunciation of ideas but in mastery over motive."

⁷¹ W. M. F. Petrie, "Archaeological Evidence," in *Lectures on the Method of Science*, ed. by T. B. Strong (Oxford, 1906), p. 230.

⁷² In order that the force of the foregoing statement may be fully appreciated, the following extracts, taken at random from a late volume (XXIX) of the *English Historical Review*, are subjoined. "We prefer her treatment of a really heroic character. . . . Her analysis of the marshal's character is just and illuminating" (H. W. C. Davis, pp. 145, 146). "Mr. Williams has built up the first credible and convincing portrait of his hero. . . . On the character of Chatham, both as man and as statesman, Mr. Williams is absolutely satisfactory" (W. L. Grant, p. 380). "It is in the judgment of persons that one finds most to seek. Mr. Vickers never seems to have a hero, and the general depreciation of most of the great names which figure in his pages has a somewhat depressing effect on the reader. This is conspicuously the case with the kings and members of the royal house" (C. L. Kingsford, p. 555).

⁷³ Sir G. C. Lewis, *A Treatise on the Methods of Observation and Reasoning in Politics* (London, 1852), I, 120.

“La tâche de l'historien ne diffère pas en cela de celle du dramaturge ou du romancier. Comme eux, il doit assigner des rôles, combiner des scènes, préparer des effets, graduer l'intérêt et faire que le lecteur ne s'ennuie pas un instant.”⁷⁴

It has been a serious detriment to the study of historiography that Aristotle regarded history as annals. “In Aristotle's view a history is a chronicle, or register, of events taken just as they came in order of time, however separate and disconnected they may have been in themselves.”⁷⁵ In poetic story, on the other hand, there must be unity and logical coherence of the parts; the action must be a whole with a beginning, middle, and end. Thus, from Aristotle's point of view, “poetry in virtue of its higher subject-matter and of the closer and more organic union of its parts acquires an ideal unity that history never possesses.”⁷⁶ The two things that are here set over against one another are not commensurable. Aristotle compares epic, a highly-wrought form of historic art in which the emotion awakened by past deeds has liberated itself from the burden of fact, and annals, the skeleton of history, but not yet history itself because the dry bones have not been clothed with flesh and endowed with the spirit of life. The contrast, as formulated by Aristotle, is extreme, but since historiography has followed the precedent of Herodotus and Thucydides, which to all appearance Aristotle condemned,⁷⁷ the discussion can no longer be maintained on the lines which he laid down. In historiography, as distinct from annals, the first consideration—as in tragedy—is the ‘action,’ and the problem confronting every historian is how to bring

⁷⁴ Louis Bourdeau, *L'histoire et les historiens* (Paris, 1888), p. 205.

⁷⁵ Bywater, as cited, p. 187; cf. p. 306.

⁷⁶ Butcher, as cited, p. 185.

⁷⁷ Bywater thinks (p. 305) a correction is required in *Poetics* XXIII, 1, 1459a21, as the accepted reading “makes him say that our ordinary histories should not be like tragedies or epics, as though there were something in the practice of the historians that he wished to set right.” So far am I from being disposed to admit “the absurdity of such a notion,” that even the beauty of Bywater's suggested emendation does not shake the belief that Aristotle was out of sympathy with the tendencies that found expression, say, in the history of Ephorus.

the heterogeneous materials at his disposal within the compass of a unity.

"The dramatic action . . . is a coherent series of events, standing in organic relation to one another and bound together by the law of cause and effect. The internal centre, the pivot round which the whole system turns, is the plot."⁷⁸

The type of unity in historiography differs in an important particular from that of tragedy; a point the more deserving of notice since Aristotle (iv. 10) states that tragedy succeeded epic. In early heroic poetry, the 'action' is simple, being concerned with the deeds of individual heroes. In the Homeric epic, however, the scope of the narrative has significantly widened. "The story and the deeds of those who pass across its wide canvas are linked with the larger movement of which the men themselves are but a part. The particular action rests upon forces outside itself. The hero is swept into the tide of events. The hairbreadth escapes, the surprises, the episodes, the marvelous incidents of epic story, only partly depend on the spontaneous energy of the hero." "The epic poem," in short, "relates a great and complete action which attaches itself to the fortunes of a people, or to the destiny of mankind." Tragedy, on the other hand, "represents the destiny of the individual man." In tragic drama "it is but seldom that outward circumstances are entirely dominant over the forces of the spirit."⁷⁹ Obviously, then, tragedy in succeeding to epic does not carry over that notable outlook in which the fate of the individual appears subordinated to the fortunes of a group. Aristotle's words are applicable to the surface-continuity of subject-matter between epic and tragedy—the Athenian tragedies utilized the epic poems—but he does not remark the less immediately apparent continuity of treatment between epic and historiography, even though Herodotus had succeeded to the width of vision of a Homer.

In the wonderful creative outburst that followed the Persian War, drama and history, springing from the same root in epic,

⁷⁸ Butcher, as cited, p. 348.

⁷⁹ Butcher, as cited, p. 353.

so completely developed their special types of appeal that they appear to us, as to Polybius (ii. 56), "widely opposed to each other." Tragedy, even at the beginning, assumed "the point of view which takes the human mind to be the essence in all drama." The interest of the dramatist lies in the common destiny of individual men; and he presents the individual human soul struggling in the self-woven toils of fate. History, in a wholly different spirit, presents the group through the activities of its representative men. The dramatist speaks for all men; the historian for the men of his own time and country. The dramatist identifies himself emotionally with "characters," the historian identifies himself with a particular nation. We, the auditors, recognize in any drama what might happen to ourselves personally, and in any history what might befall our own country. In neither case is there "teaching" as such; there is simply the clear and definite picture of an outcome—black-visaged or triumphant—and the means—folly or devotion, treachery or singleness of will—by which it came to be.

It is not the fate of individuals with which history is concerned, but of nations. Yet, inasmuch as the group is only to be seen in the named individuals who represent it, there is an insistent tendency on the part of historians to lose the wider vision and follow the traditions of drama. The tendency is obvious in classical historiography owing to the convention, inherited from epic poetry, that permitted the introduction of speeches; but the admiration of modern historical scholars for Thucydides and Tacitus (in each of whom the dramatic attitude was pronounced), the persistent emphasis on "character-drawing," and the far-reaching attraction of historical romance, show the danger in which the art of Herodotus ever stands from the rival art of Aeschylus and Sophocles.

5

The characteristic 'action' in historiography presents the issue of a crucial struggle between different groups, societies, or nations; and the histories that men have chosen to keep in

remembrance have been inspired by bitter conflicts. This distinctive schema appears fully developed, at the beginning of prose historiography, in Herodotus. In its first form, the work of the "Father of History" consisted merely of the story of the Persian invasion now comprised in the last three books.⁸⁰ The author thus began with the narrative of a single war which was to him recent history. This was a story, simple in action, conceived in the old heroic spirit, of a victory won against overwhelming odds. The account was one that redounded to the glory of Athens and flattered Athenian pride. Herodotus represented the Athenians as "truly the saviours of Greece;" but "he did more: he gave currency and authority to a story which embodied Athenian tradition and justified Athenian empire." "If the story is true," Bury remarks, "that the Athenians bestowed on him ten talents in recognition of the merits of his work, it was a small remuneration for the service he rendered to the renown of their city."⁸¹

At some later point in his career, Herodotus came to have a new vision of the war, seeing in it the culmination of different converging series of events, and it is in this later form that his history has won the undying admiration of men. Some danger there has been in modern times that the appreciation of his supreme artistry might be obscured by the interest taken by scholars in the details of his subject-matter. Herodotus is, indeed, one thing to the student of ancient history; another to the investigator of the growth of historical criticism; and yet a third to the historian of historiographic literature. "It is something," Macan says, "to have written the best story-book in Greek literature, perhaps in European literature. No other Greek writer has covered so large a world with so full a population of living and immortal men and women as Herodotus (no, not even his master, Homer). The work of Herodotus is a prose *Iliad* and *Odyssey* in one, rich in episodes and details, and

⁸⁰ Herodotus, IV-VI, ed. by R. W. Macan (London, 1895), I, xcii.

⁸¹ J. B. Bury, *The Ancient Greek Historians* (New York, 1909), pp. 62, 65.

more indisputably one and indivisible than either Epos."⁸² This appreciation may be taken to illustrate the kind of interest that has charmed countless men and women in all ages; it does not, however, touch the element that entitles the work of Herodotus to its high place as a history. What constitutes it a masterpiece of historical writing is the wide vision that gives unity to the whole narrative.⁸³ This vision is inseparable from the emotion in the light of which it is beheld. Whether the Persians retired unbeaten, having effected their object, or whether the honor of their repulse should be accorded to the arms of Sparta, is, in this connection, immaterial; what matters is that Athens was remade, intellectually reborn, as a result of the war. The first form of the work of Herodotus may well be set down as the expression of a pardonable vainglory; the enlargement, on the other hand, reflects not merely pride in achievement, but, what is of the highest significance, the ambition born of victory—the inspiration of which, for a moment, made all things seem possible; the dream that led Athens to defeat and Alexander to conquest.

The work of Herodotus is of the type of history that narrates the details of a recent event, with a prefatory account of the circumstances that led up to it. In such works the focus is the dénouement as it appears to the author; the unity is inspired by the outcome. Furthermore, it is characteristic of this type that in proportion as the event is felt to be decisive will there be a marked tendency to look upon the present outcome as determining the future. Of this type, Polybius, especially in view of his self-conscious explanation, is an interesting example.

"Now in the times preceding this period," he says, "the events of the world's history may be said to have happened in a state of isolation,

⁸² Macan, as cited, I, lxxiii, and cf. cxvii-viii.

⁸³ "Mais lorsque les Perses arrivèrent, et repartirent vaincus, une admirable matière s'offrit aux artistes. Non seulement les victoires de Marathon et de Salamine flattaient l'amour-propre national, et assuraient le succès à quiconque parlerait d'elles, mais elles fournissaient un moyen facile d'ordonner le chaos des événements. . . . et seule la vanité d'un peuple triomphant put voir dans la conquête de l'Égypte et l'expédition de Scythie, des travaux d'approche contre la minuscule presqu'île hellénique." Henri Ouvré, *Les formes littéraires de la pensée grecque* (Paris, 1900), pp. 307-8.

because each action, both in its inception and in its development, was disconnected with all others by time or place. But from this period we find that the history has become an organic whole, and the affairs of Italy and Libya are bound up with those of Asia and Greece, and the general current of events sets to one fixed point." "The distinctive feature of our work," he goes on to say, "corresponds with the marvellous characteristic of our times; for as Fortune has swayed almost all the affairs of the world to one centre, and compelled every force to set in one and the same direction, so we would by means of our History bring under a common view, for the benefit of our readers, the operations which Fortune has employed for the completion of a combined system of the world. Indeed it was this above everything that incited and urged us to attempt the writing of history."⁸⁴

The theme of Roman conquest unified the work of Polybius; at the same time, the far-reaching success of the Republic led him to look towards the future, for, he remarks (iii. 4), "it seemed agreed and forced on the conviction of all men, that all that remained to the world is to submit to the Romans, and to perform whatever they shall enjoin." The idea that the success of Rome introduced a unity into history is seen, therefore, to antedate the writings of Professor Freeman.

The extension of the power of Rome had, however, a wider influence on historiography than in affording an inspiration to Polybius. It may be said, indeed, to have forced upon men a second type of history, namely, that in which the past of a single nation is seen as a self-contained whole. This type, of which the great example in classical antiquity is the history of Livy, and which to us, owing to its cultivation in the nineteenth century,⁸⁵ may seem even the natural and proper form of history, was not only late in emerging, but even after its appearance suffered, in the Middle Ages, a long eclipse.

In Herodotus, everything leads up to the crisis of the Persian invasion and the happenings antecedent to this event fall within

⁸⁴ Polybius, I, 3, 4; tr. by J. L. Strachan-Davidson.

⁸⁵ The historian's "work seems rather to be to display the development of a nation or of a period, and to record accurately, and in the light of the spirit of the nation or period, the sequence of events in which its character has manifested itself." Viscount Haldane, *The Meaning of Truth in History* (London, 1914), p. 10.

the "action" of the drama he presents, setting, as it were, the characters upon the stage and introducing the "complication." In Livy, the stimulus is also a crisis in the affairs of a people, but of a different kind. The author is not stirred to write by the outcome of a single war, nor is there a dramatic climax in his presentation. The crisis is, one may say, "unresolved;" it is present to the minds of Livy and his auditors, rather than depicted in his work. Livy's view is concentrated upon the internal history of the Roman people; he looks back from the height to which a long series of achievements has brought the Roman people, and sees at every step victory won by Roman piety, constancy, and discipline. The spirit in which he writes is not, however, that of exultation in victory, even though his theme is the ever-increasing glory of Rome; it is pride, certainly, but the pride of assured position, of conscious superiority. His pride is also of a contemplative sort: a mingling of regret for the noble virtues of former generations, of distrust in the present, and—far from an ambitious daring—an actual foreboding of the future. So he says in the memorable preface to his history:

"The subjects to which I would ask each of my readers to devote his earnest attention are these—the life and morals of the community; the men and the qualities by which through domestic policy and foreign war dominion was won and extended. Then as the standard of morality gradually lowers, let him follow the decay of the national character, observing how at first it slowly sinks, then slips downward more and more rapidly, and finally begins to plunge into headlong ruin, until he reaches these days, in which we can bear neither our diseases nor their remedies."

This is rhetoric surely, but it reveals the presence in the author's mind of a pictorial composition into which he is able to fit the abundant detail of his seven hundred years.

6

How or when the vision of Roman history as the expression of Roman character came to Livy we do not know, but, fortunately, among modern historians of the first rank more than one has

revealed the secret of his own creative experience. Michelet, for example, in the preface of 1869 to his *Histoire de France*, says:

"Cette œuvre laborieuse d'environ quarante ans fut conçue d'un moment, de l'éclair de Julliet [1830]. Dans ces jours mémorables, une grande lumière se fit, et j'aperçus la France. Elle avait des annales, et non point une histoire. Des hommes éminents l'avaient étudiée surtout au point de vue politique. Nul n'avait pénétré dans l'infini détail des développements divers de son activité. . . . Le premier je la vis comme une âme et une personne."

Gibbon's equally well-known account of the moment's inspiration that gave birth to the *Decline and Fall* may likewise be instanced:

"It was at Rome, on the fifteenth of October, 1764, that as I sat musing amidst the ruins of the Capitol, while the barefooted fryars were singing Vespers in the temple of Jupiter, that the idea of writing the decline and fall of the City first started to my mind."⁸⁶

These statements are so far characteristic that they might be cited in a handbook of psychology to illustrate what is perhaps the best-known type of the artist's way of working. The flash-like illumination is not, however, the first step, whatever appearances may suggest. Back of the sudden emergence of the vision or picture there lies of necessity a period of gestation and subconscious growth; and it is one of the remarkable features of Gibbon's autobiography that it enables us to trace in detail the course of the artist's brooding that preceded the most interesting moment in his literary life.

It was suggested earlier that the act of creation which is characteristic of art has its beginning when an experience is lived over in the mind of the artist and is remade by contemplation. The work of art is not a transcript or photograph of an experience, but the experience seen through the haze of the impression it has produced; it is not the utterance of personal

⁸⁶ *The Autobiographies of Edward Gibbon*, ed. by John Murray (2d ed., London, 1897), p. 302. Cf. pp. 405-6: "I must not forget the day, the hour, the most interesting in my literary life. It was on the fifteenth of October, in the gloom of evening, as I sat musing on the Capitol, while the barefooted fryars were chanting their litanies in the temple of Jupiter, that I conceived the first thought of my history. . . ."

hope, fear, pride or anger, but the expression of such an emotion detached from its immediate relation to the artist.

Now the personal experience of the artist-historian who comes to write the history of his country is not of the actual events of the past, but of what others have said of these events. The historian "lives over" not scenes that he himself has witnessed but scenes that he has imagined from other men's descriptions. This mode of procedure is not peculiar to the historian; many dramatists and all historical novelists follow the same course. The function of imaginative literature is, however, as Aristotle says, to express "the universal," and this is accomplished by representing deeds or happenings as the outcome of character. Accepting the known issue of events, Shakespeare and Sir Walter Scott present the steps by which the individual introduced comes to act in a particular manner at a given crisis. The interest lies in the psychological problem of how a man of a certain character will act in certain circumstances. What is of importance to notice here is that the dramatist or novelist in following this course is on safe ground, for his delineation is true if it is recognized as true to human nature; but, contrariwise, the historian in pursuing the same road is on treacherous footing. "Character-drawing" for him rests only upon supposition and fantasy. The concern of drama and novel is the depiction of character; the concern of history is the statement of what has taken place in the past; and what to the one is truth, to the other is mere unsubstantial imagining.

It is evident, furthermore, that in going to the past for "situations" the dramatist and novelist, Shakespeare and Scott, do not limit themselves to what they find contained in the records they consult, but rely primarily upon the knowledge of men they have acquired through their own personal experience. In precisely the same manner, the experience of the artist-historian is not confined to what he reads; he carries with him to the statement of past events a vivid realization of what his country is in his own day. The great histories, as we have seen, are reflections of crises in national existences. The interest of the

historian is awakened by the changes and circumstances through which he himself lives; and the past is revived for him in a far higher degree by momentous events of which he is a witness than by documentary discoveries. The artist is the consciousness of his fellows in respect to some particular aspect of life; the artist-historian is not less, but more susceptible to national feeling than the public of which he is the spokesman. .

Patriotism and political partisanship are of all feelings the most difficult for a man to "get outside." Anger is wholly absorbing at the time; if a man is possessed by a passion of rage it is obvious that he cannot describe this passion to another; for the time being he is that passion, and reflection is impossible. Time, however, cools anger; and so, later on, the individual may describe the situation and the attendant circumstances—perhaps humorously, perhaps with a feeling of conscious pride. Time has, for him, exteriorized the passion and enabled him to see it detached from its immediate relation to himself. The direct expression of anger is not art; on the other hand, the exteriorized, detached, "distanced" view is the very core of aesthetic presentation.⁸⁷ It would seem as if men found some almost insuperable obstacle in the way of exteriorizing or "distancing" political subjects. When political questions are the subject of discussion, passion is inevitably aroused—more especially in times of crisis. Loyalty, indeed, may be said to forbid the inhibition, the restraint, of such feelings. Misrepresentation of one's country stirs indignant protest, though the circumstances are a century old. The essence of patriotism is personal identification with one's

⁸⁷ In this connection the historical student is urged to make himself familiar with the remarkable paper of Edward Bullough, "'Psychical Distance' as a Factor in Art and an Aesthetic Principle," *British Journal of Psychology*, 5 (1912), 87-118. Mr. Bullough says: "Distance is obtained by separating the object and its appeal from one's own self, by putting it out of gear with practical needs and ends." "It describes a personal relation, often highly emotionally coloured, but of a peculiar character. Its peculiarity lies in that the personal character of the relation has been, so to speak, filtered. It has been cleared of the practical, concrete nature of its appeal, without, however, thereby losing its original constitution" (p. 91). "There are two ways of losing Distance: either to 'under-distance' or to 'over-distance.' 'Under-distancing' is the commonest failing of the subject, an excess of Distance is a frequent failing of Art" (p. 94).

country, and so it comes that the knowledge of the past derived from records is realized as personal memory, and when the historian writes it is not as a spectator, but as one personally affected by the events. Thus it is that Mommsen said, out of a full experience, "Those who have lived through historical events, as I have, begin to see that history is neither written or made without love or hate."⁸⁸ It is this intensity of personal feeling, inseparable from patriotism and politics, that, on the one hand, gives history its specific quality and, on the other, has remained the great obstacle to an historiographic art.

At this point there would seem to be ample justification for the remonstrances made in recent years against the principle of "impartiality"—upon which great weight has always been laid by historical methodologists.⁸⁹ In his introductory note to *The Cambridge Modern History*, Mandell Creighton says: "In the vast and diversified area of modern history, the point of view determines the whole nature of the record, or else the whole work sinks to the level of a mass of details uninformed by any luminous idea. The writer who strives to avoid any tendency becomes dull, and the cult of impartiality paralyzes the judgment." In the same vein, Cunningham remarks: "The claim to impartiality, on the part of the historian, seems to me to be unmeaning; and in so far as it has a meaning, is likely to be a mere affectation."⁹⁰

⁸⁸ Quoted in G. P. Gooch, *History and Historians in the Nineteenth Century* (London, 1913), p. 458. Note the attitude of Bishop Stubbs: "Without some infusion of spite," he says, "it seems as if history could not be written; that no man's zeal is roused to write unless it is moved by the desire to write down." *Seventeen Lectures* (Oxford, 1887), p. 126.

⁸⁹ "The third distinctive note of the generation of writers who dug so deep a trench between history as known to our grandfathers and as it appears to us, is their dogma of impartiality." Lord Acton, *A Lecture on the Study of History* (London, 1896), p. 44. "Le premier devoir de l'historien est de se mettre au travail sans préjugé, sans colère, sans idée ni passion préconçues. Il s'abstraira de tous les sentiments de l'époque présente." Camille Jullian, *Extraits des historiens français du XIX^e siècle* (6^e éd., Paris, 1910), p. cxxvi.

⁹⁰ William Cunningham, "Impartiality in History," *Rivista di Scienza*, 1 (1907), 121. Cf. G. M. Trevelyan, in *Sociological Papers*, (London, 1906), II, 229: "History must be thought about from some standpoint, and the cant of pure impartiality in history is only equalled by the cant of historical facts having value except as food for thought and speculation."

The claim of "impartiality" in historiography is unmeaning. Every student of history knows, however, that the reasons men give for their actions and advocacies rarely touch the actual aim of their endeavors. "Partiality" means that the historian takes sides, that he is affected by love and hate, that he "allows" himself to be influenced by personal and patriotic considerations—that he is Memory's mouthpiece for his countrymen. The demand for "impartiality" is just the unconscious recognition of the need of "distance" in history-writing.

Modern writers have not improved upon the statement of the case for "impartiality" made by Polybius in speaking of Philinus and Fabius.

"Judging from their lives and principles, I do not suppose," he says, "that these writers have intentionally stated what was false; but I think that they are much in the same state of mind as men in love. Partisanship and complete prepossession made Philinus think that all the actions of the Carthaginians were characterised by wisdom, honour, and courage: those of the Romans by the reverse. Fabius thought the exact opposite. Now," Polybius continues, "in other relations of life one would hesitate to exclude such warmth of sentiment: for a good man ought to be loyal to his friends and patriotic to his country; ought to be at one with his friends in their hatreds and their likings. But directly a man assumes the moral attitude of an historian he ought to forget all considerations of that kind."⁹¹

The obvious propriety of this "ought" has won verbal acceptance of a principle that no historian has been able to apply as a rule of life. Far indeed from its being appropriate that the national historian should dehumanize himself for his task, the very terms of his undertaking make him the representative of the loyalty that "good men" feel for their friends, and the spokesman of that patriotism which is the spirit of national unity. While, however, the "ought" of Polybius has been regarded by later historians as a moral principle, the object of Polybius himself was to introduce a means whereby the historian might, as he says, hold himself "entirely aloof from his fellows"—his aim was to create the "distance" necessary for art by the interposition of moral judgments.

⁹¹ Polybius, i, 14; tr. by E. S. Shuckburgh.

How the problem of "distance" was recognized and dealt with by the greatest of historical artists is disclosed in Gibbon's autobiographies—to which we now return. Gibbon's success was not due, as has frequently been suggested, to some fortunate accident that gave him a great subject, nor yet to the brilliance of his style or his accuracy of statement; it was due to the deliberation with which he approached the writing of history, and the pains he was at to rule out, so far as was humanly possible, every element of failure. There is this peculiarity about historiography as an art that, on the one hand, the author must produce a work of sufficient proportions to have his claims to distinction considered, and that, on the other, the compass of life rarely permits of his profiting by earlier experiences to achieve a later triumph. Gibbon's fame rests upon a single work.

The reader of the autobiographies will recollect that from youth onward he "aspired to the character of an historian." Before the illumination that gave him his subject, he had spent years in search of a suitable topic. Thus he had been much occupied with the thought of writing upon some period of English history—Richard I attracted him, as did the Wars of the Barons, the exploits of the Black Prince, and the lives of Sir Philip Sydney and Sir Walter Raleigh.⁹² As his ideas matured, however, Gibbon eliminated the English subjects from consideration. In July 1762, he wrote in his diary: "I am afraid of being reduced to drop my Hero [Raleigh] . . . Could I even surmount these obstacles [which he has detailed], I should shrink with terror from the modern history of England, where every character is a problem, and every reader a friend or an enemy; where a writer is supposed to hoist a flag of party, and is devoted to damnation by the adverse faction." "I must," he concludes, "embrace a safer and more extensive theme." "The history of the origin and establishment of the liberty of the Swiss" next engaged his attention—Switzerland having become for him a second home. This "glorious theme" proved so attractive that

⁹² *Autobiographies*, as cited, pp. 258-59; cf. pp. 193-97, 275-78, 301-2, 407-9.

Gibbon actually wrote a "first book," which was badly received and so abandoned. He was conscious, he said, that he had not attained "the genuine style, the middle tone, of that species of writing."⁹³ Thus, after years of study and deliberation, he decided against writing the history of either of the countries to which he was emotionally attached. That is, Gibbon discovered that the characteristic interest or emotion of national history stood in the way of the production of a work of art: on the one hand, he could not achieve "the middle tone," and, on the other, his audience could not, in reading, overcome their political feelings. After consideration of the outstanding problems of historiography, he found that what has here been called "distance" was to be achieved only in relation to a period remote from the embarrassment of political or patriotic emotion.

Here it may well appear to one who reflects upon the effect produced by the histories he has read that "distance" is, in actuality, a marked characteristic of older historical writings. This is undoubtedly true; but the "distancing" in these cases is not due to the skill of the artist; it is the effect of time. The work of an earlier historian, paradoxical as it may seem, may be "distanced" art for us, though "underdistanced" for the generation in which it was written. This is, however, merely the corollary of the fact that while the emotion expressed in the first instance is that of the author's present, the emotion conveyed is that of the reader's present. Consequently, if the reader is no longer affected by the immediacy of the political feeling expressed by the historian, what was "underdistanced" for a contemporary may be art for him. The ambitious writer will, nevertheless, scarcely be content with the possibility that this fortuitous circumstance suggests. A work which is not art in the first place—the "standard" history of its day that Mark Pattison refers to—is much more likely to be forgotten than to be appreciated by later generations. On the other hand, a great work of art, such as Gibbon's *Decline and Fall*, retains its prestige in despite of

⁹³ *Autobiographies*, as cited, pp. 195-96, 276, 408.

Time, though its statements may be challenged in detail by Teutonic and Slavonic "researchers."

What art does is to create clear and definite objects or pictures, which awaken emotion (but not partisanship or antagonism), and satisfy the reader by "that harmony and sense of the inevitableness which only a work of art can give." Consciously or unconsciously, it is at the creation of just such "clear and definite objects" that the historian aims. Stubbs illustrates this when he speaks of the historian's work as "an artistic unity, a perfect image, true to its author's idea."⁹⁴ The great obstacle to his success lies in the fact that, owing apparently to a naïve self-distrust or timidity, he invariably regards historiography through the eyes of the critic, and hesitates to consider himself in the light of a creative artist. There is, in fact, a chill in the air when the modern historical scholar comes to discuss the writing of history, and the source of this chill may be detected in the context of the phrase just quoted from Stubbs. "The result will," he says, "be an artistic unity, a perfect image, true to the author's idea, and," he continues, "if he has not let his own idea prejudice him in the manipulation of his materials, true to the reality, so far as the reality can be discovered." The "if" here is the academic doubt. The scholar-historian is to be an artist, but he is, at the same time, to distrust the inspiration and question the vision without which art is impossible. It is against this misapplication of the critical spirit that men like Creighton and Cunningham rise in protest. It is indeed only by reliance on the artist's vision that the "impartiality"—the "distance"—demanded is to be attained. Vision is not surrender

⁹⁴ Stubbs, as cited, p. 112. Caird has aptly described the procedure of the historian: "Ranging over the vast mass of seemingly heterogeneous materials with which he has to deal, and impelled simply by the unconscious effort after unity of effect, he seizes intuitively on the events that have gone to mould or that express the spirit of an age or the characteristic genius of a people." *University Addresses* (Glasgow, 1899), pp. 244-45. Cf. Albert Sorel, *Nouveaux essais d'histoire et de critique* (Paris, 1898), p. 12: "Toute la méthode, tout l'art de l'historien consistent à exercer, à perfectionner cette faculté naturelle de retenir l'image des objets, de réunir les images, de les grouper, d'en former une image totale et persistante. L'homme compose l'histoire comme il compose les souvenirs de sa propre vie."

to personal passion. "So far from being self-expression, artistic production is the indirect formulation of a distanced mental content,"⁹⁵ and this subconscious formulation is realized consciously in the flash-like illumination that has been illustrated from the experience of Michelet and Gibbon.

7

Historiography, then, is no mere colorless product of scholarship. It is the mental reflection of the consciousness of national existence,⁹⁶ it is the memory of what men cherish in the life of the nation to which they belong. It is the expression of the spirit of the community that gives it birth, and takes new forms as that spirit expands. This is true whether the historian writes of recent times or of times remote. A Mommsen, Ferrero or Eduard Meyer may present the picture of a distant past, but he speaks always with the voice of his own generation, and gives utterance to the ideas and aspirations of his own community. The historian, far from being open to condemnation, is true to his calling when he follows his "natural impulses, like the common run of men," for he does not write as a scholar, but as the spokesman of a people.

From the days of the Greeks down to the present, there has been a constant tendency among historians to discuss the utility of history. If, now, ceasing to repeat what Thucydides and Polybius said, we examine the evidence, it will be to find that, in giving expression to national pride, history provides a body of ideas which serves to unify the attitude of the individuals of a nation towards their common country; in fact, the feeling of nationality is due primarily to a common pride in past events.

⁹⁵ Bullough, as cited, p. 115.

⁹⁶ "The Reformation quickened history into a new life, as it quickened the world; the consciousness of national existence, of which it was the outcome, naturally sought its vindication in the study which is, after all, but the mental reflection of that consciousness." J. R. Green, *Historical Studies* (London, 1903), p. 56.

"Le véritable patriotisme n'est pas l'amour du sol, c'est l'amour du passé, c'est le respect pour les générations qui nous ont précédés."⁹⁷ Historians follow close upon the movements of race and of people; their "invention," their originality, consists chiefly in vitalizing old materials, in interpreting the records in the light of the present, in recreating and ever renewing the memory of the past. The potency of this type of emotionalized information for inducing unity of sentiment and action is one of the notable discoveries of the nineteenth century;⁹⁸ by this means the spirit of small nations has been resuscitated, and the imagination of greater units has been fired to the point of aggression. It is to the efforts of historians that the awakening of patriotism during the last century is to be attributed.⁹⁹

From such recognition of the influence of historians it is but a step to say with Gabriel Monod: "L'histoire travaille d'une manière secrète et sûre à la grandeur de la Patrie en même temps qu'au progrès du genre humain."¹⁰⁰ Indeed, not only

⁹⁷ Fustel de Coulanges, *Questions historiques* (Paris, 1893), p. 6; cf. Ernest Renan, "Qu'est-ce qu'une nation," in his *Discours et conférences* (Paris, 1887).

⁹⁸ "In Germany at least it was the dynasty of historians, and not the abstract men, who supplied the final clenchers for public opinion and national resolution." Lord Morley, *Notes on Politics and History* (New York, 1914), p. 183.

The discovery was, as is well known, that of Stein. In 1829, he wrote: "In the year 1818 I gave an impulse to this undertaking, because I thought it for the honour of the nation to collect and set out properly the monuments of its history, because I considered history an efficacious means of exciting patriotism, and sustaining it against the influence of self-interest." See Sir J. R. Seeley, *Life and Times of Stein* (Cambridge, 1878), III, 499; cf. pp. 441 ff.

"Only through history," Schopenhauer remarked in 1818, "does a nation become completely conscious of itself." *The World as Will and Idea*, tr. by R. B. Haldane and J. Kemp (London, 1886), III, 228.

⁹⁹ Lord Acton, "Nationality" [1862], in his *History of Freedom, and other Essays* (London, 1907), pp. 270-300; and "German Schools of History" [1886], in his *Historical Essays & Studies* (London, 1908), p. 348. Also H. M. Stephens, "Modern Historians and their Influence on Small Nationalities," *Contemporary Review*, 52 (1887), 107-121; for the later views of Professor Stephens see his address, "Nationality and History," *American Historical Review*, 21 (1916), 225-236. The Earl of Cromer's article on "The Teaching of Patriotism," *Nineteenth Century and After*, 78 (1915), 1012-20, should also be read in this connection.

¹⁰⁰ *Revue historique*, 1 (1876), 38. The practical application of this view appears in the advice of Zurbonsen: "Studierte die Geschichte als

has history-writing in the nineteenth century awakened dormant emotions, it has incited peoples to action with visions of the future. Success, as in the case of Athens, leads on ambition; and the historian, like Herodotus, justifies the forward policy. "Through recounting or representing the exploits of earlier generations," Hirn says, "the descendants acquire that healthy feeling of pride which is the most important factor of success"¹⁰¹ in the struggle for national existence, and now that primitive modes of excitation are out of date history-teachers take the place of the scops and scalds of our forefathers. History, like any art, is not to be judged by what it becomes under the tutelage of mediocrities,¹⁰² but by what it is in the hands of great men; it is not merely a vehicle for the training of critics or a literature suitable for the promotion of general culture, but it is a great moving spirit in the open world and a living force inspiring the actions of men.

The foregoing analysis has been undertaken for the reason that in discussions upon historical method there is a marked tendency to assert what, it is thought, historiography should be, and an equally marked neglect to observe what it actually has been and is. There is, indeed, something remarkable in the fact that historical study should be involved in difficulties because historical scholars, in dealing with their own subject, cling tenaciously to the absolute or philosophical, as opposed to the relative or historical method of criticism.¹⁰³ One of the great

Patriot. Patriotismus erwärmt das Studium; 'sanctus amor patriae dat animum!' ist das schöne Motto der *Monumenta Germaniae historica*. Aber sei kein Chauvinist; Chauvinismus blendet und macht ungerecht. Wir Deutsche sind nicht das einzige Volk auf der Welt." *Anleitung zum wissenschaftlichen Studium der Geschichte* (2. Aufl., Berlin [1910]), p. 5.

¹⁰¹ Yrjö Hirn, *The Origins of Art* (London, 1900), pp. 178-179; cf. pp. 180, 268.

¹⁰² "The strongest and most impressive personalities, it is true, like Macaulay, Thiers, and the two greatest of living writers [1895], Mommsen and Treitschke, project their own broad shadow upon their pages. This is a practice proper to great men, and a great man may be worth several immaculate historians." Lord Acton, *A Lecture on the Study of History* (London, 1896), p. 30.

¹⁰³ "The [philosophical] point of view implies the existence of definite standards and clear principles; the [historical] leads us to the great

services of the "method of origins" is that it enables us, by going back to a point where our personal judgments are not immediately involved, to follow up the line of advance, and, as it were, to take our prepossessions in the rear. In no subject would this procedure appear to be more necessary than in that now under consideration; and what the historical study of historiography renders conspicuous is the property-interest of the community in the recital of the story of its past. "History," the record of what men of the same group cherish in common, is a literature that cannot readily be superseded or replaced, because it fills a definite social need. To provide materials for this record is no unworthy object of research; and, indeed, there would seem to be an obligation upon scholars to serve their fellows by bringing old deeds and reputations to the test of "what it was that actually happened."

Nevertheless, there maintains itself in the minds of present-day scholars a hope that the study of history may possibly be directed to other ends than the satisfying of national vainglory; and the plea that history should be studied for its own sake represents a striving, as yet not wholly conscious of its aim, toward something different. It must be evident from what has gone before that the primary obstacle in the way of historical inquiry leading to scientific results lies in the subordination of inquiry to historiography. Such, however, is the vitality of the tradition in the presence of which the historian lives that he finds it difficult to conceive of "history" as presented in other form than that of chronologized narrative, and so adheres with pertinacity to a type of historical composition that antedates the first beginnings of criticism among the Greeks.

It might now seem the obvious course to proceed with a statement of the means to be adopted by historical investigators

problem of historical genesis. In the first instance we refer the subject we are interested in to standards and principles, which we must either assume or demonstrate; in the latter case we connect the object of our study historically with its antecedents and surroundings in time and place." J. T. Merz, *A History of European Thought in the Nineteenth Century* (Edinburgh, 1912), III, 131.

having for their aim the achievement of scientific results. The road, however, is not yet clear, for in defense of orthodoxy and tradition it is now declared that "logic has at length justified the historical method"—meaning historiography—and hence it becomes necessary to consider the relation in which History stands to Philosophy.

IV

HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY

1

The mind of a thinking being is largely occupied in making constructions; impressions come to us and we fit them into our own schemes of thought. Our constructions, conscious or unconscious, are framed for the purpose of setting up an intelligent conception of the world we live in, and Philosophy and Science are the two methods available for the attainment of this object. Philosophy regards the universe as a totality, and adopts the view that the significance of any part depends upon the meaning of the whole. The philosopher may be said to look upon the universe as a work of art. For him it is made up of details, but is not a mere aggregate; it is a whole or unity in which the details acquire a significance that does not attach to them taken separately. In a work of art, and in the universe as the philosopher views it, the whole is something more than the sum of all its parts; and this conception finds expression in the doctrine that analysis always falsifies, because the parts of a complex whole are different, as contained in that whole, from what they would otherwise be. Science, on the other hand, maintains that any view of the whole must be in conformity with what is known of the parts, and so, putting off the entire question of "meaning," devotes itself to the laborious undertaking of dissecting and sorting the objects of experience. In either case, it should be observed, the construction is an hypothesis; but whereas the hypotheses of science relate to strands or factors of which more than one example is to be found in the world, those of philosophy relate to a unique thing, the universe itself, so that verification by comparison is here impossible. It follows that while the constructions of science may be tested by reference to objective actualities, those of philosophy can be criticized only in respect

to their self-consistency in thought—[Philosophy, as Kant remarked, is constructed out of the resources of reason.]

“The essence of philosophy lies in the connected vision of the totality of things, maintaining in every point the subordination of every element and factor to every other element and factor as conditioned by the totality. It may be compared to the best theory of Impressionism. You may perfect your detail and finish as much as you please, but there is one inexorable condition. Lose subordination to the whole and all is lost. You must never violate the singleness of the impression.”¹

It will be seen, then, that the philosopher is in the position of assuming that we may grasp the meaning of the entire complex of existence while remaining in ignorance of the factors or strands of which this is made up. There will be little difficulty in appreciating the fact that any such construction can be but a temporary expedient which must be abandoned or revised with every new contribution to knowledge made by science. Philosophy is an expression of the human desire to arrive at an understanding of the significance of life and human endeavor on the basis of the knowledge available at any given time. In contradistinction to this point of view, the scientist is in the position of asserting that we must first identify and name the objects to be discussed if we are ever to become mutually intelligible to each other. From his experience of the difficulty of verifying hypotheses in limited fields, he is distrustful of hypotheses framed to describe “wholes.” From his experience of the mind’s way of working, he distrusts all constructions that proceed “from the resources of reason;” and he cannot concede that our interpretations of the exterior world can be justified by their consistency in thought.

Historically speaking, all forms of inquiry were originally conducted in accordance with the method of philosophy, and it has been but slowly that one field after another has come to be placed upon a scientific footing. With the rise of many new sciences in modern times, philosophy has seen its old supremacy challenged, and has been forced to define its field with reference to the activities of science. It is admitted that “the need which

¹ Bernard Bosanquet, “Science and Philosophy,” *Aristotelian Society, Proceedings*, n. s., 15 (1914-15), 13.

modern philosophy has of the particular sciences in their modern form is urgent and indispensable."² The exact status of this dependence has, however, been the subject of an indeterminate debate. A view widely accepted is that of Professor Paulsen: "Philosophy," he says, "cannot be separated from the sciences; it is simply the sum-total of all scientific knowledge."³ "The most important distinction," Sidgwick says, "is that the sciences concentrate attention on particular parts or aspects of the knowable world; abstracting from the rest; while it is, in contrast, the essential characteristic of philosophy that it aims at putting together the parts of knowledge thus attained into a systematic whole; so that all methods of attaining truth may be grasped as parts of one method; and all the conclusions attained may be presented, so far as possible, as harmonious and consistent."⁴ Philosophy, then, takes the world as science finds it; but does not on that account admit a subordination of function. On the contrary, it assumes that the devotion of the man of science to his restricted problem, by limiting his outlook, renders him incapable of a comprehensive grasp of what is possible to science as a whole. Hence philosophy undertakes the formulation of a wider synthesis than is possible to any one of the sciences; not that the complete unification and systematisation of knowledge lies beyond the province of science, but since this is "the goal of science as a whole, it cannot be the task of a particular individual discipline."⁵ That is, philosophy in its endeavor to deal

² G. T. Ladd, *Knowledge, Life and Reality* (New York, 1909), p. 12.

³ Friedrich Paulsen, *Introduction to Philosophy*, tr. by Frank Thilly (New York, 1895), p. 19.

⁴ Henry Sidgwick, *Philosophy, its Scope and Relations* (London, 1902), p. 11. Compare Abel Rey, *La philosophie moderne* (Paris, 1908), pp. 360-61: "Pourquoi la philosophie ne serait-elle pas, de même façon, une synthèse générale de toutes les connaissances scientifiques, un effort pour se représenter l'inconnu en fonction du connu afin d'aider à sa découverte et de maintenir l'esprit scientifique dans sa véritable orientation? Elle ne différerait de la science que par la plus grande généralité de l'hypothèse; la théorie philosophique, au lieu d'être la théorie d'un groupe de faits isolés et bien délimités, serait la théorie de l'ensemble des faits que la nature nous présente."

⁵ Aloys Riehl, *Introduction to the Theory of Science and Metaphysics*, tr. by Arthur Fairbanks (London, 1894), p. 14. Cf. Oswald Külpe, *Introduction to Philosophy*, tr. by W. S. Pillsbury and E. B. Titchener

with experience as a whole, as a systematic unity, is dependent upon the results of the special sciences, and must continually revise its judgments as scientific knowledge expands.

It is, furthermore, necessary to point out that the modern philosopher occupies himself with criticism rather than with construction, and regards as his particular province the criticism of the methods, as well as the analysis of the fundamental conceptions and assumptions of the sciences. In other words, the scientist is intent upon his own enterprise; the "philosopher comes into being as one who is interested in observing what it is that the scientist is so intently doing."⁶ Here, again, philosophy follows science; and it is of the utmost importance in the present connection to observe that, while it investigates methodology, philosophy, logic, or science of knowledge, does not devise methods for men of science to follow. "As the sciences progress in actual insight they have to complete, improve, refine, and extend their methods;"⁷ the logician simply analyses the methods actually employed by the sciences at a given time. "It is not the business of the logician," Rashdall says, "to lay down rules for the guidance of scientific men. In so far as logic is concerned with the actual methods of particular sciences, the logician must rather analyse the methods actually employed in those sciences up to the present than to attempt to prescribe *a priori* the methods that they must follow." "Each branch of learning has its own methods, and the method can only be acquired by familiarity with the science itself."⁸ Logic does not justify, it describes method.

A good illustration of the procedure of logic is provided in the description of the method of the historian given by J. G. Hibben: "To

(London, 1901), p. 239. The special sciences, "in all cases, are limited in their scope, and evade the ultimate problems which their subject-matters suggest. Metaphysics, on the other hand, aims at completeness of view, and seeks to press all its questions home." J. S. Mackenzie, *Outlines of Metaphysics* (London, 1902), p. 10.

⁶ R. B. Perry, *The Approach to Philosophy* (London, 1905), p. 119.

⁷ Wilhelm Windelband, in *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, tr. by B. E. Meyer (London, 1913), I, 43.

⁸ Hastings Rashdall, in Aristotelian Society, *Proceedings*, n.s., 6 (1905-6), 1.

solve the special and the general problems of history, recourse is had to an analysis of events on the basis of well-established psychological results. The phenomena of history are substantially the activities of man, both in his individual and collective capacities. Events being given, an hypothesis concerning the motives, and ends which actuated them, is framed upon the supposition that men ordinarily are impelled by similar motives under similar circumstances, in order to achieve similar ends. Here the analogies drawn between men of the present and men of the past, or between men moving in the ordinary routine of every-day life and men whose acts may be epoch-making, furnish a basis for historical interpretation."⁹

What the scientist may hope to find in the discussions of logicians is not a justification of his own procedure, but a fuller analysis of its implications than he himself is able to carry out; the historical student may utilize logic as a mirror and discover, if he will, the aspect which his endeavor presents to the outside world, or as a means to enhance that self-consciousness of his own mental processes which is a prerequisite of successful scientific work. If, then, we turn to logic, as to a candid friend, it will be to discover that history is the narrative of certain unique happenings particularised by names and dates, and selected by an individual writer as of value or worth in relation to a given set of ideas. In short, the analysis of logic demonstrates that the relationship of history is with philosophy, not with science—and there are even philosophers who hold the opinion "that History is Philosophy and Philosophy History."¹⁰

At this point, the inevitable difficulty over the use of words has of recent years become prominent. Men "think" history as an after-one-another procession of events, each one emerging somehow from what has gone before, and they assume that every occurrence is particular and unrepeatable. It is urged that in the world of everyday reality, the concrete world of experience, the world of action and of men, there is nothing but the actuality of deeds done that may not be undone, of words uttered that may not be recalled. In this world of unrepeatable fact, it is argued,

⁹ *Inductive Logic* (Edinburgh, 1896), p. 291.

¹⁰ Benedetto Croce, in *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, tr. by B. E. Meyer (London, 1913), I, 212.

history stands out as the record of a unique series of events that has happened once for all. Among the myriad possibilities of a given moment a single choice is made, and the entire future is dominated thereby; among the ways open but one is followed, and this can never be retraced. Recent philosophical discussion lays stress on this view, which is, in fact, the obvious reflection of the narrative method; and the logicians assume that history, with its statements of unique happenings, differs from the ✓ sciences, which they describe as concerned only with recurrent uniformities. This distinction reveals the initiatory obstacle to the scientific treatment of "history"—the use of personal names for human beings. Biology also has to reckon with the existence of individuals, but documentary history is the only field of study in which the individual is differentiated from the group by a special nomenclature. The difficulty is incidentally made clear by Professor Bury when, on the one hand, he asserts that the rôle of the individual is the heel of Achilles for historical theory, and, on the other, admits that pre-documentary history lends itself as readily to scientific treatment as zoology.¹¹

Until recently philosophy has asserted that history is not a science; this characterization goes back to Aristotle, and is explicit in European philosophy since the Renaissance. Various opinions are, however, to be observed in the definition of the relations posited between history and philosophy: thus an early view maintained was that as history is not a science it necessarily lies outside of philosophy, whereas the latest is that as history is not a science it is identical with philosophy. Bacon and Hobbes thought that history is properly concerned with individuals, which are circumscribed by time and place, whereas philosophy discards individuals and deals only with abstract

¹¹ J. B. Bury, "Darwinism and History," in *Darwin and Modern Science*, ed. by A. C. Seward (Cambridge, 1909), pp. 541, 537. Karl Pearson, *The Grammar of Science* (2d ed., London, 1900), p. 360, says: "It is peculiarly in 'prehistoric history' that we are for the time being best able to apply the scientific method." T. B. Strong, in *Lectures on the Method of Science* (Oxford, 1906), p. 242, remarks that "the great source of the difficulty of history altogether is the presence of the human element."

notions. In the nineteenth century the argument shifts so as to bring the antithesis between history and science: thus Schopenhauer asserts that history is not a science because it deals with the particular and individual, whereas the sciences are systems of conceptions; and insists that while the sciences speak of what always is, history knows only "that which is once, and then no more." More recently a common form of the contrast has been that the sciences deal with facts that recur, whereas in history what has once happened is not repeated and can never be reproduced. The antithesis has lent itself to a wealth of expression: Nature deals with the typical in the manifold, History separates the manifold from the typical; Nature is the realm of necessity, History is the realm of freedom; Natural Science systematises and classifies, History individualises and narrates; Natural Science deals with the abstract and conceptual, History with the actual and concrete.

In current discussion the antithesis is based by logicians on the practice of historians during the nineteenth century, and more particularly on the formula of Ranke that the office of the historian is simply to state what it was that happened.¹² While historians, heedless of the outcome, were occupying themselves in describing the succession of such particular events in one country after another as could be detailed from available documents, the logicians were observing their procedure with the object of determining the principles of historical method. Now the crux for logic was that history claimed to be a science, though it did not produce scientific results. In the circumstances there were two ways of escape from the dilemma, and of these one was adopted by English, the other by German logicians. Admitting the claim, English logicians, like Mill and Fowler, looked for a scientific element in historical work; this they found in what

¹² "Allein die vornehmste Forderung an ein historisches Werk bleibt doch immer, dass es wahr sei, dass die Dinge sich so begeben haben, wie sie dargestellt werden." *Sämmtliche Werke* (3. Aufl., Leipzig, 1877), XII, 6. "Man hat der Historie das Amt, die Vergangenheit zu richten, die Mitwelt zum Nutzen zukünftiger Jahre zu belehren, beigemessen: so hoher Aemter unterwindet sich gegenwärtiger Versuch nicht: er will blos zeigen, wie es eigentlich gewesen." *Same*, XXXIII, vii.

is known as the "comparative method," and hence it comes that, in English logic, "historical" and "comparative," as applied to method, are synonymous terms. In Germany, on the other hand, logicians accepted literally the claim of history to be a science, and, following out this assumption to its conclusion, announced that history constituted a science of a new type.

The argument is simple. It is admitted by Windelband and Rickert¹³ that logic follows after method and describes it, and that the method of history differs from that of science. They assume that the practice of historians exhibits the method proper to their subject,¹⁴ and, to justify this view, assume further that the method of a science is determined by the object it has in view. Since, then, the object of history is just the narrative description of unrepeatable happenings, it is to be regarded as the science of the particular or individual, in contradistinction to the natural sciences whose object, they say, is the discovery of "laws."¹⁵

¹³ For the literature see Bibliographical Appendix, II, 4.

¹⁴ "Sous le prétexte que la logique vient toujours après la pratique, enregistre les résultats heureux de l'activité spontanée, ils prennent comme type de la réussite historique les grands historiens du passé. Ranke, surtout, est considéré comme le maître. Certains déclarent que Thucydide ne saurait être dépassé." Henri Berr, "Théoriciens allemands," *Revue de synthèse historique*, 10 (1905), 371.

¹⁵ "Windelband had already replaced the old distinction between natural and moral sciences by that between the sciences of events, *Ereigniswissenschaften*, and sciences of laws, *Gesetzeswissenschaften*, applying the term *idiographisch* to the method of the former, and *nomothetisch* to that of the latter (*Geschichte und Naturwissenschaft*, Strassburger Rektoratsrede, 1894). Xénopol, too, in his *Les principes fondamentaux de l'histoire* (Paris, 1899), makes a similar division, distinguishing the *faits de répétition* from the *faits de succession*. The first suggestion of a division of the kind occurs in Humboldt's *Cosmos*, but Cournot was the first to determine it clearly and to extend it to all the sciences (*Considération sur la marche des idées et des événements dans les temps modernes*, Paris, 1872, p. iv). Hermann Paul, who was not acquainted with Cournot's work, draws a distinction in his *Prinzipien der Sprachgeschichte* (Halle, 1880) between the *Gesetzwissenschaften* and the *Geschichtswissenschaften*." Antonio Aliotta, *The Idealistic Reaction against Science*, tr. by Agnes McCaskill (London, 1914), p. 270.

The extended note of Hanns Oertel on pp. 5 and 6 of his *Lectures on the Study of Language* (New York, 1902) should be read in this connection. It should be observed that the views of this school are based on "the comfortable eighteenth century conception of 'laws of nature.'" Carl Fries points out that "Rickert betont hier nicht genug den Inhalt des Begriffes Gesetz." *Archiv für systematische Philosophie* 16 (1910), 448 ff.

Now, the admission that "history" is not a science in the recognized meaning of the word is all that need here be taken into consideration. Rickert describes traditional historiography and applies to it the term "scientific." Obviously, then, the question "whether history is capable of scientific treatment" remains precisely where it was before. Scholars who are desirous of placing historical investigation upon a scientific footing will not be deterred by the suggestion that they will no longer be regarded as writers of historiographic literature; nor on the other hand, will they accept the implication that as historiography is the result with which historical students have heretofore been satisfied it therefore represents the only object at which historical inquiry may aim. In short, logic ignores the scientific possibilities of historical inquiry because the historian has not yet found a way to turn to account the opportunities which his materials present.—"Je vous assure," Seignobos stated, "que je ne demanderais pas mieux que d'appliquer en histoire des modes de raisonnement analogues à ceux des sciences de la nature; mais vraiment je ne le peux pas."¹⁶—The thoughtful historian will hesitate to accept the designation "scientific" as applicable to the type of statement embodied in narrative history, for narration has always been and must remain a form or genre of literary art.

The attention of historical students should be called to the fact that although his principal work is described as "eine logische Einleitung in die historischen Wissenschaften," Rickert is a metaphysician, and an exponent of that type of philosophical thought which holds that the fullest revelation of "reality" is to be found in the aesthetic point of view, and which concentrates its critical attention upon the problems of Individuality and Value.¹⁷ It is obvious that a description of Rickert's system of "transcendental idealism" would here be out of place;

¹⁶ *Bulletin de la Société française de philosophie*, 7 (1907), 298.

¹⁷ The exposition of Rickert's views on history contained in F. M. Fling's "Historical Synthesis," *American Historical Review*, 9 (1903), 1-22, omits all reference to the metaphysical background—which is indispensable.

but an indication of the aspect that history wears from this standpoint cannot be omitted.

Philosophy, as we have seen, regards the world, and indeed every particular thing, as a totality, and endeavors to "explain" it; science, on the other hand, acts upon the assumption that all additions to knowledge proceed from the application of the method of dissection—from "the substitution of piecemeal, detailed, and verifiable results for large untested generalities recommended only by a certain appeal to imagination."¹⁸ The philosopher urges that the method of dissection can never return to the concrete individual from which it sets out (thus, for the moment, enlisting a crude realism in his argument); the scientist replies simply that any such return is premature until an adequate knowledge of the workings of nature has been obtained. Now, the interest of the philosopher in "history" is that it alone "can fill the gaps left by the formation of scientific concepts, it alone can substitute reality in the fulness of its individual aspects for the empty abstractions of science." "History, in as much as it enables us to watch the realisation of universal values in the world of concrete consciousness, thus becomes the fundamental organ of philosophy."¹⁹

¹⁸ Bertrand Russell, *Scientific Method in Philosophy* (Chicago, 1914), p. 4.

¹⁹ Aliotta, as cited, p. 206, following Heinrich Rickert, *Die Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung* (2. Aufl., Tübingen, 1913), pp. 22–23. "Hier sei nur noch bemerkt, dass entsprechend der Beschränkung bei der Untersuchung der Naturwissenschaft es uns auch für die Geschichte weniger auf den Prozess des Forschens als auf die Form der Darstellung, d.h. auf die logische Struktur der geschichtswissenschaftlichen Ergebnisse ankommt. Sie allein können die Lücken im naturwissenschaftlichen Begreifen der Wirklichkeit ausfüllen und sind daher das eigentlich philosophisch Interessante."

For criticism of Rickert's position see Aliotta, pp. 216–17. Also cf. Bernard Bosanquet, *The Principle of Individuality and Value* (London, 1912), p. 33: "For better or worse, the historical tense, the genuinely personal subject, . . . are unknown to the processes of science. A general statement is an extract or an abstract. . . . It tells us things about reality; . . . It does not pretend to speak of real beings in their whole and fundamental nature. That is to judge categorically in the full sense; to make assertions regarding the nature of the universe as a whole. And this can be done, if at all, by Philosophy alone. For Philosophy is essentially of the concrete and the whole, as science is essentially of the abstract and the part." But "to say that reality can only be found in the given, and not in its expansion and interpretation through thought, is surely the ancient fallacy of naïve Realism" (p. 80).

The nature of the distinction between history and science thus introduced is brought into full light by Urban's contrast of "appreciative description" and "scientific description"²⁰—which, furthermore, serves to make evident the aesthetic leanings of this type of philosophy. History, or, to be more explicit, historiography, is "appreciative description"; as such, it discountenances "scientific description," and considers the facts provided by investigation "in order to pass judgment on the intellectual, moral, and aesthetic worth of the objects in question in the light of transcendental ideal standards of value."²¹

Logic cannot "justify," its business is to describe, method; and the South-German "value-philosophers" have rendered a service to historical scholarship by revealing, beyond possibility of equivocation, the ineradicable philosophical substratum in all attempts to describe the course of events as they have happened. The effort of the mind in such a case is to grasp the meaning of a whole, and this effort is the characteristic procedure of philosophical thought. Critical inquiry, Merz takes pains to show, "succeeds only in matters of detail; or, where larger problems are at stake, only by the aid of leading ideas and commanding points of view which have themselves outrun criticism, being the spontaneous outcome of the inspired and divining genius. This," he continues, "has notably been the case in the treatment of larger historical subjects. . . . It is only since the time of Niebuhr, who was followed by Ranke and his school, that Germany has produced historians who have had great influence outside of Germany: this reputation rests not so much and perhaps not mainly upon the critical preparation of the material with which they dealt, as upon the general aspects from which their histories were written."²² "However limited," Caird remarks, "the period the historian undertakes to write of, as he cannot tell all the facts, he must select, and selection involves a criterion or principle of judgment as to what is more or less

²⁰ W. M. Urban, *Valuation: its Nature and Laws* (London, 1909), p. 8.

²¹ A. E. Taylor, *Philosophical Review*, 15 (1906), 385.

²² J. T. Merz, *A History of European Thought in the Nineteenth Century* (Edinburgh, 1912), III, 149-150.

important, that is, it involves a kind of philosophy however crude." From the details that investigation provides, the historian "fastens by a certain ideal instinct on those elements which furnish a clue to its meaning, and which enable him to give unity, connexion, relative proportion, harmony and significance to the whole."²³ Thus Benedetto Croce can say that "if a man is to narrate history, he must begin by understanding it, and he can only do this by bringing into consciousness the ideas which lie concealed within it."²⁴ In short, "there is an implicit philosophy of history in every modern historian, even when he may seem for the time to have no interest beyond the narrative."²⁵

Lord Acton's pronouncement, "I exhort you never to debase the moral currency or to lower the standard of rectitude, but to try others by the final maxim that governs your own lives, and to suffer no man and no cause to escape the undying penalty which history has the power to inflict on wrong,"²⁶ may be read in connection with Galloway's remark that "the final presuppositions of history as of ethics are speculative, not scientific."²⁷

"What the good historian does for a particular period," D. G. Ritchie says, "is to arrive at the meaning, or underlying principle or 'idea' of that period." "The philosophy of history . . . is an attempt to read the plan of Providence, to unravel the plot of the great drama that is played throughout the centuries."²⁸

"... and the result is, in one after another of our historians, the sense of something wanting—of a want of 'the one thing needful,' the moral and spiritual life without which history is nothing but an old almanac."²⁹

"Stubbs believed, and most of us (I think) still believe to-day, that the science which we love is not merely concerned with the stringing together of facts in their correct order and the reconstitution of annals, but with something more. We must draw the moral, whether we will or no: . . . The teacher who contents himself with arraying the facts in due order has only accomplished half his task. He must take the risk

²³ John Caird, *University Addresses* (Glasgow, 1899), pp. 242, 245.

²⁴ Croce, in *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, I, 211.

²⁵ W. P. Ker, *On the Philosophy of History* (Glasgow, 1909), p. 15.

²⁶ *A Lecture on the Study of History* (London, 1896), p. 63.

²⁷ George Galloway, *The Principles of Religious Development* (London, 1909), p. 33.

²⁸ "The Rationality of History," in *Essays in Philosophical Criticism* (London, 1883), pp. 127, 132.

²⁹ J. R. Green, *Historical Studies* (London, 1903), p. 249.

and endeavour to deduce the inner meaning of the annals that he has set forth, content to err if err he must."³⁰

"For the marrow of civilized history is ethical, not metaphysical, and the deep underlying cause of action passes through the shape of right and wrong . . . In the revolt of the last ten years [written in 1886] against utilitarians and materialists, the growth of ethical knowledge has become, for the first time, the supreme object of history."³¹

"Research," Eucken says, "does not make the slightest claim to be philosophy; its chief desire is to free history from all philosophical tutelage and make it entirely self-reliant: yet this tendency could not possibly have made such victorious progress and won such whole-hearted devotion unless it both carried in itself and aroused definite convictions."³²

"There is no indication in the work, for instance, of Maitland and Vinogradoff that they have been actuated by anything but the purest motives of historical research. Yet it would not be fanciful to attribute the unusual interest in their work to the fact that it was, however indirectly, related to political questions and to modern reconsiderations of the social structure. It had a certain imaginative grasp which the work of many of their fellow-historians has lacked."³³

"La philosophie de l'histoire consiste à prendre parmi les doctrines contemporaines une idée saillante quelconque, politique, religieuse ou autre, et à faire de cette idée, ou de sa négation, le pivot d'un récit historique."³⁴

"The historian will fail hopelessly if he seeks to be a mere recorder. For the truth about the whole, the expression of which is what matters, was not realised in its completeness until time and the working of the spirit of the period had enabled the process developed in a succession of particular events to be completed. . . . His business is to select in the light of a larger conception of the truth. He must look at his period as a whole and in the completeness of its development. And this is a task rather of the spirit than of the letter."³⁵

Lest misunderstanding should intrude itself at this point, it may be said that the world is many-sided and that there is room for every form of heedful inquiry. "Philosophy of his-

³⁰ Charles Oman, *Inaugural Lecture on the Study of History* (Oxford, 1906), pp. 7-8.

³¹ Lord Acton, *Historical Essays and Studies* (London, 1908), p. 362.

³² Rudolf Eucken, *Main Currents of Modern Thought*, tr. by Meyrick Booth (New York, 1912?), pp. 311-12.

³³ R. H. Gretton, *History* (London [1914]), p. 47.

³⁴ H. d'Arbois de Jubainville, *Deux manières d'écrire l'histoire* (Paris, 1896), p. 5.

³⁵ Viscount Haldane, *The Meaning of Truth in History* (London, 1914), pp. 28-29.

tory," which all historical students are brought up to view with suspicion, has its legitimate place, for it must not be forgotten that the desire to find a meaning in life and history is an ineradicable possession of the human spirit. The chaos and fortuitousness of events creates wonderment, and drives men to formulate explanations. There must be some meaning, we feel, in this drama, some end or aim to all this earnestness and striving. The desire for such an interpretation cannot be set aside by arguments to prove the impracticability of its object, for it has its origin in our highest aspirations. As Lotze said: "All human longing to find a guiding thread in the confused variety of history springs from the unselfish desire to recognise a worthy and sacred order in the system and course of the world." So men cling tenaciously to the idea of a divine Providence which controls at once the immediate happenings of our individual lives and the far-off destiny of the human race. The justification of all such constructions is the need men have for a guiding principle in the conduct of life. Scientific knowledge is incomplete, and these philosophical constructions are temporary working hypotheses for the conduct of life which cannot well be dispensed with.

The constructions of historiography are based upon the philosophico-aesthetic method of "appreciative description"; to make this fact clear it is only necessary to examine the teachings of those who are most urgent in proclaiming that "history is a science."

An important case is that of Principal Caird. In his "Study of History" he begins by showing that, as applied to human actions, individual or collective, the word "science" cannot be employed in accordance with its ordinary usage: "In history," he says, "the phenomena never repeat themselves, and can never be reproduced"; "the facts do not relate to a fixed and abiding order, they cease forever with the single instance of their occurrence, and can never be recalled." He then brings the problem to the form: "In what sense can the term 'science' be applied to the record of the past life of man?", and to find an answer

sets up the further question "Whether philosophy, which claims to be the science of sciences, . . . can be accused of presumption when it attempts to introduce the light of reason and intelligible law into the seeming confusion and complication of human history?" The function of a "science" of history would then be, in accordance with Caird's theory, the discovery of "a secret order of reason in the life of nations and of the world"³⁶—in other words, he proposes that history, in order to become a "science," should adopt the method of philosophy.

Again, Professor Robinson is among those who believe that history has been raised "to the dignity of a science." Having reached this conclusion he finds himself confronted with the problem of the relationship of history to the specialised histories of art, law, religion, and so forth. Is history, as, he says, Seeley maintained, merely a residuum left after these subjects have become independent sciences, and is this residuum destined to be still further reduced by some secession of tomorrow? Robinson's answer might have been drawn from any Introduction to Philosophy. The vital phenomena of human life cannot, he says, be exhausted by any number of monographs on special topics. Man is more than the sum of his scientifically classifiable operations. The whole is something quite distinct from the sum of its parts; "these may be studied, each by itself, with advantage, but specialisation would lead to the most absurd results if there were not some one to study the process as a whole, and that some one is the historian."³⁷ Thus, it appears, that both in spirit and in aim the "new" history would identify itself with philosophy.

The specialist might appear to be the person best qualified to trace the history of such subjects as mathematics, chemistry, and painting. This, it seems, is a mistake. The specialist, Professor Robinson says, is not trained to "conceive remote and unfamiliar conditions which historically lie back of the conceptions which he entertains," and the historian "is constantly shocked by a certain awkwardness which those inexperienced in historical research are almost sure to betray. They make mistakes which he would not make, in spite of their greater knowledge of the subject with which they are dealing."

³⁶ Caird, as cited, pp. 234, 236, 249, 255.

³⁷ J. H. Robinson, *The New History* (New York, 1912), pp. 65-68.

For a fuller insight into this attitude, which is not exceptional, see the remarks of Professor Edward Channing: "The time comes when the historian must begin to make up his mind. In doing this it is not at all necessary that he should have read every bit of evidence. Take the countless diaries and journals"—descriptive of an historical event—"there are differences between them, no doubt, but in essentials they teach the same truths. These will be patent to the man of historical genius when he has read three or four of them, and will never become visible to him whose mind works in another way, no matter how many he may read."³⁸

Furthermore, as Professor Bury has given currency to the widely-quoted phrase that "history is a science, no less and no more," it is of some importance to understand that he advocates the philosophical interpretation of history as "the only hypothesis on which the postulate of 'history for its own sake' can be justified as valid."³⁹ "It is one of the remarkable ideas which first emerged explicitly into consciousness in the last century," he says, "that the unique series of the phenomena of human development is worthy to be studied for itself, without any ulterior purpose, without any obligation to serve ethical or theological, or any practical ends. This principle of 'history for its own sake'," he continues, "might be described as the motto or watchword of the great movement of historical research which has gone on increasing in volume and power since the beginning of the last century. But," he asks—and, in asking, passes over from the attitude of a scientific inquirer to seek the countenance of some exterior authority—"but has this principle a theoretical justification?" "It seems to me," he says, "that our decision of this question must fall out according to the view we take of the relation of man's historical development to the whole of reality. We are brought face to face with a philosophical problem. Our apprehension of history and our reason for studying it must be ultimately determined by the view we entertain of the *moles et machina mundi* as a whole."⁴⁰ So, in bringing his

³⁸ American Antiquarian Society, *Proceedings*, n.s. 20 (1910), 433-34.

³⁹ J. B. Bury, "The Place of Modern History in the Perspective of Knowledge," *Congress of Arts and Science, St. Louis, 1904*, ed. by H. J. Rogers (Boston, 1906), II, 144.

⁴⁰ Bury, as cited, pp. 143-44.

discussion to a close, he says that "the answer to the question, 'What is the position of modern history in the domain of universal knowledge?' depends in the first instance on our view of the fundamental philosophical question at issue between idealism and naturalism."⁴¹

Professor Bury has evidently adopted the philosophical system of his Cambridge colleague, Professor James Ward. "Nothing but a spiritualistic view of the world can, without encountering the difficulty of absolute idealism, afford an intelligible explanation of the unity of nature and thought, and the universal teleology of the 'ought to be,' which the philosophy of values regards as controlling the evolutionary movement of experience. If the universe be not a brute mechanism, but the realm of ends and of history, the outcome of the interweaving of spontaneous individual activities whose goal is the actualisation of the ethical order, only a theistic conception will enable us to comprehend it. The logical completion of the philosophy of values can only be found in a form of spiritualism, and to James Ward belongs the credit of having frankly recognised this fact. Ward, in his Gifford Lectures [*Naturalism and Agnosticism* (London, 1899), and *The Realm of Ends* (Cambridge, 1911)] waged a glorious warfare against agnostic naturalism, and sees, like Royce, Münsterberg, and Rickert, in the historical and concrete aspect of the world its true reality as opposed to the abstract, mechanical fictions of science."⁴²

The point of view of this modern school which embraces history in philosophy seems to me to be adequately expressed by George Galloway: "We seem driven to the conclusion that the goal and meaning of history are not to be found in this temporal order of things at all. The facts themselves appear to necessitate the acceptance of some form of transcendency. . . . We are not able to find a meaning in history, viewed as a mundane process in time, which will satisfy the reason and do justice to the moral values involved. That the process is not meaningless we are bound to assume. Accordingly we make the postulate that the ultimate meaning of history must lie in a sphere which transcends the present temporal order."⁴³

This, then, is the end at which the modern historical school, setting out with the resolution to avoid philosophical entanglements, has arrived. The views of Caird, Croce, and Ward, Windelband, Rickert, and Bury, however unpalatable, are based upon the practice of historians—of Thucydides and Ranke, the models

⁴¹ Bury, as cited, p. 152.

⁴² Aliotta, as cited, p. 265.

⁴³ *The Principles of Religious Development* (London, 1909), p. 37.

of the logicians—and if this practice should prove to be the only form which the results of historical research may take, then historical investigation is, after all, just a study ancillary to philosophy. The subordination of investigation to historiography carries with it the subordination of investigation to philosophical ideas.

2

No frequency or emphasis of assertion that "history is a science" can make it such; nor can the verbal repudiation of philosophical ideas exclude these from the historian's statement of his results. The ineradicable philosophical outlook of historiography is perhaps nowhere better displayed than in the idea of "the continuity of history" which has been proclaimed as "the most fundamental and valuable truth which the past has to teach us."⁴⁴ To observe the bearings of this idea we may take counsel of the logicians.

The essence of the historical method, Sabine says, "is the conception of historical continuity. Every institution, social or political, every art, science, or religion, in fact, everything which is the product of human activity, as well as every race or nation, has a history and is to be adequately understood only by a study of its genesis and course of development. A nation or institution as it exists at any single period, however self-sufficing it may be, is, so to speak, a cross-section of a long process which extends both into the past and into the future; though itself an individual, it is a member of a larger individual which extends beyond the limits of any single time. Moreover—and this is the real meaning of historical continuity—a series of historical events is a true individual. A mere succession of events in time is by no means adequate to form an historical sequence; a thread of connection, a relating principle, must run through all the particular events and give them a unity in the light of which alone the particular event can have any significance. History deals always with the progress or decadence of a unitary being which persists as an individual in spite of changes; it never deals with a collection of sequent but unrelated events. Unless this were the case, any fact would be of equal importance to the historian with every other fact; selection can take place only with reference to a universal."⁴⁵

⁴⁴ Robinson, as cited, p. 14.

⁴⁵ G. H. Sabine, "Hume's Contribution to the Historical Method," *Philosophical Review*, 15 (1906), 17.

Now, it is of the first importance that the historical student should distinguish between "continuity" as the basis of an effort to grasp the significance of the course of history as a whole, and a different application of the term, in which it appears simply as a protest against the acceptance of artificial "breaks" in the sequence of events. It may be observed, in passing, that since the time of Leibniz the word "continuity" has been one of those tantalizing counters of thought that pass current though every bargainer has a different notion of what it represents; hence it may be regarded with suspicion when it is introduced into debate without full and sufficient guarantees. Today, it stands for a critical interest both in science and philosophy, and implies different sets of ideas in different fields of thought; there is danger, therefore, that its use in many different connections may convey an unfounded assurance of its validity in yet other associations. The historical student should at least be warned at the outset that "it would hardly be an exaggeration to say that the whole logical crux of metaphysics centers in the problem of continuity and discreteness."⁴⁶ As Höfding remarks, "the relation of continuity and discontinuity touches the highest interest of personality as well as of science. In both directions we aim at unity and connectedness; and in this regard the discontinuous appears as an obstacle which has to be overcome. On the other side it is just this discontinuity (difference of time, of degree, of place, of quality, of individuality) which everywhere, in the realm of science as well as of life, brings something new, releases the bound-up forces, and places before us the great tasks."⁴⁷

It is to be observed that the idea of "continuity" derives its significance, in the first place, from the denial it involves of noticeable discontinuities or breaks in nature—for example, Lyell's theory of gradual geological changes as against the older theory of successive cataclysms; Darwin's theory of gradual

⁴⁶ J. A. Leighton, "On Continuity and Discreteness," *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods*, 7 (1910), 231.

⁴⁷ Quoted in J. T. Merz, *History of European Thought in the Nineteenth Century* (Edinburgh, 1912), III, 291-92.

biological changes as against the theory of special creations of living species. Leibniz stated the principle in this negative form: "Nothing," he said, "happens all at once, and it is one of my great maxims . . . that nature never makes leaps." "Everything goes by degrees in nature, and nothing by leaps, and this rule as regards changes is part of my law of continuity."⁴⁸ "Telle est cette fameuse loi de continuité, dont Kant a pu dire qu'elle était la plus haute systématisation de l'esprit humain."⁴⁹

In history also, the principle of continuity finds its familiar application in the denial of "breaks." Thus it appears that, in the eighteenth century, one of the great obstacles which historical criticism had to overcome was the dogma of the literal interpretation of the Bible. So long as its narrative and events were protected by a veil of sanctity men accepted its statements of supernatural interventions—that is, of discontinuities—in history. Leslie Stephen remarks that Conyers Middleton had "a more distinct view than any of his contemporaries of the essential continuity of history," and that the aim of all his writings was "to remove that veil, and to apply the same methods of enquiry to all periods and all nations, and to show how the supposed breaches of continuity disappeared under closer investigation."⁵⁰

In the nineteenth century, historians like Dr. Arnold and Bishop Stubbs held that there was a significant "break" between ancient history and modern. Arnold said: "The state of things now in existence dates its origin from the fall of the western empire; so far we can trace up the fortunes of nations which are still flourishing; history so far is the biography of the living; beyond, it is but the biography of the dead."⁵¹ Stubbs expressed the same idea, saying that Modern History "compared with the study of Ancient History is like the study of life compared with

⁴⁸ Tr. in Bertrand Russell, *A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz* (Cambridge, 1900), p. 222.

⁴⁹ Louis Davillé, *Leibniz historien* (Paris, 1909), p. 671.

⁵⁰ Sir Leslie Stephen, *History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century* (3d ed., London, 1902), I, 263; cf. 58, 191.


⁵¹ Thomas Arnold, *Introductory Lectures on Modern History* (New York, 1857), p. 42. The extract is from his Inaugural Lecture, 1841.

that of death, the view of the living body compared with that of the skeleton." "It is Christianity," he continues, "that gives to the modern world its living unity and at the same time cuts it off from the death of the past." Ten years later, in 1877, in a lecture "On the Purposes and Methods of Historical Study," he said: "The false idea, or that which to me seems practically misleading in the term the Unity of History, is the acceptance as a practical rule or maxim that there are no new points of departure in human history; that modern life is a continuation of medieval, of ancient and medieval, history, by a continuity and unity that is at all points equally important, of the same consistency in fact."⁵² This pronouncement came in response to Freeman's Cambridge lecture in 1872, in which it was maintained against Stubbs that historians "must cast aside all distinctions of 'ancient' and 'modern,' of 'dead' and 'living,' and must boldly grapple with the great fact of the unity of history. As man," he said, "is the same in all ages, the history of man is one in all ages." The history of mankind must be looked upon as a continuous whole. "No period of history can be clothed with its highest interest and its highest profit, if it be looked at wholly in itself."⁵³

⁵² *Seventeen Lectures* (Oxford, 1887), pp. 15, 18, 96. Cf. Lord Acton, *A Lecture on the Study of History* (London, 1896), p. 8: "The modern age did not proceed from the medieval by normal succession, with outward tokens of legitimate descent. Unheralded, it founded a new order of things, under a law of innovation, sapping the ancient reign of continuity."

⁵³ *Comparative Politics, . . . with The Unity of History* (2d ed., London, 1896), pp. 197, 198. First ed., 1873. *The Unity of History* was first published in 1872.

Freeman's advocacy of 'continuity in history' goes back to 1849, when he published the first of three pamphlets—*Thoughts on the Study of History*—opposing the establishment of a School of Modern History at Oxford. Cf. W. R. W. Stephens, *Life and Letters of Edward A. Freeman* (London, 1895), I, 117 ff. His essay entitled "The Continuity of English History," *Historical Essays, First Series* (London, 1871), was a reprint in part of a review of Robert Vaughan's *Revolutions in English History* (London, 1859). In his *Inaugural Lecture* (1884), he returned to the attack on the position taken by Stubbs: "But I cannot help pointing out, now at the very beginning," he said, "that this unnatural division into 'ancient' and 'modern' hinders the great central fact of European history, the growth and the abiding of the power of Rome, from being ever set forth in all the fulness of its unity." "We may well agree to draw a line between 'ancient' and 'modern,' if we hold our



Freeman's general position is sound; if history is to become a scientific study it cannot pick and choose periods or episodes, but must take into consideration all the facts, not merely such as are subjectively interesting to a given individual. Nevertheless, Freeman failed to live up to the principle of continuity as set forth by himself. It turns out to be European history only that he has in mind; this, he says, "forms one whole in the strictest sense, but between European and Asiatic history the connexion is only occasional and incidental."⁵⁴ "While we claim the records of Athenian archons and Roman consuls as essentially parts of the same tale as the records of Venetian doges and English kings, we welcome the recovered records of the Accadian, the Assyrian, and the Hittite, as materials for a high and worthy study, but for a study which is not our own."⁵⁵

Almost as Freeman was speaking, however, a younger contemporary at Oxford had advanced to the position that "in the relation of Egypt and Persia to Greece, of Greece to Rome, of Rome to the nations of modern Europe, we see a continuity and a succession which we do not find in the remoter East. They have handed on to one another the lamp of civilization; Egypt, Persia, Greece, and Rome have perished, but each in dying has given life to its successor. China and India neither live nor die."⁵⁶ Caird, at the same period, recognized the continuity between the nations of the Nearer East and of Europe, but "outside the pale of civilization" could see only men and races that had "no history any more than herds of cattle."⁵⁷

By such steps, in the thirty years that have elapsed since Freeman wrote, has the principle of continuity been extended,

'modern' period to begin with the first beginnings of the recorded history of Aryan Europe." *The Methods of Historical Study* (London, 1886), pp. 22, 28.

The views of Freeman and Stubbs on 'cycles' might also be profitably compared.

⁵⁴ *Comparative Politics*, as cited, p. 215.

⁵⁵ *Methods*, as cited, p. 29.

⁵⁶ D. G. Ritchie, "The Rationality of History," in *Essays in Philosophical Criticism*, ed. by Andrew Seth and R. B. Haldane (London, 1883), p. 147.

⁵⁷ John Caird, *University Addresses* (Glasgow, 1899), pp. 268, 260-61.

until today it covers the "break" between "historical" and "unhistorical" times and peoples. The argument for discontinuity is, however, still maintained, though it no longer turns upon supernatural interventions; it upholds, on a different footing, the view that "history" is restricted to the period for which written documents are available, or, with Professor Bury, distinguishes between a hypothetical "primitive ultra-prehistoric period" in which man was dominated mechanically by his physical environment, and the historical period, in which the problem has become that of the interrelation of human wills.⁵⁸ Nevertheless, the enlargement of the knowledge of classical antiquity through archaeological discoveries and the comparative study of institutions has actually broken down the "documentary" limitation. The significance of "ancient" history for the present generation lies in the demonstration it provides of the artificiality of the "break" that is founded upon the presence or absence of a particular type of evidential material. The student of the history of ancient Greece finds "documents" everywhere—in potsherds and stones, misunderstood allusions and modern survivals. At this point, moreover, "history" has been brought into immediate and indeed inseparable connection with the work of that great group of scholars—Sir Henry Maine, Sir Charles Lyell, Sir John Lubbock, and Sir Edward Tylor—who, between 1861 and 1865, established the foundations of the "comparative" study of man. ✓

While the principle of continuity was thus enlarging the general scope of history, in its application to the history of individual countries it was proving equally effective. In England, under the influence of the Revolution of 1688, the idea emerged that internal political changes do not destroy the continuity of national existence. In Locke's opinion the Revolution was a reformation within the law, not a breaking of legal bonds.⁵⁹

⁵⁸ J. B. Bury, "Darwinism and History," in *Darwin and Modern Science*, ed. by A. C. Seward (Cambridge, 1909), p. 537.

⁵⁹ Sir Frederick Pollock, *Introduction to the History of the Science of Politics* (London, 1890), pp. 71-73. Cf. Eduard Fueter, *Geschichte der Neueren Historiographie* (München, 1911), p. 321: "Er hatte ein

Again, at the end of the eighteenth century, Burke, stirred by the events in France, expressed the view that societies cannot make a clean break with the past, "for it is by 'the discipline of nature,' as it operates through the centuries, and not by the abrupt initiatives of parties to an explicit contract, that peoples and states are fashioned and perpetuated."⁶⁰ Thus was set up the theory of Romantic historiography of "the 'soul of a people' continuously bodied forth in its customs, laws, religion, language, art";⁶¹ and the influence of the Romantic theory has been to give history a fuller content by gradually extending its purview to include every phase of the social activity of a people.

"History," Professor Firth says, "is not easy to define; but to me it seems to mean the record of the life of societies of men, of the changes which those societies have gone through, of the ideas which have determined the actions of those societies, and of the material conditions which have helped or hindered their development."⁶²

"Institutional, economic, social development, these are the subjects that excite the chief interest now."⁶³

"It is only by tracing the genesis not merely of culminating events but of national institutions, and by exhibiting them as the outcome and embodiment of the genius of the people to whom they belong, that in many cases they can be made intelligible. This principle is the foundation of the historical method."⁶⁴

"D'ailleurs l'histoire ne se compose pas uniquement, elle ne se compose même pas essentiellement des événements plus ou moins dramatiques que les annalistes et les historiens d'autrefois nous ont racontés; elle

Gefühl für historische Kontinuität. Er suchte die Theorien der englischen parlamentarischen Juristen, die da meinten, sie hätten nicht eine Revolution gemacht, sondern bloss das alte Recht des Landes behauptet oder wiederhergestellt, in geschichtliche Anschauung umzusetzen."

⁶⁰ John MacCunn, *The Political Philosophy of Burke* (London, 1913), p. 52. "The discipline of nature" is that long and gradual process of historical development through which successive generations slowly bring a society into that state of organization in which the varied elements of corporate life all find their appropriate place and function.

⁶¹ Fueter, as cited, speaks of Burke as "Der erste grosse Theoretiker der romantischen Präskriptionslehre" (p. 419); and as "Ihr hauptsächlichster Begründer" (p. 421).

⁶² *A Plea for the Historical Teaching of History* (2d ed., Oxford, 1905), p. 7.

⁶³ J. H. Round, "Historical Research," *Nineteenth Century*, 44 (1898), 1013.

⁶⁴ Viscount Haldane, *The Meaning of Truth in History* (London, 1914), p. 11.

se compose aussi de tout un ensemble d'institutions, de coutumes et de lois, de manières de vivre, de penser et de sentir, qui constituent la civilisation des diverses époques."⁶⁵

"L'histoire des grands hommes et des guerres a régné longtemps sans conteste; celle des institutions politiques et sociales lui a succédé, mais elle n'embrasse encore qu'un champ limité de l'activité humaine et si l'on veut arriver à cette reconstruction du passé dont nous parlions au début de ce livre, il ne faut pas s'interdire l'étude des aspects qui sont souvent les plus caractéristiques d'une société."⁶⁶

"Wir verstehen somit unter Geschichtswissenschaft die Wissenschaft von den Vorgängen und Veränderungen unter den Menschen. Es müssten folglich alle Betätigungen der Menschen in den Kreis der geschichtlichen Betrachtung gezogen werden." "Diese Beschränkung des Geschichtsbegriffs auf die Menschen als politische Wesen, . . . die man oft ausgesprochen findet, ist zu eng."⁶⁷

Thus it appears that the idea of "continuity" as applied to history has proved to be a principle of genuine importance; it has brought us back, after so long a circuit, to the view of Diodorus and the Stoics that "all men living, or who once lived, belong to the common human family though divided from one another by time and space."⁶⁸ It has broken down the barriers that limited "history" to certain political divisions of Europe, and, indeed, to the actions of a restricted number of individuals in these countries. As a result, history today includes not alone every manifestation of political activity among men, but the entire range of human experience.

Nevertheless, it must be borne in mind that though the principle of continuity has removed an obstacle in the way of history becoming a science, though it has created an inclusiveness of outlook without which a science of history could not be built up, yet this principle cannot of itself be said to have converted history into a science. After the belief in "breaks" has been abandoned, the conception of history that men derive from the

⁶⁵ Gabriel Monod, "Histoire," in *De la méthode dans les sciences* (2^e éd., Paris, 1910), pp. 383-84.

⁶⁶ G. Desdèvises du Dezert & L. Bréhier, *Le travail historique* (Paris, 1913), p. 70.

⁶⁷ Aloys Meister, *Grundzüge der historischen Methode* (2. Aufl., Leipzig, 1913), p. 1.

⁶⁸ Tr. in J. B. Bury, *Ancient Greek Historians* (New York, 1909), p. 235.

further insistence upon the idea of continuity is that of "a series involving an uninterrupted succession of terms," "a representation of a number of objects moving successively before the eye, like the impression obtained by making a voyage along a river, or like a journey through a country."⁶⁹ As Molinier remarks: "L'histoire est pour ainsi dire un tissu sans fin, un enchevêtrement de trames compliquées, et toute coupure dans ce vaste ensemble est forcément arbitraire."⁷⁰ In brief, the theory of "continuity" represents an adherence to the view which regards history as an unbroken after-one-another succession of events, a single stream of which scholarship is to trace the course, a unique carpet whose unfinished pattern the investigator is to detect upon the loom of Time⁷¹—the view that brings history into affiliation with philosophy and effectually interposes a barrier to its becoming a science.

⁶⁹ Sir G. C. Lewis, *A Treatise on the Methods of Observation and Reasoning in Politics* (London, 1852), I, 301.

⁷⁰ Auguste Molinier, *Les sources de l'histoire de France*. V. *Introduction générale* (Paris, 1904), p. ii.

⁷¹ Cf. J. B. Bury, "The Place of Modern History," as cited, p. 152.

V

HISTORY AND EVOLUTION

1

The methodological principle accepted generally by historical students in the nineteenth century was expressed in the formula that the aim of the historian is to state what it was that actually took place—in other words, that he should confine himself to the presentation of concrete individual facts. This dictum was not based upon analysis of the problems of historical study, but took form in opposition to the pragmatic utilisation of historical materials. The new policy asserted that the historian should restrict himself to setting down what it was that had happened without permitting himself to introduce moral judgments on the actions recorded or to point lessons for the edification of publicists and statesmen. The soundness of this position may well seem axiomatic, but what seems difficult for historians to realize is that the procedure advocated leaves the actual problems of historiography wholly untouched. As a consequence, “history” still remains identified with narrative; and the function of historical research still continues to be the preparation of materials for the use of the history-writer. The investigator is left to occupy himself with the determination of isolated facts, while the historiographer fits the details into a philosophical framework. If, however, “history” is to become a scientific pursuit, a clear-cut distinction must be made between historiography and historical inquiry. The distinction should occasion no difficulty, but historical inquiry cannot be placed upon a scientific basis so long as it remains dependent upon history-writing and continues to be occupied with the mere determination of individual facts.

What would appear to be a fundamental difficulty in the way of “history” becoming a science is the fact that the word

"history" does not denote a subject-matter. It is true that in ordinary usage a political content is read into the word. This limitation, however, does not accord with the views of contemporary scholars, who take it to include everything that affects civilized man in his social relations; and if an examination be made of the "histories" written since the time of Herodotus a continual shifting of emphasis in their content will be observed. So, while later writers omit the record of meteorological phenomena which are so prominent in the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle*, there has been a notable tendency to enlarge the scope of historical writings by the introduction of details in regard to the literary and artistic achievements of the people concerned. To-day, moreover, there is much uncertainty as to what relation should subsist between "History" and the subjects designated "economic history," "military history," "the history of civilisation," and the other special histories of art, literature, religion, philosophy, and science. Each of these fields, apparently, tends more and more to be appropriated by an independent discipline, and so it has been asked whether it only requires that political history should be taken over by Political Science to leave the "historian" without an occupation.

There is, too, another side to the question. The historian, vacillating and uncertain as he may be in regard to the subject-content of "history," has, on the other hand, an absolute confidence in the "historical method." He feels, in short, that he is called upon to emphasise the "historical" aspect—the sequence in time, the after-one-another relation—of happenings, and to show how one particular event has come to follow upon its predecessor. It is evident, indeed, that a scientific value is thought by the historian to attach to the chronological enumeration of events, and it may reasonably be inferred that he holds to the term "history" in preference to adopting a name for his subject-matter because his chief interest lies in the ordered presentation of sequences of happenings. The conception which the historian seeks to maintain is that events have taken place in the past, and that the function of "history" is to state how

these events have followed one another in time. It is, on the other hand, only necessary to examine the products of a century of historical study to see that this method cannot lead to scientific results. The statement that such and such events happened is admittedly the work of the annalist; the historian proper comes in to supply the connecting links, to show how the particular event followed upon its antecedents. The explanation provided is based upon the assumption that every human action has a motive; and each action in history is explained by the interpolation of motives which inferentially led to the particular event.¹ Again, the annalist continues his record indefinitely both as regards time and the nature of the incidents, and his work may be extended without inconsistency by any number of continuators. On the other hand, the historian aims at a unity, and this unity is created either by an emotional realization or a philosophical conception of the significance of a given event or of an extended series of happenings. Clearly, then, "History" is the name, not of a scientific subject, but of a literary form or genre, and as such may be grouped with Poetry and Drama; indeed, one may say that confusion would be avoided if this type of literature were designated "Story"²—at least, the question "Is Story Science?" would not then be likely to arise.

It should now be possible to see the question "whether history is capable of scientific treatment" in its proper light. "History"—the statement of an indeterminable number of concrete individual cases—is not, and cannot be converted into a science. If, however, the question be restated in the form: "whether the processes manifested in the concrete instances of history may be investigated in accordance with the method of science?" a wholly different reply may be anticipated. Every object we look out upon, as every idea we entertain, has a history, and the fact that this history is unrecorded in writing does not negative the statement that the object considered has come to be as it is

¹ Cf. William Cunningham, *Politics and Economics* (London, 1885), p. 11.

² Story < *storie* < *estoire* < *historia*. Cf. "Story of the Nations" series.

through changes it has undergone in the course of time. This point of view applies equally to the earth and all its physical features, the forms of life upon the globe, and the acquirements of man. Astronomy, Geology, and Biology are historical sciences, and, although they have no written documents upon which to base narratives furnished with names and dates, their efforts to show how the things with which they respectively deal have come to be as they are have been justified by the results obtained. Here, then, the student of the history of man, forced to abandon the non-scientific procedure of attempting to state "just what it was that took place," may find for his guidance a scientific procedure already tested and approved. Looking out upon the world he may see men constituted like himself, but employing different languages, entertaining different ideas, and living under different institutions, and the problem that presents itself is how all these have come to be as we now find them.

2

There are many historical sciences, but each of them faces an identical problem. Astronomy and Geology, Biology and the Science of Man, set up the same question and answer it with the same word—"Evolution."

The wide currency of this term in recent years has led to not a little ambiguity in the meaning attached to it. Consequently, "it must be borne in mind," as J. A. Thomson says, "that the general idea of organic evolution—that the present is the child of the past—is in great part just the idea of human history projected upon the natural world."³ "When applied to the development of conscious and social phenomena," Underhill remarks, "it is very hard to distinguish Evolution from what our forefathers called history."⁴ "I take it," Woodbridge says, "that the term 'evolution,' in so far as it indicates

³ *Darwin and Modern Science*, ed. by A. C. Seward (Cambridge, 1909), p. 6.

⁴ G. E. Underhill, in *Personal Idealism*, ed. by Henry Sturt (London, 1902), p. 219.

any natural fact, indicates initially no more than the fact that things have a past, that they have a history."⁵ Nevertheless, there is a significant difference in the meaning of the two words, for in all its various uses "evolution" never loses the suggestion of process, and this "history" never gains. The historian states single instances; the evolutionist investigates the processes manifested in any history. "Evolution" and "history" thus deal with the same facts; and, succinctly, the word "evolution" stands for the scientific investigation of what the historian sets down. In the long chain of happenings, the historian undertakes to relate the details of one or another prominent incident that still-existing records enable him to describe; the evolutionist, on the other hand, endeavors to determine what the processes are by which the object before him has come to be as it is. The historian, from the materials at hand, sets himself to create pictures of long-past happenings in the lives of men; the evolutionist looks upon everything around him as having come into existence through the operation of processes which are still going on.

An analogue, seemingly closer than "history," of the word "evolution," is the word "progress." Actually, the modern doctrines of evolution originated in eighteenth-century theories of "progress,"⁶ and these theories sprang from the desire of men like Condorcet to discover a meaning in the world around them.⁷ The words "evolution" and "progress" are, however, by no means equivalent, for the latter definitely connotes betterment and perfectibility. As used in biology, the term "evolution" is practically synonymous with the theory of descent, and means simply that living species of plants and animals are descended from earlier forms and do not owe their origin to special acts of creation. "Progress," on the other hand, implies a judgment of value; "it assumes a standard—some end or ends, by relation

⁵ F. J. E. Woodbridge, "Evolution," *Philosophical Review*, 21 (1912), 137.

⁶ Patrick Geddes & J. A. Thomson, *Evolution* (New York, 1911), pp. x-xi.

⁷ On the history of the idea of "progress" see Jules Delvaille, *Essai sur l'histoire de l'idée de progrès* (Paris, 1910).

to which we judge historical movements and declare that they mean progress."⁸ Quite truly "it imparts to history an intenser meaning," and leads us "to conceive the short development which is behind us and the long development which is before us as coherent parts of a whole";⁹ but this interest in values and ends, this imaginative projection of the course of history—past, present, and to come—which Professor Bury contemplates, is not science, it is philosophy.¹⁰ Indeed, the idea of progress holds a commanding place in the "philosophy of history,"¹¹ and the formulation of a theory of progress is the aim of the branch of philosophy known as Sociology.¹² It should, in addition, be noticed by the historical student, that as the idea of "evolution"

⁸ J. B. Bury, *The Ancient Greek Historians* (New York, 1909), p. 256.

⁹ Bury, as cited.

¹⁰ That Professor Bury is not alone in this respect may be seen from the following remarks of Bishop Creighton: "We search the records of the past of mankind, in order that we may learn wisdom for the present, and hope for the future. . . . We are bound to assume . . . a progress in human affairs. This progress must inevitably be towards some end; and we find it difficult to escape the temptation, while we keep that end in view, of treating certain events as great landmarks on the road. A mode of historical presentation thus comes into fashion based upon an inspiring assumption." Mandell Creighton, "Introductory Note," *Cambridge Modern History* (New York, 1902), I, 4.

¹¹ "The growth of history towards a scientific stage has been partly the consequence and partly the cause of the growth of certain ideas, without a firm and comprehensive grasp of which no philosophical study or conception of history is possible. . . . One of the most important of the ideas referred to is that of progress. The philosophy of history deals not exclusively but to a great extent with laws of progress, with laws of evolution; and until the idea of progress was firmly and clearly apprehended, little could be done in it." Robert Flint, *Historical Philosophy in France* (New York, 1894), pp. 87-88.

"La loi de l'évolution est l'objet principal de la philosophie de l'histoire. Mais ce qui nous préoccupe d'une façon particulière, c'est la loi de l'évolution qualifiée ou subjective. Autrement dit: la loi du progrès. Les hommes, au risque même de se trouver en contradiction avec la méthode objective, aspirent au bonheur." Charles Rappoport, *La philosophie de l'histoire comme science de l'évolution* (Paris, n. d.), p. 24.

¹² "The study of sociology . . . can hardly justify its existence unless it furnishes us a theory of progress which will enable us to shape the policies of society with a view to future improvement. In other words, the fundamental task of the sociologist is to furnish a theory of social progress." T. N. Carver, *Sociology and Social Progress* (Boston, 1905), p. 7.

"Sociology . . . must offer a theory of progress if it is not to be an abortive affair, but to take its place among the living sciences vitally related to human life and destiny. As a matter of fact, the majority of sociologists from Comte down have made the problem of progress

sprang from that of "progress," and represents the attempt to utilize this conception for scientific purposes, where this utilization has not been made complete, "evolution" must remain exposed to the teleological implications which constitute the effective element in the idea of "progress."

Having thus distinguished between the terms "evolution" and "progress," the historical student should discriminate between the scientific application of the idea of evolution and its place in philosophy. Thus constructively—as it is the business of the philosopher to discover the traits common to all phenomena, to find the common law or universal synthesis of things—Herbert Spencer attempted to formulate a universal "law of evolution."¹³ On the other hand, Taylor, addressing himself to the criticism of the idea, points out that as "the infinite individual whole of existence has no environment outside itself to supply conditions of development and incentives to change," "the infinite whole evolves neither forward nor backward."¹⁴ It is, for

the central and highest problem of their science." C. A. Ellwood, *Sociology in its Psychological Aspects* (New York, 1912), p. 366.

"Si la philosophie a pour champ d'étude le problème métaphysique du progrès cosmique . . . la sociologie, pour sa part, ne s'inquiète que du progrès spécifiquement humain. Pour nous, comme pour Comte et Wundt, la philosophie consiste à systématiser le savoir total du genre humain. . . . Depuis que, avec Comte, la sociologie s'est affirmée comme une branche particulière de la philosophie, son existence se justifie en tant que philosophie de la société et elle ne finira qu'avec la culture elle-même: seul, le dernier homme sur la terre sera le dernier sociologue." Ludwig Stein, "La philosophie du progrès," *Annales de l'Institut international de Sociologie*, 14 (1912), 484. Barth, as is well known, identifies sociology with Philosophy of History; see his *Die Philosophie der Geschichte als Sociologie* (2. Aufl., Leipzig, 1915).

¹³ "The aim of Darwin is a theory of species, of Spencer a doctrine of cosmical progress. . . . The theory of Darwin accounts for the genesis of natural kinds through adaptation to environment in virtue of natural selection under the conditions of the struggle for existence: Spencer's 'synthetic system' explains the world and life on the basis of 'the continuous redistribution of matter and motion.' . . . The Spencerian philosophy . . . is so inclusive in its scope that the synthesis undertaken involves from time to time the transcending of the limits of phenomenal inquiry." A. C. Armstrong, *Transitional Eras in Thought* (New York, 1904), pp. 160-161.

¹⁴ A. E. Taylor, *The Elements of Metaphysics* (London, 1903), p. 273. "In short," W. T. Marvin remarks, "we can talk of sidereal or solar evolution, of human or social evolution, of the evolution of the chemical atom, but let us give up, once for all, talking about world-evolution." *An Introduction to Systematic Philosophy* (New York, 1903), p. 316.

all practical purposes, sufficient for the scientific investigator to comprehend the nature of these discussions, to understand that they lie wholly outside his own field, and to realize that ultimately they turn upon the results of his own labors. Even to take cognizance of them will, however, lead the scientific student to see, more clearly than would otherwise be the case, the bearings of his own efforts; and to understand the importance of distinguishing, in its present instance, between "history," the series of actual concrete happenings; "history" or "historiography," the statement of certain cases regarded as of importance by a given individual writer; and "evolution," "history" viewed as the manifestation of constant processes which it is the work of science to determine and describe.

3

"Evolution" is the name given to the process-content of any history. Now, a history can only be stated in detail, and that by the chronological enumeration of its particulars, but an evolution, as Darwin showed, may be brought within the scope of scientific method. An idea commonly entertained of Darwin is that he "proved" Evolution. What he actually established—in contradistinction to the old conception that every species was the result of a separate act of creation—was the view that "new" forms of life emerge from the old by an orderly process of which the factors may be isolated and described. It has been said that Darwin projected the idea of human history upon the world of nature, but it was never his purpose to write a "history" fortified with names and dates. He may indeed have seen in the past a vast sequence of particular events; but he accomplished the intellectual liberation of his contemporaries, not by rehearsing the facts of this sequence, but by substituting for the theory of "special creation" a hypothetical statement of the process by which "new" species had their origin. His great contribution to biological science was the hypothesis of Natural Selection, and the investigator of another evolution will turn

with interest to examine the steps by which he arrived at results of such importance in the history of ideas.

In turning to consider Darwin's method, it may be pointed out that such training as he appears to have received before he joined the *Beagle* was under the direction of men whose attitude, like that of the modern historical scholar, may be described as a devotion to the "fact" in and for itself. The biologists of Darwin's youth recommended their students, as did Cuvier, "to confine themselves solely to the exposition of positive facts without attempting to draw from them inductions." The geologists of the same period "lived under the spell of that strong reaction against speculation which followed the bitter controversy between the Neptunists and Plutonists in the earlier decades of the century. They considered themselves bound to search for facts, not to build up theories."¹⁵

While this was the prevailing attitude towards investigation, it had come to be recognised that the earth and the forms of life upon it had not always been as they are today, and, further, that in the present status of inorganic and organic nature there are discernible evidences of changes which had taken place in the past. It was at the close of the eighteenth century that William Smith established the historical character of geology by his discovery not merely, as had been demonstrated earlier, that the stratified rocks occur in a definite sequence, but that each stratum may be distinguished by the fossils peculiar to itself which it contains. This great discovery "showed that within the crust lie the chronicles of a long history of plant and animal life upon this planet, it supplied the means of arranging the materials for this history in true chronological sequence, and it thus opened out a magnificent vista through a vast series of ages, each marked by its own distinctive types of organic life, which, in proportion to their antiquity, departed more and more from the aspect of the living world."¹⁶ Biology, no less than geology, it will be observed, was thus placed upon an historical

¹⁵ Sir Archibald Geikie, *Landscape in History, and other Essays* (London, 1905), p. 175.

¹⁶ Geikie, as cited, p. 169.

footing. Linnaeus, in working out his classification for the systematic description of existing plants and animals, had arranged these in an order from the simplest forms to the most complex. The new science of historical geology, comparing this classification of existing species with the time-order of appearance of species revealed in the rocks, reached the conclusion that the systematic arrangement from simplest to most complex represented an historical sequence from earliest to most recent.

Darwin wrote: "For my part, following out Lyell's metaphor, I look at the natural geological record, as a history of the world imperfectly kept, and written in a changing dialect; of this history we possess the last volume alone, relating only to two or three countries. Of this volume, only here and there a short chapter has been preserved; and of each page, only here and there a few lines. Each word of the slowly-changing language, in which the history is written, being more or less different in the successive chapters, may represent the apparently abruptly changed forms of life, entombed in our consecutive, but widely separated, formations."¹⁷

The principle of comparison thus established in regard to the whole series of life-forms had been recognised earlier in the study of morphology. Buffon had been led by comparison of the structure of different species to observe that animals carry with them internal evidence that they "are no longer what they formerly were." "The pig," he said, "is a compound of other animals; it has evidently useless parts, or rather parts of which it cannot make any use, toes all the bones of which are perfectly formed, and which, nevertheless, are of no service to it."¹⁸ So by tracing the structural similarities of closely allied groups, by demonstrating the fundamental likeness of structures used for different purposes, and by pointing out the prevalence of vestigial remains, comparative anatomy had brought to light the existence of evidence in living forms of changes which they had undergone in the past. Similarly, the comparative study of embryology had arrived at the "recapitulation theory," in which

¹⁷ *Origin of Species* (London, 1909), p. 271.

¹⁸ Quoted in H. F. Osborn, *From the Greeks to Darwin* (2d ed., New York, 1905), p. 132.

the striking resemblances between the embryos of higher and the adult forms of lower animals were interpreted as evidence that the embryos of higher animals recapitulated in their life-history the series of ancestral forms through which the species had passed.

Furthermore, before Darwin's time, the methodological principle through which these different series of historical facts were to be brought within the scope of scientific method had been laid down by the Scotch geologist James Hutton.¹⁹ "With the intuition of genius," Geikie says, "Hutton early perceived that the only solid basis from which to explore what has taken place in bygone time is a knowledge of what is taking place today. He felt assured that Nature must be consistent and uniform in her working, and that only in proportion as her operations at the present time are watched and understood will the ancient history of the earth become intelligible. Thus, in his hands, the investigation of the Present became the key to the interpretation of the Past. The establishment of this great truth was the first step towards the inauguration of a true science of the earth."²⁰ Hutton started from the point of view that the surface of the globe has not always been as it is today, and based his inquiries upon the principle that it has come to be as it is through the continued action of the same factors of change that are to be observed in operation at the present time; "we are," he said, "to examine the construction of the present earth, in order to understand the natural operations of time past."²¹

"But how," he asks, "shall we describe a process which nobody has seen performed, and of which no written history gives any account? This is only to be investigated, first, in examining the nature of those solid bodies, the history of which we want to know; and 2dly, in examining the natural operations of the globe, in order to see if there now actually exist such operations, as, from the nature of the solid bodies, appear to have been necessary to their formation."²²

¹⁹ Hutton was born in 1726 and died in 1797. His *Theory of the Earth* was read before the Royal Society of Edinburgh in 1785, and was first published in its *Transactions*, vol. 1, part 2, I, pp. 209-304.

²⁰ Geikie, as cited, p. 171.

²¹ Hutton, as cited, p. 218.

²² Hutton, as cited, p. 219.

It is to be observed that Hutton postulated that "Time, which measures everything in our idea, and is often deficient to our schemes, is to nature endless and as nothing";²³ and adopted the point of view that it was no part of his undertaking to consider "questions as to the origin of things." "By thus placing his theory on a basis of actual observation, and providing in the study of existing operations a guide to the interpretation of those in past times, he rescued the investigation of the history of the earth from the speculations of theologians and cosmologists, and established a place for it among the recognised inductive sciences."²⁴

Hutton's contribution received scant recognition in his lifetime, but after his death it was restated by his friend John Playfair in a work "which for luminous treatment and graceful diction still stands without a rival in English geological literature."²⁵ From Playfair the mantle of Hutton descended to Sir Charles Lyell,²⁶ and it was to Lyell that Darwin dedicated the later edition of the *Narrative of the Voyage of the Beagle* "as an acknowledgement that the chief part of whatever scientific merit this Journal and the other works of the author may possess, has been derived from studying the well-known and admirable Principles of Geology."

It should, therefore, occasion no surprise to find that Darwin's method is simply that of Hutton applied to a new field. With the fact borne in upon him by his South American observations that species become modified, Darwin consciously put aside all

²³ Hutton, as cited, p. 215.

²⁴ Geikie, as cited, p. 173.

²⁵ Geikie, as cited, p. 164.

²⁶ Lyell wrote in 1839: "The mottos of my first two volumes were especially selected from Playfair's Huttonian Theory, because although I was brought round slowly, against some of my early prejudices, to adopt Playfair's doctrines to the full extent, I was desirous to acknowledge his and Hutton's priority, and I have a letter of Basil Hall's in which after speaking of points in which Hutton approached nearer to my doctrines than his father, Sir James Hall, he comments on the manner in which my very title-page did homage to the Huttonians, and complimented me for thus disavowing all pretensions to be the originator of the theory of the adequacy of modern causes." *Life, Letters, and Journals of Sir Charles Lyell* (London, 1881), II, 49.

questions of the origin of life, and addressed himself to the investigation of the changes that are to be observed between successive generations of plants and animals at the present time. "After my return to England," he wrote in his Autobiography, "it appeared to me that by following the example of Lyell in Geology, and by collecting all facts which bore in any way on the variation of animals and plants under domestication and nature, some light might perhaps be thrown on the whole subject."²⁷ He assumed, as Hutton had done, that Nature was uniform in her ways of working, and that if the factors in the process of change now going on could be discovered they might with confidence be taken as applicable throughout the past. He assumed, in short, that things have come to be as they are through the continuous operation of processes that are now to be observed in nature.

Darwin found it impracticable to observe changes among animals living under natural conditions, and hence his investigations were largely concerned with "domesticated productions." He soon perceived that the keystone of man's success in making useful races of animals and plants was the selection exercised in breeding, that without the intelligent interference of the breeder there would be no new race. The problem then presented itself, and remained for some time a mystery to him, how selection could be applied to organisms living in a state of nature—in Weismann's words, "how what was purposive could conceivably be brought about without the intervention of a directing power." The next step he thus describes: "In October, 1838, that is, fifteen months after I had begun my systematic enquiry, I happened to read for amusement 'Malthus on Population,' and being well prepared to appreciate the struggle for existence which everywhere goes on from long-continued observation of the habits of animals and plants, it at once struck me that under these circumstances favourable variations would tend to be preserved, and unfavourable ones to be destroyed. The result of

²⁷ *Life and Letters of Charles Darwin*, ed. by Francis Darwin (New York, 1889), I, 67-68.

this would be the formation of new species. Here then I had at last got a theory by which to work."²⁸

"The Darwinian hypothesis," Huxley said, "has the merit of being eminently simple and comprehensible in principle, and its essential positions may be stated in a very few words: all species have been produced by the development of varieties from common stocks, by the conversion of these first into permanent races and then into new species, by the process of natural selection, which process is essentially identical with that artificial selection by which man has originated the races of domestic animals—the struggle for existence taking the place of man, and exerting, in the case of natural selection, that selective action which he performs in artificial selection."²⁹ In Darwin's statement: "As many more individuals of each species are born than can possibly survive; and as, consequently, there is a frequently recurring struggle for existence, it follows that any being, if it vary however slightly in any manner profitable to itself, under the complex and sometimes varying conditions of life, will have a better chance of surviving, and thus be naturally selected. From the strong principle of inheritance, any selected variety will tend to propagate its new and modified form."³⁰

For the present purpose it is unnecessary to proceed with an analysis of Darwin's hypothesis or to follow the debates to which it has given rise.³¹ Here it is his method only that is of moment. The problem that he set for himself was to discover how "new" species arise, and the hypothetical element in his description of this process was the rôle he assigned to "the struggle for existence."³² He began, as we have seen, by attempt-

²⁸ *Life and Letters*, as cited, I, 68.

²⁹ T. H. Huxley, *Lay Sermons, Addresses, and Reviews* (5th ed., London, 1874), p. 292.

³⁰ Darwin, as cited, p. 16.

³¹ See V. L. Kellogg, *Darwinism To-day* (New York, 1907).

³² "The only element of theory in his doctrine of evolution by natural selection has reference to the degree in which these observable facts, when thus brought together, are adequate to account for the process of evolution." G. J. Romanes, *Darwin and after Darwin*, I (Chicago, 1892), p. 264. "The characteristic feature in which Natural Selection differs from every other attempt to solve the problem of evolution is the account taken of the struggle for existence, and the rôle assigned to it." E. B. Poulton, *Charles Darwin and The Origin of Species* (London, 1909), p. 8.

ing to determine the factors of change which are to be observed at the present time; he investigated change in the Present on the methodological assumption that the processes which had been in operation throughout the Past were still active; and, having arrived at his hypothesis, he applied it to the Past on the further assumption that "Time is to nature endless and as nothing." The outcome of Darwin's work, in his own eyes, was the demonstration of "how things had come to be as they are." "It is interesting," he says in conclusion, "to contemplate an entangled bank, clothed with many plants of many kinds, with birds singing on the bushes, with various insects flitting about, and with worms crawling through the damp earth, and to reflect that these elaborately constructed forms, so different from each other, and dependent on each other in so complex a manner, have all been produced by laws acting around us. These laws, taken in the largest sense, being Growth with Reproduction; Inheritance which is almost implied by reproduction; Variability from the indirect and direct action of the external conditions of life, and from use and disuse; a Ratio of Increase so high as to lead to a Struggle for Life, and as a consequence to Natural Selection, entailing Divergence of Character and the Extinction of less-improved forms. Thus, from the war of nature, from famine and death, the most exalted object which we are capable of conceiving, namely, the production of the higher animals, directly follows." ³³

4

The investigator in another field who proposes to follow the method of Hutton and Darwin must be prepared to conduct his investigations with complete independence of spirit. Every science must formulate its own hypotheses in its own terminology on the basis of its own material.

"Each science is but an aspect of the whole, a pictured facet of Nature's unity, but it has its own categories, its own values. No one of the main sciences . . . is intelligibly reducible into the concepts of

³³ Darwin, as cited, p. 413.

any other, those of mechanics, physics, chemistry, despite their long exaggerated pretensions, as little as any. . . . So then for biology. Its theory of life, of evolution must be in its own terms, of function and form, and free therefore from absorption into the lower physical order, as from exaggeration into the higher ethical and political one."³⁴

This necessity is the more to be noted since the stimulus to thought, and the impetus to biological inquiry occasioned by Darwin's hypothesis have tempted some theorists to assume that Natural Selection is a universal formula applicable to every evolution. Thus J. M. Baldwin says: "The theory of natural selection is to be accepted not merely as a law of biology as such, but as a principle of the natural world, which finds appropriate application in all the sciences of life and mind."³⁵ Now the particular evolution investigated by Darwin was that of the physical forms of animal species; whereas the evolution to be considered by the student of "history" is fundamentally intellectual and involves the purposive activities of men. Consequently, even if biologists had not arrived at the conclusion that "Natural Selection has long since ceased to be the dominant factor in human progress,"³⁶ it might properly be inferred that the terms descriptive of the one would not be applicable to the other. There is a special reason, however, why the student of "history" should be on his guard against adopting the terminology of Darwin's theory. The nearly identical hypotheses

³⁴ Patrick Geddes and J. A. Thomson, *Evolution* (New York, 1911), pp. 231-32.

³⁵ *Darwin and the Humanities* (Baltimore, 1909), p. 89. To reach this conclusion, Professor Baldwin defines "the principle of selection as Darwin conceived it," not in Darwin's words, but as "the principle of survival from varied cases" (p. viii); it is, however, just the specific biological content of the theory, which this re-formulation so carefully excludes, that gives the theory its working value.

³⁶ Lloyd Morgan, in *Darwin and Modern Science*, ed. by A. C. Seward (Cambridge, 1909), p. 445. "The mental qualities which have developed in Man, though traceable in a vague and rudimentary condition in some of his animal associates, are of such an unprecedented power and so far dominate everything else in his activities as a living organism, that they have to a very large extent, if not entirely, cut him off from the general operation of that process of Natural Selection and survival of the fittest which up to their appearance had been the law of the living world." Sir E. R. Lankester, *The Kingdom of Man* (London, 1907), p. 25. Cf. Charles Darwin, *The Descent of Man* (New York, 1871), I, 161-177: "Natural Selection as affecting Civilized Nations."

of Darwin and Wallace were both suggested by reading Malthus, which was itself an "historical" study; the two hypotheses were derived, broadly speaking, from observation of English society in the earlier part of the nineteenth century;³⁷ and the terms—"struggle for existence," "survival of the fittest," "natural selection"—used by Darwin to designate the factors of organic evolution were metaphorical expressions suggested by human experience. So "behind these fatal phrases, which have become almost household words, lurk many dangers for the unwary."³⁸

The student of the evolution represented in the facts of human history must, therefore, be prepared to take upon himself the burden of an independent investigation; he cannot hope to adopt ready-made the formulae which have proved useful in other subjects; and he will turn to Darwin simply to observe, the method which he employed.

Again, before accepting Darwin's mode of approach to his subject, it is of the utmost importance that the investigator in another field should take account of certain fundamental objections that have been urged against the theories of Lyell and Darwin.

Hutton, as has been already mentioned, assumed, that "Time is to nature endless and as nothing." Building upon this foundation, Lyell postulated, not only that all the changes in the earth's surface have been due to operations similar to those still going on around us, but that these "have never acted with different degrees of energy from that which they now exert."³⁹ In other words, he advocated the view that things have come

³⁷ "There has prevailed in the main, and still prevails, a naïve forgetfulness of the social origins of these naturalists' discoveries." Geddes and Thomson, as cited, p. 214. For Wallace's account of his discovery of the theory of natural selection, see his autobiography, *My Life* (New York, 1905), I, 361-62.

³⁸ Darwin himself recognised this criticism: "Every one knows," he said, "what is meant and is implied by such metaphorical expressions; and they are almost necessary for brevity." *Origin of Species*, as cited, p. 79. The difficulty, which presents itself even in biology, is, however, greatly increased when these words, freighted with new meanings, are carried back again into the discussion of social problems.

³⁹ *Life, Letters, and Journals of Sir Charles Lyell* (London, 1881), I, 234.

to be as they are by a process of continuous slow modification through unlimited time. Neither in Lyell's day nor subsequently has this view passed unchallenged; and there has been a pronounced disposition among later geologists to insist that the known agencies of geological change have operated with varying degrees of intensity in different periods. Indeed, that some modification of "uniformitarianism" is necessary seems to follow from the growing realisation that the life-history of the earth, however indefinitely extended it may appear to human reckoning, falls, nevertheless, within a limited period of time.⁴⁰

Darwin, it must be clearly understood, accepted Lyell's view, and held that "as natural selection acts solely by accumulating slight, successive, favourable variations, it can produce no great or sudden modification; it can act only by very short and slow steps. Hence the canon of 'natura non facit saltum.'"⁴¹ He says further: "I am well aware that this doctrine of natural selection, . . . is open to the same objections which were at first urged against Sir Charles Lyell's noble views on 'the modern changes of the earth, as illustrative of geology'; but we now seldom hear the action, for instance, of the coast-waves, called a trifling and insignificant cause, when applied to the excavation of gigantic valleys or to the formation of the longest lines of inland cliffs. Natural selection can act only by the preservation and accumulation of small inherited modifications, each profitable to the preserved being; and as modern geology has almost banished such views as the excavation of a great valley by a single diluvial wave, so will natural selection, if it be a true principle, banish the belief of the continued creation of new organic beings, or of any great and sudden modification in their structure."⁴² That is, natural selection will alter a specific type slowly and continuously in adaptation to a gradually changing environment.⁴³ Darwin's theory is thus literally an addendum

⁴⁰ Cf., Sir Joseph Prestwich, *Geology* (Oxford, 1886), I, 2; Sir Archibald Geikie, *Text-book of Geology* (4th ed., London, 1903), p. 3; W. J. Sollas, *The Age of the Earth* (London, 1905), p. 2.

⁴¹ Darwin, as cited, p. 397; cf. p. 179.

⁴² Darwin, as cited, p. 91.

⁴³ Romanes, as cited, pp. 260-61.

to that of Lyell; but if "it is characteristic of a species that it always exhibits a constant relation to a particular environment."⁴⁴ and if, as Darwin asserted, "scarcely any palaeontological discovery is more striking than the fact that the forms of life change almost simultaneously throughout the world," it would follow from the admission of accelerated geological changes that far-reaching changes of environment may at times have led to species-modifications which were not "insensibly fine gradations."⁴⁵

It is of interest to note that Wallace's theory was also based upon that of Lyell. "Along with Malthus," he says, "I had read, and been even more deeply impressed by, Sir Charles Lyell's immortal *Principles of Geology*; which had taught me that the inorganic world—the whole surface of the earth, its seas and lands, its mountains and valleys, its rivers and lakes, and every detail of its climatic conditions—were and always had been in a continual state of slow modification. Hence it became obvious that the forms of life must have become continually adjusted to these changed conditions in order to survive. The succession of fossil remains throughout the whole geological series of rocks is the record of the change; and it became easy to see that the extreme slowness of these changes was such as to allow ample opportunity for the continuous automatic adjustment of the organic to the inorganic world, as well as of each organism to every other organism in the same area, by the simple process of 'variation and survival of the fittest.' Thus was the fundamental idea of the 'origin of species' logically formulated from the consideration of a series of well ascertained facts."⁴⁶

From the point of view of method, it is to be regretted that Lyell had not read Hutton with greater care, for the latter distinctly points out—what Lyell does not seem to have fully recognised and Darwin completely ignored—that the postulate of uniformity or gradual modification is a methodological assumption set up for the convenience of the investigator. "We have,"

⁴⁴ Georg Klebs, in *Darwin and Modern Science*, as cited, p. 227.

⁴⁵ "Huxley, in his early correspondence upon the *Origin of Species*, tried to convince Darwin of the possibility of occasional rapid leaps or changes in Nature, analogous to those which St. Hilaire had advocated, . . . Darwin held to his original proposition, handed down from Leibnitz: '*Natura non facit saltum*.' " H. F. Osborn, *From the Greeks to Darwin* (2d ed., New York, 1905), p. 238.

⁴⁶ A. R. Wallace, quoted in J. W. Judd, *The Coming of Evolution* (Cambridge, 1910), p. 79.

Hutton says, "been representing the system of this earth as proceeding with a certain regularity, which is not perhaps in nature, but which is necessary for our clear conception of the system of nature. The system of nature is certainly in rule, although we may not know every circumstance of its regulation. We are under a necessity, therefore, of making regular suppositions [i.e., suppositions of regularity], in order to come at certain conclusions which may be compared with the present state of things." "We are not," he says emphatically, "to limit nature with the uniformity of an equable progression, although it be necessary in our computations to proceed upon equalities."⁴⁷ The postulate of continuous slow modification was, therefore, regarded by Hutton as a methodological assumption necessary in the earlier stages of scientific inquiry, but as one which was not to be permitted to interpose an obstacle to further investigation. "Thus also," he remarks, "in the use of means, we are not to prescribe to nature those alone which we think suitable for the purpose, in our narrow view. It is our business to learn of nature (that is by observation) the ways and means, which in her wisdom are adopted; and we are to imagine these only in order to find means for further information, and to increase our knowledge from the examination of things which actually have been."⁴⁸

In toiling upward the human mind progresses by making stretches, now to one side of the ascent, and now to the other. So Lyell explained: "I did not lay it down as an axiom that there cannot have been a succession of paroxysms and crises, on which '*à priori* reasoning' I was accused of proceeding, but . . . I complained that in attempting to explain geological phenomena, the bias has always been on the wrong side; there has always been a disposition to reason *à priori* on the extraordinary violence and suddenness of changes, both in the inorganic crust of the earth, and in organic types, instead of attempting strenuously to frame theories in accordance with the ordinary opera-

⁴⁷ Hutton, as cited, pp. 301-302.

⁴⁸ Hutton, as cited, p. 302.

tions of nature.”⁴⁹ Lyell accomplished important results by holding tenaciously to this methodological standpoint, from which, however, the succeeding generation of geologists diverged much as he had done from the view taken by his predecessors. “While, therefore,” Geikie says, “the geological doctrine that the present order of Nature must be our guide to the interpretation of the past remained as true and as fruitful as ever, it had now to be widened by the reception of evidence furnished by a study of the earth as a planetary body.”⁵⁰ Similarly, biologists taking up the study of organic evolution where Darwin left it, have also declined “to limit nature with the uniformity of an equable progression,” and have found it necessary to supplement “the ordinary operations of nature” by taking into consideration the course of change upon the face of the earth.

“All known facts appear to suggest that the processes of evolution have not operated in a gradual and uniform manner.”⁵¹

“The condition of the earth’s surface or, at least, of large portions of it, has for long periods remained substantially the same; this would involve a greater degree of fixity in the organisms which have existed during such periods of little change than in those which have come into being during periods of more rapid transition; for, though rejecting catastrophes as the general *modus agendi* of nature, I am far from saying that the march of physical changes has been always perfectly uniform.”⁵²

“... These considerations lead me to express a doubt whether biologists have been correct in looking for continuous transformation of species. Judging by analogy we should rather expect to find slight continuous changes occurring during a long period of time, followed by a somewhat sudden transformation into a new species, or by rapid extinction.”⁵³

“The terrestrial plant is inseparably dependent on the conditions, not only of the soil and the water, but also of the air from which it derives an important part of its substance. Any change, therefore, in the climatic, terrestrial, or water conditions of its environment directly

⁴⁹ *Life . . . of Sir Charles Lyell*, as cited, II, 3.

⁵⁰ Geikie, *Landscape in History*, as cited, p. 177.

⁵¹ A. S. Woodward, *Outlines of Vertebrate Palaeontology* (Cambridge, 1898), p. xxi.

⁵² Sir William Grove, “Address of the President,” *British Association, Report of the 36th Meeting, 1866*, p. lxxvi.

⁵³ Sir George Darwin, “President’s Address,” *British Association, Report of the 75th Meeting, 1905*, p. 8.

affects the plant and causes morphologic changes to a greater or less degree, the greater plant variations corresponding usually to the greater environmental changes. The great floral revolutions of geologic history are connected with the great diastrophic movements.⁵⁴

We are here, evidently, at a point of some importance for evolutionary study. The "modern changes" which Lyell and Darwin set up are inadequate as a statement of the processes manifested in the evolution of the earth and the forms of life upon it. Bateson is simply re-echoing the words of the geologists when he says that "we see no changes in progress around us in the contemporary world which we can imagine likely to culminate in the evolution of forms distinct in the larger sense."⁵⁵ Clearly, then, the question arises whether the method we have been examining is inherently sound, or whether there has been some failure in the application of it.

The difficulty, it seems to me, lies in a too instant concentration of attention upon the element of "change." "We overlook and half forget the constant while we see and watch the variable."⁵⁶ The business of science is to discover the processes manifested in nature; and "we should not forget that the theory of evolution does not postulate that a change must take place in the course of time, but only that it may take place sometimes."⁵⁷ "We are all accustomed," Huxley remarked, "to speak of the number and the extent of the changes in the living population of the globe during geological time as something enormous; . . . but looking only at the positive data furnished by the fossil world from a broader point of view . . . a surprise of another kind dawns upon the mind; and under this aspect the smallness of the total change becomes as astonishing as was its greatness under the other." "Any admissible hypothesis of progressive modification," he concludes, "must be compatible with persist-

⁵⁴ David White, in *Outlines of Geologic History*, ed. by R. D. Salisbury (Chicago, 1910), p. 139.

⁵⁵ William Bateson, "President's Address," *British Association, Report of the 84th Meeting, 1914*, p. 21.

⁵⁶ Walter Bagehot, *Physics and Politics* [1869] (New York, 1912), p. 32.

⁵⁷ T. H. Morgan, *Evolution and Adaptation* (New York, 1903), p. 44.

ence without progression, through indefinite periods."⁵⁸ It is, in fact, this remarkable characteristic, which Huxley calls "persistence," that makes evolutionary study possible, since it has preserved for us indications of the modifications through which the earth, life-forms, and human ideas and associations have passed.

It is open to question, therefore, whether the investigation of an evolution might not profitably begin with an attempt to determine the processes which restrict change and promote stability. Bearing in mind that change is discernible only against a background of the unchanging, one might suggest that it was the status of thought in Darwin's time that led him to place "change" in the forefront of his inquiry. No man, whatever his intellectual endowment, is independent of the surroundings in which he lives, and the belief in the fixity of species current in the earlier part of the nineteenth century, determined that Darwin's theory of species-formation should be secondary and contributory to his theory of descent.⁵⁹ In Darwin's argument, the fact of "persistence" or restriction of change receives recognition, but he explains it merely by saying that in such cases no beneficial variations had arisen. "On my theory," he remarks, "the present existence of lowly organised productions offers no difficulty; for natural selection includes no necessary and universal law of advancement or development—it only takes advantage of such variations as arise and are beneficial to each creature under its complex relations of life."⁶⁰ In recent biological literature there are indications that this explanation is felt to be unsatisfactory, and the question has been raised "whether the object of our search ought not, instead of the cause of variation, to be the cause of similarity"; but, as far as I am aware, this alternative mode of approach has not been employed in dealing with the main problem of evolutionary investigation.

⁵⁸ T. H. Huxley, *Lay Sermons* (5th ed., London, 1874), pp. 215, 226.

⁵⁹ "Descent with modification" he speaks of as "my theory." Cf. Samuel Butler, *Luck or Cunning?* (London, 1887), p. 236, and chs. 13-15.

⁶⁰ Darwin, as cited, p. 119.

"The fundamental idea in the theory of Natural Selection is the persistence of those types of life which are adapted to their surrounding conditions." "The study of stability and instability furnishes the problems which the physicist and biologist alike attempt to solve." "Stability is a property of relationship to surrounding conditions."⁶¹

"It is probable that variability is, like growth, a primary quality of living things, and that 'breeding true' has arisen secondarily as a restriction."⁶²

"In short, it is evident that the progress of the backboneed land animals during the successive periods of geological time has not been uniform and gradual, but has proceeded in a rhythmic manner. There have been alternations of restless periods which meant real advance, with periods of comparative stability, during which the predominant animals merely varied in response to their surroundings, or degenerated, or gradually grew to a large size."⁶³

"The problem that confronts the evolutionist is the nature of the mechanism which rendered possible the persistence of a certain compound or of certain compounds possessing that particular constitution conferring upon them that stable instability known as life."⁶⁴

"Quand je parle de la stabilité d'une espèce vivante, je pense à la stabilité du patrimoine héréditaire de cette espèce. Ce patrimoine héréditaire définit complètement l'espèce, et l'espèce ne peut être définie que par lui. . . . Quand je parle de la stabilité du patrimoine spécifique, je fais allusion au fait que ce patrimoine a une tendance à se conserver à travers les vicissitudes de la vie. . . . Il est donc bien évident que l'hérédité, comme l'assimilation, conservent le patrimoine spécifique. Si cette conservation était parfaite, il n'y aurait pas d'évolution. . . . En réalité, cette stabilité, bien que remarquable, n'est pas absolue; quand les conditions changent, il y a lutte. Les individus vaincus par le milieu disparaissent; ceux qui triomphent se conservent, mais ils ne triomphent pas totalement; ils subissent une défaite partielle qui est l'adaptation." . . . "La loi de stabilité progressive dont je m'occupe actuellement peut s'énoncer ainsi: Quand, sous l'influence d'une adaptation prolongée à des conditions nouvelles d'existence, le patrimoine héréditaire d'une lignée subit une variation qualitative, il passe, d'un état stable, à un état plus stable que le précédent."⁶⁵

⁶¹ Sir George Darwin, "President's Address," *British Association, Report of the 75th Meeting, 1905*, pp. 7, 9, 14.

⁶² J. A. Thomson, *The Bible of Nature* (New York, 1908), p. 160.

⁶³ A. S. Woodward, "Presidential Address" (Section C, Geology), *British Association, Report of the 79th Meeting, 1909*, p. 464.

⁶⁴ Raphael Meldola, *Evolution, Darwinian and Spencerian* (Oxford, 1910), pp. 19-20.

⁶⁵ Félix Le Dantec, "Stabilité et Mutation," *Bulletin de la Société française de philosophie*, 11 (1911), 121-22. Cf. his *La stabilité de la vie* (Paris, 1910).

The case, as affecting man, may be stated thus: if, in considering the evolution of humanity, we allow our attention to be engrossed by the details of documentary history, by "history" as it is written, by the conditions of life under which we ourselves are living, then, obviously, "change" will appear as the very essence of things. So, when we say "that the general idea of organic evolution is in great part just the idea of human history projected upon the natural world," we are applying in biology a concept derived from an undue preoccupation with what is, after all, but a fraction of human history; and are ignoring, like all historians, the less mobile parts as "unhistorical" and negligible. If, on the other hand, we endeavor to take a broader view of human life, the element of "change" loses its preponderance, and that of "fixity"—to use Bagehot's word—of backwardness or barbarism, comes into prominence; for the vast majority of mankind, in the past as in the present, has been and still is relatively immobile. In the special case of human evolution, at least, the element of "fixity" may well become the fundamental problem of inquiry; and if we assume with the anthropologists that the mind of man is everywhere the same, it will be seen that the stationary character of backward and barbarous peoples is due to the presence of continuously operative restraints, while, on the other hand, advancement follows upon the loosening of these restrictions at a given moment of time—"most of the peoples who have played a great part in history, have as a matter of fact started their 'historical' period with something of a crisis, and period of rapid change."⁶⁶

"In spite of overwhelming evidence, it is most difficult for a citizen of Western Europe to bring thoroughly home to himself the truth that the civilisation which surrounds him is a rare exception in the history of the world." "The truth is that the stable part of our mental, moral, and physical constitution is the largest part of it, and the resistance it opposes to change is such that, though the variations of human society in a portion of the world are plain enough, they are neither so rapid nor so extensive that their amount, character, and general direction cannot be ascertained."⁶⁷

⁶⁶ J. L. Myres, *The Dawn of History* (New York, c. 1911), p. 11.

⁶⁷ Sir Henry Sumner Maine, *Ancient Law*, ed. by Sir Frederick Pollock (London, 1906), p. 27, 126.

"Our habitual instructors, our ordinary conversation, our inevitable and ineradicable prejudices tend to make us think that 'Progress' is the normal fact in human society, the fact which we should expect to see, the fact which we should be surprised if we did not see." . . . "But, in fact, any progress is extremely rare. As a rule . . . a stationary state is by far the most frequent condition of man, as far as history describes that condition; the progressive state is only a rare and an occasional exception." "This principle will, I think, help us in trying to solve the question why so few nations have progressed, though to us progress seems so natural—what is the cause or set of causes which have prevented that progress in the vast majority of cases, and produced it in the feeble minority."⁶⁸

"It does not follow . . . that civilisation is always on the move, or that its movement is always progress. On the contrary, . . . it remains stationary for long periods, and often falls back."⁶⁹

"There can, I think, be little doubt that . . . most savage races are in large measure strictly primitive, survivals from early conditions, the development of their ideas having from various causes remained practically stationary during a very considerable period of time."⁷⁰

"I have confidence," Bateson says in his British Association address, "that the artistic gifts of mankind will prove to be due not to something added to the make-up of an ordinary man, but to the absence of factors which in the normal person inhibit the development of these gifts. They are almost beyond doubt to be looked upon as *releases* of powers normally suppressed." "Among the civilized races of Europe we are witnessing an emancipation from traditional control in thought, in art, and in conduct which is likely to have prolonged and wonderful influences."⁷¹

Darwin, we have seen, accepted Lyell's theory of "gradual modification," and ignored Hutton's warning that this assumption of regularity is to be regarded solely as a convenience in research. This does not mean that Hutton asserted, and Darwin denied, arbitrary interpositions in the natural order of things; on the contrary, the Scotch geologist held to the opinion that "the system of nature is certainly in rule"—but he recognised that this "rule" is not confined to the one strand or element which the scientist may have taken as the object of his inquiry.

⁶⁸ Walter Bagehot, *Physics and Politics* [1869] (New York, 1912), pp. 41, 211, 206.

⁶⁹ Sir E. B. Tylor, *Anthropology* (London, 1881), p. 18.

⁷⁰ Henry Balfour, Presidential Address, (Section H, Anthropology), British Association, *Report of the 74th Meeting, 1904*, p. 697.

⁷¹ Bateson, as cited, pp. 19, 29.

For the purposes of research phenomena must be isolated, but the investigator must not be betrayed into imagining that this isolation ever occurs under actual conditions. Every "change" is an "event," but it is not on that account to be regarded as an "accident." To the individual ignorant of the conception of natural process, everything must appear "accidental"; to the scientist, however, "accident" is natural process out of focus for a particular investigator at a given time. So, while "the system of nature is certainly in rule," it admits of changes taking place, and "change in one part of the universe involves a change throughout. No part lives unto itself, but all are members one of another."

It is apparent, then, that there are two ways by which the study of an evolution may be approached—we may begin with the isolation and description either of the processes manifested in "change," or of those manifested in "fixity." In adopting the first course, the assumption of "uniformity" requires the further assumption, made by Lyell and Darwin, of unlimited time for the operation of "gradual modifications"; in adopting the second, we must follow the historical record in order to observe the actual course of change. In the first instance, evolution is thought of as a flowing stream of change continuously moving forward in a direction from lowest to highest; in the second, it is conceived as a series of experiments in adjustment or adaptation,⁷² broken in upon, from time to time, by conflicting experiments of the same sort. The mode of thought induced by the first approach tends to a forgetfulness of the essential fact that in nature no process appears in isolation; the point of view of the second demands a constant vigilance in regard to changes occurring outside the field immediately under investigation.

It must not be thought that this alternative mode of approaching the study of evolution is brought forward as a contribution

⁷² C. B. Davenport, *Congress of Arts and Science, St. Louis, 1904* (Boston, 1906), V, 250, says: "Only within the last few years have we come to recognize that every organ is more than a homologue: it is also a successful experiment with the environment."

to astronomical, geological, or biological theory, or as applicable to any evolution but that of man. It is introduced here merely to emphasize to students of human evolution, first, that the objections urged against Darwin's theory of natural selection may possibly be a result of his too ready acceptance of Lyell's authority; and, second, that Darwin's procedure in taking "change" as the immediate subject of inquiry is not necessarily the only course open to them. Nor should this conclusion be taken as an argument against Hutton's principle that the Present is the key to the Past, although it does point to a modification of the procedure to be followed. The Present that lies before us is not even mainly "new," but consists for the greater part of things carried over from the Past. Hence, in attempting to discover "how things have come to be as they are," it is possible that the processes first to be investigated should be those manifested everywhere in repression and fixity, while in the second place would follow inquiry into the processes made visible in temporary "releases" from the restrictions of habit, custom, and accepted ideas.

"The system of nature is certainly in rule," but "we are not to limit nature with the uniformity of an equable progression." The inquiry into present or "modern" processes of evolution was recognized by Hutton as an expedient in the earlier stages of investigation. Darwin saw clearly that the test of his theory lay in its applicability to the past. "He who rejects these views on the nature of the geological record," he remarked, "will rightly reject my whole theory."⁷³ We may study the present in order to throw light upon the past, and we may begin by isolating what appear to be the existing processes, but, for verification, any evolutionary hypothesis must be shown to agree with what we know to have taken place in the course of time. The truth is that the discovery of a valid hypothesis necessitates an equal consideration of all the evidence. For any evolution, this is tripartite, consisting of (1) the existing series as arranged in order from lowest to highest;

⁷³ Darwin, as cited, p. 297.

(2) the ontogenetic series, represented in individual development; and (3) the historical or palaeontological series. A hypothesis to be satisfactory must fit each of these classes of facts, and hence a hypothesis to be satisfactory must be based upon the comparison of the different series of facts regarded as manifestations of the same processes. When, however, the problem is stated in this way, it at once becomes apparent that the method of investigation to be followed in the broad subjects of organic and human evolution is just the application to a more extended content of that "Comparative Method" which has proved its efficiency in a wide range of special fields.

5.

In discussing the attitude of Logic towards History it was stated that English logicians, like Mill and Fowler, looking for a scientific element in historical work, found this in what is known as the "comparative method," and that subsequently in English logic, "historical" and "comparative," as applied to method, are synonymous terms. This statement may now be illustrated.

"What is called the historical or comparative method," one of the latest representatives of this school says, "has in the last few generations revolutionized many branches of enquiry. It is but an application of the general principle of varying the circumstances in order the better to discover the cause of a phenomenon. But of old, enquirers into matters of historical growth, such as language, or myth, or religion, or legal ideas, were content to attempt an explanation of the facts of some particular age or country by observations carried on within that age or country alone, or if beyond it, only in adjacent ages or countries of the same type. The historic method looks farther afield. It compares the institutions of widely different ages, or of peoples who though contemporaneous stand at widely different levels of civilization and of thought. In the light of such a comparison, facts may take on quite a new appearance. Legal or other customs for which a later age had found a reason in some supposed meaning or utility which they now possessed are seen to have had a very different origin, in conditions no longer existing, and ideas no longer entertained. Folk-lore is full of

such surprises. . . . It is the same with myth; . . . Therefore it is important to insist upon studying the present in the light of history and comparing as extensive a range of facts as can be gathered together." ⁷⁴

That this description may be taken to represent the view of scholars who make use of the comparative method is to be seen from the following:

"I think I may venture to affirm," Sir Henry Maine says, "that the Comparative Method, which has already been fruitful of such wonderful results, is not distinguishable in some of its applications from the Historical Method. We take a number of contemporary facts, ideas, and customs, and we infer the past form of those facts, ideas, and customs not only from historical records of that past form, but from examples of it which have not yet died out of the world, and are still to be found in it. When in truth . . . we gain something like an adequate idea of the vastness and variety of the phenomena of human society; when in particular we have learned not to exclude from our view of earth and man those great and unexplored regions which we vaguely term the East, we find it to be not wholly a conceit or a paradox to say that the distinction between the Present and the Past disappears. Sometimes the Past is the Present; much more often it is removed from it by varying distances, which, however, cannot be estimated or expressed chronologically. Direct observation comes thus to the aid of historical enquiry, and historical enquiry to the help of direct observation." ⁷⁵

"Our system," Andrew Lang said, "is but one aspect of the theory of evolution, or is but the application of that theory to the topic of mythology. The archaeologist studies human life in its material remains; he tracks progress (and occasional degeneration) from the rudely chipped flints in the ancient gravel beds, to the polished stone weapon, and thence to the ages of bronze and iron. He is guided by material 'survivals'—ancient arms, implements, and ornaments. The student of Institutions has a similar method. He finds his relics of the uncivilised past in agricultural usages, in archaic methods of allotment of land, in odd marriage customs, things rudimentary—fossil relics, as it were, of an early social and political condition. The archaeologist and the student of Institutions compare these relics, material or customary, with the weapons, pottery, implements, or again with the habitual law and usage of existing savage or barbaric races, and demonstrate that our weapons and tools, and our laws and manners, have been slowly evolved out of lower conditions, even out of savage conditions. The anthropological method in mythology is the same. . . ." ⁷⁶

⁷⁴ H. W. B. Joseph, *An Introduction to Logic* (Oxford, 1906), pp. 522-23.

⁷⁵ *Village-Communities in the East and West* (London, 1871), pp. 6-7.

⁷⁶ *Modern Mythology* (London, 1897), p. viii.

"The study might accordingly be described as the embryology of human thought and institutions, or, to be more precise, as that enquiry which seeks to ascertain, first, the beliefs and customs of savages, and, second, the relics of these beliefs and customs which have survived like fossils among peoples of higher culture."⁷⁷

"The beliefs, customs, and institutions of tribes in a low degree of civilisation are our only clue to those of a more archaic condition no longer extant. They are evolved from them, and are in the last resort the outgrowth of ideas which underlay them. When, therefore, we find a belief, a custom, or an institution—still more when we find a connected series of beliefs, customs, and institutions—overspreading the lower culture we may reasonably infer its roots in ideas common to mankind and native to the primitive ancestral soil. The inference is greatly strengthened if vestigial forms are also found embedded in the culture of the higher races. It is raised to a certainty if unambiguous expression of the ideas themselves can be discovered to-day among the lower races. The advance of even the most backward from primeval savagery has been so great that a large harvest of these ideas is not to be expected. . . ."⁷⁸

It is evident that the method here described is made possible by the fact—which is characteristic of our world—that the Past lives on into the Present. "When in the process of time," Tylor says, "there has come general change in the condition of a people, it is usual, notwithstanding, to find much that manifestly had not its origin in the new state of things, but has simply lasted on into it."⁷⁹ M'Lennan was of opinion that "the variety of the forms of life—of domestic and civil institution—is ascribable mainly to the unequal development of the different sections of mankind." "The species has been so unequally developed that almost every phase of progress may be studied as a thing somewhere observed and recorded."⁸⁰ That is, the type of evidence available for the study of human evolution is identical with that utilized in geology and biology.

Now, broadly speaking, it may be said that the present situation of the studies relating to Man is similar to that of the

⁷⁷ Sir J. G. Frazer, "The Scope of Social Anthropology" [1908], in his *Psyche's Task* (2d ed., London, 1913), p. 162.

⁷⁸ E. S. Hartland, *Primitive Paternity* (London, 1909), I, v-vi.

⁷⁹ Sir E. B. Tylor, *Primitive Culture* (3d ed., London, 1891), I, 71.

⁸⁰ J. F. M'Lennan, *Studies in Ancient History, Second Series* (London, 1896), pp. 9, 15.

biological sciences when Darwin began his work. At that time, as has been pointed out, subjects like palaeontology, comparative anatomy, and comparative embryology had already been brought to a high state of elaboration; while, on the other hand, general theories of evolution were entertained, and attempts, notably that of Lamarck, had even been made to formulate scientific hypotheses in regard to the evolution of plant and animal life. It was Darwin's great achievement to have brought into the focus of a hypothesis the knowledge accumulated in the separate "comparative" fields, and to have "sorted out," in a more satisfactory manner than his predecessors, the factors of biological evolution. Similarly, we have today a whole series of specialized sciences relating to man—of which linguistics, mythology, folklore, ethnology, and anthropology by no means exhaust the list; and, further, though vague unverifiable theories of "progress" continue to multiply, there have not been wanting hypotheses of a more scientific character in regard to the factors of human evolution.

Yet, notwithstanding all these indications of activity, it must still be confessed that the study of Human Evolution is far from showing that vitality which might be expected in a subject of such evident importance. There is today the same insistence on the value of "facts," and the same resentment of "theory" that characterized the biologists and geologists of a century ago; but now the fault lies with the "historian."

Still another difficulty needs must be referred to. The modern historical scholar is in the position of proclaiming that "the whole evolution of human society is the province of history. It embraces," he says, "not political evolution alone, but the history of religion and philosophy, of literature and art, of trade and industry. There is not a side of the multifarious activity of man which the historian can safely neglect, for there is nothing that man thinks or does, or hopes or fears, but leaves its mark on the society in which he lives."⁸¹ The historian is, however,

⁸¹ G. W. Prothero, *Why should we learn History?* (Edinburgh, 1894), p. 8.

but one of many claimants to this wide domain. Mr. Andrew Lang, a quarter-century ago, was engaging his enthusiasm in the cause of Comparative Anthropology, "a new science which," he said, "had come into existence, the science which studies man in the sum of all his works and thoughts, as evolved through the whole process of his development."⁸² Today, "Anthropology," in the view of Professor Myres, "is the Science of Man; its full task is nothing less than this, to observe and record, to classify and interpret, all the activities of all the varieties of this species of living being."⁸³ So, too, Mr. Marett, with promotive ardor, expresses the opinion that "Anthropology is the whole history of man as fired and pervaded by the idea of evolution. Man in evolution—that is the subject in its full reach. Anthropology studies man as he occurs at all known times. It studies him as he occurs in all known parts of the world. It studies him body and soul together—as a bodily organism, subject to conditions operating in time and space, which bodily organism is in intimate relation with a soul-life, also subject to those same conditions. Having an eye to such conditions from first to last, it seeks to plot out the general series of the changes, bodily and mental together, undergone by man in the course of his history."⁸⁴

The truth is, such visions are inspiring, are even, in a way, essential; but, to come down abruptly, they are no substitute for method. The student of every "human" discipline catches glimpses at times of the results that would accrue from the foundation of a Science of Man, and promptly lays claim, in anticipation, to the reward, in the name of the study he happens to represent. The situation, however, does not admit of claims; and "as regards the word," let us agree with Mr. Marett, and "call it a science, or history, or anthropology, or anything else." Let us recognise that the need of the present moment is not the

⁸² *Myth, Ritual and Religion* (new impr., London, 1913), I, 30.

⁸³ J. L. Myres, "The Influence of Anthropology on the Course of Political Science," *British Association, Report of the 79th Meeting, 1909* (London, 1910), p. 589.

⁸⁴ R. R. Marett, *Anthropology* (New York, [1912]), p. 7.

logical delimitation of spheres, but a working hypothesis for the evolution of mankind. Let us follow Darwin, not, however, by trying to adapt his theory to an evolution for which it was not designed, but by applying to our own problems, as he did, the method of James Hutton. Let us take counsel of the fact that Darwin's contribution—which must ever elicit our highest admiration—was made possible by the results previously achieved in the special biological sciences, and recognise that, for our needs, there exists the great body of knowledge already accumulated by the special sciences of Man. Let us, moreover, find encouragement in the known effect that Darwin's hypothesis produced upon the different branches of biological study. "A still more important consequence," M. Giard says, "resulted from these new conceptions. The theory of descent introduced into the biological sciences a unity of view, a community of end, which established among them the closest relations of mutual dependence and suppressed all futile questions of supremacy or of precedence."⁸⁵ So, it is not unwarrantable to infer, the common effort to define the processes manifested in Human Evolution would tend, in like manner, to bring into co-ordination the separate branches of inquiry which have for their object the study of the distinguishing activities of human kind.

6

The historical scholar, it is not improbable, may feel that the present discussion has run far beyond the scope and possibility of his own inquiries; hence the situation that confronts him must, if possible, be made clear.

The ideal of nineteenth century scholarship was that the historian should tell the exact truth in regard to what had happened in the past without political or philosophical prepossessions.

Thus Palacký, in 1836, prefaced his *History of Bohemia* with the notable statement: "As regards the principles and intentions which have

⁸⁵ A. M. Giard, *Congress of Arts and Science, St. Louis, 1904* (Boston, 1906), V, 261.

guided me while working at this history, I have hardly a word to say. I know of no others, except those that proceed naturally from the supreme principle of regard for historical truth and faith. That I write from the standpoint of a Bohemian is a fact for which I could only be blamed, if it rendered me unjust either to the Bohemians or to their opponents. I hope, however, that my sincere craving for truth, my respect for all laws, divine and human, my zeal for order and legality, my sympathy with the weal and woe of all mankind, will preserve me from the sin of partiality. With God's help, these principles will continue to guide me in my task."⁸⁶


Of late, however, historians, like Mandell Creighton, have come to see, what Bradley pointed out thirty years ago, that "a history without so-called prejudications is a mere delusion."⁸⁷ The perception of this fact must of necessity bring the historian to inquire anew, and with a more open mind, into the nature and office of historiography. Now, the result of such an inquiry shows, in the first place, that historiography stands in a unique relation to the spirit of nationality. The historian is memory's mouthpiece for his countrymen; and history is the inspiration of the patriot. So conceived, history (that is, historiography) is a form of literature, a genre which claims a high seriousness in its devotees, and which evokes a deep response in the hearts of men. Furthermore, the result of an inquiry into the nature of historiography reveals it as standing in an important relation to the highest aspirations of the human spirit. The historian, from considering the history of his own country, passes on to describe the rise and decline of empires; he presents, in his ultimate synthesis, momentous occurrences that have affected

⁸⁶ As quoted in Count Lützow's *Lectures on the Historians of Bohemia* (London, 1905), p. 94.

⁸⁷ F. H. Bradley, *The Presuppositions of Critical History* (Oxford, 1874), pp. 5, 6. "The historian," he says, "is not and cannot be merely receptive, or barely reproductive. It is true that he may not actually add any new material of his own, and yet his action, in so far as he realises that which never as such has been given him, implies a preconception, and denotes in a sense a foregone conclusion. The straightening of the crooked rests on the knowledge of the straight, and the exercise of criticism requires a canon. This is not the only difficulty which historical writing in its practice brings to the theory of passivity. . . . With every fresh standing-ground gained by the growth of experience, with every rise of the spirit to a fuller life comes another view of the far-lying past from a higher and a new level, and a fresh and corresponding change in the features of the object recognised."

the destinies of the entire human race, and inevitably incorporates in his construction an answer of some sort to the question, "What does it all mean?" Thus consciously or unconsciously he arrives at the standpoint of Philosophy, and wittingly or unwittingly essays an explanation of its central problem; and Professor Bury quite properly reaches the conclusion that, as history-writers, "our apprehension of history and our reason for studying it must be ultimately determined by the view we entertain of the *moles et machina mundi* as a whole."

Nevertheless, high as we may rate the practice of historiography, neither as art nor as philosophy does it set problems for research or provide an outlet for the energies and ambitions of modern investigators. The work of art or the philosophical explanation, once created, lives on as a monument, independent of any subsequent extension of knowledge, to give pleasure or excite admiration, to be praised or condemned, as the case may be—but as an obstacle, not as an incitement, to further research. So the future progress of historical investigation turns upon the possibility of scholars being able to free their work from the domination of historiography.



But the aim of nineteenth century scholarship to investigate the history of mankind without prepossessions is not to be abandoned merely because the proper mode for the statement of its results has not yet been achieved. The failure of "history" to become a science has been due primarily to the subordination of investigation to history-writing, and, knowing this, the failure may be retrieved if the investigator will cease merely to declare that "history is a science," and set himself consciously to apply scientific methods to the subject-matter with which he is concerned. Science, as we have seen, is the systematic investigation of the processes manifested in phenomena, and this is the only method that can satisfy the ambition, or provide an outlet for the activity of the investigator.

The contrast here emphasised has long been recognized in at least one of the specialised fields of historical inquiry. Speaking of the course of philological study in the nineteenth century, Hanns Oertel says: "By

far the greatest part of all investigations in the historical sciences has been borne along by one of two main currents of thought. Both of them have their beginnings at the opening of the century which has just closed, but they spring from different sources, they pursue different ends, they employ different methods. These two chief tendencies may perhaps best be called the one synthetic, the other analytic.

The synthetic conception of Philology has its first and foremost representative in Friedrich August Wolf and is admirably outlined by him in an essay published in 1807. . . . Wolf conceived of Philology as the Biography of a Nation. . . . The chief characteristics of his conception of philology are these. First and foremost its synthetic nature. It examines the individual remains of antiquity as to their genuineness, it cleanses them from blemishes by which, in the course of time, they have become defaced, it gives to each an adequate interpretation. . . . It takes them as they are. . . . And it is for this reason that Wolf's Philology is an art, in the Aristotelian sense of *τεχνη*. Aristotle, in the *Poetics* (xxv, 1), distinguishes three kinds of poetic *μίμησις* namely, of things as they were or are, of things as they are said to be, and of an unrealized ideal. The philological *μίμησις* is of the first kind. It differs from that of the poet in that the latter freely constructs from true elements an imaginary composite whole, be it characters or incidents, which has never so existed and may therefore ever exist, while the Wolfian philologist carefully reconstructs from their elements actual characters and events as they have really existed. Such reconstruction requires artistic perspective, a well-planned arrangement of parts in order to produce the desired effect, a proper foreshortening. . . . Proportion is the very essence of art, and only by a constant reference to the whole can the proper place and value be assigned to each element. . . . Wolf's philology, then, has two sides: the one turned toward the spectator, the other turned toward the artist-philologist. . . . He who would successfully accomplish Wolf's purpose must unite two distinct qualities, namely, the critical for the preliminary preparation of his material and the artistic for its final composition. . . . Neither criticism nor hermeneutics can ever be an end in itself. They are the necessary substratum for all further work; they are not sciences by themselves, but parts of sciences, initial stages which are intended to lead up to something else. Without first hewing the beams no building can be erected; but who would hew beams except to erect a building?"

"This same material may, however, be viewed from another point, and this is the second aspect in which historical objects have, in the century past, presented themselves. In contradistinction to Wolf's synthesis this second attitude of the mind may be termed analytical. The contrast of the two methods is sharply marked. The central figure for Wolf is one nation; for the analytical investigator the central figure is some one of the many intellectual manifestations without reference to any particular nation, *non quis sed quid*. These homogeneous facts

he sets out to analyze in order to discover the laws which underlie the development of the phenomena which make up this particular group.”⁸⁸

The failure of nineteenth-century historical scholarship has been due in some measure also to the arbitrary limitation of the investigator's outlook, consequent upon his preoccupation with documentary evidence. By insensible degrees, however, the historian has come to see that there is no hard and fast boundary between “historic” and “prehistoric” times, between “historical” and “unhistorical” peoples; the history of Man includes man everywhere and at all times. Furthermore, the historian has come to see that “history” cannot be confined to any one set of happenings or to any one category of facts. It must, therefore, be admitted that, in reality, Anthropology and History differ only in so far as each represents the use of a special investigative technique.

The widening outlook of both anthropologists and historians, then, as well as the requirements of science, demands the co-ordination of these two phases of humanistic inquiry; and yet it is clear that the technique of the Abbé Breuil is not interchangeable with that of Mr. Round. In this dilemma, it becomes necessary to consider the relations subsisting between specialists in other historical fields, such as Geology and Biology. Differences of technique in these subjects interpose no obstacle to the orderly prosecution of an evolutionary investigation; and it requires but a cursory examination, say of the work of Charles Darwin, to realise that the co-ordination of the various aspects of biological study is a result of the general acceptance of a common aim, namely, the discovery of the processes manifested in biological evolution.

Here in our progress we are seemingly at fault, for while the unity of aim in the biological sciences was created by Darwin's theory of Natural Selection, in the humanistic sciences no equally acceptable hypothesis has yet been formulated.⁸⁹ If,

⁸⁸ *Lectures on the Study of Language* (New York, 1902), pp. 5-24.

⁸⁹ The present study concerns itself only with questions of method, and designedly omits all criticism or discussion of the many general

however, for the moment, we might assume that a working hypothesis had been stated, an inference may be drawn as to the effect of this upon the activities of the historical investigator: he would continue to employ the same investigative technique, and would confine his researches to the same area as before, but the aim and spirit of his inquiries would have undergone a complete change. His object would no longer be the creation of an aesthetic or philosophical synthesis of a complete whole, but the isolation and determination of the processes manifested in the phenomena with which he deals; he would continue his critical investigation of facts, but always with a view to their bearing upon the central problem of Human Evolution.

We have learned, of late, that "impartiality" in historiography is a mistaken ideal. We may now see that through the application of the method of science to the facts of history, prejudice in favor of one's own people would give place to the Stoic view that "all men living, or who once lived, belong to the common human family,"⁹⁰ and we may see how the ambition to contribute, in however minor a degree, to the solution of the well-nigh insuperable problem that confronts mankind would tend to supplant, in the minds of scholars, the war-compelling spirit of nationality. In the past, the historiographer has been a chief exponent of emotions that eventually find expression in conflict; it remains to be seen whether the historical investigator may not, in the future, contribute to an understanding of the processes manifested in the activities of mankind. It is pre-eminently for the investigator to realise that "Upon this generation of students is laid the task of finding for history its proper place both in science and in education."⁹¹

theories of "progress" and of the meaning of history which have been put forward. Similarly, a consideration of the contributions which have been made towards a scientific hypothesis for human evolution has been deferred to a later occasion.

⁹⁰ The widespread existence of such an attitude is exemplified in the *Papers on Inter-Racial Problems communicated to the First Universal Races Congress*, London, 1911.

⁹¹ Sir J. R. Seeley, *Introduction to Political Science* (London, 1896), p. 384.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL APPENDIX

- I. 1. The Method of Science
- 2. The Relation of Philosophy to Science
- II. The Problems of Historiography
 - 1. Historical Investigation and Historiography
 - 2. a. Greek and Roman Historiography
 - b. Medieval Historiography
 - c. Modern Historiography
 - 3. Histories of the Philosophy of History
 - 4. History in Current Philosophical Discussion
- III. The Comparative Method

The bibliographical memoranda which follow are not presented as a conspectus of the literature of the subjects referred to, but are offered as a selection in further illustration of the matters dealt with in the text. The titles are arranged in chronological order.

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CALIFORNIA: THE NAME

BY

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"I was first led to these studies by the wish to fill up certain puzzling blanks of ignorance in my own mind, and doubtless the little book bears marks of this origin . . . It deals little with the harvest of flowers or fruit, but watches the inconspicuous seasons when the soil is beginning to stir, the seeds are falling or ripening."

— Sir GILBERT MURRAY: Preface to *The Four Stages of Greek Religion*.

CALIFORNIA: THE NAME

BY

RUTH PUTNAM

It is just possible that the name "California" may owe its existence to a union of high hopes and deep disappointment. For, undoubtedly, the first white men to make a landfall on the soil did have very high hopes, and, as certainly, the sun-burned Pacific coastland, in spite of its potential fruitfulness and hidden treasure, was not appreciated at first acquaintance. It seems to be true that her naming was casual. No godparent was honored by having the given name commemorate the donor as well as serve as designation to the recipient. California is not in the same category as her sister states, Virginia, Carolina, Maryland, Georgia, and Louisiana. Nor did she find her present name in the possession of the aborigines, like Massachusetts, Connecticut, and other states.

About fifty years ago, Edward Everett Hale chanced upon the word "California" in a Spanish romance three and a half centuries old, and leaped to the conclusion that here was the source of the state's name. He was fully convinced that his conjecture was correct.¹ The romance, *Las sergas de Esplandian*, or the fifth book of *Amadis de Gaula*, was in existence in print at least twenty-five years before the discovery of the peninsula of California by the Spaniards, and the identity of the two names looked so perfectly self-evident that the dearth of connecting links was, naturally enough, deemed unimportant. Dr. Hale's theory was accepted and then doubted. Other derivations were put forth. All surmises in the matter are given in an appendix to this paper. In 1910, Dr. George Davidson examined the evidence carefully, and came to the conclusion that

¹ *Proceedings* of the American Antiquarian Society, April, 1862. *Historical Magazine*, VI, 313; *Atlantic Monthly*, XIII, 265.

Dr. Hale's clue was the correct one.² The following consideration of the question simply offers a fuller examination of the circumstances attending the discovery of Lower California, and of the possible way in which a term fabricated for fiction reached its dignified status on the map of America, after traveling up the coast from the point, until it covered the two Californias.

The first question arising concerns the probability whether a word, used only incidentally in a fairly recent minor Spanish romance, was applied to the remote peninsula of California by the conquistadores who came from Mexico and who could hardly be supposed to have received the latest novel from home by post, as one critic observes. It would seem a major rôle to be played by fiction in the first half of the sixteenth century.

Yet it really was not long after the introduction of printing that man—non-academic and unclerical man, in addition to the world's scholars—became a reading animal. The best sellers in one language were speedily translated into other tongues, and the press, as a potent agent for affecting human society, exercised its power. Romances were circulated and cherished, of course, long before the era of printing, but their vogue was increased markedly very shortly after it. No one would deny the popularity of *Amadis de Gaula*. It had a surprisingly long life in circles of expanding size both before and after it went to press, that is, from some year near 1400, if not earlier, to one more than two centuries later, about the time when Cervantes made the barber spare it in the general holocaust of all romantic literature that had played havoc with the brain of Don Quixote.

The authorship of *Amadis de Gaula* is attributed to one Lobeira, a Portuguese, and the novel in its early form undoubtedly antedates printing, the zest for discovery, and improved international communication. Somewhere about 1470 one Montalvo—his Christian name, too, is not certain—began its translation into Spanish. The publication of that version marks the

² G. Davidson, "The origin and the meaning of the name California," in *Transactions and proceedings of the Geographical Society of the Pacific*, Series II, Vol. VI, Part I (1910), 3-50.

beginning of the wonderful popularity of the tale, or its increase, at least.³ In the next half century versions in all languages swarmed over Europe. Montalvo added a sequel, all his own—*Las sergas de Esplandian*, already referred to—but before touching on it and the train of other continuations, which proved a demand by the general public, two instances may be worth noting to show how the original *Amadis*, at least, was sufficiently well known in the sixteenth century for two very widely separated men to make passing allusions to it with apparent surety of being understood. Examples could, of course, be multiplied; these two simply prove casual familiarity with the text. In 1651, William of Nassau, Prince of Orange, was negotiating his second marriage with a young German girl, Anne of Saxony, whose Protestant kinsfolk were much troubled lest she might be contaminated by the customs of the Catholic court of the Spanish monarch at Brussels, whither she would be taken if the alliance were made. Orange was then a faithful servant of Philip II, and by no means the Protestant hero he became later. The prince was urged to make definite promises that his wife should have full freedom to read the Bible and religious books true to the Reformed Faith. He was unwilling to commit himself in a manner to give umbrage to the Catholic Philip, and desired to pledge himself in general terms only. He said, rather flippantly, that he did not think a young girl should be troubled at all about serious literature. She would better read the romances of *Amadis de Gaula* and devote herself to learning the *gailliard*—fancy dance. Years afterward, when Anne had proven herself an unworthy wife, her Protestant relatives remembered this remark of her husband's, and brought it up as evidence of his failure to give due weight to the religious life and its necessary intellectual pabulum. Anne had gone wrong, and it was the fault of Orange, who had been quite willing to expose her to the baneful influence of light romances,

³ The earliest edition extant is that of 1508, preserved in the British Museum. One of 1498 is referred to, but cannot be found. See Appendix B for authorities on the *Amadis* cycle.

instead of building up her character with spiritual food. Had he not declared that *Amadis de Gaula* was better for her than the Bible itself? Now he was reaping a just reward for his want of attention to sacred things.⁴

Almost exactly at the same time, at any rate within the same decade in which this Netherland official of Philip II used this passing allusion to the romances of *Amadis de Gaula* to point his argument against serious reading for young maidens, another officer of the Spanish monarch, far away in a city of the American colonies, in Santiago de Guatemala, was recalling the interesting experiences of his life, the story of the first advance of the Spaniards upon the City of Mexico.

He was a very human person, this Bernal Díaz del Castillo, this old soldier past eighty, blind and deaf, but still alert to his reputation in the midst of his reduced circumstances. His actual writing of his reminiscences began in the year 1568, when things had changed much in that wonderful Mexico which Cortés had won away from Montezuma's race for Charles V, and which made part of the heritage passed on to that same Philip II whom the Prince of Orange had feared to offend.

In 1568 the conqueror Hernán Cortés was dead, as were most of the adventurers who had shared his labors. Our veteran, Bernal Díaz, says that only five of his fellow soldiers were still living, and all alike were poor and forlorn. None had had their rightful share of the wealth they had helped to wrest from the ancient Aztecs. They had had no fitting recompense for their "sweat and blood." Bernal Díaz himself had traveled twice to Spain as advocate of his own petitions, getting little solace for those long sea passages. At the end of his life, he was again in America, living in Guatemala, receiving the affection and consideration of all on account of his "charming conversation" and because of his dignified bearing in spite of poverty.

Now, quite possibly, it was just this gift of pleasant talk, this habit of holding agreeable converse with his fellowmen,

⁴ R. Putnam, *William the Silent* (New York, 1895), I, 132.

that enabled him to retain vivid pictures in his memory of those early stirring years in America, when all had been so impressive and strange to the European. If, like a modern veteran in club or even in country store, Bernal Díaz had frequently rehearsed his experiences in the one hundred and nineteen battles of his active life, the incidents had undoubtedly crystallized into narrative form, and were ready for use when he came to write them down. It did not occur to him that those memories, vivid as they were to him, were historical material, until nearly half a century had elapsed. This Spaniard was a typical veteran of all time, the very counterpart of his later brethren of Waterloo and the Civil War—men who never thought of posing as literary people until they found that chroniclers were treating—or mistreating—history that they themselves had assisted to make. Imagine one of our volunteers of '61 reading, in current magazines of 1910 or thereabouts, faulty and one-sided statements of engagements *quorum magna pars fuit*, and one has a suggestive counterpart of Bernal Díaz. Having just perused Las Casas, he decides to go to work and see what he can do in carving rich material with tools that he is only too conscious are not perfect. Then a copy of Gómara's *Historia de las Indias*, published in 1552, falls into his hands. At first, Díaz is enraptured with the easy flowing style, the polished diction. He feels that he, the rough soldier, is terribly ill-equipped to enter the field of literature where trained writers are at home. He declared that their elegance made him blush for his rude and unskilled style. He was ready to abandon his plan in despair. But when he read further, he found the account full of misrepresentations. The fame of Cortés was enhanced and all credit given to him without consideration of the fact that he would have been helpless had not his captains and soldiers been brave and valiant, though of them there was scanty mention!⁵

⁵ B. Díaz del Castillo, *Historia verdadera de la conquista de la Nueva España* (Genaro García, ed., Mexico, 1904-05), I, 50. For the English version see B. Díaz del Castillo, *The True History of the Conquest of New Spain* (A. P. Maudslay, tr., London, The Hakluyt Society, 1908-16), I, 66.

He resumed his task with fresh vigor, and struggled on at it, taking about four years (1568-1572) for its completion. His first humility after comparing his unpolished true records with Gómara passed quickly. The glaring inaccuracies with which Gómara's *Historia* teemed, the fact that it was a compilation from purely official documents, acted as a spur to the old soldier's memory. So many errors met his eyes! His chief grievance was, naturally, the attribution of all credit to Cortés. And as for figures! Why, Gómara simply did not know what he was talking about when it came to figures, so glaring were his exaggerations. He was "as ready to write 80,000 as 8000."

Indignation and wounded pride vitalize the reminiscences into a delightful human document. Much of the *True History* carries conviction that the veteran's memory had not played him false. Again, it must be considered that the half-century intervening between action and the recording thereof had brought, little by little, stores of new knowledge to men, and that it was difficult for the writer invariably to discard more recently acquired data in treating of a time when he could not have known that which was current talk at the time of putting pen to paper. He may not always have distinguished between the two classes of mental baggage. Life had gone on in Mexico, discoveries had been extended, and, above all, names had become attached to localities that had been nameless to Europeans fifty years previously. Many circumstances are never noted until they have been in actual existence a long time. But to get to the point under consideration. Bernal Díaz makes a reference to the same romance or cycle of romances that the Prince of Orange used to denote a class of typical pleasant reading. This is his description of the famous approach to the capital of Montezuma:

The next day, in the morning, we arrived at a broad causeway, and continued our march towards Iztapalapa, and when we saw so many cities and villages built in the water and other great towns on dry land and that straight and level causeway going towards Mexico, we were amazed and said it was like the enchantments they tell of in the legend

of *Amadis*, on account of the great towers and cues and buildings rising from the water, and all built of masonry. And some of our soldiers even asked whether the things we saw were not a dream. It is not to be wondered at that I write it down in this manner, for there is so much to think over that I do not know how to describe it, seeing things as we did that had never been heard of or seen before.⁶

✕In glancing at this reminiscence, note that it was not his own reflections that Bernal Díaz was recalling. It is not as though he were proudly using his superior literary knowledge in making the allusion to romantic tales. No, he gives the impression of remembering clearly how a buzz of comment passed along the advancing column from man to man, | much as when the German troops approached the Arc de Triomphe on March 1, 1871, a season when the city on the Seine looks her prettiest, and paused to look down on Paris illuminated by brilliant spring sunshine. For one moment the soldiers were silent. Then "Wunderschön" sprang to the lips of the foremost companies and rippled along the ranks.

✕Surely here is a fair indication that an allusion to current fiction was comprehensible to the rank and file of Spanish adventurers! |

|Mr. Prescott turns our veteran's phrase into a picturesque statement: "A scene so new and wonderful filled their hearts with amazement. It seemed like enchantment; and they could find nothing to compare it with but the magical pictures in the *Amadis de Gaula*."⁷

There is still another proof of such familiarity in the text of *The True History*. Bernal Díaz says that they called a boastful man, weak in deeds, Agrayes—another character in the novel.⁸

⁶ Díaz del Castillo, *The True History* (Maudslay, tr.), II, 37.

⁷ W. Prescott, *History of the Conquest of Mexico* (Philadelphia, 1860), II, 62.

⁸ Southey points this out in his preface to his English version of *Amadis* (London, 1803), I, xxxiii. His theory is that the tale was already well known from its unprinted Portuguese original, because he infers that Montalvo modified the character of Agrayes and made him less conspicuous than he originally was.

The successful adventurer, Hernán Cortés, had no intention of resting content with his Mexican exploits after he had finally reduced the city that had seemed so wonderfully strange and beautiful to the invaders. He was most anxious to push on to further explorations and find treasures more wonderful still. In his letter of May 15, 1522, to Charles V, he describes the reports he had received from Pedro de Alvarado, whom he had sent to "subjugate the province of Tututepeque, forty leagues beyond Guaxaca, near the South Sea, where they did much damage to and made war against those who had given themselves as Your Majesty's vassals, and those of the province of Tututepeque, because they had allowed us to come through their country to discover the South Sea." After mentioning a plot against Alvarado, concocted in Tututepeque, Cortés continues:

When God had disclosed this baseness, he [Alvarado] had feigned ignorance, and, as if accidentally, had carried the chief and his son with him, and had decided to keep them in his power as prisoners; they had given him twenty-five thousand *castellanos*, and, from what the vassals of that chief had told him, he believed there were greater treasures. The whole of the province was as well pacified as possible, and they carried on their markets and commerce as before. The country was very rich in gold mines, for in his presence they had taken possession of it for His Majesty, where, in his presence, they had taken out a sample of pearls which he likewise sent me, and which I send to Your Majesty, together with the sample from the gold mine.

As God our Lord had well guided this business, and fulfilled my desire to serve Your Majesty on this South Sea, being as it is of such importance, I have provided with so much diligence that in two of the three places where I discovered the sea, two medium-sized caravels and two brigantines are being built; the caravels for the purpose of discovering, and the brigantines to follow the coast. For this purpose, I sent, under a reliable person, forty Spaniards, amongst whom go shipmasters, ship-carpenters, woodsawyers, blacksmiths, and seamen; and I have sent to the city for sails, nails, and other things necessary for the said ships, and all possible haste will be used to finish and launch them. Your Majesty may believe that it will be a great thing to accomplish this, and the greatest discovery since the discovery of the Indies will be rendered to Your Majesty.⁹

⁹ H. Cortés, *The Five Letters* (F. A. MacNutt, tr., New York, 1908), II, 142-144; F. A. Lorenzana, *Historia de Nueva España, escrita por ... Hernán Cortés* (Mexico, 1770), pp. 315-16.

There were delays, however. Two years pass, and still nothing more is known of the South Sea. In his fourth letter October 15, 1524, Cortés has much to say of the reports he has heard in regard to the regions round about. For instance, in one region, where there was danger of an universal uprising against the civilizing Spaniards, his lieutenant managed to seize a "woman whom all in those parts obeyed and everything quieted down because she sent to all the chiefs and commanded them to observe whatever was ordered in Your Majesty's name, as she herself intended to do, etc."

Then he tells how some of the Indians were disposed to be friendly with the Spaniards, simply because other Mexican tribes were hostile to them; a deputation from Impileingo comes to seek help from Cortés against their native foes. This is a province near the South Sea, and Cortés is quite ready to push out in that direction.

He proceeds to describe the expedition of his men to give the desired aid. When their mission was accomplished, they were to march on to the new city of Zacatula. Other provinces, too, had sent to offer themselves as vassals to his Caesarian Majesty, namely, Aliman, Colimante, and Ceguatan.¹⁰

He [Cortés' lieutenant] wrote me from there all that had happened, and I ordered him to seek a good site to found a town which he should call Coliman, like the province, and I sent him the nominations for alcaldes and municipal officers, directing him to visit the towns and peoples of those provinces and to bring me the fullest reports of the secrets of the country. When he returned, he brought this report, as well as certain samples of pearls; and, in the name of Your Majesty, I divided the towns and those provinces among the settlers who remained there, who numbered twenty-five horsemen and one hundred and twenty foot-soldiers. In his description of these provinces, there was news of a very good port on that coast, which greatly pleased me because there are few; he likewise brought me an account of the chiefs of the province of Ceguatan, who affirm that there is an island inhabited only by women without any men, and that, at given times, men from the mainland visit them; if they conceive, they keep the female children to which they give birth, but the males they throw away. This island is ten days' journey from the province, and

¹⁰ Cortés, *The Five Letters*, II, 177.

many of them went thither and saw it, and told me also that it is very rich in pearls and gold. I shall strive to ascertain the truth, and when I am able to do so, I shall make a full account to Your Majesty.¹¹

Here we have a definite statement of what was in Cortés' mind when he was planning the expeditions to the South Sea. The coast was not wholly unknown to the Spaniards by 1524, which was ten years before Cortés himself crossed the gulf. Some of the adventurers had been along the coast and culled bits of information more or less inexact, owing to their ignorance of the native dialects. Rumors of all kinds were inaccurately heard before they were repeated, and did not gain accuracy in their transit, while every story was colored by preconceived notions, the true and the false telescoped, superimposed, or set in mosaic, as the case might be. No one among the *conquistadores*, cosmographers, and historians, was capable of judging the true value of the morsels of information each handled. One powerful woman chief had been found among the chiefs of the tribes. That fact was valuable testimony in weighing the chances of finding the Amazonian island spoken of by many an adventurer out in the Western world. Whether she was a charmer or not, she led them on.

But Cortés found it expedient to delay temporarily his search for gold-bearing islands. Spices were surely waiting for the Spanish ships far in the East. If those vessels could only make quicker passage between the Moluccas and Spain, the gains would not be doubtful. There must be a strait north of the one

¹¹ Lorenzana, *op. cit.*, p. 349, note 3: "Este pais solo de Mugerres, que expresa aquí Cortés, es el que llamaron por entonces de las Amazonas, que creyeron habia, y se descubrió falso."

Note 4: "Ya está averiguada, que la California no es Isla segun la creyeron algunos, sino Península."

This last, stating that it is proven that California is not an island but a peninsula, is significant as showing that the Amazon story as related by Cortés was connected with the land he afterward discovered. In 1769, therefore, it was assumed that the land associated with this persistently recurring fable was the California on which Cortés landed.

A note to the Dutch version of Cortés' letters shows another attitude of mind. It says: "That the Island was a fable can be seen from the story itself. The conclusion is confirmed and made perfectly clear by the knowledge that all attempts of Cortés to discover the Island remained fruitless."

found by Magellan. That was to be discovered with as little delay as possible—that wonderful opening between North and South America. Cortés decided to postpone his prospecting on the South Sea until the precise whereabouts of that “doubtful strait”—*stretto dubitoso* as it is called on one map—should be ascertained. Later, in his letter of October 15, 1524, he says, after explaining his project of sending an expedition along the Atlantic coast to search for the strait:

I likewise expect to send the ships I have built on the South Sea... along the coast at the end of July in this year 1524, in search of this same strait; if it exist, it cannot escape both those who go by the South Sea and those who go by the North; for the South Sea expedition will go until they either find it or reach the country discovered by Magellan, and those of the North, as I have already said, until they reach the Bacallaos [the Sea of Codfish]. Thus, on the one hand or the other, we shall not fail to discover the secret.¹²

The writer proceeds to assure his liege lord that he is making this strenuous effort to find the interoceanic passage only because he has been told that its discovery would be greater service to the Crown. His own preference would have been to pursue his explorations out into the South Sea. He had, however, renounced his own hope of profit to do his sovereign's will. He adds: “May the Lord grant it as He pleases, and may Your Majesty's desire be satisfied and my wish to comply with that desire be gratified.”

The prayer was not answered and the renunciation of one plan did not win success for the other. Everything seemed to block Cortés in his progress toward South Sea explorations. The difficulties of transporting materials for ship-building had been great, and the first lot, laboriously brought across the

¹² Assimismo pienso embiar los Navios, que tengo hechos en la Mar del Sur, que, queriendo Nuestro Señor, navegarán en fin de el mes de Julio, de este año de quinientos, y viene, y quatro, por la misma Costa abajo, en demanda del dicho Estrecho (Lorenzana, p. 384).

The free translation makes it plain that Cortés meant to go north. Undoubtedly this is the correct interpretation, although Cortés distinctly says *abajo*. But “down north” is still used in Cape Breton Island today, and Bancroft points out that Cortés frequently uses *costa abajo* to mean *up the coast*, that is northbound. See *North Mexican States*, I, 21.

mountains, had been destroyed by fire—nothing left but the anchors. There had been, too, the delays on account of other pressing affairs, and then came this need of using his ships to look for the strait. Did the *conquistador* try to soothe his restless spirit by reading light literature? How I wish we knew! If he did, what books, in addition to that one novel which Bernal Díaz quoted, might have been accessible to him and his Spaniards in those years when he was baffled in getting down to the South Sea, and when he was dreaming of its secrets?

There were really a good many romances in circulation in Spain by that time, although, of course, their importation into the colonies does not necessarily follow. After *Amadis de Gaula* came a long line of imitations. And the first Spaniard to attempt to float his own fiction upon the fame of that popular novel was the man who introduced it to Spain by his translation. It all came about very naturally. He reasoned that if readers had learned to love *Amadis*, the perfect knight, they would be interested in the fortunes of his son, *Esplandian*. He made his plan in advance while he was at work on the three books that he put into Spanish from Portuguese.¹³ Montalvo's part in Book IV is not assured, according to literary authorities, but it is certain that he worked in an original thread of preparation for Book V, even though he was still using a Portuguese basis for the fourth. *Amadis*, sovereign of Gaula, that strange land of the Arthurian legends, merging vaguely into France and Britain with little regard for Channel waters, lives on in the pages where the victories of his son are exploited—that fifth wheel of his own romance bearing also the title: *Las sergas del muy esforzado caballero Esplandian, hijo del excelente rey Amadis de Gaula*. And it is in this sequel that the word "California" first appears in print, so far as is now known.¹⁴

Montalvo does not claim originality for this fifth book, any more than for the previous four. He adopts a device not in-

¹³ See Appendix B.

¹⁴ See Appendix A for the analogous name *Califerne* occurring in *La Chanson de Roland*, line 2924.

frequent in the field of fiction, and pretends that it was taken from the Greek of the "*Gran maestro Elisabet*," eye-witness of the events described. In order to keep up the illusion, various derivatives from Greek roots are introduced, and it is to this circumstance that Dr. Davidson attributes the coinage of the word "California," but the etymology of the name is not the point under consideration. *The question here is simply the relation between the romance and the discoverers of the tongue of land that bore the name, either by chance or by intention. And the story must be looked at so far as it has to do with that same name. |

Esplandian's career was marked by incidents natural to an age when the domains of Emperor and Pope were being extended to the uttermost parts of the earth, and when, too, the East had not yet been cleaved apart from the West. When Montalvo was first at work at his translation, Columbus had not crossed the sea. When he began his sequel, possible knowledge of that exploit may be assumed. The date is not fixed, but it was certainly before 1504 that it was completed. In his prologue, the author refers to the Catholic Sovereigns in a way to show that they were both still in life, and Isabella died in 1504. Columbus had been over-seas and back again three times, his fourth and last venture beginning in 1502, and ending after Isabella's death in September, 1504. Magellan had not yet tempted fate; Balboa had not yet looked down on the Pacific Ocean. Part of the world was still ignorant of or indifferent to this wonderful widening out of man's potential habitation, but on the Spanish peninsula there must have been both curiosity and willingness to accept the possibility of strange new things existing far off in the unexplored seas that had just been proven explorable. Montalvo could thus count on a pleasantly credulous public ready to enjoy all the marvels he could bring together on the pages of his romance. The narrative of the adventures and exploits of his hero, Esplandian, was brought down to the time when Armato, king of Persia, invites all the pagan princes to form a coalition against the Christians and to wrest Constantinople

from the Emperor and his Christian allies, among whom Amadis of Britain and his son Esplandian are chief in importance. Armato's letter to the heads of all pagandom makes chapter CXXIII of the novel, the previous chapters being filled with the progress of Esplandian and his development as one of the mighty heroes of Europe. Armato found ready response to his call to arms. Emperors and kings came in person, black and white alike, mighty admirals, *grandes maestros* in the art of navigation. Finally, there were more people than were mentioned in any records since the days of mighty Nimrod.¹⁵ There was widespread interest among all the nations of the earth in the matter, and what wonder that a strange race of islanders was attracted to the fray—to the pitting of strength between Christian and pagan hosts before the gates of Constantinople!¹⁶ Twenty-four chapters are devoted to the gathering of the prowess of Christendom about the menaced Emperor at Constantinople; then the author returns to the pagan uprising and gives the following account of the last allies to join the forces where the Sultan and Armato were chief. Chapter CLVII begins in this wise:

Know ye that at the right hand of the Indies there is an island called California, very close to that part of the Terrestrial Paradise, which was inhabited by black women without a single man among them, and they lived in the manner of Amazons. They were robust of body with strong passionate hearts and great virtue. The island itself is one of the wildest in the world on account of the bold and craggy rocks. In their land there are many griffins . . . In no other place of the world are they found.¹⁷

This island of California was ruled by a queen, Calafia, of majestic proportions, more beautiful than all the others, and in the full vigor of womanhood.

¹⁵ "Finalmente, eran tantas las gentes, que en ninguna escriptura no se halla, desde el tiempo de aquel gigante Nembrot."

¹⁶ The fall of Constantinople in 1453 must have been current knowledge, of course, to every one during this half-century that followed the event. It was natural for the romancer to go back of that and give a different outcome to events.

¹⁷ *Las sergas*, chap. CLVII.

The way the information was disseminated is not stated by our novelist, but he is definite in his account; these Amazons, remote from the masculine world though they were, were roused to action by stories of how the Christians were pressing the Turks—all sympathy being with the latter. Calafia proposed to her women to sally forth and carry help to their friends, even though she did not know what *Christians* were, adding as an argument that they would gain fame by such action. Moreover, she remarked that it was rather stupid for her people to adhere to a quiet life and duplicate the existence of their ancestors. "It was like living in a tomb and the present and future would pass without glory as with brute animals." Her maidens are quite ready to be convinced. Five hundred griffins are put aboard ship as auxiliaries in the war to be waged in vindication of the rights of the Turks, and off they sail to the harbor of Constantinople.

The grand Sultan of Liquia and the Sultan of Halapa were among those glad to welcome these strange new allies, headed by Calafia covered with gold and the precious stones, "which are found in the island of California in great abundance."

When the assault of the city was about to begin, Calafia "let loose her griffins." The first result was eminently satisfying. "The animals came forward wildly and seeing the land about them, flew up in the air with apparent delight, and soon they espied many people walking about. They were hungry and joyfully seized on men and carried them off to eat, to the terrible grief of the Christians, whose weapons were futile against the protection of thick feathers." The Turks, standing far away in safety, thought this the most satisfactory hunting they had ever seen. All went splendidly for the pagan forces, until an assault was ordered by the Sultans. Their men obeyed. Then the limited experience of the women-bred griffins wrought unexpected results. To their eyes any male creature was a foe! They were unable to distinguish between Christians and the friends of their royal mistress, Calafia! The Turkish allies were

seized with as much avidity as the Christians had been! Being no longer hungry, the griffins simply carried their prey aloft, high up in the air, and dropped them to certain death. Consternation in the ranks of Turks and Amazons! The women hastened to the rescue. They climbed the walls, but their arms of gold proved weak, and the aid they expected from their allies could not be given under the fierce onslaught of the birds. Calafia saw her friends' *desbarate sin remedio*, and summoned the keepers of the griffins to call them off. The fierce birds were perfectly obedient to the familiar voices of the women who had always tended them and were soon safely shut up in their cages again. But the mischief had been done.

The Amazons were in terror lest the Turks should doubt their practical advantage as effective allies, so they quickly girded themselves anew for the conflict and proceeded without their birds to show what they could do by their own skill. Two of the Christian knights, Talanque and Mande, noticing what wonders Calafia was performing with her sword, attacked her furiously, as if they counted her absolutely insane. Thereupon Liota, the queen's sister, sprang to her assistance like a wild lioness, and fought the *caballeros* so mortally that besides losing their horses they were compelled to withdraw.

Calafia now began to feel fairly well assured of victory, and proposed to the Sultan that they two should take matters into their own hands and send personal challenges to Amadis and Esplandian. Accordingly, a very bombastic epistle was drawn up in the names of Radiaro and of "Calafia, Señora of the great island of California, celebrated for its great abundance of gold and jewels." It was addressed to Amadis de Gaula, king of Great Britain and to his son, Knight of the Serpent, and it stated that "we have voluntarily come to these parts to destroy the city of Constantinople and to punish the injuries and losses suffered by our brother, King Armato of Persia."

A doncella, negra y hermosa, richly attired, carried this challenge to Amadis and Esplandian, who could do nothing less than

accept it, although they were rather contemptuous in their manner of referring to one of the principals in the projected duels.

Calafia, however, was so much interested in her messenger's account of Esplandian's wonderful beauty that she was resolved to pay a visit to the Christian camp in person, nominally to arrange the details for the combat, but really to satisfy her aroused curiosity. The world of men was so new to this islander! When her message, proposing this visit, was delivered to the allies, Amadis began to laugh, and said to the kings, "What think you of this demand?" "Let her come," said King Lisuarte, "it is a good opportunity to see the most noted woman in the world." "Let that be your answer," said Amadis, to the maiden, "and do not doubt that she shall be treated with all truth and propriety."¹⁸

Montalvo is unwilling to portray Calafia as alien to usual feminine characteristics in spite of her unique education in regions remote from Europe. He tells us that she lay awake all night debating with herself as to whether she should wear warrior's gear or flowing robes when making her call upon the enemy. She decides upon the latter. With her train of maidens, all attired in splendid feminine garments very different from their fighting garb, all mounted on strange beasts imported from California, the Amazon queen enters the Christian camp. The older kings are courteous to their guest, but Esplandian will not deign to notice her, so opposed is he to her escape from woman's sphere and to her intrusion into the military world. But his appearance makes a deep impression upon the virgin queen. Very simply and naively does she declare—when had the supreme islander had need to conceal her emotions?—that never before had her eyes beheld any mortal as fair as this son of Amadis. It was just a statement of historical fact and does

¹⁸ El se comenzó de reir, y dijo á los reyes: "¿Qué os parece desta demanda?" "Que venga digo," dijo el rey Lisuarte, "que grand razon es de ver una tan señalada mujer en el mundo." "Esto tomad por respuesta," dijo Amadis á la doncella, "y no dudes que con toda verdad y honestidad será tratada." Cap. CLXV.

not interfere with her completing the arrangements for the combat. Her adieux are made bravely, accompanied by the remark that she will look quite different when she and her hosts are confronted on the field of battle.

On the morrow, Amadis is pitted against Calafia and Esplandian against the Sultan. Here the courtly Amadis does not play fair. He had distinctly accepted the challenge on the same terms for himself as for Esplandian, but decided that he was too chivalrous to use his sword against a woman. The Queen began her attack with heavy blows, some falling on his shield, some being evaded by her antagonist. At last, when her lance was broken, Amadis picked up one of the pieces and used it as a weapon to hit her helmet with so much force that Calafia was stunned. On her recovery, she exclaimed, "How, Amadis, do you rate my strength so low that you think you can vanquish me with a cudgel?"¹⁹ And he answered, "Queen, it has always been my character to serve women and to aid them, and you being one, if I should take arms against you, I should deserve to lose all that I had ever won." The Queen said: "What, then? Do you reckon me as one of them? Then you shall see."

Unfortunately the valiant Calafia was unable to make good her brave words. She did succeed in cleaving her opponent's shield with her vigorous sword-stroke, but he forced her to her knees and demanded her surrender. Probably she would not have yielded then had she not seen that the Sultan had just been conquered by Esplandian. Her last trial was ineffective and she acknowledged herself a prisoner, little to her discredit, as Radiaro had already done the same thing. The vanquished combatants were taken into the palace, and Calafia was placed under the care of Leonorina, daughter of the Emperor of Constantinople. This lady was betrothed to Esplandian, which was, perhaps, the main reason why he was so cold to Calafia.

¹⁹ Cuando ella esto vió, dijo: "¿Cómo, Amadis? en tan poco tienes mi esfuerza que á palos me piensas vencer?" El le dijo: "Reina, yo siempre tuve por estilo servir y ayudar á las mujeres; y si en tí que lo eres, pudiese arma alguna, merecería perder todo lo hecho pasado." La Reina le dijo: "¿Cómo, en la cuenta de esas me pones." Cap. CLXVI.

The meeting between the two women is a pretty scene. Calafia rises to the occasion and declares that as soon as her eyes rested upon Leonorina, she realized that she and she alone was a fitting mate to Esplandian. Later in the story, after Esplandian's marriage, she declares before the whole court that her lineage was so high, her riches so great, her rank in the world so assured, that she had felt that Esplandian would be a suitable husband for her, but that the loveliness of Leonorina had immediately convinced her that her hopes were futile. Then she added that, having accepted the inevitable, as the wise should do, she was also ready to accept both Christianity and a Christian husband, and thus to enter into "the established order of your law," having recognized the disorder of all the others.

At these words, Esplandian, now Emperor by the resignation of his father-in-law, embraces her, declaring that now she is sensible and that he, who has refrained from saying a single word to the stranger hitherto, now considers her his *buena amiga*, and will give her the hand of his cousin Talanque in marriage.

A mate was also found for Liota, Calafia's lion-hearted sister, the Amazonian army was baptized, California was won for the Christians, and the women became submissive to their sphere and the great Amazonian to the rank of Queen Consort.²⁰ Esplandian's promise to be a brother to her was, doubtless, a consolation to her. Naturally, Christianity and male supremacy had to be victorious in this tale written by a Christian and a man. The whole episode is worth reading as it is full of humor, and the interest inspired in Calafia by Esplandian is treated with great delicacy.²¹

²⁰ El Emperador, cuando por el fue todo oído, abrazándola riendo, dijo. "Reina Calafia, mi buena amiga, hasta aquí nunca de mi ninguna habla ni razón hubiste... pero ahora que el Señor muy poderoso esta tan gran merced te hace, de te dar tal conocimiento que su sierva te tornes, agora hallarás en mi gran amor, como si el Rey mi padre entrambos nos engendrara, etc." Cap. CLXXVIII.

²¹ The French translations of *Las sergas* are interesting, both for omissions and additions. Seigneur des Essars, Nicolas de Herberay, translated eight books of *Amadis de Gaula*—the real thing and four

After Calafia's marriage the main story is resumed, but just at the end of Book V (chap. CLXXIV) the author reverts to Calafia and her husband. The Queen has a longing to feel arms in her hand again. Her husband graciously accepts her as a joint leader in an expedition against a neighboring tribe on the island of Argalia. Off sails the squadron with the royal pair in command. Of course they proved victorious and Argalia was added to their domain.

This is the closing episode of *Las sergas*, the fifth book of *Amadis*. But the appetite for romantic literature was not sated. The sequels, once begun, go on and on. The author of the sixth book knows not Calafia, but in the seventh,²² she reappears from the island of California and takes part in fresh

sequels, completing Book V, *Las sergas*—about 1542, at a period almost contemporaneous with the discovery of California, the peninsula, that is. When he comes to the episode of Calafia, he makes many variations from the text of Montalvo. The news of the projected expedition against Constantinople came to the ears of the "mighty Queen Calafie, reigning in Californie, an opulent and fertile country which lies at the source of the river 'Boristenes' near the foot of the 'Riffées' mountains." (Thus there is no mention of "las Indias" or "la parte del Paraíso Terrenal.") "This land I speak of was once peopled by good cavaliers and others of all classes, but the women by dint of craft, found means to make them all die, establishing as law among them that henceforth they would recognize a Queen sovereign and govern themselves as Amazons." The account of Calafie's determination to aid the Turks does not differ materially in substance from the original, but it is noteworthy that Herberay uses the term "Californiennes," probably its first appearance in any language in print. Moreover, while he does not describe the queen as a white beauty, he does not use the adjective *black*. The incident of the set-to between Talanque and Calafia is passed over entirely and the messenger who carries the letters from pagan to Christian camp is not specifically made black as in the Spanish. In the Italian version of 1592, the Amazons are black, but Count de Tress (Paris, 1779) entirely ignores that suggestion and adds items to prove that his conception of beauty is necessarily fair. His version—or rather paraphrase—is altogether adapted to suit the refined taste of the eighteenth century. He uses the word "Californie" but once, and makes it a region in the east of Europe. The edition of *Amadis* which he used was a folio (Paris, D. Janot, 1540).

²² See Appendix B. There is some doubt whether the author of *Lisuarte de Grecia* (Libro VII of *Amadis*) knew of *El sexto libro... Don Florisando*, as he goes on, consecutively, with the thread of Libro V. The French translation, the only version accessible in American libraries, so far as I can ascertain, gives *Lisuarte as le sixieme livre... mis en Francois par le seigneur de Essars, Nicolas de Herberay*. See pp. 97, 148, 149, 220, 210, for mention of "Californie." The author repeats some of the incidents of *Esplandian*, under new aspects. The story does not hold the interest.

coalitions in the neighborhood of Constantinople, being now one of the Christian warriors to oppose the pagans, her old friend Armato of Persia among the latter. Eight times, at least, she or her island is mentioned. There was her "California" demanding attention and getting it in 1525, just when Cortés was talking about Amazons; a new edition followed in 1539, and others succeeded this. It is impossible to ignore Calafia if light literature had any weight at all in that period of time. In the seventh book Calafia is rather pervasive. She drifts through the narrative, although she is not very essential. But that is not the case in *Las sergas de Esplandian*. The portion of that romance dealing with California and its lovely black queen disappointed at not being the *dea ex machina* of the siege of Constantinople is nothing more than an interlude.

*The tradition of Amazons goes back into antiquity. The word is Greek, meaning simply "equal to man." It occurs in Homer, in Herodotus, and in many later classics, both Latin and Greek. Medieval literature, too, abounds in references to female warriors, notable exceptions to the ordinary run of women. There is one description in Jacques de Vitry of the thirteenth century.²³ But this particular episode, as related by Montalvo, has a certain freshness about it. Is it not possible that the Spaniard had a new inspiration to breathe vitality into the ancient legend?

It seems a fair inference that Montalvo did not complete his own story of Esplandian's victories until after Columbus came back from his first voyage. Even if it appeared originally in

²³ Jacobi a Vitriaco [fl. 1220], *Historia Orientalis* (Duaci, 1597), chap. XCII. De Amazonibus: Sunt praeterea in partibus orientis quidam homines ab aliis mundi nationibus valde dissimiles. Sunt ibi Amazones egregie in armis & praeliis mulieres juxta montes Caspiae in insula undique fluvio commorantes. Sunt autem plusquam ducenta millia praedictarum mulierum absque virorum consortio seorsum in praedicta insula habitantium. Omnes autem tenentes gladium & ad bella doctissime, quando victrices cum regina sua refertuntur a praeliis, a viris suis, qui extra insulam per se commorantur, adorantur. Semel autem in anno transeuntes ad maritos suos, postquam reversi fuerunt. Si masculum conceperint, ipsum per sex annos nutriunt, & postea patri suo transmittunt. Si vero foemina peperint, ipsam secum reservantes custodiunt. Sicut autem in quibusdam volucibus foemine fortiores sunt quam masculi, ita praedictae Amazones fortiores sunt viris suis: quibus ad bella procedentibus, mariti earum domi remanentes quiescunt.

1496, the author would have had time to incorporate a fresh incident into his nearly finished "copy." It is true that his scheme for covering Esplandian with his father's mantle of fame evidently antedated the great adventure, because he moulded his translation to tally with the extension of the narrative, as already said. *But the whole episode of Calafia of California is not an intrinsic part of that narrative.* It could have been omitted entirely without disturbing matters. | Leonorina was the heroine as far as Esplandian was concerned. The even tenor of his emotions was not ruffled by the appearance of the Queen of California, nor did he hanker after her pearls and her gold. He was fully occupied. It seems clear that Montalvo did not need the stranger for his plot. She might have been nothing more than an afterthought when the main structure was practically reared. And we have only to glance at Columbus himself to see why just such a sovereign of just such an island realm as "California" might have been suggested to a novelist's fertile mind to lend verisimilitude to the sequel growing into form upon his desk. Turn to the Admiral's letter "made in brief on board the caravel, at the latitude of the Canary Islands."²⁴ We read that the weather was such that

²⁴ Sunday, January 6.—... The first mentioned island was called, said the admiral, Yamaye [Jamaica]. He also said that he learned that over toward the east there was an island upon which were only single women; this he had heard from many persons. And that the island Española, or the other island Yamaye, was near the mainland, ten days by canoe, which might be a matter of sixty or seventy leagues; and that the people there were clothed.

Sunday, January 13.—... In the island of Española they call copper or base gold *tuob*. The Indian also said of the island of Matinino that it was peopled entirely with women without a single man, and that there was in it much *tuob*, which is gold or copper, and that it lay to the east beyond Carib. He also spoke of the island of Goanin, where there is much *tuob*. The Admiral says that he had had notice of these islands some days previously, and from a number of persons.

Wednesday, January 16.—... He [Columbus] was obliged to forsake the course he thought would take him to the island, and turned NE by E straight toward Spain. Sailing in this direction until sunset, he went forty-eight miles, which are twelve leagues. The Indians told him that in that direction he would find the island of Matinino, which they said was peopled with women without men. The admiral wanted very much to visit the place and carry five or six of the women to his sovereigns, but he doubted whether the Indians knew the proper course, and he could not be detained as it would be dangerous to his caravels, which were making water. He

the admiral found himself obliged to change his course, so as to steer directly toward Spain. Following this new course until sunset, he went twelve leagues, when the Indians told him that if he continued in that direction he would come upon the Island of Matinino, which was inhabited by women. He would have liked to visit the island and take some of the women to Spain, but his vessel was leaky, and he had not confidence in his Indians' ability to guide him properly to the island. Its existence he doubted not at all, nor that it was visited at certain times of the year by men from the Island of Carib, to whom were sent the male children born on Matinino, while the females were kept on the latter island. These islands Columbus was sure lay to the southeast not more than fifteen or twenty leagues from the place whence he had sailed for Spain, but he was unwilling to attempt to proceed thither for the reasons named.

Now, is it not interesting that the son of Christopher Columbus bought a copy of Book VII of *Amadis, Lisuarte de Grecia*, in 1514, the very year it was published in Seville? There is the volume, in the Biblioteca Columbina, bearing the words "*Costó en Valladolid 130 mrs., por Noviembre de 1514.*" If Ferdinand Columbus was willing to pay this substantial price for the new novel, containing more news of the Island of California, is not that proof that romances had a market? In September he had bought Books V and VI at Valladolid for thirteen reals. Evidently he was anxious to read all that touched on the subject.²⁵

If Señor Montalvo had been making a pompous attempt says, however, that it was true that there were such women, and that at a certain time of the year the men came to them from the island of Carib, said to be ten or twelve leagues distant. If they bore male children, they sent them to the island of the men, but if they bore females, they kept them. The Admiral said that these two islands could not be more than fifteen or twenty leagues from the place whence he had set out; he believed that they were toward the southeast, and that the Indians did not know how to show him the course (*Primer viage de Colon* in M. Fernández de Navarrete, *Colección de los viages y descubrimientos*, Madrid, 1825, I, 127, 134, 139-40). Cf. the translation by Samuel Kettell, *Personal narrative of the first voyage of Columbus to America* (Boston, 1827), pp. 187, 198, 205.

²⁵ Francisco Escudero y Perosso, *Tipografía hispalense* (Madrid, 1894), p. 140.

at a work of scholarly erudition, such as Cervantes sneered at a century later, wherein the writer protects his own reputation with an armor of bibliography, undoubtedly this letter of Columbus would have been referred to as *corroborating* the data about the island of Calafia. Even in the sixteenth century, many book-makers were skilled in the art of erecting bulwarks of titles as lines of defense for their ranks of facts. And then as now, well-directed attacks on the strength of the outpost-numbers could cause serious damage to the scholarly fame of the would-be learned author, such damage as Don Quixote's helmet sustained when treated as though it was bona fide steel.

✓ Montalvo has this degree of likeness to Shakespeare: he gathers his material freely, as a child might pick up shells on the beach and string them together as his own property. Except to "Maestro Elisabet," there is no credit given to anyone for his facts or fancies. Yet, considering the dates, with these passages from Columbus' papers before one, the inference does not seem far-fetched that the author of *Las sergas* gladly picked up a few fresh shells to thread into his narrative and to give it a realistic touch. It seems as though he hardly could have escaped knowing what Columbus had reported. And if he knew, surely this item would have seemed wonderful. Homer proved prophet instead of mere poet! Herodotus and Plutarch bolstered up by this new Daniel come to judgment! Was that not fine for the veracious historical romancer? Did it not suddenly seem as though vague notions of the past were to be verified? What better moment for the novel? Montalvo might have rejoiced indeed, at a chance to please the public with fresh fruits to its taste.

The terrestrial paradise had hitherto been vague as to locality. Sir John Mandeville mentions it (1322) as being somewhere near the Isle of Prester John. That, too, was to be more definitely placed. By 1498, Columbus was on his third voyage, and reached the delta of the Orinoco. He writes, ✱ "The terrestrial paradise is situated at the spot I have described."

Here was another bit of local color that possibly was seen in time to serve Montalvo, and to enable him to say: * An island named California very close to that part of the terrestrial paradise, etc."

One of the first writers to spread abroad and popularize the reports brought by \Columbus was Peter Martyr./ His Decades, *De rebus oceanis et orbe novo*, were in the form of a series of letters despatched to Italy from Spain, containing all that he could glean of the tidings from the West. A portion of these Decades was in print, for the benefit of a larger public than his correspondents, as early as 1504. The writer had had an opportunity to talk with the commander of a squadron sent home by Columbus after his second voyage. "I questioned him and other trustworthy witnesses, and shall now repeat what they told me, hoping by so doing to render myself agreeable to you." Then he proceeds to relate the experience of Columbus as he had heard the accounts, illuminating the same with lights from his classic lore.

Straight ahead to the north appeared a large island. Those natives who had been brought to Spain on the first voyage, and those who had been delivered from Captivity, declared that it was called Madanina, and that it was inhabited exclusively by women. The Spaniards had, in fact, heard the island spoken of during their first voyage. It appeared that the cannibals went at certain epochs of the year to visit these women, as in ancient history the Thracians crossed to the Island of Lesbos inhabited by the Amazons. When the children were weaned, they sent the boys to their fathers, but kept the girls, precisely as did the Amazons. It is claimed that these women know of vast caverns where they conceal themselves if any man tries to visit them at other than the established time. Should any try to force his way into these caverns by violence or trickery, they defend themselves with arrows which they shoot with the greatest precision. At least that is the story as it is told, and I repeat it to you. The north wind renders this island unapproachable, and it can only be reached when the wind is southwest.²⁶

Peter Martyr found that his news-letters, primarily intended for church dignitaries, were well received by the public. His

²⁶ Martyr, *De orbe novo: The Eight Decades of Peter Martyr D'Anghera* (F. A. McNutt, tr., New York, 1912), I, 73-74.

three Decades, covering events from 1492 to 1516, were printed first, and shortly after the last-mentioned year he began a fresh Decade.

I have delayed somewhat [he writes in his address to Pope Leo x] because many futile particulars, unworthy of remembrance, were recorded. Our Royal Council for Indian Affairs daily received letters devoid of interest written by correspondents bereft of intelligence, from which I was able to draw little material. The one boasted of having discovered the finger of a hand, another a joint of that finger; and they glorified themselves far more proudly and vociferously for having found new countries and accomplished great deeds, than did the true discoverers of the entire continent. They resemble the ant, which believes itself to be crushed beneath a heavy burden when it has taken one grain from an immense heap of wheat sown by another, and dragged it to its underground storehouse. I mean by a finger of the hand or a grain of wheat, all the neighboring isles which dot the sea about Hispaniola, Cuba, and the land supposed to be a continent. For these countries are surrounded on all sides by innumerable islands, like hens with their chicks, swarming about them.²⁷

Then he proceeds to describe some of these islands, and recurs to another form of the same legend that he had heard from Columbus in regard to a more easterly place.

A number of other islands lie off the coast of Coluacan which are inhabited only by women, who have no relation with men. Some people think they live as did the Amazons, but others who have studied the question more closely, believe that they are virgins dedicated to God, who take pleasure in solitude just as those amongst us; or in ancient times, did the vestal virgins or the princesses of the *Bona Dea*. At certain epochs of the year, men cross to the islands, not to have intercourse with these religious women, but out of the spirit of piety to cultivate their fields and gardens, and thus assure their means of existence. The report is spread, however, that there are other islands likewise inhabited by women of bad morals, who from their earliest youth cut away the breast to enable them to draw their bows with greater facility. Men go to these islands to have relations with them, but they do not stop there; I think this story is a fable.²⁸

A few years later than the date of this Decade of Peter Martyr, but still long before Cortés reached the South Sea, Magellan made his record-breaking voyage. He did not live to enjoy honor for his achievement, or even to tell his tale; but,

²⁷ Martyr, *De orbe novo* (McNutt, tr.), II, 3, 4.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, II, 18.

luckily, the ship which completed the circumnavigation of the globe had on board the Italian, Pigafetta, with his diary. It was Monday, September 8, 1522, when the *Victoria* dropped anchor at the quay at Seville. Not long afterward Pigafetta says he presented to His Sacred Majesty, Don Carlos, "neither gold nor silver, but things very highly esteemed by such a sovereign. Among other things, I gave him a book written by my hand, concerning all the matters that had occurred from day to day during our voyage."

Probably this book referred to thus proudly was a brief record. The *Relacion* was compiled later. On August 5, 1523, he asks the Doge and Council of Venice for copyright on his completed book. "For that purpose I petition that no one may print it for xv years except myself under penalty of a fine of three lire per copy besides the loss of the book."

In this book, too, occurs a mention of an Amazonian island, though now located farther east. As a rule, Pigafetta relates only what he himself has seen. In this instance, he is careful to state that his information is at second hand, at the same time making it clear that his informant is no flighty youth, but a man of experience.²⁹

After touching on Java, the author continues:

Our oldest pilot told us that there is an island called Acoloro [in MS 5650 and in Cà da Mosto *Ocoloro*] which lies below Java Majôr, where are found no persons but women, and that they become mothers by the wind. When they give birth, if the offspring is a male they kill it, but if it is a female they rear it. If men go to that island of theirs, they kill them if they are able to do so.³⁰

In giving another piece of hearsay information, Pigafetta mentions also "the terrestrial paradise."³¹ "He [the king of

²⁹ Antonio Pigafetta, *Magellan's voyage around the world*. Original text of the Ambrosian MS, with English translation, notes, etc., by James Alexander Robertson, 2 vols., Cleveland, 1906.

³⁰ The original of the above passage is as follows:

In nro piloto piu vechio ne disse Como vna ysola deta acoloro soto de Java magiore in Quella trovarsi sinon femine et quelle Inpregniarsi de vento et poi Quando parturiscono sil parto et maschio Lamazano se he femina lo aleuano et se hominj vanno aquella sua ysola loro amazarli purché possanno." *Ibid.*, II, 168-70.

³¹ *Ibid.*, II, 105.

Bachiar] sent as a present to the king of Spagnia a slave, two bahars of cloves . . . two extremely beautiful dead birds . . . they never fly except when there is wind. The people told us that these birds came from the terrestrial paradise and they call them *bolon divata*, that is to say "birds of God."³²

In the first quarter of the sixteenth century the transit of news was infinitely slow, while information seemed to cross the sea very promptly. By October 15, 1524, Cortés was fully informed of Magellan's achievement, as he mentions it incidentally in his letter of that date. The events touching the two men on land and sea were, indeed, nearly contemporaneous:

MAGELLAN

August 10, 1519, Magellan sailed from Seville.

Saturday, April 27, 1521, Magellan was killed on the island of Matan.

Monday, September 8, 1522, the *Victoria* completed the circuit of the earth.

1523, Pigafetta's report of Magellan's voyage printed.

CORTÉS

November 8, 1519, Cortés made his first entry into the Aztec capital.

August 13, 1521, Cortés completed the conquest of the capital. 1522, Cortés began to plan exploration of the South Sea.

October 15, 1524, Cortés mentions Magellan's achievement.

It was in the above-mentioned letter of 1524 that Cortés informed the Emperor that he had relinquished, for the time being, his own plans of exploration, and had sent the ships, built on the South Sea for that purpose, to help search for the strait between the oceans. He did not dream that the passage from the Atlantic to the Pacific would not be made until 1914! Meanwhile another Spanish fleet under Loaysa had followed

³² There were other wonderful tales current which Pigafetta repeats without vouching for. One old pilot described an island where men and women were only one cubit high, but their ears were so long and wide that one could serve as a bed for their owner and the other for a blanket! Yet another island was nothing but a tree growing in the sea. It was frequented by birds so big that they could carry buffaloes or elephants in their mouths. Boats cannot approach the tree because of the whirlpool around it, but once a little boy, sole survivor of a wreck, was floated thither on a plank. He climbed up into the tree and hid under the wing of a bird and, still in that seclusion, was carried ashore when the bird went hunting, and rejoined his friends! Strange fruit had been found floating about, and now they knew it came from this tree.

Magellan's trail as far as the Moluccas, and in 1527 Cortés was again obliged to use the ships intended for explorations near at hand for a longer voyage in search of Loaysa. Three vessels under Alvaro de Saavedra Cerca set sail from New Spain. But beyond being pioneers in Pacific waters as far as American-built ships were concerned, Saavedra's expedition accomplished nothing, and does not mark a stage in the discovery of California. Bernal Díaz dismisses the matter in the following phrase:

Our Lord Jesus Christ favored them so that they reached the Moluccas and other islands. I do not know the pains nor the hunger nor the sufferings that they had to endure any more than the maladies that afflicted them on that voyage; but three years later I saw at Mexico a sailor who had been with Saavedra. He recounted such wonderful things concerning the islands and the cities that are built on them which they visited that I marveled.³³

Díaz isn't quite sure about what happened to Saavedra, because "it is so many years since it all took place." "As far as what I saw personally is concerned, I can only mention the letter written by his Majesty to Cortés." The letter referred to was the order to send the ships to the Moluccas. This venture was in 1527, but by that date Cortés had found himself in a sea of difficulties. These need to be glanced at before proceeding to the voyages on the South Sea, since his situation had a possible connection with the naming of the peninsula of California.

It must be remembered that the conqueror was in a very critical position in regard to his superiors when he entered Mexico. He had no status whatever as a duly commissioned Spanish officer when he made the conquest in the name of Charles V. He was simply an adventurer without credentials. In being there at all he had defied his chief Velázquez, the governor of Cuba, and thereby made him his implacable enemy. The effort made by Velázquez to check his progress by the expedition of Narváez failed, and actually told against the governor when

³³ Díaz del Castillo, *Historia verdadera de la conquista de Nueva España* (Mexico, 1904-05), II, 412.

appeal was made to the Emperor himself, who upheld the adventurer, to the intense chagrin of the superior officer. If the venture had not proven successful, the story might have been different. But in 1523, when the *cédula* of Charles V was signed whereby Cortés was made governor and captain-general of New Spain, the prospect of wonderful returns from Mexican wealth made the Emperor willing³⁴ to ignore irregularities in the conduct of the officer who had won it in his name, and to prefer him to the chief whom he had vexed by his insubordination. By a stroke of a pen, Cortés was raised from the status of a rebel to that of an accredited and honored lieutenant of the Spanish monarch. It was Velázquez whose claims were disregarded, whose agents were repulsed or won over to the side of his foe. He had had splendid plans for extending Spanish rule upon the continent from Cuba as a vantage ground, and all the missions he had despatched, expecting them to redound to his credit, had miscarried! The two that had failed utterly were less disastrous to him than the one that had slipped out of his hand and brought fame to Cortés instead of to him. He failed in his attempt to switch that fame back to himself. Two years after the recognition of Cortés, Velázquez died (1524), a disappointed man. But he left friends behind him who continued after his death to espouse his cause as against Cortés. In every way these adherents were on the alert to annoy and harass Cortés, and they succeeded in hampering his movements to a great extent. Everywhere there lurked a hostile spirit, ready to animate malcontents into parties of opposition.

As soon as Cortés had organized a semblance of government for the country, four revenue officers were sent over from Spain to look after the royal interests. Their presence in New Spain made Cortés rather uneasy, as he did not know what secret powers they might hold which would enable them to turn against him in a crisis. It was nothing new in Spanish policy to set officials to spy upon each other, and the conqueror's fears were

³⁴ *Colección de documentos inéditos relativos á... América y Oceanía*, XXVI, 59-70.

fully justified. The revenue officers were Gonzalo de Salazar, factor, Pero Almindez Chirinos, inspector, Rodrigo de Albornoz, accountant, and Alonzo de Estrada, treasurer.³⁵ They were ready to listen to all stories to the discredit of Cortés, and to believe that he had systematically concealed large portions of his booty, robbing the coffers of the Emperor's tithe to enrich himself. They, too, were disappointed in the riches they expected to find ready to their hand. There was suspicion and intrigue on all sides. And the distrust filtered back to Spain.

The adventures of Cortés in Honduras need not be told here. They are another story, except as his absence on the expedition left his enemies and critics free to damage his reputation with more acrimony. Estrada, appointed by Cortés himself as chief in his absence, was neither very efficient nor very loyal. Intrigue and jealousies became more and more intense during the months that followed, and were increased by rumors of the death of Cortés. Malicious accusations were circulated, attacking him in every way. Thus when he returned from his long expedition he found a very mare's nest of trouble. Moreover, all the charges, with black hints of worse crimes not specified, were promptly forwarded to Spain. A *residencia*, or court of inquiry, was ordered. This was not such a serious matter as it might appear. Such investigations were not unusual. But it did not tend to enhance Cortés' reputation that Ponce de León and Aguilar, successively appointed to hold this court in Mexico, both died before their duty was discharged. Then Alonzo de Estrada was chosen as commissioner in charge. Meantime everything was in confusion, and Cortés was hampered in straightening the tangle of misgovernment by the way in which his foes made capital out of every circumstance adverse to him. They had no hesitation in laying the responsibility for the deaths of the first commissioners at his door, in addition to the other crimes of which they accused him. To escape all this, Cortés finally decided to go to Spain and defend himself to the

³⁵ Bancroft, *History of Mexico*, II, 143.

Emperor. Before his departure there was another arrival in the country whose coming boded no good to Cortés. In 1526, Nuño de Guzman was appointed governor of Pánuco, an appointment due entirely to the influence of the Velázquez faction, as Guzman had been a warm adherent of the late governor of Cuba. He had reached San Estevan del Puerto on May 20, 1527, and from that time he had steadily attempted to undermine Cortés, although there was no outward appearance of hostility at the beginning; but he was a cruel, unprincipled man, wholly unscrupulous in his methods. Guzman's jurisdiction extended in a broad belt from the coast inward, under the name of Pánuco and Victoria Garayana. It was hoped that this region would prove very rich in gold, and that there the still unfulfilled dreams of marvelous wealth would be realized. The new governor found opportunities in the exercise of his power to injure such adherents of Cortés as had their *repartimientos* in his territories. While the latter was in Honduras, Guzman was especially outrageous in depriving these planters of their land on the most frivolous pretexts, in spite of the efforts of Estrada and Sandoval to prevent him. Thus to the confusion already prevailing, new discord was added.

When the investigation into the administration of Cortés was finally held, nothing important came of it, while his journey to Spain seemed to give him new glory. The Emperor made him Marqués del Valle de Oajaca, besides bestowing other honors, among which was the important and somewhat extensive title of "Captain-General of New Spain, the provinces and coasts of the South Sea, discoverer and colonizer of this coast and islands with the twelfth part of his conquests for himself and his heirs."⁸⁶

Armed with this panoply of imperial confidence in him, Cortés returned to New Spain prepared to continue his explorations on the South Sea and gain fresh reputation. But there was Guzman, equally determined to forestall him if he possibly

⁸⁶ *Cédula de Carlos V nombrando a Hernan Cortés gobernador de las islas y tierras que descubriese en el Mar del Sur*, November 5, 1529 (*Colección de documentos inéditos para la historia de España*, II, 401).

could. He too had been zealous in extending the zone of Spanish domination and in reporting his successes directly to the Emperor. He too had heard tales of gold, jewels, and Amazons, all waiting to be discovered somewhere along the South Sea. In a letter of July 8, 1530, the following passage occurs:

"...The next day I made a procession with a Te Deum. Thence I passed the great River of the Trinitie, to come to Omitlan, the chiefe of that Province. The Countrie is very hot, and the River full of Crocodiles, and there are many venomous Scorpions. Here was erected one Church and two Crosses. Aztatlan is three dayes journey hence, where they prepare to give mee battell. From thence ten dayes further I shall goe to finde the Amazons, which some say dwell in the Sea, some in an arme of the Sea, and that they are rich, and accounted of the people for Goddesses, and whiter than other women. They use Bowes, Arrows, and Targets; have many and great Townes; at a certain time admit them to accompanie them, which bring up the males as these the female issue, &c. From Omitlan a Province of Mecuacan of the greater Spaine, on the eighth of July, 1530.³⁷

The news of Guzman's expedition must have reached Cortés on his arrival from Spain, and the suggestion that this interloper might anticipate him and actually reach that wonderful realm, so long the lodestar to his purposes, was fresh inducement to him to hasten to assert his rights as "Discoverer of the South Sea," and to maintain his privilege. He bore a title and he was determined that none should infringe upon his monopoly. The legal investigation set on foot to determine the rival claims of Cortés, Guzman, and other Spanish officials, throws much light on the way explorations were carried on, and on the stren-

³⁷ *The relation of Nunno di Gusman written to Charles the fifth Emperour; translated out of Ramusios third Tome, and abridged, in Samuel Purchas, Hakluytus Posthumus or Purchas His Pilgrimes, Glasgow, 1906, XVIII, 59-60. Cf. Gio. Battista Ramusio, Terzo volume delle navigationi et viaggi (Venetia, 1565), p. 333. Ramusio (a learned Venetian born 1485, died 1557), in addition to wide reading, gained knowledge by traveling in behalf of Venice and in the service of Louis XII of France. He began to collect material for his *Navigazioni* as early as 1523. Two volumes were published before, and the third just after, his death. The latter contains many important documents relating to the sixteenth century not known in their original languages, from which Ramusio translated them into Italian. Many of these were translated into English by Richard Hakluyt, and a few by Samuel Purchas.*

uous efforts that were made to cast a cloak of equity over the annexation of new domain to Spanish sovereignty.³⁸

There was to be no irregular "squatting," the share of king and explorer was definitely agreed upon, and the encroachments of the latter or his deceptions were guarded against by various precautions. Every expedition was provided with an accredited public notary (*escribano público*) to draw up an act of possession at each landfall, with regulated ceremonies and proper witnesses. All was to pass decently and in order, native rights, however, being ignored.

The first work that Cortés had to take in hand, in preparation for renewing his plans to make good his rights and privileges beyond the coast line of New Spain, was to equip ships for the purpose. The materials gathered before his departure for Spain were of little use. It was necessary to begin *de novo*. And this he did, determined that nothing should hinder him from completing the project. "May the Lord grant that the devil no longer impede this good work," he writes to the Emperor on October 10, 1530, sure in his own mind that his desire "to know the secret of these parts" was the thing pleasing to Heaven.³⁹ The work was pushed on to completion in spite of all difficulties thrown in the way by Guzman and his friends.⁴⁰ But it was, nevertheless, nearly two years before the pious wish of the conqueror was realized and two ships were ready to set off to find rich treasures and extend the power of the Church. On July 30, 1532, the "San Marcos" and the "San Miguel," with Diego Hurtado de Mendoza as commander of the

³⁸ See *Probanza sobre la tierra del Marqués del Valle... é autos entre Nuño de Guzman, Hernando Cortés y otros in Colección de documentos inéditos relativos á... América y Oceanía*, XVI, 5, and *Proceso del Marqués del Valle y Nuño de Guzman*, *ibid.*, XV, 300.

³⁹ "...y por lo que yo conocí del desseo que V. M. tiene de saber el secreto destas partes, y porque el que yo traía de emplear mi persona en este descubrimiento, plega á Dios que no permita que el demonio dé ya mas estorbos en esta obra, sino que se cumpla la voluntad que V. M. tiene de servirle, y que por estas partes se predique su santo Evangelio—Cortés, *Cartas y relaciones* (Pascual de Gayangos, ed., Paris, 1866), p. 506.

⁴⁰ There is conflicting testimony as to the exact details of the fate of the various ships begun, destroyed, and completed by Cortés; see Bancroft, *North Mexican States*, I, 24, 44.

expedition, set sail from Acapulco.⁴¹ Hurtado disappeared into mystery and nothing definite was ever known of his fate, though rumor told various tales. The "San Miguel" was forced to put into a bay where Guzman's men were in control, and where they met with unfriendly treatment that gave rise to fresh rancor between Cortés and his foe. The islands of "La Magdalena," as they named the group later called "Las Marías," were found, but nothing more of note. So far as "California" is concerned, no history was made.

Here was fresh food for complaint about the infamy of Guzman; Cortés did not hesitate to express his indignation, and there were mutual recriminations. But the Marquis was not to be deterred from his purpose. He actually took up his abode near the shipyard at Tehuantepec, in order to supervise the completion of the remaining ships. He writes to Charles V that he is in "esta villa de Tecoantepeque, ques en las costas de la mar del Sur dando prisa al despacho de ciertos navíos que tengo en un puerto della." The letter is dated January 25, 1533.⁴²

At last, the "Concepción" and the "San Lázaro" were put into commission, not indeed by March, as Cortés had hoped, but at the end of the summer. Diego Becerra was appointed commander-in-chief, as well as captain of the "San Lázaro."⁴³ with one Fortún Ximenes as pilot. On October 24, Cortés bade farewell to the vessels, and on the twenty-ninth or thirtieth the two departed on their mission to follow the trail of Hurtado and

⁴¹ See the *Instrucción* given to Hurtado by Cortés, in *Colección de documentos inéditos para la historia de España*, IV, 167; Navarrete, who found the document, wrote an account of the expedition in the *Introducción* to the *Relación del viage hecho por las goletas Sútil y Mexicana en el año de 1792* (Madrid, 1802), pp. xi-xiii; Díaz del Castillo (*Historia verdadera*, II, 412) tells the story with vague memory of the details.

⁴² *Colección de documentos inéditos relativos á... América y Oceanía*, XII, 547; for Guzman's defense, see the *Proceso*, *ibid.*, XV, 341 ff.

⁴³ The official account of the voyage of the *San Lázaro* is given in Buckingham Smith, *Colección de varios documentos para la historia de la Florida y tierras adyacentes* (Londres, 1527), I, 163-172. Navarrete had more material than is accessible at present which he used in his *Introducción* to the *Relación del viage hecho por las goletas Sútil y Mexicana*, p. xvi. The dates given in the various narratives are not the same. In some cases the year is 1534, but 1533 seems more probable.

to bring back news of him and of the new lands. Almost at once, certainly by the second night, the ships parted company. Grijalva sailed on by himself, saw an island which he named "Santo Tomás"—incidentally he also had a good view of a merman whose portrait duly appears in the official record of the voyage—but no notable discovery was made, although it was rumored that, owing to the hope of wonderful finds, Grijalva had purposely lost sight of his consort so as not to have to share hoped-for profits and glory with Becerra, who was the senior officially in command of the expedition.

The "Concepción" met greater success and experienced greater tragedy. Becerra excited hostility among his crew for some reason. Fortún Ximenes, the pilot, a cosmographer of reputation, headed a mutiny and seized the command, after slaying Becerra. Then he sailed on until he touched land and set foot on what was either the soil of Baja California or an island close against the coast. Díaz del Castillo calls it an island to which he gave the name of "Santa Cruz." Ximenes and an escort went ashore, where they were attacked by unfriendly Indians and met their death. Their comrades aboard ship could see enough of what occurred in the encounter between the intruders and the occupants of the peninsula to look to their own safety. They quickly recrossed the gulf to the better known shore of the eastern side, where they met ill treatment of another kind at the hands of their master's vigilant foe, Nuño de Guzman, again ready to check Cortés enterprises, fearing their "pith and moment." The sailors had an opportunity to tell their tale, however, which proved that the adjacent land was inhabited and that the rumor of pearls on its shores was confirmed. Thus, as far as is known, it was Fortún Ximenes, skilled cosmographer and lawless mutineer, who was the first European to set foot on "California." Díaz del Castillo and Guzman both state that Ximenes applied the name of "Santa Cruz" to the island that abounded in pearls.⁴⁴ Against that, we have the words of

⁴⁴ *Proceso*, in *Colección de documentos inéditos relativos á... América y Oceanía*, XV, 346.

Cortés, as will appear later. It is probable that Díaz del Castillo was confused in regard to this point. Lorenzana says that Ximenes reached "the bay of Santa Cruz, or La Paz in Californias, which at that time did not bear the latter name."⁴⁵ In other particulars, Lorenzana follows Díaz del Castillo literally.

The veteran continues his story: The news of the disaster was quickly reported in Mexico, and Cortés was much vexed when he learned it. But as he was a courageous man and his energy was never at rest, he resolved, considering all these failures, to send no more captains but to go himself.

At that moment three ships of fair tonnage were just ready to be launched from the stocks at Tehuantepec. Having received the news that there were pearls at the place where Fortún Ximenes was slain, and having, moreover, always thought of discovering inhabited lands in the South Sea, Cortés was now desirous of going to colonize that coast, as had been agreed upon already with Her Serene Majesty, Doña Isabel of glorious memory, and with the Royal Council of the Indies, while His Majesty was in Flanders. When it was known in New Spain that the Marquis was going in person, it was believed that the enterprise would surely be crowned with success. Soldiers, cavaliers, harquebusiers, archers, and, among others, thirty or forty married men, joined the expedition. All told, they aggregated about 320 persons,⁴⁶ including the legitimate wives. The ships were well provisioned with biscuits, meat, oil, wine, and vinegar, besides other things useful in such cases. Objects for exchange were also taken, besides three blacksmiths with their forges, three carpenters supplied with tools and other things which I do not specify so as not to burden my narrative... As to himself [Cortés], he set out from Mexico, accompanied by Captain Andrés de Tapia and other chiefs and soldiers besides priests and monks to sing mass, and physicians and surgeons equipped with a pharmacy.⁴⁷

The first ship of this well furnished expedition made straight for the "island of Santa Cruz, where the pearls were said to be. They arrived in good time; it was in May 1536 or 1537, I cannot quite remember."⁴⁸

⁴⁵ *Historia de Nueva España, escrita por... Hernán Cortés* (New York, 1828), p. 492; Díaz del Castillo, *Historia verdadera*, II, 414.

⁴⁶ Díaz del Castillo, II, 415.

⁴⁷ Cf. Díaz del Castillo, *The True History*; Maudslay, tr., V, 183-4.

⁴⁸ The date was May, 1535.

Cortés was sufficiently pleased with the appearance of the country to send back for the colonists who were waiting his orders on the mainland under Captain Tapia.

They embarked without delay, but were at once assailed by a tempest and driven into the mouth of a big river which they named San Pedro y San Pablo. Profiting by a return of fine weather, they resumed their course and encountered a new tempest which scattered the three vessels. One arrived at the bay of Santa Cruz where Cortés was. Another ran aground and was stranded on the coast of Jalisco. The soldiers on board her, tired of the voyage and the hardships endured, remained at Jalisco or returned to New Spain. The third ship was driven toward a bay which they called Guayabal because there was all about great abundance of the fruit which they call *guayabas*.⁴⁹

It was the vessel that stayed at Jalisco which carried the bulk of the provisions for which Cortés waited eagerly on the peninsula, and its non-arrival caused extreme misery. There was nothing to eat but wild fruits and fish. "Twenty-three of Cortés' escort perished of hunger, while many more were ill and cursed him, his port, and his discovery."

Seeing this, he resolved to go in person on the ship which had rejoined him, with fifty soldiers, carpenters, two blacksmiths and three calkers, to look out for the other two ships, thinking that the bad weather might also have injured them in some way. He discovered one stranded on the Jalisco coast without a soldier aboard. The second was not far away. By dint of force and exertion he succeeded in floating them, and... finally was able to return to Santa Cruz with the three. The soldiers waiting there were extremely weakened from having had no solid food for days, and then they ate meat in such excess that they contracted disease of which many died. It was in order to save himself the sight of so much misery that Cortés departed for the discovery of other countries and fell upon California, which is a bay.⁵⁰

Cortés then wanted to return to New Spain, but tried to hold out longer because he regretted so much money spent without more return. The Marquise, his wife, began to be seriously alarmed about his safety, and despatched two more vessels to his aid. When Cortés read her letters filled with

⁴⁹ Díaz del Castillo, *Historia verdadera*, II, 416.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, II, 418.

entreaties to come back to Mexico and assume his land and his estate there, he yielded, deputed Ulloa, the commander of the little expedition sent by his wife, to take charge of the colonists left on the peninsula, and returned to Mexico, where he was received with great rejoicing by his friends, who had feared a general revolt among the caciques during his absence.

"For the rest, the soldiers and captains whom he had left on the island and in the Gulf of California effected their return; but I could not say whether they came on their own initiative or if the viceroy and the royal audiencia intervened to give them authorization."⁵¹

Then Díaz del Castillo gives a brief account of the next expedition despatched by Cortés under this same Francisco de Ulloa. This enterprise was by

the express order of the royal audiencia of Mexico, in furtherance of the promise made by Cortés to His Majesty, as I have related in the preceding chapters. However that may be, they departed from the port of La Navidad in June of the year 153-, I can no longer recall the exact year. Cortés ordered the captain to sail down the length of California, searching for Captain Diego Hurtado, who had never reappeared. In going and coming he spent seven months in his voyage, without accomplishing anything worthy of record, as far as I know, and he returned to the port of Jalisco. Just a few days after Ulloa landed, when he was taking a little repose, a soldier who had accompanied him on the voyage laid in wait for him and killed him, and that is the end of all the voyages and discoveries that the Marquis undertook.⁵²

In his narrative, our old veteran uses the word "California" three times. First: "It was in order to save himself the sight of so much misery that Cortés departed for the discovery of other countries and fell upon California which is a bay"; second: "...all the soldiers and captains whom he had left in those isles or bay which they called La California"; third, this time in the story of Ulloa: "Cortés ordered the captain to skirt the whole extent of the coast and to sail around La California,

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, II, 418.

⁵² *Ibid.*, II, 418.

and to endeavor to search for Captain Diego Hurtado who nevermore appeared."⁵³

Before Díaz del Castillo wrote down this narrative, "veracious" to the best of his ability, in regard to the discoveries and mishaps of Cortés, Gómara had printed his *Historia de Mexico*. He too introduces "California" in the story of Ulloa, in two passages: "Del Guayaual atrauessaron á la California en busca de un nauio," etc., and "Del ancon de Santandres siguiendo la otra costa, llegaron a la California."⁵⁴ In describing the arrival of Cortés at the place where Ximenes was slain, Gómara says it was "called the bay of Santa Cruz."⁵⁵ Herrera, writing much later, says that the place where the colony was to be was "Santa Cruz," but in a later chapter about the Chichimecas, under the year 1550, this phrase appears: "la California adonde llego el primer Marques del Valle que le puso este nombre."⁵⁶

The usage of the reminiscent Díaz del Castillo (1568), of the official Gómara (1554), and of the historian Herrera (1601) is mentioned before consideration of documentary evidence upon the name of California because they were cited as the first authorities in the original discussion, and because the differences in the way in which these same historians and the conqueror himself refer to the peninsula are part of the story in hand. Certain definite words of the discoverer and his people are preserved to us. First, we have the formal "Act of Possession" recording the assertion of Spanish sovereignty over the newly discovered land. It is a duly attested affidavit, and states that Cortés landed "in a port or bay, and . . . taking possession in the name of His Majesty by virtue of the said provisions . . . gave as name to the said port and bay the port and bay of Santa Cruz." Martín de Castro, notary of the expedition, drew up the document with all legal formality, and the same was wit-

⁵³ Díaz del Castillo, *Historia verdadera*, II, 417-418.

⁵⁴ Francisco Lopez de Gómara, *Historia de Mexico* (Anvers, 1554), p. 292.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 289.

⁵⁶ Antonio Herrera, *Historia general* [Madrid], 1601-15, decada VIII, libro VI, p. 178.

nessed by Dr. Valdobiese, *alcalde mayor*, Juan de Gaso, Alonzo de Navarrete, Bernardino del Castillo, Fernan Darias de Saavedra, Francisco de Ulloa, and many others of the *armada* and the army.⁵⁷ The date was May 3, 1535. A little sketch map of the point of land and the *baya o puerto* accompanied the copy of the *Auto de posesión* which was sent to Spain,⁵⁸ so that we have the first outline of the coast of Baja California as it was conceived by the pilot of Cortés.

But this deed or act is not all. The very words of the conqueror written on the peninsula itself a few days after his arrival there are preserved. His letter is addressed to Cristóbal de Oñate at the city of Compostela, and runs as follows:

Noble Sir: On account of the haste of my departure, I did not write to you from the port of Spiritu Santo, and now there is nothing more to tell you than that I arrived at this port and bay of Santa Cruz on the day of Santa Cruz de Mayo, for which reason I gave it this name. I sighted land on the first of May, the feast of the two apostles, and because the point we sighted was among the highest mountains of this country, I gave them the name of Sierras de San Felipe. This same day we discovered an island lying near this land, which was named the island of Santiago. Immediately afterwards, we saw two others, one is called the island of San Miguel, and the other San Cristoval. I was delayed sixteen days on the voyage because of many calms and the bad weather I experienced. Of all my outfit six horses are missing, among which was the one named El Hoverico, which I consider a great loss. All the other horses and all the men arrived in good condition. [He adds that he cannot yet tell anything about the lay and nature of the land, but that they had seen many people, some of whom had quantities of pearls, proving that there is a pearl fishery; that he will go into the interior of the country when these two ships depart. He charges him (Don Cristóbal) to give his compliments to the governor and the protector, and to forward some letters, which he had addressed to the *licenciado* Altamirano, cousin of the Marquis.]

From the port and bay of Santa Cruz, May 14, 1535. Yours to command, the Marquis.⁵⁹

⁵⁷ *Colección de documentos inéditos para la historia de España*, IV, 190-192.

⁵⁸ Dr. E. E. Hale was the first to find this rare little map, in 1882; he furnished Mr. Justin Winsor with the sketch given in his *Narrative and Critical History of America* (Boston, 1886-89), II, 442. We have now a better facsimile.

⁵⁹ Extract, in the hand of Don Juan Bautista Muñoz, volume 80 of his collection, folio 137, Academia de la Historia; in Congreso Internacional de Americanistas, *Actas de la Cuarta Reunion*, Madrid, 1881 (Madrid, 1883), II, 332-3.

Here are phrases that prove unequivocally that Cortés named the land across the gulf "Santa Cruz," for the very natural reason that the day when he took formal possession of it in the name of his sovereign chanced to be the church festival of the Holy Cross. That was very usual procedure. He certainly knew nothing of "California" in that connection. In a memorial of some five years later, presented to the king, he says distinctly that because his lieutenant Hurtado had met with misfortune, he had gone in person to pursue the said conquest, and had reached the land of Santa Cruz and was in it. He repeats the name several times.⁶⁰

Still it is rather curious that this name does not seem to have made as much impression on all members of the conqueror's company, limited as its number must have been, as might be expected. In the same year, 1535, there was a hearing before Juan de Samaniego, *alcalde ordinario* of the city of Compostela in Galicia, concerning conditions in the lands of the new discoveries. One witness was asked the name of the place where the Marquis had been. He answered that no name was given to the land, nor was any city founded; that the port was called the bay of Santa Cruz. Another fragment of the testimony is noteworthy. It was given on December 10, 1535, while Cortés was still on the peninsula.⁶¹ The witness had seen too much of the hard side of the colonizing scheme to be favorably disposed toward Cortés.

Being sworn, he said that he had known Cortés about five years. Asked the name of the place where the Marquis was, he said that it was called Tarsis;⁶² that in that country there was nothing to eat, neither corn nor any other grain, only some peach-like fruit found on thorny trees, and certain pods of plants similar to lentils; the latter are hulled, ground, and eaten, but all that a person can gather in a day is not enough to feed him,

⁶⁰ *Colección de documentos inéditos para la historia de España*, IV, 210-211.

⁶¹ The testimony taken in Mexico in 1535 was examined in Spain in 1540. *Probanza sobre la tierra del marques del Valle*, in *Colección de documentos inéditos relativos á . . . América y Oceanía*, XVI, 5 ff.

⁶² Is there a possible link between "Tarsis" and the river of "St. Paul?"

because so little is got out of them; and he said that the trees there were the above-mentioned, from which they gather fruit, and others that bear something like plums; and that there are other, non-producing trees, but very few; the latter had been nearly all cut down; in that country they found a stream with a little water, and they gathered at some pools where they drank; there was no grass for the horses, because the ground was very dry and sandy.

Asked how many Indians were found and seen, he said: that some said there were one hundred and fifty; others, two hundred; those that he himself had seen might have been seventy or eighty; they were well disposed, and went about naked; the women wear petticoats of grass, and, so far as he saw, they ate and lived upon roots, herbs, and fish.

Asked when the Marquis embarked how many horsemen he took, he said: that they shipped about one hundred cavalry and a hundred infantry, more or less; of negroes, upwards of sixty; of friends and free Indians, a hundred or more.

Asked how many persons died after the arrival of the Marquis in the said country, Spaniards as well as blacks and others, he said: that two Spaniards died of hunger; of the negroes and Indians he does not know how many, but it was said that a great many died; other people who remained with the Marquis were very weak and debilitated when the witness left the country; this witness believes that more than half of them are dead, unless they have been rescued.⁶³

About the time of the failure of the scheme to colonize the peninsula—its insular character still more than believed in—something happened to give fresh impetus to the explorers' zeal.

In the month of May, 1536, four weary, footsore travelers arrived in the province of Culiacán. They were Alvar Nuñez Cabeza de Vaca, Andrés Dorantes, Alonzo del Castillo Maldonado, and Estevanico, an Arabian negro slave. It was a strange tale of wanderings and of hardship that they had to tell the first fellow-countrymen whom they had spoken with in nine long years. In 1527, they had set out from Florida in the company of Panfilo de Narváez; they, the surviving remnant of that large party, had tracked through the wilderness, unknown to white men, spending the entire nine years in making their way from the one Spanish settlement to that of New Spain—a terrible journey, indeed. Virgin soil and forest land seemed to be all they had actually seen, but they had heard from

⁶³ *Op. cit.*, XVI, 12-13.

Indians stories of wealth and civilizations, rude, perhaps, but rich, to the northward of their line of march, rumors of the Seven Cities and accumulated wealth—the kind that the Spaniards longed to find waiting for them in this New World.⁶⁴

Guzman was the first Spanish official to see these newcomers. He received them more kindly than he had the survivors from Cortés' little fleet, and speeded them on their way to the capital, where they made their report to the new viceroy, Antonio de Mendoza, as well as to the Marqués del Valle.

By this time Guzman's career was nearly run and he was no longer in a position to be a formidable rival to Cortés or to hamper his projects, but this did not leave the Marquis free to pursue his course unchecked. The new viceroy considered that his commission included capacity to explore as well as to perform other service for his royal master, in spite of the express permission granted to Cortés to enjoy a monopoly of the South Sea. Accordingly, Mendoza empowered Coronado, the recently appointed governor of Nueva Galicia, to organize fresh expeditions, using the information given him by these overland travelers. The first preparations came to nothing, but at last, in May, 1539, a small party of Franciscans and freedmen, guided by Estevanico, the negro of Cabeza de Vaca's party, set off and penetrated far into the interior, the territory of the present New Mexico. Marcos de Niza, one of the Franciscans, wrote a glowing account of what he claimed to have seen and to have heard from trustworthy witnesses. He did not tell rumors. His story bore the air of real testimony. There were, indeed, seven cities, there in the north. All that there was for the Spaniards to do was to carry Christian doctrines thither and impose them on the not reluctant Indians, quite ready to swear fealty to the Emperor and to give their best as tribute. It was to be an easy conquest! Few documents have given rise to as much

⁶⁴ *Relation et naufrages d'Alvar Nuñez Cabeça de Vaca*, in Ternaux-Compans, *Voyages, relations et mémoires originaux*, Serie I, Tome VII, Paris, 1837. *The journey of Alvar Nuñez Cabeza de Vaca*; translated by Fanny Bandelier, New York, 1905. See Bancroft, *North American States*, I, 62, for other references to Alvar Nuñez' journey.

controversy as has this narrative of Friar Marcos. Coronado hastened to report the whole matter from the beginning to Mendoza, and the viceroy wrote posthaste to the Emperor "because their journey fell out to greater purpose than was looked for."⁶⁵

The moot point has been: Did the friar simply fabricate his descriptions of people who wore precious stones as ordinary ornaments and covered their temples and even household utensils with plates of pure gold? Perhaps Marcos was deceived by words only half understood, meaning to him what the Indians had no idea of saying. However that may be, his narrative was taken at its face value, without discount for uncertainty. The desire to hasten up to the Seven Cities, so long elusive, spread like wildfire through New Spain. The effect of Niza's descriptions, not their truth, concerns the present inquiry.

The story as told by Marcos de Niza himself has no direct bearing on the name of the peninsula, but the English version of Ramusio's Italian translation of the undiscovered Spanish original has suggestive side notes. The friar says:

I saw nothing worthy the noting, save that there came to seeke me certaine Indians from the Island, where Fernando Cortéz the Marques of the valley had bin, of whom I was informed, that it was an Island, & not firme land, as some suppose it to be. They came to ye firme land upon certaine rafts of wood; and from the maine to the island is but halfe a league by sea, little more or lesse. Likewise certaine Indians of another island greater then this came to visit me, which island is farther off, of which I was informed that there were 30 other small islands, which were inhabited but had smal store of victuals, saving 2, which have Maiz or corne of the country. These Indians had about their necks many great shels which were mother of Pearle; I showed them perles which I carryed with me for a shew, and they told me that there were in the Islands great store of them, and those very great; howbeit I saw none of them.⁶⁶

⁶⁵ Ramusio, *Terzo volume delle navigationi et viaggi*, pp. 356-59; Hakluyt, *The third and last volume of the voyages* (London, 1600), pp. 366-373.

Richard Hakluyt, preacher (b. 1553, d. 1616), was inspired with the same idea as Ramusio. His third volume is devoted to the "fourth part of the world." He does not hesitate to make free use of what the Venetian gathered together, which he translated with fair accuracy, but with the differences noted in the text.

⁶⁶ Hakluyt, III, 366.

In this translation, the English follows the Italian closely, but Hakluyt adds an original side note: "A great island and 30 small islands which seem to be the new islands of California, rich in pearles." Two more side notes are the Englishman's invention also: "Vacopa, a town 40 leagues from the Bay of California," and "Great pearles and much gold in the isles of California, which are 34 in number." This last refers to the following passage:

[I waited] the return of my messengers which I had sent unto the Sea, which returned unto me upon Easter day bringing with them certaine inhabitants of the Sea-coast, and of two of the Islands. . . . They informed me of foure and thirty Islandes, lying one neere unto another.⁶⁷

Bitter recriminations between explorers and accusations of using each other's material and information are not characteristics of latter-day adventurers alone. Cortés declared that the friar had gathered suggestions from him which he gave back to the public as his own experiences. The Marquis had thought of attaching Marcos de Niza to his service, and, in preliminary negotiations, had mentioned certain pieces of intelligence that he or his people had picked up from the Indians at various times. Later, the friar incorporated this same matter into his reports as though it were original. The Marquis also accused the friar of having committed acts of treachery in other parts of the Spanish colonies and of being a discredited and unreliable person.⁶⁸

But the Marquis had not waited to see what Mendoza's people would accomplish. His great desire was not only to learn "the secret of the Gulf," but to accomplish this *before* the viceroy, and to make good his vested rights. Almost contemporaneously with this northward march of Marcos de Niza, Cortés' preparations were completed for another attempt to find out all there was to know about that sheet of water and its shores. Francisco de Ulloa commanded the last voyage of exploration that Hernán Cortés had in his power to put into commission.

⁶⁷ Cf. Ramusio, III, 356.

⁶⁸ *Memorial que dió al Rey el Marqués del Valle, in Colección de documentos inéditos para la historia de España*, IV, 212.

Friar Marcos departed from the town of San Miguel in the province of Culiacán on Friday, March 7, 1539, while Ulloa's little fleet of three vessels, the "Santa Agueda," the "Trinidad," and the "Santo Tomás," set sail from Acapulco on July 8 of the same year. They were gone seven months, and Díaz del Castillo declared that there was nothing to show for the voyage. But that is not true. The peninsula was rounded for the first time, and the record of the voyage was written down by two participants in the venture—Francisco Preciado and Pedro de Palencia. The last-named was a notary public, especially appointed to safeguard Cortés' interests by making affidavits of all discoveries and drawing up legal certificates (*autos de posesión*), to show to the world whose claim was staked, and to whom the newly endowed owner owed thanks for the extension of his territory. The report made by this Pedro de Palencia was addressed to the Marqués del Valle, by order of Francisco de Ulloa, and duly delivered to an official of Cortés, while that same captain was still at sea. A certified copy of the document with its appendices was made in the City of Mexico by another notary, Alonzo Díaz de Gibráleon, on May 29, 1540.

The great interest of this authenticated record of Ulloa's voyage lies in the fact that, prior to its discovery at Seville within the last five years, the sole authority was the account given in Italian by Ramusio, translated into English with some slight modifications, by Hakluyt.⁶⁹

Ramusio put into his own tongue the narrative made from the notes or journals brought by Preciado: "This relation was

⁶⁹ The Palencia document is in the archives at Seville, where, apparently, it had escaped notice until it was copied for Mr. Irving Berdine Richman among material collected for his *California under Spain and Mexico* (q. v., p. 365). It has not been printed (1917), and all previous writers on the discovery of the peninsula say with Dr. Davidson, "There is no early Spanish publication or record of his [Ulloa's] discoveries. The Italian account, etc." There are ninety-one foolscap pages in the transcript, which Mr. Richman has most kindly permitted me to use. The caption is as follows: *Testimonio donde se expresan los descubrimientos que hizo el Capitan Francisco de Ulloa, por orden de Hernan Cortes en la costa Norte de Nueva España, con una relación de su viaje desde Acapulco hasta la Isla de los Cedros, Méjico, 29 de Mayo, 1540, A. G. de I., Estante 1, Cajón 1, Legajo 1.*

taken out of that which Francis Preciado brought with him," as Hakluyt puts it in his easy phrasing of the original Italian.⁷⁰ The Spanish original of Preciado's narrative is still missing. But we now have a satisfactory substitute for it in this authoritative Spanish original of the official report, written by a notary, duly attested by a second notary, and placed in the hands of Cortés at the request of Ulloa, he not daring to carry the precious document further when he sailed on beyond the island of Cedros. The writer is very conscious that he is trained in law and not in nautical terms, and he calls attention to the "little drawing or chart" accompanying his text, as possibly more correct than the latter. The scrupulous notary's words are (referring to his own account as compared with that of the pilot):

This narrative should conform to that [latitude, etc.] taken by this latter, because I consider him a man who knows his business well, especially in all that relates to the latitudes, and besides this, he carries his astrolabe and other things in good condition, and at any point where he [has them] not he has those of Juan de Castellon, and for this reason I have followed his [account], and there are seven affidavits in this narrative of the possessions taken for your lordship in the lands by which we passed, &c.

He describes his record as a

memorandum in regard to the voyage and discovery made in the name of our Lord from the time Your Lordship's armada left the port of Acapulco when it went on the said discovery the eighth of July 1539 until it reached the island of Cedars, and returned Monday the fifth of April, 1540. In the first place we sailed from the port of Acapulco on the eighth day of the month of July with the ships (may our Lord preserve them), one named the "Santagueda," another the "Trinidad," and another the "Santo Tomás," and in good weather although with recent heavy rainstorms, and the winds were so frequent and high that they gave us some trouble; and sailing along the coast and arriving in the neighborhood of Point Motinuio Wednesday the tenth... of the said month and going on with a light wind...⁷¹

⁷⁰ Ramusio, III, 339-354; Hakluyt, III, 397-424.

⁷¹ *Memoria en relacion del viaje y descubrimiento que en nombre de nuestro señor se a hecho despues que salio esta armada de vuestra señoría del puerto de acapulco que fue al dicho descubrimiento ocho de julio del año de mill e quinientos é treinta é nueve años hasta esta ysla de los cedros á donde quedo y lunes cinco de abril de mill é quinientos é quarenta.*

The status of Pedro de Palencia on the fleet is perfectly clear, while that of his fellow-recounters is not so certain. The assumption that Francisco Preciado was one of the chaplains is weakened by the fact that he was in the thick of the fight more than once. But he might have been a militant brother. He refers to himself in the third person, which is also rather strange. His story runs along with that of Palencia *pari passu*, and it is evident that he, too, is not nautical. Nor does he use legal phraseology. He refers to taking possession of the soil in general terms. His narrative is just such as a traveled clerical person might write. In all essentials, the accounts agree. Pedro de Palencia seems to have been, usually, on board the "Trinidad," while Preciado was on the "Santa Agueda." But Ulloa was in the habit of shifting his quarters, and the notary might have done so too.

... And the Captaine made no great reckoning to approach neere unto them nor to seeke nor serch what the matter was, and perchance because he was not then in the "Santa Agueda," but was aboard the "Trinitie," as his manner was to come and stay there two or three dayes, as well to passe the time, as to give orders for things that were needefull.⁷²

On one occasion, when the "Santo Tomás" met difficulties, Palencia mentions telling the sailors that they could save themselves by working hard and not giving way to their fears. He continues (MS, p. 7):

I having said this to them, they followed their course by the route I had told them and I stayed to wait for the "Santa Agueda," which was coming after, in order to talk with her and tell her what she must do if we followed the other ship, to which I could not speak because Castellon, who was piloting her, tried to keep her away constantly so that I could not speak her.

The "Santo Tomás" was lost, and this led the other ships to cross over to the port of Santa Cruz.

After a stay in that harbor, the two remaining vessels recrossed the Gulf and pursued their course up the coast of the mainland almost to the head of the Gulf, and down along the

⁷² Hakluyt, III, 415.

eastern coast of the peninsula. Seven affidavits are duly taken in the presence of witnesses to show that the land is henceforth within the realm of the Spanish sovereign, and that this extension of his domain is entirely due to the efforts of Hernán Cortés. One affidavit is as follows:

I, Pedro de Palencia, notary public of this armada, attest and bear true witness to all gentlemen by whom these presents may be seen, (whom God our Lord bless and keep from harm), that on the tenth day of the month of September, 1539, the most distinguished gentleman Francisco de Ulloa, lieutenant-governor and captain of this armada for the most illustrious gentleman the Marqués del Valle de Oaxaca, arrived on the river San Pedro y San Pablo which is in latitude twenty-six and a half degrees on the coast of this New Spain towards the north of Culiacán, and asked me the said notary to take his deposition which he then made of his discovery with the said armada from the cape of San Pedro, for the most illustrious gentleman the Marqués del Valle in the name of the imperial king our master and king of Castile, the witnesses present being the reverend father of the order of St. Francis, Fr. Pedro de Aroche, Francisco Preciado, Pedro de Busto and Martín de Espinosa, they being in the said armada; dated the year, month, and day aforesaid; and I Pedro de Palencia, notary public of this armada wrote it according to what passed before me, and in conclusion placed here this my seal in witness of the truth.

PEDRO DE PALENCIA, *notary public*,
MARTÍN DE ESPINOSA,
FRANCISCO PRECIADO.

This point at the mouth of the river San Pedro y San Pablo was about the limit of the land "annexed" by Cortés, and the declaration made there is not a regular *auto de posesión*. Sixty-two leagues farther on, the explorer found a secure shelter. "On account of these harbors we called this port the Puerto de Puertos, and the bay in which it lies the Bahía de la Posesión, because it was the first taken for your lordship on this voyage of discovery."

Five more *autos* are made and duly registered as the voyage proceeds, Francisco Preciado often being one of the legal witnesses. The little vessels skirt the eastern coast of the peninsula on their downward course from the head of the Gulf; they round its point, and sail out into the South Sea and up the western

coast as far as the island of Cedros. For a long time they stayed in that region, constantly baffled by contrary winds. Then Ulloa desired to go on in the better vessel, the "Trinidad," and to send the "Santa Agueda" back to New Spain. He was anxious that Cortés should learn of their success as far as they had gone. Both Preciado and the notary return, the pilot Juan Castillo acting as sailing master. Preciado went ashore at Santiago, the ship went on to Acapulco, and Preciado, when he wrote on May 17, had heard nothing more of her.⁷³

The notary probably lost no time in delivering his report into the hands of an official who took further steps to have it authenticated. Cortés' majordomo, Francisco Sánchez de Toledo, carried the document, together with the seven affidavits, and had the precious papers endorsed by another notary, Alonzo Díaz de Gibráleon, in the City of Mexico. The Marquis himself had not waited to learn the outcome of the voyage. He became convinced that his foes were too strong for him to obtain justice, and started on his last journey to Spain early in 1540.⁷⁴

From this report, a clear story of the venture appears, which is, moreover, supported by that preserved in the Italian. Most of the places can be identified. But here it is not so much the *facts* as the names used by the recounters of those facts which are to be looked at. In the Spanish report there is no suggestion of the word "California" (1540). In Ramusio (between 1550 and 1556) the word occurs three times: "Quivi ci ritrovāmo cinquanta quattro leghe lontani dalla California" (p. 343); "In Tanto vène l'Interprete Chichimecho dell' Isola California" (p. 347); "Il capitano comādò che l'Indiano nostro Chichimecho gli parlasse, ma, mai l'intefero, in modo che tenemo al fermo che no intendesse il linguaggio dell' Isola California" (p. 347).

The first of these phrases finds its equivalent on the right day in the Spanish record, although the number of leagues given

⁷³ Hakluyt, III, 424.

⁷⁴ The date of his departure from Mexico is not certain, but a letter by him to Oviedo written at Havana, is dated February 5. See Winship, *The Coronado Expedition*, Fourteenth Annual Report of the American Bureau of Ethnology, Washington, 1892-3, Part I, p. 369.

is indefinite, and the place named is *Santa X*. Moreover the interpreter himself comes from there; so that here is an example of the direct application of "California" to *Santa Cruz*. It has been argued that it was impossible to make this "California" of the interpreter apply to the peninsula, since Indians a little to the north on that same tongue of land could not understand the man's speech. But the state of civilization was so low that the language varied every few miles. Alarcón speaks of twenty-three different tongues being spoken on the Colorado River, and repeatedly mentions cases when his interpreter does not understand other Indians.

Hakluyt was less conscientious, perhaps, than Ramusio. It is just in connection with the name that he takes liberties. He writes about half a century later, his third volume bearing the date 1600. A few examples will show his usage:

Questa fortuna ci fece perder
la nave di San Tomaso & per
haverla smarrita arrivammo al
porto di Santa Croce.

Ramusio, III, 339.

...onde furono tra noi' vari
giudicij & pareri, che questo porto
fusse terra ferma, & che si venisse
a congiunger con la terra ferma
che tenevamo per larghezza della
Nuova Spagna.

Ramusio, III, 340.

Queste pioggie ci colsero tra
l'Isola di Santo Iacomo & san
Felippe & l'Isola delle perle all'
incontro della terra ferma.

Ramusio, III, 343.

In this storm wee lost the pin-
nesse called Sant Thomas, and be-
cause wee had lost her wee crossed
over to the port of Santa Cruz in
California.

Hakluyt, III, 398.

Whereupon wee began to be of
divers opinions, some thinking that
this coast of Santa Cruz was a
firme land & that it ioyned with
the continent of New Spaine.

(Side-note in Hakluyt: "Some
take the land of California to be
nothing but Islands.")

Hakluyt, III, 339.

These storms tooke us betweene
the Isles of Saint Iago and Saint
Philip and the Isle called Isla de
perlas, lying over against the point
of California supposed to be firme
land.

Hakluyt, III, 405.

Chapter heading:

Delle balene che navigando re-
trovano. Ramusio, III, 353.

Of the multitude of whales
they found about the point of
California. Hakluyt, III, 423.

There are several other instances where "California" occurs in Hakluyt's side-notes, where his text still follows the original, as on pages 411, 424, 425. The side-note on page 424 couples Santa Cruz with the other term: "They sail from the Isle of Cedars to the point of Santa Cruz or California in five daies."

That is, the Englishman, conscious that he knew more than the Italian editor, had no hesitation in applying a name that had become current by the end of the sixteenth century—so well known that it did not even need explanation.

Whether Ramusio took similar liberties in his translation from Spanish into Italian cannot be stated with absolute certainty, because the original of the phrases he translated is not accessible; but it is perfectly evident that the official scribe of the expedition, Pedro de Palencia, never employed the word, that Cortés himself distinctly asserted that Santa Cruz was the name of the land he proposed to colonize, and that his people either used that same term or declared that they did not know that there was any name for it (though one witness had heard of "Tarsis"); hence the inference seems justified that Ramusio, by the mid-century, had heard of "California" from other sources and made use of it, just as Hakluyt added his casual knowledge to his versions.

Who, then, did put "California" on the map? The rest of the story is conjecture.

Cortés did not await the return of his ships. Mendoza was preparing to put two more Richmonds in the field to capture the wealth that Marcos de Niza had pictured in alluring hues; volunteers flocked to his colors, anxious to share in the plunder of the Seven Cities, and Cortés grew uneasy lest the viceroy might snatch the laurels that belonged rightfully to the "Discoverer of the South Sea." He decided to hasten again to Spain to make his representations. The seven years of life that remained to him were consumed in tireless effort to secure the fruits of his early successes. They were miserable years, but Cortés was not alone in his misery. It seemed the final reward of every explorer in the service of Spain.

Very close on the trail of Ulloa's report of what had been seen on the voyage was the report of the maritime division of Mendoza's more pretentious expedition. Francisco Vázquez de Coronado was put in command of land forces, while Ferdinand Alarcón with two ships sailed up the gulf. Coronado set off on April 22 from Culiacán, and Alarcón—the port of sally is not mentioned—on Sunday, May 9, 1540.⁷⁵

They never joined forces, though Alarcón heard of the army from time to time, and found some messages buried near trees. Alarcón's report is given in the first person, and he is very sure that his ships discovered "very good havens" which the ships "whereof Captaine Francis de Ulloa was Generall for the Marquis de Valle neither saw nor found." His chief pilot was Domingo del Castillo, whose map, compiled from his own data and from what he must have obtained from one of Ulloa's pilots, is the first to show the whole outline of the peninsula.

The name California appears plainly, but the lettering is not that of the map-maker, and was probably added by Lorenzana in 1771. Alarcón's main exploit was to sail up the Colorado. He has much to say of the Indians, relating quite frankly that he told them he was the offspring of the sun. Possibly that was the reason that the viceroy was not wholly pleased with him—Mendoza may have thought that his lieutenant took too much upon himself.⁷⁶

He, too, hastens to turn in his report. There was so much jealousy and suspicion between all these seekers after truth that every one wished to have his record plain. There is one document relating to Alarcón which is a trifle mystifying. It is entitled: "Instruction for Captain Hernando Alarcón on the expedition to California that he is to undertake by order of the viceroy Don Antonio de Mendoza." It is dated, however, 1541,

⁷⁵ See the letter of Cortés to the Emperor, Madrid, June 26, 1540, in *Documentos inéditos para la historia de España*, CIV, 491-492, for his characterization of the activities of Mendoza.

⁷⁶ *Relatione della navigatione & scoperta che fece il Capitano Fernando Alarchone*, Ramusio, III, 363-370: *The relation of the navigation and discovery which Captaine Fernando Alarchon made*, Hakluyt, III, 425-439.

and must refer to a second projected voyage of Alarcón. Here, too, "California" is not to be relied on as of contemporaneous date with the text. The endorsement may be late, and it is in the endorsement alone that the name occurs.⁷⁷

The *Relation*, as we have it in Ramusio's Italian and in Hakluyt's English text, contains no mention of "California." The Englishman, however, does as he did with Ulloa's story—puts into side-notes his own later information, "These shoalds are at the bottome of mar Vermejo, or the bay of California," and "The bottome of the Bay of California." Here he anticipates even more than in the Ulloa story, for he carries "California" out into the gulf, where the word contended with others intermittently, until, at last, *Vermejo*, *Vermilion*, *Cortés*, *Caroline*, all yielded their claims and the sheet of water came into its own as the "Gulf of California."

Now, although the word "California" does not appear in Alarcón's story, it does not require a mighty leap of the imagination to infer, by circumstantial evidence, that it might have been tossed over to the peninsula from his fleet, not because the land as seen at the head of the gulf, or as its reputation described it, bore a likeness to the opulent realm of Calafia, but because it was so unattractive and poor, when Cortés had hoped for so much.

Alarcón prides himself on penetrating farther into the "secrets of the Gulf" than the envoy of Cortés had done. On becoming assured that only barren land lay where his lord's rival had hoped to found rich settlements, he or some one of his followers might have said: "There is the wonderful island the Marquis sought—there is the romancer's California," yet they did not follow its shore, but sailed down the eastern coast of the Gulf, along the land that was later to be known as Sonora.

With the thought of how the word *might* have been said,

⁷⁷ Instrucción que debía observar el capitán Hernando de Alarcon en la expedición á la California que iba á emprender de order del virey D. Antonio de Mendoza, in *Colleción de varios documentos para la historia de la Florida*, pp. 1-6.

one can almost hear the sneer at the end of the *ia*. Sneers in regard to previous explorations are repeatedly intimated. Alarcón mentions in regard to the latitude at the mouth of the Colorado: "I finde that that which the Masters and Pilots of the Marquis tooke is false." And there are other passages where he exploits his own achievements in comparison with those of Ulloa. He, too, brought back many "actes of taking possession of all that Coast." No credit was to be lost that Mendoza could possibly claim.

The land expedition went farther and fared worse. It was not until March, 1542, that the leader, as disappointed as his predecessors, returned to Mexico. "Francis Vázquez fell from his horse in Tiguex, and with the fall fell out of his wits and became madde," is the last news we have of him in the Hakluyt version of the story. There are other reports that make his end less sad. The best story of the events is related by Pedro de Castañeda de Nacera, who was a participant in the expedition.⁷⁸ But he did not write down the *Relación* until twenty years later, so that the fact that he refers to "California" in his text has no contemporary value.⁷⁹

Like Cortés, the viceroy was greatly out of pocket by these expensive and fruitless efforts to track the vast stores of wealth, but he was not ready to relinquish the chase. On June 27, 1542, Juan Rodríguez Cabrillo sailed from the port of Navidad in two ships. Juan Paez wrote the journal of that voyage into the Pacific, up the west coast of the peninsula as far as Santa Barbara, where Cabrillo died. The enterprise was continued under the direction of the *piloto mayor*, Bartolomé Ferrelo, as far as latitude 42°.

The coast of the state of California thus was seen for the first time. But Cabrillo, like so many of his fellow discoverers, did not return to reap honors. The interest in the story, here, lies in

⁷⁸ See Hakluyt, III, 373-382, *The relation of Francis Vazquez de Coronado*.

⁷⁹ *Relacion de la Jornada de Cibola compuesta por Pedro de Castañeda de Nacera* (Winship, *The Coronado Expedition*, Fourteenth Annual Report of the Bureau of Ethnology), Part I, p. 448.

the fact that the word "California" occurs three times in the journal of the voyage, its first appearance in a Spanish document, so far as has been discovered: "Sunday, July 2, we came in sight of California"; "...the point of California"; "...from California."⁸⁰

Thus, in the year 1542, the word, applied to the land, whether rated as *island* or *main*, finds place in the text of a Spanish record, and twenty years later it was put on the map of Diego Guterrez.⁸¹ The point to be noted in its use by Juan Paez is that he mentions it casually as a name well understood. And that is another reason for thinking that its application might have been made during the voyage of Alarcón, the last to see the land before Cabrillo, whose record shows its name in the very first days of the voyage.

Whether "California" were applied to the peninsula in jest or in earnest, because the island of Calafia was taken as synonymous with an Amazon realm, it is interesting that in the very year in which Ulloa rounded the point and entered the Pacific in his search, Francisco de Orellana, one of the comrades of the Pizarros in Peru, sailed down the mighty river of South America, and left on its waters a permanent memento of the deep-seated belief in a woman's sovereignty. The name Amazon was, however, apparently given to the river in all seriousness, when it was assumed that these strange folk inhabited the region. Other names, fitfully bestowed on the great stream, Marañón, Orellana, gave way finally to Amazon.

When Ulrich Schmidt—Hulderike Schnirdel as the Englishman records his name—ascends the river a few years later, there was the same old story waiting for him. Merely a slightly different twist is given to the version that Columbus thought he

⁸⁰ *Relación, o diario, de la navegacion que hizo Juan Rodriguez Cabrillo, in Colección de varios documentos para la historia de la Florida, 173-189. Relación del descubrimiento que hizo Juan Rodriguez Cabrillo, navegando por la contra costa del mar del Sur al Norte, in Colección de documentos inéditos relativos á... América y Oceanía, XIV, 165-191. Translation in Bolton, Spanish Explorations in the Southwest, 1542-1706, pp. 3-39.*

⁸¹ Here first applied to the peninsula, except as in the del Castillo map, as noted.

heard on his first voyage in 1493. Here are a few passages from the story:⁸²

The ninth day we came unto a certaine Village of the Nation Orethuisen, betweene ten and eleven of the clocke. And at twelve of the clocke, being come into the middest of the Towne, we came unto the Princes house.... But our Captaine asked the Petie-King of this Nation, how many dayes Journey we yet had to the Amazonas? from whence he receiveth answer; That wee must yet travell one whole moneth, besides that all the Countrie was full of water.⁸³

Prior to the arrival of the party at the village of the Orethuisen, some of its experiences were as follows:

When we had stayed there foure dayes, this pettie King demanded of our Captaine what our purpose was, and whether we would goe? to whom he made this answer, that he sought Gold and Silver. Therefore he gave him a Crowne of Silver weighing a pound and an halfe. He gave him also a plate of Gold of a spanne and an halfe long, and halfe a span broad, and certaine other things made cunningly wrought of Silver, and told our Captaine that he had no more Silver nor Gold: And that these things wherewith he presented him, were the spoiles which in time past he had gotten in war against the Amazonas.

That he made mention of the Amazonas and of their riches, was very pleasing to us to heare. Our Captaine therefore presently demandeth of the King, whether we might come to them by Sea, or by the River, and how much further we had to goe, when wee were to take our journey towards them? whereunto he answered, that we could not goe to them by water but by land, and that in two whole moneths journey.

Thees women the Amazonas, have only one of their pappes, their Husbands come unto them three or four times in the yeere. And if the woman beeing with child by her Husband, bring forth a Male child, she sendeth him home again to his Father, but if it be a Female, she keepeth it with her: and seareth the right pap of it, that it may grow no more, which she doth for this purpose, that they may be more fit to handle their Weapons and Bowes. For they are warlike women, making continuall war with their Enemies. These women inhabit an Iland that is very large, on every side compassed with water, to whom there is no accesse but by Canoas or Boats. The Amazonas have neither Gold nor Silver in this Iland, but they are reported to have great Treasures in the firme land, which the men inhabit.⁸⁴

⁸² *The travels of Hulderike Schnirdel in twentie yeeres space from 1534 to 1554, abbreviated, in Hakluyt Posthumus or Purchas His Pilgrimes* (Glasgow, 1906), XVII, 1-56.

⁸³ *Op. cit.*, p. 35.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 33-34.

Here again expectation was disappointed. The realm vanished when approached, just as all the other reported feminist islands had done. A few villages from which the males were absent for war or the chase were all that appeared of the much-talked-of kingdom of political and militant Amazons.⁸⁵

To sum up: In 1542 a Spaniard wrote down "California" as the name for the peninsula. He did not give it as a newly bestowed term. That writer, Juan Paez, finds it associated with the land past which Cabrillo sailed. Who put it there? That is still unrevealed. But as already suggested, it might have been tossed over from Alarcón's ship. But that the word originally blossomed on the romantic island of Calafia at the stroke of Montalvo's pen, and was transplanted thence to the point of uncertain insularity, seems more than probable. There is such striking proof of the circumstantial kind! For nearly fifty years, an island, characterized by the strange phenomenon of women living contentedly and managing their own affairs, independent of men, an island rich in gold and pearls, had been lying, according to the unwritten maps of tradition, somewhere out in the western sea, just beyond the ken of the explorer at any given moment, but always to be found the next time. Columbus began this series of observations, unconscious that in giving details he was drawing on the lore of the Greek world. Often it was difficult to discriminate between what was previously known and what was fresh knowledge! Peter Martyr, Cortés, and Guzman all successively repeat the tale, the same in essentials as the classic legend, differing only in details. Steadily the *locale* moves westward to waters still unfathomed. From 1493 to 1543, there was an outlook on the watch for it. Magellan's companions heard of it when the West had turned into the East. There the island had a name, *Acoloro* or *Ocoloro*,

⁸⁵ It is still a fruitful subject for discussion as to whether the Europeans simply threw the ancient tale repeated from classical sources upon the western shores and then picked it up again as though it were a fresh growth, or whether there were some basis in fact that something like an Amazonian form of society did exist in the New World. See Georg Friederici, *Die Amazonen Amerikas* (Leipzig, 1910), for further discussion of the subject.

but no one from the *Victoria* set foot on it. That island, too, was hearsay land only. The single definite and concrete description of this floating island was to be read in Montalvo's romance. Very possibly, as already suggested, it was its presence in Book VII of *Amadis de Gaula* that gained a circulation for that volume refused to Book VI.⁸⁶

When Cortés went to Spain in 1527, he was accompanied by many people. If no copies of *Las sergas de Esplandian* had been known in Mexico previous to that year, it is easy to see how the returned travelers would have been especially interested in the romance or how it might have been quoted by the untraveled to prove that they, too, knew something of the New World "at the right hand of the Indies."

But it is not to be implied that the name was applied by men who even dreamed that Calafia's realm had been discovered. The early comers were perfectly well aware that there were no developed riches to be plundered on the brown soil they had reached in the waters of the South Sea. The disappointment of Cortés' men was terrible, the more so because there was so much rivalry involved. We have noted how anxious Alarcón was to prove himself a more careful investigator in strange waters than Ulloa, the "General of the Marqués del Valle." Cortés and his followers had, undoubtedly, talked about what the South Sea was to yield, and this boasted treasure-trove was unalluring to the view, occupied by very low-type Indians—savages who had not risen above the beasts, so little had the region attracted the more civilized tribes. It is just possible that in some one of those numerous dialects spoken on or near the peninsula, some word might have been uttered that sounded a little like the euphonious invention of the novelist. In describing the first approach to Mexico, Díaz del Castillo says: "And they repeated *Culua, culua, Mexico, Mexico!* And we

⁸⁶ See appendix for discussion of this. It may be added that there came a time when the exportation of romantic literature to the Spanish colonies was prohibited by statute. The Spaniards always made an effort to keep the virgin soil of the New World free from criminals and false doctrine. But the prohibition implies the presence of novels in Spanish America.

know no more what *Culua* was than we did *Mexico*.⁸⁷ The strong syllable of *Culua* is not so alien to the *Cal* of *California* that it is impossible to imagine that someone familiar with the latter, upon hearing some term similar to it, might thus conceivably have suggested it. But the point to bear in mind is that, once suggested, the application was probably in derision pure and simple.

Hernán Cortés never used the word, nor did any one in his service. The record of Pedro de Palencia is the best proof of this. The word was in writing in 1542, and in Gómara's history before 1554. Then it appeared somewhat fitfully in histories and records subsequent to that. Francis Drake sailed by Baja California and up the coast which he named "Nova Albion," and knew nothing of the name which was to be permanent. Ten years later, another Englishman was better informed. In the story of Thomas Cavendish's (Candish) capture of the 700-ton vessel "Santa Ana" off the coast of California, thus merrily celebrating Elizabeth's birthday, England had an opportunity of learning where the peninsula was.⁸⁸ This voyage lasted two years (1586-88), while there was open war between England and Spain, and English seamen were free to take from Spanish ships treasure that they had failed to find elsewhere in their cruise.

Between the voyages of Drake and Cavendish, the Spanish Francisco de Gali sailed from Acapulco on March 10, 1582, to the Philippines, returning to the same port in 1584. By that time, maps and historians had probably made the name of California familiar to the sailing world. In the text of his voyage as given in Hakluyt, he mentions: "El Cabo de Sant Lucas, which is the beginning of the lande of California... being five hundred leagues distant from Cape Mendocino."⁸⁹

⁸⁷ Díaz del Castillo, *The True History*, I, 128. In the first edition, the word is *Culchua*.

⁸⁸ *The admirable and prosperous Voyage of the worshipfull Master Thomas Candish*, Hakluyt, III, 803-824.

⁸⁹ *The true and perfect description of a voyage performed and done by Francisco de Gualle*, Hakluyt, III, 442-447.

Later, when Sebastian Vizcaíno sailed in his turn from Acapulco, on Sunday, May 2, 1602, commissioned to explore "the harbors and bays of the South Sea as far as Cape Mendocino," the name was common property. This well known voyage was, however, not Vizcaíno's first venture on the waters of the Pacific, and one item of testimony given in connection with his landing on the peninsula of Santa Cruz in 1597 offers a curious piece of evidence in regard to the shadowy location of the Amazons on the Gulf.

Gonzalo de Francia, boatswain of the "Capitana," gives a statement about the expedition, some thirty years later than the event. In the course of his story, he tells how the little fleet, bearing a number of people intended for colonists, "reached the land of the Californias at a recognized place, in front of which there is an island." Vizcaíno went on in advance and sent back for Gonzalo's party.⁹⁰ All, colonists and others, were ordered to reëmbark and proceed farther in quest of a better port and better Indians:

Ten leagues from this bay (the place where the "Capitana" had first anchored), we found a large port called the port of La Paz because peaceable Indians came out to see us there—[this is the Santa Cruz of the time of Cortés]—and there is an island at the entrance of the mouth which they called the island of women, who live there without any men, who go over to them only in summer on the rafts which they use for communication.⁹¹

Undoubtedly there are other evidences of a vague uncertainty as to whether there was a small island of *California*, just as there was vagueness about whether Santa Cruz were bay, place, or peninsula, and whether "California" were applied to

⁹⁰ The introductory statement of Gonzalo de Francia is: "In the year 1597, when the Count of Monterey was governing New Spain, I went out with Sebastian Vizcaino as boatswain of the flagship, with one large ship and two small ones, etc." The testimony was given May 27, 1629.

⁹¹ Parecer que dió en Méjico á 27. de Mayo de 1629, Gonzalo de Francia, Contramaistre de la Nao Capitana de la armada con que el General Sebastian Vizcaino fué al descubrimiento de las Californias el año de 1602 sobre la importancia de la poblacion de aquellas provincias. In Navarrete, *Collection*, XIX, doc. no. 15. Papeles sobre el descubrimiento de la California causados en el año de 1638. Confrontos en 13 de Febrero de 1794. Vo Bo, Martin Fern de Navarrete. Copied for Mr. Richman in Seville, and used with his kind permission.

that same bay or locality or cape. Nothing connected with the peninsula was sufficiently important to make chroniclers or clerks very accurate in its regard. But by 1600, the name floated over the whole peninsula. Then there came a day when it crept up north, until it crowded out the "Nova Albion" that had been accepted and was never formally dislodged. The maps tell that chapter of the story, though they fail to give an explanation why, in 1622, the whole of the two Californias, from the point of the peninsula to latitude 42°, was unmoored from the continent and appeared as a great island for nearly a century. But the name survived this cosmographical vicissitude.

It was about the time when the peninsula sank into oblivion, into the obscurity that enveloped the long stretch of California—from the time of Vizcaíno to that of the Jesuits—that the romances which cradled its name were declared responsible for the madness of Don Quixote, according to the veracious Cervantes. Pernicious light reading had robbed that good man of his reason, and his friends resolved upon a general destruction of his stores of demoralizing romances. The priest and the barber decided that *Amadis de Gaula* might be spared, but that the virtue of the father should not save the son, Esplandian, any more than the rest of that long line of weak posterity. *Las sergas de Esplandian* is expressly mentioned as obnoxious, and the wonderful episode of Calafia and her realm was sacrificed as rudely by intent as Old Time had done by just proceeding calmly on his way. If the great brown land had not prospered under the name, and thus lived to bear witness to the tale, those "victories" (*sergas*) would never have been thought of again. The thickening mists of a receding past would have hidden Calafia and her California forever, in ruthless oblivion.

APPENDIX A

ETYMOLOGY OF THE WORD "CALIFORNIA"

SURMISES AND USAGE

If it be assumed that the name was taken bodily from *Las sergas de Esplandian*, where did Montalvo find it, and, if he coined it, what were his materials?

Dr. Davidson considers that the Spaniard made up the word from Greek roots. Montalvo claims that he obtained his narrative from one "Gran Maestro Elisabet," a Greek. To bear out this, he invents various words with Greek stems.

1. Calafia is from Καλλι (kalli)—beautiful, and Φίλη (phile), a female friend, or from Καλλιφύης (kalliphues)—of beautiful stature. (The name is introduced seventeen times in the romance.)

2. California is from Κάλλος (kallos)—beauty, or (kalli)—beautiful, and from ὄρνις (ornis)—a bird. "In this island are many griffins... which can be found in no other part of the world." The Queen took 500 of these griffins to assist in the capture of Constantinople. (The name is used ten times.)

Consultation with various Greek scholars possessing knowledge of medieval usages in regard to classical roots did not result in any confirmation of these conjectures. One authority characterized the hypotheses as "moonshine," adding specifically in regard to the second: "I think this is etymologically impossible because of the insertion of the 'f.'"

Professor Reed of the Romance Department, University of Wisconsin, kindly gave the subject careful attention. "I can say nothing final," he wrote, "perhaps nothing final can ever be said. I can only make the following observations:

"The 'f' in California makes it exceedingly unlikely that the Greek 'ornis,' a bird, had anything to do with the formation of the word in the brain of the author of *Las sergas*...

"As to the formation of the fantastic names of the sixteenth century *libros de caballerías*, very little can be said which would have any scientific value. They are made up from every conceivable combination of associations. I quote a few: Gaula, Wales; Vindilisora, Windsor; Tesifante, Tesiphon, Turkey; Norgales, North Wales—all of which have some basis in fact. Such, however, is not always the case. Occasionally some favorite prefix will start a whole list of formations; of this class, I quote a few taken from *Amadis*: Branm, a river of Great Britain; Brananda, a forest of Great Britain; Brandalia, a principality; Brandalisa, a lady; Brandisidel, a knight; Brandcibas, a knight; Brandonio, a man's name; Brandueta, a maid; Branfil, a knight. Here the bond of association is

evidently *bran*, a prefix, just as in other cases it is a suffix, e.g., Aldadan, a giant; Ardan, Baladan, Cildadan, Famongomadan, Caldan, Caradan, Grumedan, Ladadan—all persons in *dan*, etc.... At other times it is a fancy based on some suggestive or easily recognizable word, e.g., Tantaless, not etymologically correct, of course, from Tantalus; Quinorante, equivalent to Queinorante or more correctly "*Que ignorante!*" a man's name; Dragonis, a knight from Dragon; Andadena, a giantess, from *andar*, etc.

"There are half a dozen other favorite endings and prefixes that might be mentioned. I have mentioned the above simply to show that one should be very cautious in turning to Greek for the explanation of words which have some part that might by chance just as well as by design have their elements represented in Greek."

After some further comments, Professor Reed continues:

"It is to be noted that there appear two stems, *cala* and *cali*, in the five words taken from Esplandian—Calafia, California, Califin, Califera, Califerno—although this does not mean that they are by origin different, necessarily. The introduction of any one of these words into the author's mind by any association whatever would legitimately explain all others, and Greek off-hand in 1510 is the last place to turn for the explanation of names in romances of chivalry, which were not written for the learned but for the humble, who, for the most part, could hardly read at all, as appears from Don Quixote, I, 32, but who enjoyed them none the less."

He adds that in general the association between the words was through a "fanciful assonance" with some word or name already familiar. It is in this suggestion of Professor Reed's that I believe lies the clue to the derivation of Calafia and California. It is a clue that Dr. Hale indicated years ago. Both words spring from a fancied resemblance in sound, just as words are invented by any active-minded child. Calafia is nothing more than a female caliph. What more natural appellation for a sovereign queen, an ally to the heathen Turk? From that, "California" was coined without the slightest concern that *ornia* was a free lance etymologically. It sounded plausible. A proof that it had a finished living sound is that it has held its own through many vicissitudes, when less skilfully coined haphazard terms have vanished into oblivion.

There is, however, another possible explanation for the origin of the word "California" which transfers the responsibility of actual invention from the shoulders of Montalvo to that of the unknown author of *La Chanson de Roland*—the great epic of the eleventh century or earlier. When Charles the Great (*Charles li reis*) laments the death of his nephew Roland on the field of Roncevaux, he enumerates the foes who will attack him when they know that the valiant warrior is gone—the Saxons, Hungarians... those of Palerne and of Affrike and those of Califerne."

- 2920 "Mor est mis nies ki tant soleit conquere
Encuntre mei revelerunt li Saisne
2922 Et Hungre et Bugre et tante gent averse,
Romain, Puillain et tuit cil de Palerne
2924 E cil d'Affrike e cil de Califerne;"

In Léon Gautier's modern French version (Tours, 1872, 2 vols., *texte critique accompagné d'une traduction nouvelle*), this reads:

"Il est mort, mon cher neveu, celui qui m'a conquis tant de terres
Et voila que les Saxons vont se revolter contre moi,
Les Hongrois, les Bulgares, et tant d'autres peuples,
Les Romains avec ceux de la Puille et de la Sicile,
Ceux d'Afrique et de Califerne."

M. Gautier makes no comment upon "Califerne" in his copious and learned notes. Other editors either pass over the word in silence or say that it cannot be identified, although it is probably *the calif's domain*.

Geddes (ed. Boston, 1906) adds a map to his edition, but "Califerne" is not on it, the name being given in a short list of the unidentified places.

Here the conjecture is possible that Montalvo had this very country in mind, this calif's heathen land, while the different vowel in the word he actually introduced into his novel was either due to intention, to suit the requirements of the maiden queen's remote island, or to one of the chance misprints not unknown to the modern press. And then the changeling held its footing precariously until it climbed upon the map.

But even if Montalvo had no thoughts of "Califerne" and was just inventing a place where a califa or female caliph was supreme, it is doubtful whether he would have had any etymological qualms of conscience in tacking *ornia* onto the sound of caliph, when he was trying to fit the latest news brought by Columbus into his narrative where greater wonders than Amazons and their islands ran riot. Literary consciences were not tender in those days.

This theory must, or course, be considered as a conjecture. But it seems a plausible and justifiable one. The writers of the sixteenth century who have mentioned "California"—Gómara, Bernal Díaz, Herrera, and others—make no attempt at explanation of the etymology of the word. By the time the seventeenth-century historians began to rewrite the earlier records, all recollections of Calafia and her island had passed away. References to popular novels would not be understood a few decades after their publication. The historians found the work, some used it without comment, some built up theories to explain its existence.

Taking the works mentioned by Dr. Davidson¹ the following passages are noteworthy:

Notiora tamen navigatione nostrae regna regionesque sunt illae... eodem litoris tractu, mare praetenduntur (Orientem versus) California loca... plusquam ad mediam Californiam longitudinem. Eum quidem Mare Vermejum vocant, ad simulacrum nunnullum maris Hadriatici Tyrrhenique; ... aut in effigiem aliquam Arabici sinus... Californiam omnem, in arctum, ac tres in angulos, compellunt (Joannis Bisselli e Societate Jesu, *Argonauticon Americanorum, sive historiae periculorum Petri de Victoriae, ac sociorum ejus, libri XV*, 1647, p. 401).

¹ "The origin and the meaning of the name California," in *Transactions and proceedings of the Geographical Society of the Pacific*, Series II, Vol. VI, Part I (1910), 3-50.

On page 402 Bissel refers to the Gulf of California—California Sinus—and to desert islands. The Jesuit makes no attempt to explain the name.

Contemporary with Bissel was Robert Dudley, who wrote his great work on the secrets of the sea in Italian. In his reference to California, he shows that the period of uncertainty in regard to it had set in.

E per quella via esce il mare Vermio, como novamente scoperto dagli Spagnuoli della nuova Spagna. Comincia il detto mare con il capo santa Clara della California, come di sopra, e passa per l'isola nominata de Giganti, & esce nel mare Settentrionale, in gr. 43 di latitudine per il regno di Coronado, e fa che la California sia isola con l'America Maestrale e non terra ferma, come racconta il detto Jansonio nella sua Carta; Con il qual avvertimento si termina questo Libro sesto, & ultimo.

"...The Vermilion Sea begins at the Cape Santa Clara of California, as shown elsewhere... and this determines that California may be an island off western America and not terra firma, as Jansen states on his chart." Dudley makes no attempt to explain the name (Robert Dudley, *Dell' Arcano del mare, di Roberto Dudleo duca di Northumbria*, Firenze (1630), 1647.)

Next we have the treatise of a learned professor of Guelderland, George Horn, who takes his *amice lector* into his confidence in a friendly way as he explains how he is about to discuss the origin of native Americans. Horn believes that the American Indians came from Asia, and he does not hesitate to give derivations to corroborate this theory. Thus does he describe Korea:

Corai Sinensibus, *Corassi* Japoniis, Caoli indigenis, Paulo Veneto *Caolis*, longitudinis centum, latitudinis sexaginta milliarum insula.

Qua Asiam respicit, ingenti trium milliarum flumine a Cataia abscinditur, caetera Oceanus ambit. Et quia flumen non fretum inter eam ac Cataiam jacet, hinc Paulus Venetus & alii peninsulam & Asiae continentum faciunt. Hi Coreani primo in Californiam veniunt; quae nomen suum a Caoli habet. Unde brevis in Colimam trajectus, ubi & Caligua; in Xalisco Chacalla, Coringa Provincia prope Chiapolam, et Calos Floridae Provincia late sparsos arguit. In popojan *Cal*, in Peruvia *Chili*.

"These people were the first to come to California, which takes its name from Caoli, etc." The other derivations from the same source may be inferred (*Georgi Horni de originibus Americanis*. Libri quatuor, Hagae Comitum, 1652, chap. VII, p. 242). Horn uses "California" three times in addition to this.

The *Noticia de la California* published by the Jesuit Venegas in 1757 gives credit to Father Kino for proving that California was a peninsula. It says:

The name, then, which is now in use, is the ancient one California, which we find applied to the region since its first discovery. Some use the name in the plural, calling it Las Californias. I think that this arises from the desire to comprehend by this mode of speech that which was thought an island, the largest in the world, and with it the other smaller islands which encircle it on both sides. . . .

I should well like to inform the curious as to the origin and etymology of a name which, both by reason of the peculiarity of its sound, and by the fact that it is associated with real misfortunes and dreamed-of riches, has been made memorable in New Spain and even in Europe. But all that I can say is that, in none of the various languages of the natives have the missionaries found such a name given to the land, nor to any port, bay, or place in it. Neither can I adopt the etymology which some indicate, suggesting that it is a name given by the Spaniards, of whom they affirm that, experiencing extreme heat upon the first expeditions, they named the land California, forming a vocable from the two Latin words *calida* and *fornax*, as if we should say *hornocaliente* (hot oven). I fear that many will not credit our *conquistadores* with so much erudition; and, although Bernal Díaz del Castillo does not deny to Cortés the peculiar distinction among his companions of being a Latin scholar, and even a poet and a bachelor of laws, we do not find that either he or his captains had this style in giving names to their conquests. I judge then, that this name arose from some casual circumstance, as, among others, well could have been that of some of the Indian words being misunderstood by the Spaniards.²

In regard to the other names applied to the land, Venegas mentions "New Albion," and then continues:

The name Islas Carolinas was not given to this country till near a century after, in honor of Charles II of Spain [1665-1700] when, by his order, the conquest of California, then thought to be an island, and the others adjacent, was undertaken by a force equal to the enterprise. . . . The name by which the country is at present known is that of California, an appellation given at the time of its discovery. Some use the name in the plural number, calling it Las Californias.²

James Burney simply rephrases the sentences of Venegas, and has no original suggestion to make except that he adds: "By some, all the northern coast on that side of America has at times been loosely called California."³

The *Narrative* by Captain Beechy of his voyages in the Pacific is no compilation of other men's records, but the account of personal experiences. He visited the mission of San Juan and discussed the name of "California" with the Jesuit priest, Arroyo. He says:

I shall observe first that it was never known why Cortés gave to the bay which he first discovered a name which appears to be composed of the Latin words, *calida* and *fornax*, signifying *heat* and *furnace*; and which was afterwards transferred to the peninsula.

After referring to Venegas and to Burney, Captain Beechy continues:

It was thought in Monterey to have arisen in consequence of a custom which prevails throughout California, of the Indians shutting themselves in ovens until they perspire profusely, as I have already described in speaking of the Temeschal. It is not improbable that the practice

² Miguel Venegas, *Noticia de la California y de su conquista* (Madrid, 1757), I, 1-4.

³ James Burney, *A chronological history of the discoveries in the South Sea or Pacific Ocean* (London, 1803), I, 178.

appeared so singular to Cortés that he applied the name of California as being one in which hot ovens were used for such singular purposes. Padre Arroyo, however, maintained that it was a corruption of *colofon*, which, in the Spanish language, signifies resin, in consequence of the pine trees which yield that material being so numerous. The first settlers, he said, at the sight of these trees would naturally exclaim "Colofon," which by its similarity to "Californo" (in the Catalan dialect, *hot oven*), a more familiar expression, would soon become changed."⁴

Among later references to the derivation of the name worthy of consideration is that of Professor Jules Marcou. He says:

Cortés and his companions, struck with the difference between the dry and burning heat they experienced, compared with the moist and much less oppressive heat of the Mexican *tierra caliente*, first gave to a bay, and afterward extended to the entire country the name of *tierra California*, derived from *calida fornax*, which signifies fiery furnace or hot as an oven. . . . The author who first employed the name of California was Bernardo Díaz del Castillo.⁵

H. H. Bancroft says⁶ that the Californians of 1846, Vallejo and Alvarado, agree that the name came from the words *kali forno* upon authority from Baja California, and meant either a "high hill" or "native land." He further adds that E. D. Guilbert of Copala, Sinaloa, informed him in 1878 that an old Indian of his locality called the peninsula *Tchali-falni-al*, "the sandy land beyond the water."

Thomas E. Selvin, councillor of the Geographical Society of the Pacific, has suggested that this was not an Indian word, but the Indian's pronunciation of "California."

Theodore T. Hittell⁷ says: The first account of California that is found in old records represented it as an island rich in pearls and gold." He carries it back to Cortés' fourth letter—that of October 15, 1524—and thus attaches the peninsula to the legend of the Amazonian realm, but does not refer to Calafia and her definite island.

An anonymous writer, "M. L.," of Fresno, California, makes⁸ the following suggestion: In approaching Loreto (on the eastern coast of the peninsula in latitude 26° 10') he saw snow-white heaps upon a knoll, and asked the guide, "¿Qué cosa es?" "Cal y forno," answered the Indian; when he knew at once the true meaning of the name California, because these white heaps were limekilns, *cal* meaning lime, and *forno* an oven or kiln. He believed that Ulloa, remembering Montalvo's California, accepted the name for the country.

⁴ Beechy, *Narrative of a voyage to the Pacific and Behring's Strait, in the years 1825, 1826, 1827, 1828* (London, 1831), I, 55-56.

⁵ Jules Marcou, "Notes upon the first discoveries of California, and the origin of its name," in *Annual report of the chief of engineers, United States Army, 1878* (Washington, 1878).

⁶ *History of California* (San Francisco, 1884-90), I, 66.

⁷ *History of California* (San Francisco, 1885-97), I, 37.

⁸ *San Francisco Chronicle*, June, 1893.

Dr. Davidson's comment upon the last theory is that there is no proof that the Indians of Lower California built houses of stone and mortar, although Díaz says that the great edifices of Montezuma's city were constructed of *cal y canto*, stone and mortar.

L. Lodain, writing in the *Booklover*, vol. 3, no. 12, May-June, 1902, dismisses the origin of the word in *Esplandian* as an "old yarn." His theory is that California is derived from an Arabic word *kalifat*, a province, which he changes to an Arabic-Spanish compound *kalifon*, a great province. Finally, he declares, *Kalif-ornia* was evolved.

Still another hypothesis is that the word comes from Caliphurnia, Caesar's wife.

APPENDIX B

THE ROMANCE OF AMADIS DE GAULA AND ITS SEQUELS

The authorship, land of origin, and basic sources of the once popular novel, *Amadis de Gaula*, are still fruitful subjects of discussion. For an excellent resumé of theories and literature pertaining to the controversy, see an article entitled "The Amadis question," by G. S. Williams, published in the *Revue hispanique*, Tome XXI (Paris, 1909), 7-167. After an exhaustive consideration of the whole field, the writer states that the evidence is still insufficient to allow definitive conclusions on the disputed points, that is, on most of them. For the one item in connection with "California," as it is found in *Las sergas de Esplandian*, it is sufficient to assume as accepted that the original sources were akin to the cycle of Round Table romances; that they were used in a Portuguese novel consisting of at least three books, attributed to one Lobeira, but not proven to be his; that, although there was, probably, an earlier Spanish version, the Spanish translation made by one Montalvo, *regidor de la noble villa de Medina del Campo*, was the only one to survive; that Montalvo made this translation in the latter part of the fifteenth century. His preface can be definitely dated as written between 1492 and 1504. His Christian name is given variously: Garcírodriguez (edition of Venezia, 1508), Garcíordones (edition of Venezia, 1533), as Garcigutierrez (edition of Sevilla, 1542). Nothing further is known of this Montalvo.

It is further accepted that he translated three books, and wrote the fifth, while the complete authorship of Book IV remains uncertain.

He himself claims no originality for any of the books, only corrections. His statement in his preface is as follows:

And I, desiring that some shadow of memory of me should remain, not daring to set my weak genius to those things with which the wisest of men occupy themselves, wanted to connect it with these latter who have written the lightest and most unsubstantial things, to which they are, through their weakness, most adapted, by correcting these three books of *Amadis* (which through fault of bad writers or composers are read in very corrupt and vicious form), and by translating and emending the fourth book, with the exploits of his son Esplandian, which, until now, has not been seen within the memory of anyone. (Williams, *op. cit.*, p. 7).

There could be no surer proof of the popularity of *Amadis* and of *Esplandian* than the fact that Montalvo had immediately a host of imitators. It is certain that *Las sergas* must have had earlier editions than the known one of 1521, because there was a sixth book of *Amadis*, *Florisando*, published at Salamanca in 1510. One Paez de Ribera claims to be

the author in the second edition, Sevilla, 1526. It is terribly weak stuff, but it proves a market for this type of wares. There were enough readers to keep the novel from going out of print. Book VI, *Lisuarte de Grecia y Perion de Gaula*, has a fresh interest for us, because on its pages Calafia reappears. It was issued between the first and second editions of *Don Florisando*. A copy of 1514 is in the Biblioteca Columbina, as mentioned elsewhere, purchased by Ferdinand Columbus for 135 *maraviglias*. New editions followed each other in 1526, 1539, 1548, 1550, while in 1587 two came out in Zaragoza and one in Lisboa.¹

Were they partially due to Calafia? Who knows? Book VIII, *Lisuarte de Grecia y muerte de Amadis*, apparently went through only the one edition of 1526. Book IX, *Amadis de Grecia* (Burgos, 1535), had a better sale. It was reprinted at Sevilla in 1542, at Medina del Campo in 1564, in Valencia in 1582, in Lisboa in 1596, while yet another copy is preserved which contains neither date nor place of publication.

Book X, *Don Florisel de Niquia*, appeared in 1532 (this shows that *Amadis de Grecia* must have had an earlier edition than that of 1535) at Valladolid in 1546, at Sevilla in 1566, at Lisboa in 1568, at Zaragoza in 1584, and in the same year at Tarragona—six editions in all, from rival publishers.

Book XI, *Rogel de Grecia* (really Part III of Book X), appeared in 1536 and 1546 at Sevilla, and again in 1551 at Salamanca, and in 1566 at Lisboa, while there are two editions without date or place.

Book XI, *Don Florisel de Niquet* (parte cuarta) was issued in two editions at Salamanca in 1551, and at Zaragoza in 1568, other copies being also referred to.

Book XII, *Don Silves de la Selva*, appeared in 1546 and 1549 at Sevilla. The inference from this is that there was an earlier edition of the following item.

Book XIII, *Esfersmundi de Grecia*. This was known to exist in Castilian.

Book XIV of *Amadis* is spoken of as existing in Portuguese.


¹ The known Spanish editions of *Amadis* and *Las sergas* are thirty-two in number, as follows (see Williams, *op. cit.*, pp. 155-167): 1496, edition referred to and not authenticated; 1508, Los quatro libros del virtuoso cavallero Amadis de Gaula (October 30, Zaragoza); 1510, Amadis. Two editions, one at Salamanca and one at Sevilla; 1511, Amadis. Sevilla, mentioned but not found; other editions of 1519, 1521, 1524, 1526, 1531, 1533, 1535, 1545, 1547 (2), 1551, 1552, 1563, 1565, 1574, 1575 (3), 1576, 1580, 1586, 1587, 1589, 1837, 1847, 1857, appeared successively at Salamanca, Zaragoza, Toledo, Sevilla, Venezia, Medina, Louayna, Burgos, Madrid, and Barcelona, some cities fathering more than one edition.

In the "Catalogo de los libros de caballerias" given in the *Biblioteca de autores Españoles*, XL (Madrid, 1857), lxvii, the following editions of *Las sergas* are mentioned, this being entitled *Libro V de Amadis* in all cases: Toledo, 1521; Salamanca, 1525 (†); Burgos, 1526; Sevilla, 1542; Burgos, 1587; Zaragoza, 1587; ———, 1588.

Contemporary with this long tale of *Amadis* sequels is another series, *Los Palmerines*. *Palmerin de Oliva* was published in 1511, and reached nine editions before 1580.

It was followed by *Primaleon*, *Polindo*, *Platir*, *Flotir*, *Palmerin de Inglaterra*, *Eduardos II de Bertania*, and *Don Clarisel de Bertania*, all numbered consecutively II-VII, 1602. There are various other series, all running from 1510 to 1600, issued by different publishers in different cities, and showing conclusively that the public was clamorous for more news of favorite heroes and their descendants.

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